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The alleviation of suffering lies at the core of compassionate end-of-life care, yet 
little is known about the lived experience of suffering. Motivated by a series of 
reports on poor care of older people in hospital, this study addresses suffering 
in older people at the end of life in an acute hospital ward in the United 
Kingdom. Methods were developed from a synthesis of ethnographic fieldwork 
and phenomenological interpretation. 
 
Data were collected using participant observation on an acute care ward for 
older people in a hospital in Northern England, over 186 hours between June 
and August 2015. Data included field notes, documents, photographs and 
informal interviewing. Staff and patient participants were identified using 
theoretical sampling. Data were analysed using a hermeneutic approach 
involving a continuous process of analysis, further data collection, posing of 
problems and questions, and interpretation. This cyclical approach to the data 
enabled the development of interpretive perspectives which could then be 
further explored in the field.  
 
Findings suggested that care for older people was shaped by competing 
ideologies of care and organisational regulatory processes. Particularly when 
there was ambiguity regarding prognosis, there was a tendency for care to 
default to a ‘rescuing’ acute care model. Through exploring the experiences of 
individual patients and placing these in the context of cultures of care, I suggest 
that iatrogenic suffering was a significant concern that often went unrecognised. 
Patient-centred goals must be more focused upon avoidance of iatrogenic 
suffering. Recommendations include innovations in clinical education and 
multiprofessional working.  
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Figure 1: We are the guardians of what we witnessed [Behar 2014] 
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
  
My thesis is concerned with exploring the suffering of older people in hospital 
who are approaching the end of life. I present a study which investigated how 
suffering was experienced and expressed by older people in this setting, and 
critically examined the kinds of social, environmental and interpersonal factors 
that influenced its experience and expression. I investigated this on two levels. 
At the ward level, I examined how the broader cultural and social context 
impacted upon the processes and practices of caring for those who were 
suffering. On an interpersonal level I explored patient experience, through the 
use of sensory ethnography which enabled in-depth observation of suffering 
experiences in context. 
1.1 Background 
 
Recent reports highlight concerns over poor hospital care, particularly for older 
people (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 2011, 2015; Francis 
2013b; Neuberger et al. 2013). Improving the care of people dying in hospital 
was highlighted as a research priority in a recent public consultation (Palliative 
and End of Life Care Priority Setting Partnership, 2015). The government’s 
response to the Francis Report (Department of Health 2014) identified that it 
was imperative that we understand the link between culture and compassionate 
care. This requires us to understand more about the nature of compassion in 
this setting.  
 
The alleged ‘compassion deficit’, seen as contributing to suffering and poor care 
for older people in the health service, has motivated calls for increased 
education on compassion (Willis 2012), values-based recruitment (Francis 
2013a) and regulation and monitoring of compassionate care (Parliamentary 
and Health Service Ombudsman 2011). These three recommendations appear 
to locate the blame for the apparent compassion deficit at the feet of the 
caregivers, particularly nurses.  
 
   2 
The definition of compassion is contested (Van der Cingel 2009; 2011) but for 
the purposes of the current study it was understood to be a response to 
suffering, requiring the recognition of suffering in the first instance, the intention 
to alleviate that suffering, and the ability and resources to respond to that 
suffering with appropriate action (Chochinov 2002; Sinclair et al. 2016). This is 
illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
Figure 2: Compassion conceptualised (adapted from Gilbert 2005; Wilson et al. 2007; Van 
Der Cingel 2009) 
  
Paley (2014) argues that rather than a “failure in compassion”, the findings of 
the Francis Report suggested a “failure to see suffering” emphasising that the 
improvement of individual virtues such as compassion fails to consider the 
“interlocking set of contextual factors that are known to affect social cognition” 
(p1). Suffering is a complex human experience, with no agreed definition 
(Cassell 1998; Wilkinson 2005; Kellehear 2009; Best et al. 2015). Despite this 
lack of conceptual clarity the word suffering is at the core of the World Health 
Organisation’s definition of palliative care (WHO 2010), and is prominent in 
palliative care policy, guidance and literature (for example Department of Health 
2008; National Cancer Peer Review 2012). Furthermore, suffering is cited in the 
literature on assisted dying as the core concern when living with life-limiting 
illness (Hendry et al. 2013).  
In this thesis, I explored the suffering of older people approaching the end of life 
in inpatient hospital wards. My findings suggested that suffering experiences 
were highly variable and demonstrate that there was much to be learned from 
hearing the stories and from witnessing the experiences of those who were 
suffering. It was through this direct contact with such experiences that we may 
Compassion
resources to 
relieve suffering
motivation to 
relieve suffering 
recognition of 
suffering
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be able to interrogate the issue of poor care and understand it in relation to 
some of the experiences of older people in this environment. Through 
understanding suffering, we might make progress towards enhancing 
compassionate care.  
Aims 
 
My aim was to investigate how suffering was experienced and expressed and to 
critically examine the kinds of social, environmental and interpersonal factors 
that influenced suffering. 
Objectives 
 
In order to achieve these aims I set out to: 
1. Explore the context of care in a hospital ward where many patients were 
older people at the end of life 
2. Observe patients in the last months of life and illustrate a range of 
themes representing their suffering experiences 
3. Draw inferences relating to the interface between context and experience 
4. Consider potential applications of findings to enhancement of 
compassionate care 
1.2 Rationale 
First it is necessary to discuss the rationale for choosing to focus on this 
particular demographic group in this particular context. To this end, I consider 
why this research looked at hospital care, why it focused on older people, why it 
narrowed this to those thought to be at the end of life, and why it included 
participants with cognitive or communicative impairment. 
1.2.1 Why Hospital? 
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The Reports described above focused on hospitalised patients. It is perhaps in 
this setting that people are most at risk of poor care, and most distanced from 
their usual resources and sources of support. I also elected to base this 
research in a hospital because this remains the most common place of death 
(NEoLCIN 2011; Murtagh et al. 2012). A significant amount of hospital care 
particularly for older people can be framed as end of life care, if adopting the 
view that this refers to the last year of life as defined in the End of Life Care 
Strategy (Department of Health 2008a). 
Even for those who do not actually die in hospital, a significant proportion of the 
last year of life is likely to be spent in hospital on account of the complications of 
life-limiting disease (Aminoff and Adunsky 2006; Georghiou et al. 2012). Most 
people are admitted to hospital with the intention (from both the patient and the 
professional) to investigate, diagnose or treat a particular condition, even when 
this may be long term and not possible to cure. When in hospital acute needs 
are often prioritised over more subtle aspects of human suffering (Gardiner et 
al. 2013). 
There is variation in organisational culture, regional priorities, demographics 
and technical facilities within and between hospitals. Yet as Van der Geest and 
Finkler observe, hospitals also “reflect and reinforce dominant cultural and 
social processes” (2004, p1995), rendering them important locations in which to 
explore how these processes are played out in the everyday activities taking 
place therein. 
Hospital wards specialising in older people’s medicine typically care for patients 
with a variety of conditions, with differing levels of cognitive impairment, and at 
different points in their illness trajectory from curative to palliative. This clinical 
setting therefore provides a potentially rich source of insight into the lived 
experiences of people who are currently under-represented in the end of life 
care literature, and whose suffering may be less likely to be attended to by staff 
(Bridges et al 2010). 
 
1.2.2 Why Older People? 
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Older people in hospital are a primary focus of current concerns about 
compassionate care (Addicott and Ashton 2010; Brereton et al. 2012; Cornwell 
2012). They are particularly vulnerable to social, spiritual, physical and 
psychological aspects of suffering, informed by a range of factors (Alexopoulos 
2005; Brocklehurst and Laurenson 2008). Many experience the effects of 
multiple clinical conditions and cognitive impairment (Dixon et al. 2015). Further, 
their experiences are shaped by broader social and cultural issues such as 
ageism and, consequently, marginalisation within the healthcare setting 
(Bytheway 1995; Bodner 2009; Thomas and Milligan 2015). 
 
In the UK, the majority of people over 65 die in hospital (NEoLCIN 2010, 2011). 
Even for those who die elsewhere (for example, at home, in a hospice, or in a 
care home) the last year of life is often associated with at least one hospital 
admission (Clark et al. 2014) particularly for people with chronic organ failure 
such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Gadoud and Johnson 2011; 
Murtagh et al. 2012). Often, older people are unable to remain at home at the 
end of life because of a lack of available care, whether from widowhood or 
illness of co-resident or spouse, family members who live away or who are out 
at work, or unavailable or inappropriate social care provision. Older people 
frequently live alone, possibly because of widowhood. Therefore, many older 
people in hospital are there for social care or rehabilitative rather than curative, 
reasons even if at the point of admission there are expectations and hopes for 
something more. In many cases, there is no possibility for active treatment to 
reverse their clinical conditions, hospitals are largely structured around a 
biomedical model of illness and it is known that there are problems in providing 
the social aspects of care in this setting (Brown and Walter 2014). 
 
1.2.3 Why People with Communication Barriers? 
 
The experiences described in this thesis included the stories of some patients 
who were unable to communicate meaningfully using words. This was an 
intentional aspect of the study. Many older people in hospital towards the end-
of-life are likely to experience cognitive impairment, whether through existing 
conditions such as the dementias, or through temporary acute states such as 
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infection-related delirium (Hughes et al. 2005) or the effects of depression, 
which is an under-recognised problem in older people that can profoundly affect 
people’s ability to communicate (Alexopoulos 2005). People with dementia or 
cognitive impairment formed the majority of the subjects of investigations in the 
Francis Report, and yet are significantly under-represented in research. It might 
be argued that this is largely because of pragmatic and ethical challenges in 
recruitment and conduct of relevant and appropriate research. This mismatch 
means that the suffering experiences that are well documented in the literature 
may only have limited relevance to the experiences of those who appear to be 
most at risk of suffering in the last months of their lives. This thesis hopes to 
address this inequality in representation. 
 
The issue of marginalisation is also a concern in acute care settings. People 
unable to communicate are less likely to be able to make their care needs 
known and are less likely to complain about their care. Some may experience 
being avoided by the healthcare team because the condition of their bodies and 
minds engenders a reaction of disgust (Holmes, Perron and O’Byrne 2006; 
Picco et al 2010; Simpson 2012; Consedine et al 2013). It might be argued that 
this may result in distance rather than connection. Furthermore, there are 
concerns that paternalistic attitudes that pervade healthcare systems may lead 
to the needs of older people being assumed, rather than based on authentic 
connection and assessment (Cornwell 2012). 
 
1.2.4 Why End of Life? 
 
People in hospital may encounter specific problems in their last year of life. 
There is often ambiguity about prognosis or the terminal nature of certain 
chronic disease, as well as uncertainty and ambiguity about other aspects of the 
future, including place of care or spiritual needs (Gott et al. 2004; Seymour 
2007; Boston et al 2011; Lee, Froggatt and Simpson 2013). It is a time of life 
when physical illnesses often give rise to difficult symptoms such as pain or 
fatigue, which can be associated with suffering (Cherny et al. 2015).  
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There is some discrepancy between definitions of palliative and end-of-life care 
(see for example Connor 2008; Pastrana et al. 2008; Hui et al. 2014). Palliative 
care seeks to improve “the quality of life of patients and their families facing the 
problem associated with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and 
relief of suffering by means of early identification and impeccable assessment 
and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual” 
(WHO 2010). This definition has been challenged on philosophical grounds by 
Randall and Downie (2006) and will be further discussed in chapter 5. In the 
meantime, I use the term ‘end of life’ as defined in the End of Life Care Strategy 
(DoH 2008) to describe the patient participants in this study. This definition 
refers to care provided in the last year of life although this is not a fixed 
prognosis, but more of an approximation in order to delineate the boundaries of 
care. People may live longer than this with progressive terminal diseases, or 
they may die sooner. Although work is underway to develop prognostic 
indicators (O’Callaghan et al. 2014) this area is not well understood. In order to 
identify those participants who might be in the last year of life, I adopted the 
‘surprise question’ as a catalyst for conversation with the clinical team (Connor 
2008). This involves asking care providers whether they would be surprised if 
an individual were to die in the next twelve months. In the notoriously inaccurate 
field of prognostication, it is thought that this question – given that it relies on 
clinical intuition – is as good as any of the existing, unsubstantiated, prognostic 
indicator tools (Downar et al. 2017)1.  
 
A significant proportion of hospital inpatients are thought to be in the last year of 
life, and the majority of these are over seventy. A prevalence cohort study by 
Clark et al. (2014) identified that of a group of over 10,000 hospital patients, 
around 29% had died within a year of admission to hospital. Unsurprisingly, 
mortality rose sharply with age. Those over 85 were three times as likely to 
have died with the year following discharge as younger patients. Furthermore, 
patients admitted to medical specialities were more likely to have died than 
those admitted for surgery, perhaps reflecting again a demographic whereby 
those patients eligible for surgery are overall a younger and fitter group, 
                                            
1 I consider this issue further in chapter 5 when discussing different approaches to care of the dying 
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whereas older people are more likely to be at the advanced stages of long-term 
progressive illnesses. This study was substantiated by current data supporting 
hospital as the most common place of death for older people in the UK 
(NEoLCIN 2010, 2011). In the region of the UK where this study was 
conducted, 89.9% of people who died in hospital in 2013 had been admitted 
through A&E. In the NHS Trust area in which this research took place there 
were 1794 deaths in the last quarter of 2015, of which 717 (42%) took place in 
that person’s ‘usual’ place of residence (ONS 2015) implying that 58% were in 
another place, likely to have been an acute hospital. 
The last year of life is often characterised by uncertainty as the criteria for 
success of treatment becomes less clear and the risk of iatrogenic harm 
increases. The trajectory of illness may feature multiple fluctuations, some 
(such as in COPD) by severe exacerbations that may lead to people being very 
close to death, followed by full or partial recovery. This lack of predictability in 
the last year of life can be a source of distress both for patients, those important 
to them, and their health and social care professionals. It can also represent a 
time of transition in terms of social roles and spiritual awareness (Best et al 
2015) and is known to be a time of vulnerability to psychological difficulties 
(Abraham et al 2006). 
1.2.5 Section Summary: Why is This Research Needed? 
 
This study addressed the nature of suffering of older people experiencing end of 
life care in hospital; an area which has been largely excluded from current 
research. The essence of enabling a ‘good death’ is for health and social care 
professionals to respond effectively to suffering and to seek its alleviation or 
minimization (George 2009; Cassell and Rich 2010). There is an increasing 
body of literature that suggests that the suffering of older people is frequently 
ignored (Aminoff and Adunsky 2004; Lesho et al. 2009; Krikorian et al 2012). 
The experiences of those who Chapple refers to as the ‘disenfranchised dying’ 
(2010) are under-represented in current research (Sleeman and Murtagh 2014). 
Frequently, people are excluded from research because they are considered 
too vulnerable, ill or unable to participate. This may partially reflect 
methodological challenges, and partially a widely shared perception that dying 
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people should not be burdened by being involved in research (Rhodes and 
Small 2014). This paternalistic approach has recently been challenged, 
recognising that even those with significant burden of illness and disability may 
wish to participate in research to improve care (Gysels, Evans and Higginson 
2012). 
 
Numerous studies have attended to the nature of end of life care in hospital, but 
there is very little research that examines the experiences of dying people 
themselves in the last months of life. Those studies that do consider suffering 
primarily involved patients diagnosed with illnesses such as cancer, in which 
participants had capacity to be interviewed in relation to their experiences, and 
furthermore, in which the last year of life was relatively straightforward to 
identify. Identification of people dying from diseases other than cancer is more 
problematic and presents numerous clinical challenges (Department of Health 
2008a) so it is reasonable to presume this renders this population similarly hard 
to identify for the purposes of research, which may partly account for the lack of 
studies. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Section 1: Development of the Study 
 
Section 1 outlines how the study developed, including the establishment and 
clarification of the philosophical perspectives and how this informed 
development of the methodology. 
In chapter 2 (“The Finger Pointing at the Moon”) I argue that, despite 
methodological and practical challenges, suffering is a valid object of enquiry 
within a social constructionist research paradigm. I outline my epistemological 
and ontological position in relation to the development of a methodology. I 
appraise the potential contributions of anthropology and phenomenology to the 
study of suffering in situ. I consider issues such as intersubjectivity and 
embodied awareness, drawing upon Merleau Ponty’s (1962) phenomenology of 
perception. I then appraise the ethnographic work of Geertz (1973) and 
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consider the contribution of thick description to understanding of ambiguous 
phenomena.  
Chapter 3 (“Embodied Ethnography: A Synthesis”) focuses on reviewing 
studies of end of life care that address aspects of this topic, providing a critical 
overview of their methods as well as summarising their findings. I use this 
review to justify the way in which I take my methodology forward. Next, I 
describe the synthesis of ethnographic and phenomenological perspectives 
which I decided to use as my methodology. The synthesis is framed as an 
embodied ethnography in which the observation is framed through all of the 
senses and is positioned as a device through which to achieve intersubjective 
awareness of the embodied suffering of another.  I describe the elements I 
intended to include in my ethnography: verbatim accounts of informal 
conversations, thick description of body language, embodied experiences, the 
sensory landscape of the field, and reflexivity.  
Section 2: The Ethnography 
 
Section 2 incorporates chapters 4 -7 and consists of the ethnographic account, 
derived from field notes and analysis of documents and photographs. Across 
these chapters I address in turn the environment and culture of care, the 
experiences of participants with whom I spoke, and finally the experiences of 
participants unable to communicate their experiences verbally.  
In chapter 4 (“In the Field”) I describe my observational research method, 
addressing ethical considerations, engagement in the field and my approach to 
fieldwork and data collection. I describe the ward and the broader institutional 
and political context of the study. This is followed by thick descriptions of 
aspects of the ward, including its physical environment and the routines of care 
that typify practice. The intention is to enable the reader to place the 
subsequent ethnography in context, to be able to imagine through the use of 
thick description the everyday experiences of life on the ward.  
In chapter 5 (Rock, Paper, Scissors) the field is described in terms of the 
clinical team and the routines and rituals that shape and inform everyday clinical 
practice. In this chapter I describe how the clinical area was characterised by 
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three ideologies which I term rescue, rehabilitation and release. These 
sometimes align, but at other times they compete or conflict, and this impacts 
on care. Theoretical perspectives of Bourdieu (1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992) are drawn upon to analyse mechanisms of social and cultural capital 
within the health and social care team, and the dominant scripts that 
characterise everyday practices on the ward. 
Chapter 6 (“Here There is Nobody”) introduces the first group of five 
participants. They were patients on the ward during the time of the study. I 
focus on my accounts of their experiences, as I observed them. Each account 
attends to a different aspect of suffering, and although each narrative stands 
alone, there were common themes which I have drawn together in the 
conclusion of chapter 6. This chapter incorporated a significant proportion of 
reflexivity in order to attend to the embodied and intersubjective elements of 
suffering. Although informed by the phenomenological positions outlined in 
earlier chapters, this chapter only minimally draws upon theory. Its aim is to 
present the patient narratives and themes for subsequent discussion in chapter 
8. 
Chapter 7 (“White Knuckles, Tapping Spoons”) introduces a new group of 
six participants – those who were unable to verbally articulate their experiences. 
The shared characteristic of these participants is that they had all been deemed 
to be lacking in mental capacity for the purposes of participating in the study, as 
well as for many of the day-to-day decisions that needed to be made on their 
behalf. For these participants, the ethnography was presented in a different 
way, and greater attention was paid to the embodied expression of suffering. As 
with chapter 6, there is minimal use of theory and the chapter aims to present a 
set of patient narratives, each illustrative of different facets of suffering. 
Section 3: Analysis, Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The final section, chapters 8-10, explores the concept of suffering through a 
pragmatic review of philosophical, literary and clinical perspectives.  
Chapter 8 (The Nature of Suffering) considers how the findings in Chapters 6 
and 7 add to existing understanding of the concept of suffering. This takes the 
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form of a pragmatic literature review, addressing ideas of suffering from 
philosophical, clinical and sociological perspectives, complemented by the 
findings from the previous two chapters. I attest to the nuanced nature of 
suffering illustrated by the participants’ narratives and consider the resonance of 
these stories with what is known about the suffering experience.  
Chapter 9 (Iatrogenic Suffering) examines the context of the narratives in 
more depth, drawing upon Illich’s (1975) notion of iatrogenic harm. I consider 
how a healthcare culture that was defined by risk aversion, efficiency and 
regulation may have contributed to poorer experiences of end of life care in 
older people. In particular, I suggest that in this study, the ward culture 
contributed to particular forms of suffering that go unrecognised, because the 
suffering originated from within the very culture that was attempting to alleviate 
it. I argue that this in part had to do with the comparative power of the 
ideological scripts relating to rescue and rehabilitation within the overall position 
of the health service. Furthermore, the multiple levels of context at play meant 
that even where nurses were in a position to alleviate suffering, the weight of 
the broader sociocultural influences were such that they were unable to do so. 
Therefore, to attempt to shoehorn compassion into care provision at this level 
failed to recognise the influence of these larger powerful processes.  
Finally, chapter 10 (Engaging with Suffering) considers the potential of this 
study to inform education and clinical practice. I make two suggestions that 
arose out of my reflections during the course of this research. Firstly, I reflect on 
my experiences of observing care as a novice researcher, and in particular on 
the depth of insight that becoming an ‘observer’ afforded me in relation to 
patient experience and healthcare practices. My conclusions from this 
experience led me to suggest a potential innovative application of 
anthropological research methods in pre-registration nursing education. I will 
consider the potential utility of observational methods in early clinical 
placements during pre-registration nursing training as a means of enhancing 
insight into suffering experiences, potentially enhancing internal rather than 
external motivations for compassionate care. Secondly, a model for guiding 
multidisciplinary team decision-making in older person’s care is considered, 
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based upon the premise that suffering results from misalignment of goals of 
care within the ideologies discussed in chapter 5.  
1.4 Summary 
 
In this thesis, I addressed three key research questions:  
1. How was suffering expressed and experienced by older people at the 
end of life in hospital? 
2. How do social, environmental and interactional factors appear to impact 
upon experiences of suffering? 
3. What can we learn from this that might inform how we care for older 
people at the end of life?  
These questions were addressed through the use of observational research 
methods, grounded in a constructionist paradigm that locates suffering within 
the social context in which it was experienced. I adapted existing techniques 
and developed a sensory ethnography that enabled the study of embodied 
suffering experiences. Across three findings chapters, I address in turn the 
environment and culture of care, the experiences of participants with whom I 
spoke, and finally the experiences of participants unable to verbally 
communicate their experiences. The ethnographic field notes were rendered 
into themed narratives. In my analysis, I considered how Illich’s notion of 
iatrogenic suffering offers insight into the apparent invisibility of many of the 
forms of suffering that I witnessed, suggesting that much of this suffering was 
created by the environment and delivery of care as well as the social context of 
dying in the UK. In the final chapter, I make recommendations for clinical 
practice and education that relate to my findings.  
There is a real need to understand the experience and contexts of suffering for 
older people, as well as the ways in which the healthcare environment 
contributed to this – either positively or negatively. There are no studies that 
specifically examine suffering in people in the last year of life in the hospital 
setting. Yet suffering is at the core of the philosophy of palliative care, and it is 
broadly recognised that quality of life and patient-centred care require greater 
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understanding of suffering. If more is known about situated influences on 
suffering then this might inform ways to enhance compassionate care. 
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Section 1: Development of the Study 
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Chapter 2: The Finger Pointing at the Moon 
 “Always remember, truth cannot be said, it can be shown. It is a 
finger pointing to the moon. All words are just fingers pointing to 
the moon, but don’t accept the fingers as the moon” (Hsuan Hua 
/ Buddha 1999) 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I outline four foundational premises, and examine each in turn to 
build a methodological argument that informs how the study was designed. I 
consider various epistemological and ontological challenges in researching 
suffering and suggest that despite these challenges, suffering is a valid object of 
inquiry within a social constructionist research paradigm. I appraise the potential 
contributions of anthropology and phenomenology to the study of suffering in 
situ, concluding with a description of ‘embodied ethnography’ which combines 
elements of these approaches. 
 
The opening quote, originally attributed to Buddha in the Sūraṅgamasamādhi 
Sūtra, forms the premise for the present chapter. I aim to explore the nature and 
context of suffering in older people in an acute hospital ward. Suffering is 
subjective and idiosyncratic, complex in its manifestations, socially constructed, 
and contextual. The epistemological challenge confronting this research is to 
ascertain whether it is possible to research other people’s experiences of 
suffering as it manifests in individual and relational behaviour. Inner 
experiences are intrinsically unobservable events, although as this chapter will 
argue it is possible to derive an approach to the study that enables the study of 
proxies to these inner worlds. This chapter outlines a methodological approach 
that is sensitive to these challenges, that recognises the complexity of suffering 
but nonetheless presents a case that it is a plausible object for research. To 
address these, I have been informed by theoretical perspectives drawing on 
anthropology and phenomenology. I defend subjectivity within the overall 
methodology, arguing that it is not possible to research a phenomenon as 
complex as suffering through objective means.  
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Cassell (1999;1991) observes that one cannot know as an outsider what the 
source of a person’s suffering is, since it is intimately related to that individuals’ 
personhood and values. To research suffering implies that suffering is an ‘it’ that 
can be observed. Suffering is not a tangible object as such, so it is necessary to 
discuss the extent to which it can nevertheless be an object of research.  
 
Bourdieu advises that to gain understanding of complex social phenomena, we 
must “learn how to translate highly abstract problems into thoroughly practical 
scientific operations” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p221). An important part 
of this is understanding the relationship between agent and action, subject and 
object, and self and other.  
2.2 Methodological foundations 
 
The methodology assumes the following four premises: 
 
1. Suffering is socially and culturally constructed and interpreted 
2. Suffering is contextual  
3. Suffering is expressed verbally and non-verbally 
4. Recognising suffering relies on intersubjective processes that may 
not  be objectively observed 
 
I now consider each of these in turn and outline how these have informed my 
methodology. 
2.2.1. Suffering is socially and culturally constructed and interpreted 
 
Suffering is socially constructed (Cassell, 1998; Frank, 2001; Kellehear, 2009; 
Kleinman, 1988). This means that the experience, expression and recognition of 
suffering varies between people, places and situations. It is impossible for two 
people to share an identical experience of a particular situation because each 
person brings their own unique history and stock of experiences, alongside their 
socially conditioned beliefs, to each situation. This thesis therefore draws on a 
constructionist epistemology, rejecting positivist ideas that phenomena can be 
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explained using the tenets of natural science. From a positivist perspective, 
evidence consists of objective data (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). 
Positivism rejects metaphysical ideas that speculate about non-observable 
aspects of reality and suggests that in all areas of science from the ‘natural 
sciences’ of physics and mathematics to the social sciences, it is possible to 
proceed from observations to general laws. Further, positivism rejects 
introspection as being likely to distort perceptions. I argue that introspection (in 
the form of reflexivity) is not just inevitable but forms an essential component of 
the study of suffering, for empathy is essential in trying to gain perspective on 
another person’s internal reality.  
 
Social constructionism comprises the following features: (1) realist ontology is 
challenged (2) socially situated interactions create multiple realities (3) social 
interactions serve particular purposes and initiate actions, and (4) 
understanding human relationships involves examining the relationship between 
participants as well as between researcher and participants (Priya 2012). As 
such, no single view of suffering held greater validity over any other, and 
people’s actions in relation to suffering could be understood as intentional.  
Within this paradigm, there is a focus on “interpretation, multiplicity, context, 
depth, and local knowledge” (Ramey and Grubb 2009, p80). Language and 
‘reality’ are linked but are not claimed to be equivalent. It is more the case that 
language reflects aspects of reality.  
Subjectivity and objectivity  
 
Suffering does not manifest in objectively measurable ways. According to 
Schulz et al (2010, p775) there is a clear need to attend to the “scientific study 
of the experience, expression, and interpersonal effects of suffering”. He claims 
that the reason that this is absent from the scientific literature is that we “lack 
good measures of suffering humans”. This need is echoed by Krikorian and 
Román (2014) who claim that “although relief from suffering is essential in 
healthcare and palliative care, few efforts have aimed at defining, 
operationalising, and developing standards for its detection, assessment, and 
relief” (p1). The implication is that if we had valid and reliable measures this 
could inform appropriate interventions to alleviate suffering. There have been 
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extensive efforts within the medical and nursing literature to develop 
assessment tools to screen for, or quantify suffering (see Buchi et al. 2002; 
Aminoff and Adunsky 2004; Beng et al. 2017, plus Krikorian et al (2013) and 
Best (2014) for a review). However, this endeavour has been beset by 
challenges such as the lack of a robust theoretical background to suffering 
(Krikorian and Román 2014).  
All research, regardless of methodology or method, is underpinned by certain 
pragmatic assumptions (Paley 2011). The study of human behaviour and 
emotions presents a number of epistemological challenges, not least of which is 
the disjuncture between subjectivity and objectivity. Whether a researcher is 
observing a health professional or a patient, the object of research is the ‘other’. 
Reporting another person’s experience cannot be objective, as this would 
presume that what people say is a precise reflection of what they experience 
and is presented to the researcher in an unfiltered way. However it is known 
that recalling experiences, particularly difficult ones, involves multiple levels of 
interpretation, selectivity, reconstruction, error and motivations (Scarry 1985). 
There is no such thing as a transparent window into the inner life of another 
being. All is interpretation (Denzin and Lincoln 2011, p24).  
 
This should not pose a problem in research as long as the researcher engages 
in a process of hermeneutic dialogue between self and field (Gadamer et al. 
2004). It is perhaps through looking directly at our assumptions and prejudices 
that we may locate ourselves and gain insight into the choices we make and the 
actions we take. The only ‘truth’ that exists is that which relates to a person’s 
direct experience of their own reality. As soon as this experience is interpreted 
by an observer, it becomes a new truth - that belonging to the observer (which 
may or may not resonate in part with the experienced reality of the sufferer). 
What is important is that the nature of subjective truth is acknowledged, as the 
presence of multiple voices in relation to a single person’s experience of 
suffering is welcomed. There can be no single or empirical truth in relation to the 
experience of another person. There will always be perceptual filtering. The 
experience of suffering can only ever be interpreted, and these interpretations 
are themselves socially constructed and contingent. The suffering experience is 
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subjective; its interpretation by observers is subjective. And yet, it is also 
somehow related to objective structures that can be observed within the field. 
 
This notion intersects with Bourdieu’s theory of habitus which will be 
increasingly drawn upon as the thesis develops. Bourdieu emphasises the 
relationship between objective and cognitive structures through his concept of 
habitus (Bourdieu 1977; 1990). In his theory, humans are neither blind 
automatons that fulfil predetermined structural behaviours based on knowable 
rules; nor are they utterly guided by internal individualistic worlds. This 
epistemological stance challenges ideas of causality by suggesting that there is 
no rigid divide between agent and action. Devereux (1967) considers that it is 
important to analyse the nature of the junction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Mutual understanding of communication between people will only 
ever be partial, and one ought to try and avoid trying to account for this by 
constructing theoretical explanatory structures. The potential tyranny of meta-
narratives and over-theorising is further articulated by Davis (1999) who argues 
that ethnography requires a realist position in order to be able to draw 
appropriate boundaries between observations, beliefs and interpretation.  
 
Clifford Geertz (1973) refers to the value of ‘thick description’ for conveying 
understanding of complex social phenomena to the reader. He describes an 
account of a gesture - a wink, communicated from one boy to another - in which 
the synthesis of “a speck of behaviour” and a “fleck of culture” constructs a 
gesture imbued with meaning that can be imparted from one person to another, 
as eloquently articulated in the following example: 
 
“The object of ethnography: a stratified hierarchy of meaningful 
structures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, 
parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived and 
interpreted, and without which they would not (not even the zero-
form twitches, which, as a cultural category are as much non 
winks as winks are non-twitches) in fact exist, no matter what 
anyone did or didn’t do with his eyelid” (Geertz 1973, p312)  
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This description represents an important transition from objectivity to 
subjectivity, a move from the idea of observer as camera. The crucial difference 
is between accurately capturing the reality of a situation, and adopting a 
nuanced, interpretive approach to observation. Geertz describes that certain 
symbols (such as language, actions or practices) require interpretation in order 
to identify implicit assumptions about their function. For Geertz, all actions relate 
to people’s understandings of the meaning of their actions. Diversity is part of 
the human condition and this is reflected in the multiplicity of interpretations he 
makes available in his account of “winks upon winks”. He suggests that 
participants, as well as researchers, are engaged in ongoing interpretation of 
the ways they engage and act in the world. Thus, Geertz’s ethnography is 
essentially a matter of interpretation of interpretation2.  
Causality 
 
A key question in the study of social interactions is the extent to which 
observable phenomena can be said to be causally linked. Social 
constructionism is opposed to the notion that behaviour is deterministic, or that 
knowledge exists in some abstract form simply ‘awaiting’ discovery. Knowledge 
is understood as being created through a process wherein agents interact with 
one another and with their environments in ways that are purposeful (even if 
this purpose cannot be explicitly known) (Priya 2012). This links with ideas of 
causality. The notion of causality has largely been abandoned in sociological 
research, yet it continues to dominate much healthcare research. Within the 
positivist paradigm that dominates health research, this is generally presumed 
to be plausible; for example, one might postulate a link between consumption of 
saturated fats and the incidence of cardiovascular disease, or a causal 
connection between childhood neglect and attachment problems in later life.  
 
                                            
2 This is at odds with the kinds of universalizing practices described by other ethnographers 
such as Malinowski (eg Malinowski and Young 1979). Epistemological positions on 
ethnographic research still retain something of a schism. Scientific (or neopositivist) 
ethnographies (such as conversational analysis) challenge postcolonial, or narrative 
ethnography. 
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In the process of interpreting suffering it is possible to develop ideas about 
causal links between events and suffering. Taken a step further, it would be 
possible to develop ideas about general rules that could be applied. But this 
approach raises two concerns. Firstly, it risks reduction of a person’s suffering to 
the extent that their individual experiences are negated and simplified. 
Secondly, to search for general predictive rules can mean that unusual, subtle 
or less tangible examples of suffering are omitted in the drive for theoretical 
congruence and the development of some kind of theory of predicting suffering. 
Any causal links suggested by this study are both situational and tentative. 
Although one might observe an event followed by a response or reaction to that 
event, it is not possible to state with confidence that any meaningful process 
can be understood as a result of having observed that relational situation. 
 
Suffering is invariably about something; it connects a person’s present 
experiences with their emotional biography. Yet as an outsider, one can no more 
propose the existence of clear-cut causal links than offer a panacea for the 
suffering experience. So, it may be possible through careful study to offer some 
explanatory perspective as to a person’s experience, but this serves the 
purpose of deepening insight into that experience at a particular place and time, 
and – crucially – through the lens of my own research skills. Another researcher 
studying the phenomenon may derive different explanatory processes to seek 
to understand what they have observed.  
2.2.2. Suffering is contextual 
 
“Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in 
webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be 
those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in 
search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social 
expressions on their surface enigmatical.” (Geertz 1973, p311) 
 
Suffering is best understood in the particular context of the cultural situation in 
which it is experienced. The ‘culture’ under scrutiny in this study is that of the 
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ward; staff, patients and visitors all play a part. Hospital cultures comprise 
multiple sub-cultures which continuously interact and overlap with one another 
(Fox 1979). The ‘macro’ culture of the hospital and the various broader 
influences on its practices seep into the ‘meso’ culture of the ward and the 
‘micro’ cultures of different groups of people and professionals. In turn, these 
micro cultures exert their influence on the shape of practices at the broader 
levels. Patients, too, exert influence over practices, by virtue of the particular 
roles that they adopt, the illness and clinical dilemmas they present, and 
aspects of the relationships they develop with staff during their hospital stay.  
 
Research undertaken in the ‘real world’ requires a flexible approach to 
methodology, drawing on a range of influences to ensure that the research 
question is attended to sensitively. Gray refers to the ‘real world’ as any setting 
in which “human beings come together for communication, relationships, or 
discourse” (2013, p4). Naturalistic studies are most closely associated with 
using observation as the primary method of data collection, and lend 
themselves well to the study of social systems. Social systems constitute: 
 
“manifold, interlaced interrelations of meaning, to the 
indistinguishable, diffuse layers of meaning and the implicit 
horizon of the taken-for-granted, to the limits of what we are able 
to remember and the approximate character of understanding 
the other, and finally to the “paradox of rationality” on the level of 
everyday actions” (Eberle 2010, p136)  
Situated knowledge 
 
The discipline of anthropology - the study of cultures - is the birthplace of 
ethnography. The method has been used to study cultures in situ for many 
decades. It has been defined as:  
 
“an iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through 
the study), drawing on a family of methods, involving direct and 
sustained contact with human agents, within the context of their 
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daily lives (and cultures), watching what happens, listening to 
what is said, asking questions, and producing a richly written 
account that respects the irreducibility of human experience, that 
acknowledges the role of theory as well as the researcher’s own 
role and that views humans as part object/part subject” (O’Reilly 
2005, p3)  
 
In recent years ethnography has become increasingly recognised as having 
potential utility in the study of familiar cultures such as workplaces. There is a 
growing body of literature where ethnography has been used to answer 
questions relating to medical professional education (Becker et al. 1961), 
nursing practices in care of the dying (Costello 2001) and the culture of hospital 
as a place of care for the dying (Porock et al. 2009; Chapple 2010; Chan et al. 
2017).  
 
Ethnographic ‘data’ is predominantly unstructured at the point of collection. 
Fieldwork involves extended periods of time in the setting in which the 
phenomenon of interest takes place. During this time, the researcher 
undertakes detailed observations of people - their behaviour, actions, 
constructions - and a picture is gradually developed through listening, speaking, 
inquiring (Ingold 2014). Through immersion in a culture or situation, the 
researcher produces a written, detailed account of the kinds of practices that 
take place, and interpret, to varying degrees, the significance and meaning of 
these activities.  
 
Despite the heterogeneity of the approach contemporary ethnographers 
generally agree that they produce situated understandings, not absolute 
knowledge (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). They share the method of 
observation as the primary mode of data collection (although here, too, there 
are contested ideas of what comprises ‘observation’ - see Nader 2011). The 
validity of the ethnography is determined by the understanding created in both 
writing and reading it. It offers no more than less than “glimpses and slices” 
(Denzin 1997) of a situation. The utility of ethnography in understanding 
cultures is a product of that fact that “insider and outsider views combine to 
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provide deeper insights than would be possible by the “native” alone. This two-
sided view produces a third dimension that rounds off the ethnographic picture, 
which is a theoretical explanation of the phenomena under study” (Goulding 
2005, p300). 
 
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapters but is introduced now for the purpose of establishing the relationship 
between embodied aspects of the methodology and the situatedness of 
suffering within a sociocultural context (1972; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). 
Bourdieu refers to ‘body hexis’ to describe socially-defined ways in which 
individuals occupy, position and use their bodies within the experiential world 
(Throop and Murphy 2002b). Bodily expression is an outward manifestation of 
habitus, a central concept referring to “internalised set of structures (derived 
from pre-existing external structures) that determine how an individual acts in 
and reacts to the world” (ibid, p186). Hexis is the performative aspects of 
habitus. Through adopting this theoretical lens, observation of nonverbal 
behaviour and signs may offer insight into suffering (in the case of patients) and 
into cultures of care (in the case of ward staff).  
2.2.3. Suffering is expressed verbally and non-verbally 
 
Because suffering is expressed in idiosyncratic ways, the methodology must be 
sensitive to intersubjectivity and interpersonal interaction. Over-reliance on 
words can mean de-emphasising of aspects of experience that are impossible 
to articulate. This has led to a call for embodiment as a valuable paradigm for 
ethnographic research (Csordas 1994). I now consider the contribution of 
Merleau Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and suggest that by taking a 
phenomenological approach to ethnography, Csordas’ concerns regarding 
inchoate aspects of experience can be addressed.  
 
 
Embodiment and Phenomenology 
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Phenomenology is a school of philosophical thought rather than a defined 
approach to research. It originated in the work of Husserl (Duranti 2010) and is 
generally considered to be an approach to the problem of being, rather than a 
means of acquiring knowledge. It is concerned with describing the world rather 
than offering explanations for things. Phenomenology seeks a return to the 
essences of these phenomena (Husserl, transl. Moran 2001). The significance 
of the phenomenological position for the current study is twofold. In the first 
instance, it enables an approach to understanding suffering as an embodied 
and temporal experience in which people’s actions can be understood as 
enactments of intentionality. Second, phenomenology offers insights into how 
conscious experience might be researched. Phenomenology’s contribution 
forms part of the theoretical foundations of the phenomenon of suffering, but 
also the means of engaging with the phenomenon as a subject of research. 
Primarily, I have drawn upon ideas from Maurice Merleau Ponty’s 
‘Phenomenology of Perception’ (1945 / 2013) to investigate how to research 
embodied phenomena, and also how to make sense of the data that is thereby 
produced, as well as how to incorporate my own reflexively embodied 
participation in the research field. 
 
Merleau Ponty’s theory of perception offers a way of conceptualising the 
question of what it is to perceive suffering, how different senses interconnect 
and aid us to make sense of situations. He adopts the view that consciousness 
is embodied. A perception, for Merleau Ponty, is the way in which the body 
immediately grasps the gestalt of what is going on - or failing to. Our perception 
takes place as an irreducible whole. Merleau Ponty contests the idea that 
perception is a process by which the external world is somehow imprinted on 
the subject. According to him, perception is a behaviour effected not by 
consciousness but by the body, but not by the body as a piece of the physical 
world, rather by the body as lived, a living body. Gendlin adapted these ideas to 
describe the embodied nature of intersubjective encounters: 
 
“our bodies sense themselves in living in our situations. Our 
bodies do our living. Our bodies are infraction in the 
environment; they interact as bodies, not just through what 
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comes with the five senses. Our bodies don't lurk in isolation 
behind the five peepholes of perception” (Gendlin 1992, p342) 
 
Throughout life, we acquire a vast store of embodiments, from the instinctive 
rooting of a hungry baby to the lurching dry mouth of a toddler waking from a 
bad dream, to the first flush of desire for another person, or the bliss evoked by 
exquisite music or art. These do not simply occur and dissolve but are 
assimilated into our being in culturally conditioned ways. This repertoire is then 
drawn upon at different times of life when similar experiences are encountered. 
Embodiment is recognised as a key constituent both in Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus (1977) and in Merleau Ponty’s idea of body schema (1945/ 2013). 
Bourdieu suggests that social reality exists twice: “in things and in minds, in 
fields and in habits, outside and inside of agents, and when habits encounters a 
social world of which it is a product, it finds itself as a ‘fish in water’, it does not 
feel the weight of the water, and takes the world about itself for granted” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p216). Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is a network 
of sensory and sociocultural associations. Culture and embodiment are related 
in intimate ways. Consideration of one requires attention to the other. Merleau 
Ponty’s idea of embodiment is linked with his ideas regarding intentionality, and 
he emphasises the body as “being-towards-the-world” (p129) such that its 
expressions are orientated towards some kind of intended action. Thus, the 
experience of being in one’s body and the way one’s body is used to 
communicate are part of the same body schema. 
Observing the nonverbal  
 
A person can convey a great deal about inner experiences through body 
language, posture, expression and gesture. Gesture, body language and verbal 
language are intimately associated with inner experiences (Merleau-Ponty 
1962). Furthermore, emotional states are not “psychic facts hidden at the 
bottom of another’s consciousness” but are modes of behaviour and ways of 
being that can be seen from the outside. These states exist in expression, they 
are not hidden behind them (Merleau Ponty 1971, cited Crossley 2001, p84). 
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Making sense of someone’s inner experience through interpretation of gesture 
and body language is at the core of clinical practice. Lawler defines 'somology' 
to be an essential aspect of nursing, whereby the body is understood as “an 
integration of the object body (the thing) into experience so that it is 
simultaneously an object, a means of experience, a means of expression, a 
manner of presence among other people, and a part of one’s personal identity” 
(2006, p29).  
 
Body language and gesture can be valuable elements of research. Kontos 
considered that people with advanced Alzheimer’s disease are able to interact 
meaningfully with the world, and that this interaction can be interpreted through 
observing nonverbal communication. Her research challenges the idea that 
selfhood is located purely in consciousness, by describing ways in which people 
expressed themselves in pre-reflective action (Kontos and Naglie 2009; Kontos 
2012). Embodied selfhood manifests through appearance, social etiquette, 
caring, dancing and gesture and describes the “complex inter-relationship 
between primordial and social characteristics of the body, all of which reside 
below the threshold of cognition” and which are “grounded in the pre-reflective 
level of experience, and are manifest primarily in corporeal ways” (Kontos 2004, 
p837).  
 
As well as being perceived and expressed through the body, suffering is also 
recognised through the body. The relevance of this to nursing has been 
emphasised by Benner (1994) in her conceptualisation of ‘embodied 
awareness’ and more recently Draper (2014). Further, there is research that has 
explored embodied responses to the experience of seeing another person 
suffering. For example, Benin and Cartwright (2006) observed Disability Studies 
student’s responses to an image of a masked female inpatient in a psychiatric 
institution sitting in a wheelchair. He described observing visible discomfort of 
his students as they averted their eyes and attempted to distract themselves 
from the image. Another study (Hubbard et al. 2002) observed how ten care 
home residents used nonverbal communication. Interestingly they incorporated 
an additional hermeneutic into their design. Both residents and staff were asked 
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about the meanings they ascribed to their nonverbal communication. The study 
highlighted that each nonverbal behaviour could be interpreted in multiple ways.  
 
2.2.4. Recognising suffering is intersubjective  
 
Intersubjectivity refers to the relationship between two or more people and how 
this is articulated through communication, whether verbal or non-verbal. It 
acknowledges the fundamentally social nature of interaction. 
The best way to ask someone about their suffering is evidently to ask them 
directly, but this is not without problems (Cassell 1991). People may not 
recognise their distress as suffering; their comprehension may be beset by 
misconceptions regarding what is meant by suffering; they may not have the 
verbal ability to describe their suffering. If suffering is a threat to wholeness it is 
incumbent on the person observing the suffering to have a sense of what it 
means to that person to be whole before they can truly understand their 
suffering. It is clearly impossible to possess this degree of insight into 
someone’s biographical identities, their history and present predicament, their 
future worries and doubts. We cannot know the ‘whole’ individual, so we cannot 
know the precise shape of this ‘threat to wholeness’. 
I posit that the embodied and idiosyncratic nature of suffering means that efforts 
to make it objectively measurable will always be thwarted. Although suffering 
cannot be directly observed as itself, an observer can make inferences based 
upon observations, interactions, and knowledge, relying on a combination of 
sensory cues including one’s own embodied responses to witnessing the 
suffering person. To explore how this might be done, I now turn to consider the 
role of intersubjectivity. 
 
Intersubjectivity  
 
The idea of the ‘natural attitude’ is an important concept attributed to Husserl 
(Husserl and Moran 2001). He suggested that our everyday experiences of 
   30 
objects and encounters are experienced as quite simply ‘being there’. The 
natural attitude refers to the everyday state that humans are in. Each 
experience will be situated within a wider, largely unconscious web of facts and 
presuppositions that are brought to the situation, which inform just how a 
particular experience impacts on a person in a particular way. The self is never 
experienced as being separate from the world, and the world is never 
experienced as separate from the self. Husserl believed that adopting the 
natural attitude informs reflexivity which can aid in understanding of an 
intersubjective encounter. For Husserl, this possibility lies in being able to link 
consciousness and body to create a “natural, empirical unity by means of which 
consciousness is located in the space and time of nature, and which, in acts of 
‘empathy,’ makes possible reciprocal understanding between animate subjects 
belonging to one world” (Moran and Embree 2004, p143) 
 
Intersubjectivity and intuition are important elements of nursing practice that 
have been attended to in the literature (Gadow 1980; Benner and Tanner 1987; 
Morse et al. 1991). Suffering is not something which can be rationally known. 
For example, we do not really know whether or not a person in a coma is able 
to hear or respond to different stimuli or what the experience of dementia feels 
like, other than through proxy accounts. A few rare narratives of such states by 
people who have experienced certain states such as delirium certainly 
illuminate our insight, but they cannot be said to provide insight into the 
experience itself in terms of how it might affect others. Yet it has been argued 
that we can intuit some common human experiences such as distress, even 
where someone is in a situation that we cannot relate to from our own direct 
experiences. A certain amount of imagination is required if an empathic 
response can be offered.  
 
The expression of suffering is culturally learned in much the same way as the 
expression of pain (Zborowski 1952; Encandela 1993). Suffering will present a 
set of cues, some of which are likely to be socially and culturally conditioned, 
whilst others may be part of what Ekman has described as ‘universal human 
expressions’ that include fear and anger (Ekman 1971, 1992; Russell 1994).  
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Carnevale (2009) argues that a person’s appraisal of suffering is likely to 
incorporate a significant amount of their own emotional sympathetic experience, 
catalysed by the witnessing of another person suffering. In his account of 
einfuehlende Wahr nehmung, or “empathising perception”, Husserl described a 
“lived bodily experience in which a felt sense of the other’s interiority (namely, 
my resonating with the other’s intentionality) is given to me spontaneously, in a 
passive genesis of meaning” (Husserl, cited Churchill 2012, p3). He contrasted 
the way in which it is possible to pass someone on a street and what occurs 
when another person is really met, an up-close process that transcends the 
momentary glance. Heidegger refers to this as Mitbefindlichkeit, a kind of 
involuntary shared attunement consisting of simultaneous recognition, or ‘co-
affectedness’ (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2011).  
 
Hume describes how spectators in an operating theatre become terrified as the 
fear and anxiety of the patient is transmitted directly to them “as in strings 
equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so, all the 
affections readily passed from one person to another, and beget correspondent 
movements in every human creature”. The minds of men are “mirrors to one 
another” (cited in Baillie 2000, p190 ). Ekman (2010) considers that in observing 
suffering, two kinds of empathy are required; cognitive empathy, or perspective-
taking is the ability to consciously imagine aspects of the patients’ suffering, and 
affective empathy is a shared emotional attunement that is often unconscious 
and arises as a result of witnessing suffering in another person. To empathise 
we need to seek to ‘live’ in the other person’s experience, striking a balance 
between passive and detached observation (third-person) and complete 
immersion that would prevent us from disentangling our own emotional 
experiences from theirs (first-person).  
 
Churchill (2012) argues that since first-person perspectives are inaccessible, 
and third- person perspectives risk objectifying and reducing personal 
experiences, we must rely on the resonance created in the interpersonal 
encounter, or second-person space. In clinical practice we move between first, 
second and third-person perspectives, venturing inwards when we identify 
personally with the suffering we witness and moving outwards when we attempt 
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to analyse the situation objectively. For Churchill, simply acknowledging the 
existence of intersubjectivity can bring it into sharper focus as an important 
source of wisdom and insight. He describes the second-person space as living 
intentionality, or feeling-into the life world of the Other. He adds that this 
empathising moment from the second-person perspective is a phenomenon that 
“happens to us all the time, but we do not think about it, because we do not 
always put this moment of perception into words” (p3). Later, he notes that “If 
first person research inquiries make us better aware of the interior perspectives 
and private concerns of both patients and caring professionals, the second 
person perspective is one that can illuminate the ways in which we as observers 
have a direct access to the meaning of others’ experiences without having to go 
through the intermediary of first person reports” (p4).  
 
Observers probably oscillate between second and third person perspectives. At 
times, objectively observable phenomena may indicate the possibility of 
suffering and at other times this requires the use of intuition and imagination. An 
example of observing suffering in the context of this study might look something 
like this: visual or physiological cues (tachypnoea, tachycardia, restlessness) 
are identified as an embodied expression of suffering. In approaching the 
person to ‘feel into’ what is happening, one is simultaneously engaged in 
cognitive interpretation of a complex set of presenting signs. These may give 
rise to an awareness of a sensation of discomfort and restlessness, which is 
then related to previous experience. This alignment of the sensation of 
discomfort is associated with a recognition that it is related to the patient’s 
suffering (Middleton-Green 2015).  
Although intersubjectivity is a potentially powerful means of recognising 
suffering, it is also susceptible to being inaccurate, because it is influenced by 
the observer’s experiences and assumptions, and a host of contextual 
conditions that are not adequately accounted for by Churchill’s position because 
they are likely to act on unconscious levels. Gendlin refers to the ‘felt sense’, a 
vague internal body awareness. He distinguishes this from an emotion, pointing 
out that the latter can usually be easily named (anger, pity, anxiety). A felt sense 
in contrast is “vague and murky” and difficult to articulate (Gendlin 2010, p10). 
He observes how the felt sense often makes itself known in bodily sensations 
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rather than abstract thought. Tantia (2014) explores the idea of embodied 
intuition through in-depth interviews with psychotherapists, in which they 
described intuition with reference to its associated bodily sensations. She 
suggests that clinical intuition is largely derived from non-verbal 
representations, including images, feelings, physical sensations and metaphors. 
Reflexivity 
 
There are increasing calls for the use of reflexivity in researching complex social 
and psychological phenomena. Reflexivity considers the ability of the 
researcher to consider not only the subject/object of the ethnography but also 
the position of the researcher. This includes the environment of the researcher 
and the influence of these conditions on the eventual production of the 
ethnography.  
 
For example Howes (2006) examined the potential for reflexive ethnography to 
make use of the emplaced body in order to research being in social spaces. His 
powerful example of a disabled person navigating a walk to the pub, and worse 
- the negotiation of travelling from the bar to the table of friends with a round of 
drinks without spilling them - leaves the reader acutely aware of the emotional 
and embodied nature of such an experience. Howe suggests that through the 
use of reflexive ethnography it is possible to gain insights into the experiences 
of disabled people through careful observation even if one is not actually 
disabled oneself. A powerful example of reflexive immersion by the researcher 
is provided by Ruth Behar (2014) in describing her anthropological work on 
women in Cuba. She describes the experience of having the “desire to enter 
into the world around you and having no idea how to do it, the fear of observing 
too coldly or too distractedly or too raggedly, the rage of cowardice, the insight 
that is always arriving later, as defiant hindsight, a sense of the utter 
uselessness of writing anything and yet the burning desire to write something” 
(p3). 
 
Multiple interpretations 
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Ethnography is often used to research rites of passage and transitions, such as 
birth, death, coming of age and initiation. The context for this study is the liminal 
place where patients in hospital may be in the last year of life but this cannot be 
known for sure. They therefore constitute a group of people occupying a zone of 
uncertainty, in which there may be transitions in identity, shifts in hopes for the 
future, and re-evaluation of priorities. These kinds of changes do not happen at 
a fixed point in time but are invariably fluid and evolving. It is therefore important 
that studying people’s experiences of suffering this liminal zone is not restricted 
to one point in time. The focus is on patients experiencing, not on patient 
experience. Kleinman’s justification for adoption of anthropological principles 
even when studying topics such as suffering is that although we cannot directly 
access psychological processes, the ability to view the situation from afar - or 
the use of “both lenses” - enables the abstraction of process from the contexts 
of their ethnopsychological meanings (Kleinman, Das and Lock 1997). 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
“[we ask]…such excited questions as whether the real is truly 
real and the true really true” (Geertz 2012, p18) 
“We know much more than we can understand; we are awash in 
the meanings of experience” (Kleinman, in Jackson 1996, p172) 
 
Geertz’s quote above stems from his account of his journey through multiple 
incarnations of anthropology over the course of an illustrious career. His 
reflections in this book, in the twilight of his life (“so where am I now, as the 
millennium approaches me, scythe in hand?”) document the debates that have 
dominated the field. Such issues include whether objectivity is ever possible, to 
what degree an ethnographer should be disinterested, and whether knowledge 
is even possible.  
 
This study required an approach that is sensitive to multiple, nested realities. 
This means tuning in to the observed events in a scaled way, from the 
interpersonal context to wider institutional, organisational and sociocultural 
context. Ethnography concerns itself with the interpretation of cultures, in which 
   35 
meaning is derived from the practices, symbols and interactions that take place 
within that culture. Phenomenology focuses more on lived experiences, 
examining interpersonal realities. Both approaches are important in the current 
study as suffering is both a social and a personal phenomenon. Recent debate 
in contemporary ethnography has begun to consider the impact of cognitive 
science, neuroscience and psychology on the study of culture. In particular, the 
relationship between bodily and emotional processes that formerly constituted a 
gap in social anthropology may be addressed. Human behaviour involves the 
way that people engage sensorially, as well as cognitively, with one another and 
within their social worlds (Frank 1990; Csordas 1994). Ethnographies of 
experience need to be able to incorporate a means of approaching the 
relational and the embodied. People’s experiences of suffering are highly 
personal yet their expression is intersubjective, as is the recognition of one 
person’s suffering by another. It was felt that adopting a phenomenological lens 
would enable an extension of ethnography to include intersubjective and 
embodied experience.  
 
Ethnography and phenomenology are naturally comfortable companions, even 
though they differ in their approach to the subject of study. Both involve taking 
at face values the views of participants but also probing these assumptions to 
examine hidden and contrasting meanings. In ethnography, research 
concentrates on the descriptions that people give of their routines, and the 
ethnographer typically examines a number of perspectives of the same 
phenomenon at the same time. Meaning is assigned to phenomena according 
to cultural interpretation by participants. An interpretive phenomenology, in 
contrast, examines the chosen phenomenon in relation to hidden meanings that 
may be concealed in the participant narrative. Phenomenology aims to return to 
embodied, experiential meanings in order to produce a “fresh, complex, rich 
description of a phenomenon as it is concretely lived” (Finlay 2009, p6). A 
phenomenological account of suffering aims to find out more about shared 
meanings of patients’ experiences and of the caring practices on the ward.  
 
Adopting phenomenological positions in anthropology is not a new approach 
(see for example the work of (Jackson 1996; Katz and Csordas 2003; Ram and 
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Houston 2015). In health research, it has been suggested that a 
phenomenological approach is coherent within the epistemological framework 
of ethnography (Maggs-Rapport 2000) and can provide useful depth and 
triangulation of data, as in a study of care provided by district nurses (Rapport 
and Maggs 1997) in which interpretive phenomenological interviews with district 
nurses were supplemented by ethnographically-informed observations. This 
technique has been replicated more recently (Walshe and Luker 2010) although 
the latter was from within a realist framework. Nevertheless, both studies agree 
that combining phenomenological accounts of lived experience deepen and 
broaden ethnography, whilst ethnography provides a context for the stories that 
is embedded in the everyday practices within a particular environment. 
 
A synthesis of methodologies also avoids some of the objections to each 
approach in isolation, as long as there is epistemological commensurability, 
particularly in research that crosses disciplinary boundaries (Chamberlain 
2000). Critics of traditional ethnography have pointed out that in describing 
shared practices within a culture (the ‘emic’ view) the individual can be rendered 
invisible (the ‘etic’ view) unless there is a robust theoretical foundation (Wolcott 
1999). Kleinman (1988) criticises the tendency in medical anthropology to 
create cultural archetypes and generalisations out of the uncertain details of a 
person’s illness narrative, arguing that cultural representation is just one of 
many lenses through which lived experience of illness can be explored. Just as 
medicine can reduce suffering to a biomedical model of pain or other physical 
pathophysiological state, so too can anthropology be reductive in its analysis. 
Conversely, critics of phenomenological studies identify that a failure to consider 
context can create an illusion of individuals and their relationships as existing in 
some kind of vacuum, representing a bias towards Western notions of the 
primacy of autonomy and the individual.  
 
The contribution of phenomenology to the current study broadens out 
anthropology’s concern with the social and the cultural to consider the sensate 
and the temporal. As with anthropology, phenomenology is more concerned 
with description than explanation, and with reconstruction of a plausible and 
believable world that can communicate something to the reader. Further, 
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through continuing careful attention to the lived experience of the individual, the 
phenomenological lens prevents recourse to grand theories. The ethnographic 
method is enriched by incorporating philosophical principles of phenomenology 
producing a method that attends both to the macro context of culture and the 
meso- and micro- contexts of embodiment, relationality and lived experience - 
all of which are necessary components of studying suffering.  
 
In this chapter I have outlined the theoretical foundation for the study, 
recognising the subjectivity of the experience, expression and recognition of 
suffering. I have rejected research within the positivist tradition and argued for a 
nuanced, social constructionist approach to the topic, informed by the principles 
of ethnographic method and a phenomenological approach. I argue that this 
particular synthesis enables both attention to the embodied and idiosyncratic 
nature of suffering, and to the broader social and cultural context in which 
suffering takes place, both of which I argue are indispensable if this study is to 
address the topic holistically. My methodology was a synthesis of interpretive, 
phenomenological and reflexive ethnography, which will subsequently be 
referred to as ‘embodied ethnography’. In the next chapter I undertake a 
literature review of ethnographic methods, then go on to describe how I 
developed the study design. 
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Chapter 3: Embodied Ethnography 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In section 3.2 I provide a brief, critical overview of observational studies that 
have been used to study end-of-life care in hospitals, and/or suffering. I restrict 
this to observational studies on the basis that I have already established the 
limitations of other research methods for this topic, and to ensure a pragmatic 
and coherent review. This literature has informed what is currently known about 
the context of end-of-life care in hospital, but is largely restricted to studying the 
practices of healthcare professionals. Much less addressed are the lived 
experiences of patients. Furthermore, very little research has been conducted 
on suffering as the primary object of research from this perspective. This gap 
provides justification for the current project. Section 3.3 outlines the study’s 
design as an embodied ethnography; a synthesis of ethnographic method and 
phenomenological perspectives. I then describe my method in detail.  
3.2 Ethnographic studies of hospitals and end-of-life care 
 
Studies exploring end-of-life care in hospital environments were located by 
reviewing the research literature in key databases (CINAHL, Medline, PsychInfo 
and EMBASE) using the following key words: ‘ethnography’ ‘hospital’, ‘end-of-
life care’, ‘older people’ and ‘suffering’. Synonyms for these terms were also 
used, including ‘palliative’, ‘observational studies’, ‘acute care’, ‘geriatric’. 
Searches utilised combinations of terms using AND and OR in order to expand 
and refine this list.  Additional literature was identified by engaging with current 
research projects via ResearchGate, by engaging with academic colleagues via 
Twitter and by exploring bibliographies of key texts.  
 
Observational methods have been used to investigate a range of aspects of 
end-of-life care and hospitals, although it remains a relatively under-utilised 
method compared to interviews and survey-based approaches (Walshe et al 
2012). Numerous studies have explored the phenomenon of dying in 
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contemporary Western hospitals. Renee Fox (1959) undertook a hospital 
ethnography over a three-year period on a ward in a United States hospital; her 
work was later published as a book “Experiment Perilous”. She was concerned 
with how sociocultural factors influence medical practice and research. The 
‘perilous’ experiment she refers to in the title of the book speaks of the ethical 
dilemmas and difficult emotions that arose in the course of her study, in 
particular those which related to suffering, dying and uncertainty in the context 
of living with advancing chronic organ failure3. Fox’s work was one of the first to 
refer specifically to how death and dying were managed in the day-to-day 
practices of a hospital ward; she identified how it constitutes a disruption to the 
ordinary and that the staff have developed ways to routinise practices in such a 
way as to normalise and contain the difficult aspects of dying. 
 
Glaser and Strauss’ (1966) influential study of end-of-life care involved 
observations across three hospitals in the United States to find out how 
Americans die. They were interested in ‘contexts of action’ and focused on the 
dying process rather than death itself. Their work added weight to the argument 
that broader societal perspectives on dying influence the structure of care in 
hospital. Rather than being removed from broader society, hospitals reflect and 
sustain societal values. They identified that different contexts of awareness of 
dying shaped subsequent decisions and care. Their study did not explicitly seek 
to address suffering, and indeed the word is mentioned just six times in their 
book “Awareness of Dying” (1966) in the following contexts: 
 
1. “snowing patient under to reduce his suffering” (p40) 
2. “enactment of pretence becomes harder when “increasing pain or suffering” 
grow” (p75) 
3. “surrender justifiable when suffering is intense and the battle for life almost 
hopeless” (p84) 
4. “reassurances given to patients that their disease does not entail great 
suffering” (p100) 
5. “quotes a nurse as saying, “we can’t relieve her pain, everybody wants her to 
die for her sake, meaning her suffering, we can’t even help her”” (p215) 
6. “patient is “suffering from excruciating pain”” (p231) 
                                            
3 I discuss Fox’s work further in chapter 5. 
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Sudnow (1966) described the professional management of death in hospitals. 
His study of operational procedures surrounding death further enabled 
examination of the particular difference between clinical and social death in the 
hospital organisation, whereby the former refers to what happens to the 
physical and biological body and the latter describes the process of losing one’s 
role and identity as death approaches. 
Rituals relating to end-of-life care have also been addressed in ethnographic 
work. Wolf (1988) postulated that some nursing rituals are perceived to be 
sacred (such as laying out the dead), whilst others are profane (such as nursing 
handover). The hospital is described as imbued with quasi-religious qualities 
and Wolf describes the process of socialisation of nurses in relation to these 
rituals, hypothesising that they appear to serve as strategies for staff to manage 
the emotional sequelae of caring for the dying and the dead.  
 
Mills et al (1994) undertook non-participant observation of care of dying patients 
across 13 wards in four Scottish hospitals. Their study included 50 patients and 
150 nurses. Theirs was an account of differences between reported and actual 
care, and they identified the use by staff of distancing and isolation of patients 
that increased as death approached 4Allen’s (1996) doctoral study, an 
ethnography of a surgical and a medical ward in a UK hospital, explored 
boundaries in nursing work in hospitals. The study referred only in passing to 
end-of-life care but is mentioned here because it addresses a range of relevant 
subjects including the impact of body work, inter-occupational boundaries, and 
the influence of policy on practice.  
 
The idea of a ‘good death’ was explored in Seymour’s (2001) ethnography of 
the management of dying on an intensive care unit. She observed the struggle 
faced by nurses in trying to obtain a balance between stopping active treatment 
and arriving at a shared agreement that the patient is actively dying. This 
process entailed a shift from body work to emotion work, as nursing care came 
                                            
4 Their paper reported on observations conducted in 1983 but that remained unpublished until 1994 
because of the death of one of the authors.  
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to be recast in spiritual and comfort terms rather than biomedical, once this 
transition had taken place. The emotional labour of nursing - a phenomenon 
widely addressed in the nursing literature - was a significant factor in these 
struggles, according to Seymour.  
 
Costello (2001) explored the experiences of dying and death on an elderly ward 
in a UK hospital, identifying a lack of emotional engagement with patients about 
the issues that were facing them. His study specifically focused upon practices 
of nurses, with observations being used in the development of a semi-structured 
interview schedule and analysed using a modified Grounded Theory approach. 
In this regard, the study was not strictly speaking an ethnography but has been 
included here because of its focus on people dying in hospitals. He was 
interested to find out how doctors and nurses develop and maintain disclosure 
norms, and how ward cultural practices influence nursing care. He identified a 
range of obstacles to effective care, most of which related to difficulties in 
communication. He found that care was often characterised by a lack of 
emotional engagement with patients, coupled with institutional non-disclosure of 
honest information about death and dying. He reported that when interviewed, 
nurses described their work in terms of holistic care, incorporating psychological 
and spiritual care, but that when they were observed they attended primarily to 
physical needs. His study also highlighted the influence of power relations 
between nurses and doctors on the negotiated priorities of care, portraying 
patients as relatively voiceless in this process. Costello’s study provides 
important insight into the context of care for the current study although since it 
focused only on nursing practices it omitted the influence and impact of the 
multiprofessional team. Further, it did not explore in detail the experiences of 
the patients individually, focusing rather on the nursing practices that defined 
end of life care.  
 
Chapple (2010) undertook an extended ethnography of two hospitals in the 
United States. Her study suggested that the geographical layout of hospital 
wards, combined with the biomedical ideologies that shape care, means that for 
those people who die in hospital privacy is often compromised. Further, 
decisions in care can be confused because care of the dying is delivered 
   42 
alongside care of the recovering. Kaufman’s (2005) investigation of end of life 
care in hospital examined ways in which advancing medical technologies have 
led to a situation in which the boundaries between alive and dead are 
increasingly blurred - a so-called “zone of indistinction” (p62). 
 
A reflexive journal written during an ethnography of palliative and aged care 
environments in Sweden (Edvardsson and Street 2007) was used to examine 
issues of embodiment in healthcare ethnography, highlighting that sensory data 
can supplement and illuminate the experiences of care by patients. This paper 
identified the importance of considering the contribution of the senses to 
ethnography, but was largely reflected upon for the purpose of drawing 
comparisons between the hospital and hospice environment rather than to 
engage on a deeper level with the patients’ lived experience. The sensory 
aspect of the study was an aside, and its main findings have not been reported 
upon in the literature. The impact of the environment on patient care was not 
explored in the paper. 
 
Manderson and Warren’s (2010) ethnography of older people undergoing 
rehabilitation following amputation identifies differences in perceptions between 
the patients and the staff with regards to what constitutes rehabilitation. They 
suggest that a culture of positivity is utilised by staff in order to buffer 
themselves against negativity related to the frequent poor outcomes of 
rehabilitative attempts for this group of patients. 
 
Porock et al (2009b) observed people dying in a British hospital and explored 
the extent to which they were afforded privacy during the dying process, with 
“the final scenes of life played to an audience of strangers” (p11). The study, 
carried out on a single ward in a UK hospital, demonstrated that the public 
nature of dying shaped the behaviour of visitors and staff alike, inhibiting the 
expression of difficult emotions.  
 
Coughlin (2013) observed episodes of care during periods of hospitalisation and 
explored patient and nurses’ perceptions of the key events during these 
periods. By comparing the observed events with the accounts provided by 
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patients and nurses, she was able to demonstrate a discrepancy in perceptions. 
She suggests that patient care may be enhanced by seeking to narrow the gap 
between staff perceptions and patient perceptions through clarification with 
patients and their families. Bergenholtz et al. (2015) explored the culture of 
palliative nursing care in hospital medical wards in Denmark, identifying multiple 
ways in which the ward environment influenced care of the dying. For example, 
the architecture and equipment of the ward was observed to prioritise treatment 
rather than peace and dignity. Transitions to palliative care were found to take 
place relatively late in the illness trajectory. Most recently, a Canadian study 
(Chan et al. 2017) used a focused ethnography to present how the existing 
‘logic of care’ informs a system of prioritisation on hospital wards where people 
who are dying are cared for alongside people who are being actively and 
sometimes aggressively treated. Care of the dying is often afforded a relatively 
low priority within this logic of care as the pressing forces on staff are those that 
save and prolong lives. Other studies have identified that nurses often feel ill-
prepared to care for dying people (Hopkinson, Hallett and Luker 2005; Bloomer 
et al. 2013; Chan et al. 2017). 
 
In comparison to the rich body of ethnographic work on end-of-life care and 
hospitals, few ethnographies attend to suffering. An exception is Kleinman’s 
work examining the experience of pain and suffering across different cultures 
(1981, 1988). By including the voices of people living with different illnesses, he 
produced a rich depiction of context which has been an important influence in 
medical anthropology. Later work extended to explore the idea of social 
suffering within the clinical context (Kleinman et al 1997). His work did not, 
however, extend to examine suffering in people in hospital; nor did it include 
those unable to tell their stories. 
3.2.1 Critique 
 
The overview of studies described above provide valuable insight into the 
context of care for dying people in hospital. However, the review also 
demonstrates that there are some unaddressed issues in this literature to which 
this study can contribute. The first relates to the lack of inclusion of patient 
experience, with some notable exceptions (Glaser and Strauss’s observations 
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of patient and family awareness of dying, for example). The majority describe 
the healthcare practices that shape care of the dying or other hospital practices. 
The experiences of people dying with dementia, for example, are excluded from 
their participants. Secondly, none of the studies address the issue of suffering 
explicitly in the context in which we are interested. The only ethnographic work 
to attend to suffering directly is that of Kleinman, and this has not been in the 
context of hospital care.  
 
3.3 Method 
 
This section describes the design and conduct of the study. I describe and 
reflect upon the extended process of obtaining ethical approval. I then present a 
reflexive account of how the fieldwork and analysis was carried out, including 
some of the influences that became apparent during the process of observation. 
Finally, I consider the issue of quality assurance in ethnographic work and 
describe how potential concerns have been addressed.  
 
3.3.1 Ethics: A Reflection 
 
Before I could conduct my study, I needed to gain ethical approval and research 
governance permissions. The study was granted ethical approval in January 
2015 by Leeds West Research Ethics Committee (REC Ref: 14/YH/0166 IRAS 
ID: 149772, Appendix 1). It was also necessary to obtain approval from the local 
Acute Hospital Trust Research and Knowledge Department, which involved 
submitting a replicate set of data via the IRAS website which centralises all 
NHS research ethics. This protracted and complex process took nine months in 
total and four revisions were required. Many ethical issues and concerns were 
raised by the panel, but in the event, none of the scenarios of concern arose 
during the study. However, there were multiple ethical issues that required 
attention during the course of the study that had not been anticipated by the 
panel, despite the protracted and detailed process of approval.  In Appendix 2, I 
reflect further upon this, suggesting that since NHS Ethics Panels primarily 
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evolved to address risk in biomedical research they do not necessarily address 
the kinds of specific ethical challenges that arise in observational studies5. 
 
Ethics must become capable of taking both local, networked, moral experience 
and universal, transcendent ethical ‘standards' into account (Kleinman 1999, 
p69). Parker (2007) suggests that in failing to pay attention to culture, the 
application of ethical principles to research risks being insensitive to the object 
of research. In identifying that the word ‘suffering’ in the participant information 
literature could itself cause distress (one of several issues I have written about 
in Appendix 2) it could be argued that the panel were themselves influenced by 
the same broader societal concerns identified in the literature review that 
provided the motivation for the study itself; namely, that emotionally salient and 
intangible notions such as suffering are both central to the experience of dying 
people, but also invisible, ignored and feared within the biomedical paradigm.  
 
Kleinman suggests by careful documentation and thick description of the ways 
in which people live in their worlds, any ethical issues that arise can be 
understood in a more nuanced and contextualised way. This does not mean 
that moral ethnography is straightforward in terms of deciding on the ‘right’ 
course of action but it does offer a naturalistic perspective within which people’s 
actions can make sense in relation to their own world view rather than to an 
abstract or universalised ideal. He cites the following example to illustrate this 
point in a semi-fictional anthropological novel, “Return to Laughter”:  
 
Bowen describes her experiences of observing a participant 
“Amara” who was dying in childbirth, and who was being treated 
with a range of magic and ritual interventions. Bowen described 
her frustration and sadness at watching what was about to be 
something she perceived to be a preventable death. Eventually, 
in a burst of emotion, she told the attending healers that if they 
                                            
5 This was presented as a workshop in 2016 with Andrea Capstick, my academic 
supervisor. For more information see 
http://2016.oneverydayethics.co.uk/presenters/andrea-capstick/ 
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wanted her to live they must move her at once to a hospital 
where she could have surgery. She even went so far as to offer 
to arrange the transportation herself. In the event, both the 
participant, her family and the healers declined her offer and 
Amara died. “In silence and bitterness, at nightfall, [she] left.” 
(Bowen 1954, cited p185-185 Kleinman 1999)  
 
I had anticipated situations in which I might have an ethical responsibility to 
intervene and indeed there were several situations in which I did so (these are 
discussed further in chapter 9). The question of whether or not to intervene has 
been addressed in nursing ethnography (Costello 2001) and there is consensus 
that each situation must be appraised in relation to one’s accountability both as 
a researcher but also as a registered nurse.  
 
In Phase 1 which lasted for approximately two weeks, I observed the care 
structures and processes on the ward through working alongside different 
members of the health and social care team. In Phase 2 I spent time with 
individual patients over more prolonged periods of time.  
3.4 The Fieldwork 
3.4.1 Phase 1: Observing the Ward Routine 
 
The purpose of Phase 1 was to gain familiarity with the general ward routine 
and to build rapport with staff. For this I used observation and occasionally 
supported staff in assisting patients with basic activities such as washing and 
eating. For this study, I have named the ward “Bluebell Ward”, and the fictional 
location of the hospital “Canroyd”. 
Participants	
Participants in Phase 1 of the study consisted of every patient, visitor and staff 
member on Bluebell ward during the times when I was observing. As far as 
possible I had made my presence known: through numerous visits to the ward 
prior to the study, by placing leaflets and posters on the nurses’ pods, in the 
doctor’s room and on the staffroom board. I explained in brief the reason for my 
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presence to anyone who seemed to want to know. I did not, however, make a 
point of doing this with everyone on the ward. Practically, this would have been 
impossible and the Ethics Panel were satisfied with an opt-out mechanism, 
whereby all participants were offered the opportunity to opt out of being 
observed, or to request that I delete any data related to observations involving 
them during this first phase of the study. 
Recruitment	
After initial engagement with the gatekeepers (ward sisters, consultants and 
matrons) I arranged a series of visits to meet the staff and appraise them in 
relation to the planned study. These meetings were brief as I had been 
scheduled into the crossover time between early and late shifts. This meant that 
there were more staff on Bluebell Ward than usual, but this was a particularly 
busy time and staff were often called away to attend to something. It also only 
enabled me to engage with the nursing staff (healthcare assistants and 
registered nurses). Having discussed the structure of the MDT6 with the sister, I 
learnt that many of the allied health professionals who were likely to be in 
attendance on the ward were based elsewhere, had responsibilities throughout 
the hospital, and work as part of much larger teams across the patch. In order 
to recruit these participants, and any others who were unaware of the study 
before arriving, I sought them out individually as they arrived on the ward and 
explained my role to them at the earliest opportunity.  
 
In terms of the patients and visitors, I adopted the same approach. When I was 
observing normal everyday care on the ward, I explained my role only if it felt 
relevant, for example in the case of one patient (who subsequently opted out of 
the study) I sensed that my presence sitting on a chair in the corner of the 
shared bay may have been a potential source of distress. I therefore introduced 
myself by name and explained that I was there in the capacity of being a 
researcher, and was spending the week getting used to what all the different 
health professional’s roles were on the ward.  
 
                                            
6 Multidisciplinary Team 
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Consent	
Consenting was a continuous process, not a single event. It was not possible to 
predict particular issues that may arise in the course of the study.  
Information was provided to staff participants in the weeks prior to 
commencement. Posters were displayed with basic information and my contact 
details, as well as dates and times that I would be on the ward to introduce 
myself and answer any questions. These times were scheduled in order to 
make these sessions accessible to staff on early, late and night shifts. 
Information sheets were distributed to all members of the multidisciplinary team, 
one month prior to the study, including an opt-out slip if they did not wish to be 
observed. During the period of observation, at the beginning of each shift, I 
planned to attend the handover meeting in order to remind staff of my presence 
and provide further opportunities for them to opt out of the study.  
 
Staff members, including those who had not signed the opt-out form, were 
made aware that they could ask that observation be stopped at any time; no 
reason was required. For healthcare professionals who were not core staff, for 
example physiotherapists who visit the ward, consent to be observed was 
sought as soon as practical, ideally prior to the episode being observed, but 
where this was not the case immediately afterwards. For this purpose, I held a 
folder of information sheets and opt out forms as it was never possible to predict 
when I would next meet a participant. 
 
For patients, consent was not sought for Phase 1 of the study as they form part 
of the research field and patients or carers were not asked any specific 
information during this phase other than that derived through normal social 
interaction. In addition, no personal patient-related information was gathered 
during this first phase of the study. 
 
3.4.2 Phase 2: In-Depth Case Studies 
 
The purpose of Phase 2 was to explore individual patient’s experiences, 
focusing more specifically on the phenomenon of suffering. 
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Participants	
 
Phase 2 involved an in-depth case study approach in which patients were 
recruited as participants using a purposive approach. By sampling purposively, I 
could seek out diversity in the sample. Given the comparatively brief time in the 
field, it was necessary to obtain a depth of insight into individual experiences, 
requiring extended periods of one-to-one contact. On the other hand, the 
idiosyncratic nature of each patient meant that a smaller number of case studies 
would reveal less in the way of patterns and themes that could be understood in 
a way which could offer something of use in other areas of practice. I therefore 
decided to approach all patients on the ward who I perceived to be potentially in 
the last year of life.	
Inclusion	Criteria	
1. Prognosis: person is thought to be in the last months of life 
 
Patients invited to participate in Phase 2 were those who I considered to be 
potentially in the last months of life. I decided not to purposively seek out those 
patients who I or the staff considered to be suffering as this felt as though it 
would pre-determine what suffering was considered to be. The key criterion was 
that the person was diagnosed with a clinical condition that was no longer 
responsive to curative intervention, and their prognosis was thought to be 
limited to weeks or months rather than years. Prognosticating was not as easy 
as I had anticipated. I was aware from the literature that transitioning from 
curative to palliative care is a challenging problem in clinical care (Gott et al. 
2013; Broom et al. 2015). Potential participants were initially identified through 
listening to nursing handover but because prognosis was rarely explicitly 
discussed at this time it was necessary to make use of clinical experience. If I 
heard staff discussing a patient who sounded as though they may reasonably 
be in the last months of life I would follow this up with questions to further 
clarify, such as their current renal function, recent hospital admissions, other 
illnesses, and the health professional’s own opinion as to whether or not the 
person may be approaching death.  
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Individual patients were identified through conversations with staff and patients. 
Sometimes it was necessary to consult the patient's medical notes in order to 
ascertain whether they met the inclusion criteria. 
 
 
2. Communication and capacity: person may have cognitive impairment or 
other communicative difficulty 
 
Many older patients on hospital wards are unable to communicate verbally. This 
may be a result of cognitive impairment, as in the case of people with advanced 
dementia. Alternatively, it may be a consequence of being seriously ill, when 
levels of consciousness were often reduced. As discussed in chapter 2 my 
chosen method needed to allow for the study of interpersonal encounters 
between people unable to communicate verbally, and those who were caring for 
them. Indeed, those unable to speak constitute a group often omitted from 
research or evaluations; their experiences were often reconstructed through 
research with staff or via proxy voices such as relatives and carers (ONS 2012). 
People with advanced disease are often omitted from research because it is 
considered to be an additional and unnecessary burden (Lee and Kristjanson 
2003). However, it is ethically important to involve people at the end of life in 
research in order to gain more direct understanding of their experiences (Gysels 
et al. 2013) and furthermore, people with advanced disease often express a 
desire to help through participating in research (Gysels, Shipman and Higginson 
2006). I therefore purposively selected some participants who were unable to 
communicate to be part of the case study group. 
Recruitment	
I approached 28 patients identified as meeting the inclusion criteria, from whom 
there were sixteen patients whose direct or consultee consent was obtained. All 
patients who I perceived to be potentially in the last year of life were invited to 
participate. A total of sixteen patients were eventually recruited, utilising direct or 
consultee consent. Although there were more patients probably in the last year 
of life, there were limitations on recruitment because of various reasons: (1) lack 
of capacity and no appropriate consultee, (2) excessive distress, (3) declined to 
   51 
participate, (4) consultee too distressed and (5) staff opinion that recruitment 
was inappropriate. 
 
Consent	
 
Consent issues for this phase relate to both staff and patients. For patients, this 
was carried out in 3 stages: 
 
 1. Assumption of capacity unless otherwise known; assessment of 
mental capacity in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act (Department of 
Health 2005) in relation to understanding requirements of participating in study 
as outlined on Information Sheet.  
 
 2. Providing and explaining to patients with capacity the core 
information about the project in an appropriate way and gaining their written 
informed consent, or where the patient does not have capacity, following an 
appropriate process (see below).  
 
 3. Ensuring relatives were also aware of my role.  
 
Patients able to give consent were provided with information about the study 
and a consent form. For patients without capacity, relatives were approached to 
act as consultees and provide a perspective on whether, in their opinion, the 
patient would have consented if able, in line with current guidance (Department 
of Health 2008b) based on the Mental Capacity Act (HMSO 2005). In one 
instance where no family member was available, a member of the team acted 
as consultee. Staff were provided with the information sheet, numerous 
opportunities (staff meetings and opportunistic conversations) during Phase 1, 
so that consent for Phase 2 was in place by the time it began.  
3.4.3 Method 
 
Between June and September 2015, 186 hours of ward-based observation 
were carried out. Additionally, 18 hours of observations of other hospital activity 
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were conducted, including education sessions and meetings. Observation 
spanned one month for the ward-based study, and a further two months for 
additional visits. Observation took place in blocks of time ranging from one hour 
to 14 hours, and was undertaken at different times of day and night and on 
different days of the week, including weekends. This was to ensure a 
representative range of data and events were included (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 2007). 
3.4.4 Gathering Data 
 
My role was that of a participant-observer (De Munck and Sobo 1998) and at 
times I would assist the healthcare assistants to support patients with basic care 
needs or give out meals and drinks. This enabled an establishment of trust and 
rapport and gave me rapid insight into the activities of my participants (DeWalt 
and DeWalt 2002; LeCompte and Schensul 2010). 
 
The title of ‘data collection’ sat a little uneasily with me. It implied a shopping trip 
or a nature forage of sorts. I never felt as though I were collecting ‘data’. I found 
myself discussing things with people, reflecting on how the environment was 
making me feel, writing down these thoughts, fragments and disconnected 
sparks of ideas. It was in the reconstruction, after each shift, as I sifted through 
these fragments, that I began their reconstruction. It was only in the writing that 
they became intelligible ideas, and these ideas then accompanied me back to 
the field the following day and were further explored, turned over, digested and 
enriched. This didn't feel as though I was merely scooping up something that 
already existed, in some kind of external reality, waiting for me to assemble into 
a thesis. It was an iterative and interpretive approach. Ethnographic ’data’ is not 
something that is passively given up by the field when the latter is interrogated 
by the researcher, yet in terms of research ethics language is treated in much 
the same way as might be applied to a blood or tissue sample, or questionnaire. 
Indeed, a core tenet of ethnographic practice is in the process of mutual 
engagement through which the ethnographic stories are generated. There is an 
ethical imperative that the participants must benefit from their involvement, 
whether through enabling and empowering them to gain a deeper 
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understanding of some phenomenon, or through being able to articulate a 
narrative that may otherwise go unheard.  
 
My field notes consisted ‘brief-but-vivid’ observations (Mason 2002), notes on 
embodied responses and reactions, descriptions of non-verbal communication, 
descriptions of the physical environment, and micro-narratives. For the latter, I 
used a form of shorthand in order to capture the interactions as faithfully as 
possible. Part way through the fieldwork I realised that the data collection could 
be enhanced with photographs, so I sought and was granted a major 
amendment to my ethics approval to permit me to take photographs of spaces 
and objects, no identifiable people or other features were to be included. These 
photographs were authorised with the nurse in charge and any identifiable 
details were amended using iPhoto software. 
Participant observation 
 
The more a field worker knows and is known, the less that field 
worker can avoid joining the action. The other side of this is that 
the less field worker knows and is known, the greater will be that 
field worker's inability to interpret the actions of others, whether 
those actions taken into account or not (Tedlock 1991, p287) 
 
Malinowski (1932) is one of the first to have been credited with the development 
of participant observation. In his study of village life on the Omarkana Trobrian 
Islands he described his morning routine: 
 
“I would get out from under my mosquito net, to find around me 
the village life beginning to stir…As I went on my morning walk 
through the village, I could see intimate details of family life, of 
toilet, cooking, taking of meals; I could see the arrangements for 
the day’s work, people starting on their errands, or groups of 
men and women busy at some manufacturing task” (p7-8) 
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Participant observation provides the lens through which the field is observed. It 
relies on the development of a relationship with participants, and this enables 
investigation of practices at a much deeper level than if they were purely 
observed.  
 
Participant observation is not without challenges in this setting, where true 
‘participation’ as either a professional or a patient is not actually possible. Fox 
described how she was introduced to a newly admitted patient to the ward: 
"This is Miss Fox. She is not a doctor exactly. She is not a patient exactly. But 
she falls somewhere in between" (Fox 1959, p234).  
  
In undertaking participant observation, the first task to be addressed was in the 
establishment of rapport with participants. Once in the field, maintenance of 
relationships required ongoing attention; at times, it can be a case of striking a 
balance between proximity and distance. Too close and one loses perspective 
or takes on emotional attachment to particular people or outcomes; too distant 
and the subtle content of emotive issues may not be visible. Relationships built 
on trust were essential, and it was clear that - although it did diminish over time, 
there was a certain amount of edginess among some staff regarding being 
observed. I was in no doubt that this was related to the extent of the regulation 
and monitoring that they were exposed to on an ongoing basis. The following 
extracts illustrate that despite friendliness and receptivity there were also 
undercurrents of ambivalence relating to my presence: 
 
3:30am, the patients are asleep - or quiet, in any event. A 
healthcare assistant and nurse are looking at a computer screen 
and shopping for handbags. “I hope you're not going to report us 
to Panorama” giggled one of them.  
 
My level of participation was comparatively high at the beginning. I would assist 
staff to help patients wash and dress and carry out other activities. I would give 
out meals and sit with patients while they ate. I would run small errands for staff 
which gave me opportunities to get to know of their relationships with other 
parts of the hospital. As the fieldwork progressed and I began to spend more 
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time with the patient participants, my level of participation reduced and my role 
became one of primarily observing – either by walking alongside staff or patient, 
or sitting by bedsides. 
Walking 
 
In ethnography, it has long been recognised that “walking with others” enables 
the development of empathy and affinity with the participants of the research. In 
this study, I adopted three modes of being in the space. In the first, I did not 
attach myself to any particular participant but would sit in a particular location 
and observe whatever happened. In the second mode of being I walked 
alongside different professionals, either the ordered, regimented round of the 
medics, or the busy morning of “cares”, or the drug round, or accompanying a 
nurse as she responded to a call bell, or alongside a patient for the few who 
were able to walk. In the third mode of being I remained still. I sat near the 
patient's bed - sometimes for up to 6 hours - observing each and every 
interaction that took place. During the time between interactions I would either 
talk with them or simply sit and observe the various sensory experiences that 
this stillness offered. Walking with other people can create a particular insight 
into activities that is related to more than just the pace of the walk (Ingold 2011; 
Pink 2015). Bourdieu considered that the actions of the body reveal ways in 
which the person locates themselves in the world – an embodied habitus that 
becomes inscribed on the body through conditioning (Gale 2010). 
Stillness 
 
As I became accustomed to the staff routine and made the shift into Phase 2 of 
the study, I decided to spend less time walking and more time sitting – alone, 
and with patients. Over the next week, I spent a lot of time on the row of padded 
chairs opposite the “dirty utility” room, from which vantage point I could see 
most of the corridor, although not into any patient rooms. Sometimes I was 
joined by a patient or member of staff for a time. At other points, I asked 
patients whether they would mind if I sat near them for a while. I was greeted 
with a range of responses: bemusement, gratitude, and indifference (from the 
patients), and curiosity, ambivalence and irritation (from staff). But this new way 
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of observing provided me with much more space to observe; when sitting, I 
didn’t need to make decisions about who to follow.  
Researching the Familiar 
 
As a nurse, I already hold a view with regards to the nature of suffering, its 
causes and manifestations, and those facets of the field that might influence 
suffering. My perspectives on illness and health, and how these interface with 
culture, have developed over many years initially through medical training, and 
then nursing training. Over a decade caring for dying people I have heard 
stories about their journeys through healthcare and their hospital experiences. 
As an educator, I have listened to countless stories from my student nurses 
about practice and care of older people in hospitals. However, other than as a 
student myself, I have never worked in the acute care environment, so it is at 
once familiar and unfamiliar.  
 
Much has been written on the experience of being a nurse, undertaking 
research in a familiar context (Cudmore and Sondermeyer 2007). Becoming 
aware of competing agendas between professionals and institutions has led 
some researchers to identify that different aspects of their clinician/researcher 
role came to the fore in different circumstances (Walker 1997, Cudmore 2007). 
Seymour (2000) found her history as an intensive care nurse valuable when 
researching the dying in this setting, because she perceived that it meant she 
did not need to spend extended periods of time familiarising herself with the 
complexities of care in that very technical environment. Cudmore reflects that 
as an emergency nurse, there were challenges in maintaining the required 
distance to undertake research without also acquiring the judgment from 
participants that one is an ‘outsider’, which she considered impaired the level to 
which they were willing to disclose certain aspects of their practices. There is 
consensus in the literature that this brings both benefits and challenges, and 
certainly my experience reflected this. Bluebell Ward7 was at once familiar and 
unfamiliar; caring for chronically ill and dying older people is something in which 
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I have experience, but I have not worked in a ward environment for a decade. 
Further, it is recognised that researching one’s own practice can lead to 
reluctance to portray aspects of negative practice, or a ‘crisis of representation’ 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994) which risks bias in the final write up. However, this 
was mitigated to extent by presenting ongoing findings back to staff from 
Bluebell Ward on an end-of-life care study day held in the hospital and 
organised by one of the consultants. Staff were quick to engage in discussion 
about the challenges of working in this setting and in particular caring for people 
who may be at the end of life and were accepting of poor practices as 
something they were both aware of and had a desire to improve.  
 
Other challenges included the possibility that in trying to identify ‘taken-for-
granted’ practices in the nurses, I (as a nurse) might also take them for granted 
and not notice them. Further, my identity as a palliative care nurse means that I 
have internalised values pertaining to palliative care, just as the nurses on the 
ward have been socialised in acute care. Resisting the temptation to be critical 
often meant reminding myself regularly that this was a different environment of 
care, with different priorities. Other challenges arose included occasionally 
slipping into nurse-mode, for example through adopting a problem-solving 
approach to a patient predicament, or advocating on a patient's behalf when on 
the doctor’s round.  
 
Overall, however, my dual identity as a nurse was a benefit rather than a 
hindrance. It was not necessary, for example, for me to interrogate or interpret 
the multiple uses of acronyms and jargon that constitute the daily talk between 
members of the team. I also did not need to undertake extensive background 
research into the prognostic trajectories of the various diseases I encountered, 
nor the medical records or medications. One nurse commented that she had 
been relieved when she found out I knew about nursing - “I thought I was going 
to have to explain every little thing” she told me. 
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Identifying the Object 
 
The researcher as observer will always be selective; it is possible to filter out 
extraneous information in order to pay attention to that which is considered to 
be most relevant to the task in hand, or most threatening, or most surprising 
(see Kahneman 2012 for more on bias in perception). There is no simple 
solution to this; efforts to minimise bias through the use of reflexivity, bracketing, 
or other devices, are fundamentally flawed. How, for example, might a 
disclosing account of emotions and influences convince a reader that the study 
is free from selectivity? The busy environment of the ward was often a 
seemingly chaotic maelstrom of events. Multiple conversations took place 
simultaneously and there was usually more than one patient who fulfilled my 
inclusion criteria who was amenable to observation at any one time. At times, it 
was difficult to decide where to be. This became easier with time; nursing 
handover at the start of each shift was an opportunity to identify situations 
where there were particular issues arising in relation to patient wellbeing. I 
observed encounters where I knew there were difficult decisions or 
conversations that needed to be had, as these often related to key decisions 
relating to continuing, withdrawing or withholding treatment. This was to 
become a key theme in relation to iatrogenic suffering (see chapter 9).  
 
The field notes reveal multiple decisions that were made in relation to who to 
observe, and illustrate that this decision was made for the following three 
reasons: 
 
1. Pragmatic:  
“The ward is busy as usual. The nurses at Pod 1 are 
preoccupied with the new admission who requires ‘a load of 
things sorting’. I don’t want to get in the way. I walk past room 2 
and there is a woman in a dark blue dressing gown sitting alone 
in the high-backed plastic chair, chin resting in her hands. I go in” 
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2. Ethical:  
“Sheila is crying and calling out. She taps her empty plastic mug 
on the bars at the side of her bed. Sometimes the calling 
increases in volume to a scream, and sometimes this upsets 
other patients and visitors. I imagine it also upsets the staff. But 
when somebody enters her room, she half sits up, her hair wild 
and her hospital gown twisted. She crinkles her eyes to focus 
and see who has come in, and as soon as she recognises 
someone she smiles. I decide to sit with her for a while.” 
 
3. Staff request:  
“I arrived for the night shift, make a cup of tea and walk down to 
Pod 1 to sit and hear handover. I sit with Katie. She tells me 
Cheryl wants to work with me tonight on Pod 3. I am taken 
aback. It is the first time I have received instructions. I don't know 
any of the patients down there and feel a flash of resistance, but 
then reflect that it will give me a chance to see some different 
things, work with a different nurse. I'm also aware that by now I 
know Kirsty and feel comfortable with her, as she does with me. 
Cheryl, I don’t quite have the measure of yet. But we'll see.” 
 
3.4.5 Reflections in the field: Performativity 
 
Goffman (1967, 1971) suggested that the field of social interaction could be 
compared to a theatre, and that people within that field could be compared to 
actors who play a variety of roles according to circumstances. He employed 
principles of dramaturgy and applied them as a lens through which to undertake 
sociological study of everyday interactions in a mental health institution, 
exposing the kinds of social roles and rituals that are played out between 
people (actors) who adopt particular roles in a particular setting, and ways in 
which negotiated processes can be observed in real-life situations. Bauman 
observes that “personal narratives are merely rehearsals of public rhetoric 
designed by the public media to ‘represent subjective truths’” (1992, p86). He is 
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speaking of the inauthenticity of the “alleged authentic self” that is covered up 
by “spectacles of sincerity”. The aspect of his theory which bears relevance to 
the current study is the difference between ‘on-stage’, ‘off-stage’ and 
‘backstage’ performances. On the ward, it was possible to identify examples of 
where and how these contexts of interaction arose. Meaning could be assigned 
to actions through performance - and meaning could also be attributed by the 
audience. 
 
My presence seemed to influence the ways that staff acted - or at least the 
ways that they said they acted. Certain aspects of practice were emphasised in 
my presence, whilst others were de-emphasised. This indicated to me that the 
staff member was conveying to me something of what they felt was important. It 
also hinted at how they conceptualised compassionate care in the aftermath of 
the Francis Report. The scripts seemed to be manifestations of a felt need to 
portray the ward in a good light. Interestingly, this pressure was conveyed most 
keenly by the healthcare support workers and the consultants. The rest of the 
staff participants, such as the nurses and the allied health professionals, more 
readily described the challenges that they perceived. They perhaps viewed the 
research project as a chance for them to describe the complexity of their clinical 
area, which they believe to be misunderstood, and to simultaneously 
demonstrate how hard they work. Alternatively, because we had a shared 
professional background, the ease with which nurses confided in me may have 
been greater than for those from different professions. 
 
Over time in the field more trusting relationships evolved and staff began to 
confide more in me about the true nature of their work and the tensions that 
they felt. This strengthened my sense that those early performances had served 
an important function in terms of this research, in telling me what staff were 
trying to convey to me about the work that they did. I briefly consider two of 
these scripts, using illustrative examples from the fieldwork. 
 
Multiple rules governed daily practices on Bluebell ward. Some of these were 
explicit – such as the requirement for a dying person to be commenced on the 
Care of the Dying Care Plan. Others were subtler, and could only be perceived 
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when a member of staff intentionally or inadvertently broke those rules. The 
culture of an organisation gives its members the sense of stability and order, 
and imparts meaning to their daily actives. Organisational culture refers to the 
“system of assumptions, values, norms and attitudes, manifested through 
symbols, which members of one organisation have developed and adopted 
through mutual experience, and which help them to determine the meaning of 
the world surrounding them and how to behave in it (Janicijevic 2011, p72). 
These rules, and the micro-cultures in which they were adhered to (or not), 
gave rise to particular types of performance.  
“Look	How	Compassionate	We	Are”	
 
I became accustomed to tailoring how I describe my study, according to whom I 
was speaking. As soon as I mentioned the word ‘compassion’ the ward clerk 
described several ways in which care on the ward was compassionate. She 
described their monthly cake sale, to raise funds to buy toiletries for patients 
who come in unaccompanied or who have no visitors. She was at pains to point 
out to me that this was not covered by the NHS, with a tut, and a roll of her 
eyes. She told me how caring the nurses were. She showed me a wall full of 
‘thank you’ cards from relatives.  
 
Healthcare assistants had their own script to show me how compassionate they 
were, as the following excerpt illustrates:  
 
Edith comes in, talking loudly - “your soup for you, because you 
like it, don’t you?"  
Patient: “Can you raise it?”  
E: “I can raise it any way you want”  
Pt: “A bit higher”  
E: “I don’t think it will go any higher”  
Pt: “Oh, it’s okay then”  
E: “Are you sure” 
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E: “Right, then, I’ll leave you to have your dinner”  
(then to me as she leaves, smiling): “Ah, he’s lovely, isn’t he?”  
 
The idea of smiling as indicating compassionate care can be seen in the 
government report “Compassion in Practice: One Year On” which was published 
a year after the Francis Report. “Compassion [the report suggests] is 
represented in many ways including a word, a smile, an act of kindness, or by 
listening to another person. It is an experience in which one person recognises 
and responds to the suffering of another person by giving emotional energy” 
(NHS England / Nursing Directorate 2013, p8). 
 
Glaser and Strauss recognised the existence of ‘emotion work’ in care of the 
dying, but this theory was developed more deeply by Hochschild’s (1979) 
subsequent study of the management of emotions in certain professions. 
Hochschild was influenced here by Goffman, suggesting that emotional labour 
is required of certain professions but that in order to adequately fulfil the role it 
is usually necessary to ‘manage’ this emotion, part of which requires the ability 
to act as though one is feeling an emotion when this may not be the case. All 
that is required, Hochschild suggests, is that the recipient of the emotional 
interaction believes that the emotion is authentic. To this end she describes that 
actors are required to suppress or induce emotions in order to convey what is 
thought to be commensurate with the role. Thus a worker’s smile can be “on 
them but not of them” (Hochschild 1983). Although her work focused on public 
service employees such as airline attendants and debt collectors, her ideas 
have been applied widely within nursing (James 1989, 1992; Kelly et al. 2000; 
and for a review: Badolamenti et al. 2017).  
Hidden	Performance:	Compassionate	Care	
 
Not all staff were at pains to tell me how compassionate they were. Sometimes I 
observed what I would describe as compassionate care; that which was 
conducted without expectation of being observed, which was additional to what 
was required in the list of tasks to be completed, and which was carried out in a 
particular frame of mind. This is perhaps best conveyed in the excerpt below in 
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which Alvar, a new nurse who recently moved to the UK from Portugal, was with 
a dying patient in a side room. The door was closed, and as I entered I 
observed the following:  
 
Her family have gone home and her light has been turned down 
low; I can hear her breath, rasping. Alvar is leant over her; with a 
piece of soft gauze and a plastic tub of warm water he is gently 
and methodically wiping the crusted blood and mucous from her 
nostrils, lips and tongue. She is not responding - her tongue is 
swollen and her eyes bulge. The swelling in her arms has 
worsened and her skin is shiny, mottled, cold. I stand in silence 
and watch. He does not respond to me other than to 
acknowledge my presence with a nod. I sit in silence as he 
continues. Then, some moments later, says “there are two kinds 
of nurses, there are those who spend an extra five minutes after 
the main jobs are done and those who don’t. When my 
grandfather was dying, I noticed this”. He dabs Vaseline on to 
her lips. “When people are old, it’s organic, natural. The body 
starts to fail. It is natural. I could never do paediatrics because 
that is not natural. She is not suffering now”.  
It’s the fourth day of my observations, and the first time I have 
heard the word ‘suffering’ mentioned. I look at the patient, her 
skin smooth and her lips soft again.  
“No”, I agree, “she is not suffering”. 
 
Informal interviews 
I spoke to participants about a range of topics, not just suffering. Interviews 
were usually brief and took place at a range of locations on the ward, by the 
patients' bedside, in the day room, in the kitchen, at the nurses’ station. 
Questions were often catalysed by observations and these interviews would 
often be aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of particular events that had 
been observed. In accordance with Spradley’s (1979) notion of the 
‘ethnographic interview’, questions included a combination of descriptive (for 
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example, “can you explain what you are doing?”), structural (for example, “what 
do you do when patients are admitted?” “What do you like / dislike most about 
your work?”) and contrast (for example, “what’s the difference between how end 
of life care happens for people with cancer and without?”) items. Sometimes 
this involved postulating hypothetical scenarios. Other verbal interaction was 
captured by observing and documenting using a form of shorthand the main 
elements of the conversations.  
Examination of documents, objects and spaces 
Patients' medical and nursing notes were scrutinised in order to build up a 
history of their illness and a sense of their previous involvement with the 
hospital and other services. The notes also served to illuminate the roles of the 
various members of the team and offered insight into what the team considered 
to be the most important elements of the patient picture. Additionally, ward and 
hospital documentation including policies and protocols, displayed guidance, 
posters and publicity were included in the documentary analysis.  
3.4.6 Analysis  
 
Over 200,000 words of field notes were gathered. The sample included 16 
patients, 7 family members and 42 members of staff (see appendices 3 and 4). 
Some of these were detailed descriptions of elements of the environment, 
others were as close to verbatim reproductions of conversations as my 
shorthand would permit. These notes were often brief and rarely consisted of 
full sentences, so it was necessary to reflexively rewrite them after every shift, 
in order not to risk losing their meaning if I returned to them much later. The 
field notes included brief notes, pictures, mind maps. Each note contained the 
time and date and place of the observation, and pseudonyms were allocated 
early on in the study. I recorded in a different colour my reflections and thoughts 
so as to make it clear which notes were descriptions and which were analysis. 
 
Fieldwork involved "active looking, improving memory, informal interviewing, 
writing detailed field notes, and perhaps most importantly, patience" (DeWalt 
and DeWalt 2002, pvii). My field notes formed a record of events observed, but 
they were also an account of my reflections, thoughts that arose in the moment-
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to-moment unfolding of each shift. Sometimes a particular event would trigger a 
thought of some theory or other, and I would jot this down for consultation later 
that day. I also scribbled pictures or diagrams when these were felt to be more 
illustrative than words. I used handwritten notes which were then anonymised 
and entered into EverNoteTM, a piece of software designed for organising notes 
through a system of notes, notebooks, tagging and ordering. 
 
Analysis involved reading and re-reading the notes in both the original form and 
the typed-up version in EverNote. This proved to be a useful device in that all 
the field note entries were searchable by text, which enabled repeated checking 
of fragments. The handwritten notes were also scanned into EverNote, and this 
enabled me to locate sketches and margin notes alongside the core of the 
fieldwork. After this, I collated data in two ways.  
 
Firstly, I identified who were to be my key participants and assigned 
pseudonyms. In Phase 1 this involved members of staff and patients who came 
to be key participants in Phase 2 and observing how their work, and their 
personal and professional beliefs, interfaced with the everyday care practices. 
Examples that supported my theory about ideologies of care, as well as 
examples that illustrated tensions between approaches to care, were drawn 
upon and the findings directed the focus of subsequent enquiry. For example, in 
developing the narratives regarding the ideologies of care I drew heavily on the 
accounts provided by Dr Roberts, Dr Basu, Dr Frank, Rebecca and Kirsty, each 
of whom occupied a particular ideological position in relation to what transpired 
to be a trigger point for conflicts in care planning. In Phase 2 I developed the 
case studies for these key participants. The case study approach enabled me to 
identify important phenomena, in this case, the experience and expression of 
different aspects of suffering. It also enabled an internal logic to the organisation 
of the field work so that the narratives of individual patients could provide 
context to the thesis topic, which might otherwise be at risk of being nebulous 
and undefinable. Finally, the case study approach provided an opportunity for 
tensions and exemplars of the phenomena under investigation.  
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I adopted a hermeneutic approach to analysis, examining my field notes in 
order at the end of each day and typing them into EverNote. ‘Tags’ were applied 
as I went through as ideas arose. Some were ideas of themes, others referred 
to theoretical concepts that arose reflexively during the fieldwork or later, on 
reflection or reading. As well as reading the notes chronologically I searched 
according to tags, or combinations of tags. This was helpful in keeping the 
analysis organised and under control, as there were over 200,000 words 
generated over the course of the fieldwork. In relation to reconstructing the 
individual patient narratives, this enabled me to move from the general to the 
particular and then back again, and helped gain a deeper understanding not 
only of the lived experience of the patients but about the context of the events 
observed. For example, searching by ‘name’ tag alone would give me a set of 
events relating to that patient, but returning to the whole journal entry for that 
particular shift might shed some additional light on the atmosphere at that 
specific time, who was working, what other influencing forces might have been 
at play, other patients whose needs may have impacted on those of the one I 
was reading about, and so on. Tags thus formed categories and relationships, 
and enabled ongoing searches in different ways as the theoretical perspectives 
began to take shape. 
 
Finally, notes were read with a view to looking for what was missing. The most 
obvious missing piece of data related to the absence of the word ‘suffering’ and 
whilst I initially perceived this to be a fault in my design of the research I soon 
came to understand that the absence of the word was a highly significant 
finding in its own right. Suffering was nobody’s job. Lacunae, or missing items, 
can also convey a shared understanding – for example, in saying “he’ll be on a 
syringe driver soon” the implications and reasons were clear. No explanation 
was required.  
 
As with many ethnographic studies, there was no clear distinction between 
gathering and analysing data; much analysis took place during the fieldwork, 
and similarly, I returned to the hospital and the ward after the fieldwork to obtain 
further data such as photographs once the analysis was underway and I 
realised it would add vividity (and reduce word count!) in the findings chapters 
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to include pictures. Similarly, while writing the ethnography I came to realise that 
the process of analysis does not end. I continued to identify new themes and 
relationships between aspects of the fieldwork, right until the end of writing, in 
an ongoing hermeneutic. My approach to this was guided by Spradley’s 
approach to ethnographic analysis (Spradley 1979) involving a series of analytic 
steps which move iteratively from general domain analyses to generate focused 
enquiry, and from the findings of this process to generate taxonomies. In turn, 
these taxonomies lead to further enquiries, followed finally by exploration of 
specific components identified during the fieldwork. The figure below illustrates 
a representation of the process:- 
 
Figure 3: Spradley's analytic steps (Spradley 1979) 
 
3.4.7 Quality 
 
One challenge often faced by ethnographers is that of how to ensure quality in 
what appears at first to be a highly subjective and messy research method. In 
DOMAIN ANALYSIS TAXONOMIC ANALYSIS COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS
prioritisation of tasks
FOCUSED ENQUIRY (returning to 
the field to investigate particular 
issues further)
searching for ways to organise 
domains
ways to distinguish among the terms in 
each domain
Prioritising goals of care perceived utility
family
social capital
cultural capital 
Experienced professional
Risk avoider
Obedient follower
Authoritarian
Temporary and uninvolved
professional socialisation
Doctors
Nurses
Allied health professionals
Specialist vs generalist
Decision deferrer
Rebel
Rebel
Catalyst
symbolic capital
economic capital
Managerial
risk aversion
policy broker
performance
‘ownership; of different kinds of 
patients
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many ways, it is both of these things, yet increasingly within qualitative research 
these attributes are seen as characteristics of the research rather than de facto 
disadvantages.  
Authenticity 
A common concern in ethnography is the issue of generalisability (Atkinson and 
Hammersley 1994). My focus is on a small set of case studies, yet the aim is for 
the findings to be of interest and utility to a wider community of practice. My 
hope is that the ethnography can illustrate something beyond the immediate 
local circumstances.  
 
Unlike many contemporary ethnographies I did not undertake follow-up in-depth 
interviews. This decision was made for two main reasons.  
 
1. Patients were generally too unwell 
2. I did not believe that interview data in relation the staff’s recognition of 
suffering would necessarily add to my research question - I imagined it would 
simply tell me what people thought they did in practice, and perhaps add to an 
already well-established body of literature relating to staff attitudes to caring for 
the very ill and the dying 
 
This heavy reliance on observational data could be seen as creating a potential 
vulnerability in the robustness of the study. However, researchers such as 
Denzin (1997) suggest that this can be mitigated to an extent by paying 
attention to how the existing data is presented and ensuring as far as possible a 
sense of verisimilitude, or vraisembalance. This means that the style of writing 
aims to draw the reader closely into the world of the participants and the 
researcher, such that the experiences can be palpably felt. As long as these 
accounts are inherently coherent, this can create a sense of authenticity that 
renders the written ethnography more credible. 
 
Initial ideas regarding themes were discussed during academic supervision, 
both verbally and by sending my supervisors drafts of findings chapters which 
initially contained much lengthier field note extracts than were included in the 
final thesis. This enabled extended discussion about what was felt to be 
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happening in each of the scenarios or situations described. A further method of 
analysis involved establishing an ‘experts by experience’ group. This group of 
people, recruited via the University’s larger Service Users’ Forum, had initially 
assisted in the development of the participant documentation prior to applying 
for ethical approval. However, all expressed an interest to remain involved in the 
project to some degree, and therefore an additional mode of analysis was 
incorporated into the design that meant that simplified and anonymised extracts 
from the field notes would be brought to the group and I facilitated discussions 
using the prompt “what is going on here?”. These focus groups were video 
recorded with consent, and later watched and analysed as sources of data in 
their own right. This transpired to be less directly useful for the thesis as it 
largely catalysed participants to relate to events in their own lives, to reflect on 
their own experiences of healthcare, and to gain support from one another in 
relation to losses of their own. So, the group was helpful, even if the content of 
the focus group discussions were not used in the final analysis.  
 
Reflexivity, already discussed in chapter 2, was a further means of enhancing 
authenticity.  
Vividity 
 
Glaser (1978) suggests that researchers in sociological traditions contribute 
most when they report on what has been observed in such a way that ‘insiders’ 
would recognise it, that it would ‘ring true’ to an insider reading the account. Yet 
for Glaser it is also key that it is written in such a fashion that an insider would 
not have written it. An account that is too ‘inside’ would reveal “only that which is 
already known. And since insiders, especially those in stressful circumstances, 
do not always agree with each other on all matters, a sociological narrative 
must also take this disagreement into account. The sociologist’s obligation is to 
report honestly but according to his own light” (p9). This principle is not unique 
to sociology - the same might be said of an honest ethnographic account, or 
psychologist’s assessment. The key to this point is that the interpretation 
necessarily adds something new, and that rather than being seen as a ‘threat to 
validity’, an anti-positivist stance consists of openly acknowledging the 
contribution of the analysis. 
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Richness 
By richness, I refer to the kind of thick description argued for by Geertz (1973). 
Thick description refers to the researcher's task of both describing and 
interpreting observed social action (or behaviour) within its particular context. 
The context can be within a smaller unit (such as a couple, a family, a work 
environment) or within a larger unit (such as one's village, a community, or 
general culture)). Thick description leads to thick interpretation, which in turn 
leads to thick meaning of the research findings for the researchers and 
participants themselves, and for the report's intended readership. It is hoped 
that this will lead readers to a sense of being able to cognitively and emotively 
place themselves within the field and imagine the events that were described. 
Also involved in production of a rich account is the requirement to consider a 
range of perspectives that are representative of participants, and transparently 
reflexive throughout. It also includes drawing out contradictions, similarities and 
different frames of interpretation.  
 
Denzin suggests thick description is essential if ethnographic writing is to be 
interpreted by a wide range of people, and without a depth of analysis it will not 
be a credible piece of research.  
 
“a thick description…does more than record what a person is doing. It 
goes beyond mere fact and surface appearances. It presents detail, 
context, emotion, and the webs of social relationships that join persons to 
one another. Thick description evokes emotionality and self-feelings. It 
inserts history into experience. It establishes the significance of an 
experience, or the sequence of events, for the person or persons in 
question. In thick description, the voices, feelings, actions and meanings 
of interaction individuals are heard” (1989, p83).  
Impact 
Within health and academic research, ‘impact’ often refers to the generalisabilty 
of research to clinical practice. However, the potential impact of ethnographies 
may not relate to this, but to the impact on the reader. It has been suggested 
that scientific research can take up to 17 years to be implemented in clinical 
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practice (Mooijaart et al. 2015). However, a powerful narrative can change 
practice simply through the impact of its words. Behar argues that placing one’s 
human self in the centre of what is happening creates ethnographers that have 
the power to appeal to the emotional, and not just the analytical, in the reader. 
Behar accurately captures this in the title of her book “Anthropology That 
Breaks Your Heart” (2014). I would never have contemplated picking up a 
research paper or book relating to the experiences of Jewish Cuban immigrants 
had I not been directed towards her work by an anthropologist. Yet the impact of 
her work on me was profound; there was a vividity to her accounts, a richness 
and a depth, that caused me to respond on affective and not just intellectual 
levels. The potential impact of powerful narratives relating to end of life care can 
be seen in the popularity of the recent TED talk by Chief Medic at the Zen 
Hospice (Miller 2015) or two recent books on mortality (Gawunde 2015; 
Kalanithi and Verghese 2016) or the profound effect of Bernard Crettaz’s work 
on the adoption of death cafes around the globe (Crettaz 2010). 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have outlined and justified the method adopted for the study 
and situated the research within the broader discipline of health anthropology, 
incorporating a phenomenological analytical lens to enable the inclusion of first 
person, embodied experiences. Greater attention to the ethical aspects of 
practice have been considered in Appendix 2. I have described in detail the 
process of carrying out the ethnography, explaining how the philosophical 
principles established in the last chapter were translated into practical research 
action. The next chapters introduce the findings of the ethnography; firstly, in 
chapter 4 through a ‘scene-setting’ chapter about the ward and its environment 
and next, through exploring the cultures of care and practice in chapter 5.  
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SECTION 2: THE ETHNOGRAPHY 
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Chapter 4: Welcome to the Ward 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe “Bluebell Ward”8 where the majority of fieldwork took 
place. I describe the political context of healthcare at the time of the study. I 
examine the routines and cultures that characterise daily practices on Bluebell 
ward. This is used to build a characterisation of the cultures of care, within 
which I identify the performative function of certain scripts that staff adhere to in 
order to demonstrate to me what they perceived their roles to be. I then 
describe the physical environs of the hospital and ward and the sensory 
atmospheres that constituted the environment of care. This is used to provide 
the context for understanding the patient experiences described in the following 
chapters. 
4.2 The Field 
4.2.1 The Hospital 
 
 “Anthropologists don’t study villages…they study in villages” 
(Geertz 1973, p22).  
 
Although the hospital was not the primary focus of this work, a description of the 
organisation and its physical setting provided important context within which the 
subsequent relational narratives could be understood. Meadowlands hospital 
was located in the north of Canroyd, a large former mill town in the North of the 
United Kingdom with a population of around 170,000 (ONS 2015). Canroyd’s 
population was more ethnically diverse than the UK as a whole, although less 
so than many nearby towns and cities; 80% white British, 10% Pakistani, 5% 
Indian and around 2% African. This diversity was largely the consequence of 
clusters of ethnic minority groups in particular sub-regions. Thus, the area 
immediately around the hospital had a comparatively higher proportion of 
                                            
8 All places and names have been anonymised in the written data and images 
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people of Pakistani and Indian origin. There was religious diversity too, 
comprising Christians (65%), Muslim (10%), Sikh (2%) and a smaller number of 
Hindus, Buddhist and Jews) although the 2011 Census reports a higher-than-
average proportion of people who did not consider themselves to have a faith or 
who do not state a faith (23%). In terms of health, cancer was the most common 
cause of death in people below 75, followed by cardiovascular disease. There 
were a higher-than-average number of people with diabetes and chronic 
respiratory conditions. Meadowlands hospital was built in the mid 1960s, a time 
of rapid expansion of acute healthcare provision. The publication of the 
Cogwheel Report around that time heralded a much-needed attempt to 
organise the daily work of the medical teams in hospitals which included the 
care of older people (HMSO 1967).  
 
4.2.2 Political Context 
 
At the time of the study, the National Health Service was experiencing 
something of a crisis. The period of fieldwork coincided with political actions 
including strikes by tens of thousands of junior doctors, structures were being 
dismantled and reshaped with unprecedented rapidity, and there were grave 
concerns regarding the influence of funding cuts on the quality of care. This was 
perhaps most notably illustrated when a national leading institute, the 
Addenbrooke’s Hospital in Cambridge, failed an inspection by the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC), the national independent regulator for quality in health and 
social care setting, for – among other things – unsafe staffing levels (CQC 
2015). Canroyd Trust, the location for this study, was among several in the UK 
in serious financial difficulties. This had catalysed concern and unrest among 
staff at all levels about job losses and department closures.  
 
The role of the CQC was to measure care providers against sixteen essential 
standards (Care Quality Commission 2010) and the inspection of Canroyd 
incorporated the views of 18 service users, 16 relatives and 45 staff members. 
The report from the previous year included verbatim quotations from patients, 
including “they do so well considering the amount of staff they have” and “they 
cannot do enough for me”. Measures of dignity included that people were 
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appropriately covered and that curtains were drawn around them for 
procedures. Measures of patient-centred care included call bells being within 
people’s reach. Evidence of people’s ‘inclusion and involvement in their care 
and treatment’ was recorded as follows: “in one person’s records we saw that 
they had declined pain relief and this was recorded within their records”. The 
two other examples also related to decisions about analgesia. One piece of 
negative feedback from a patient was recorded as “I feel like I am being a 
burden when I want to ask something and when I do they always say they will 
come back and they never do”.  
 
The inspection report was positive about the use of the “butterfly” scheme 
(www.butterflyscheme.org.uk) and the use of the butterfly symbols to identify 
patients with a diagnosis of dementia on the ward, pointing out that this enabled 
staff to provide appropriate care planning. Practices identified by the CQC as 
positive were not necessarily perceived as such by staff. For example, the 
Butterfly Scheme cited above was never observed in use during the whole 
period of observation. The Butterfly magnets remained on the lower left corner 
of the magnetic patient whiteboard and were not moved to identify those 
patients requiring individualised care. I asked a nurse why these were not in 
use, and she replied that she never used the Butterfly documentation because 
she had never been “trained”. Another told me that “the butterfly scheme don’t 
make the slightest bit of difference. There’s documents in there [points at 
drawer in documentation cabinet]”. I asked her what the documentation was for. 
She replied, “I think it’s like - be a bit more understanding, like taking into 
account their history, what they like, and whatnot.” Whilst seemingly emblematic 
of compassionate care, this lack of implementation of a scheme illustrates an 
example of some of the concerns introduced in chapter 1 regarding monitoring 
of compassion. A scheme may have been visible and apparently in use, but was 
not translated into practice or considered useful by staff. 
 
A further, more recent unannounced CQC inspection had taken place a few 
months before the fieldwork began, following identification at an inspection the 
previous year that aspects of the hospital’s built environment were inadequate. 
Certain areas of the hospital had been found to be ‘requiring improvement’, 
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particularly in relation to safety and suitability of premises. The follow-up report 
had been published just three months prior to the commencement of the 
fieldwork, and reverberations from its findings were still evident.  
“It’s all around the safety” 
 
Safety was one of the key issues raised in the Francis Report, mentioned 122 
times just in the Executive Summary alone. In contrast, compassion was 
mentioned 16 times. Given this, it is perhaps understandable that those 
members of staff with managerial and strategic responsibilities, who had been 
tasked with implementing the recommendations of the report, largely interpreted 
it in these terms. The culture of ongoing monitoring included prioritising 
completion of tasks that related to areas identified as ‘high risk’ – falls 
assessments, pressure sores, infections and delayed discharges. 
Documentation of these measures took precedence over documentation of care 
that is not mandated. Further, some aspects of care did not get documented at 
all. Numerous studies describe how nurses perceive documentation as being at 
least as important as the work itself (Tinney 2008) being the only evidence that 
the work has been carried out. It was often cited, mantra-like, on the ward - “if 
it’s not written, it wasn’t done”. Yet in his ethnographic study, Diamond (2006) 
describes the phenomenon of care tasks that cannot be documented and 
therefore do not “exist,” and highlights the stress this imposes on staff who 
recognise residents’ emotional needs. Comforting a terrified resident at 5:00 am 
“was just another physically and emotionally draining moment of non-work”—
non-work because the work still got done but was just not named or paid.  
 
The focus of policy on safety was reflected in the concerns of Liz, the Matron, 
when asked what she thought were the main implications of the Francis Report 
for compassionate care. Her reply demonstrated that despite the rhetoric of 
compassion in the responses to the Francis Report, the main thrust of the 290 
recommendations was focused not on compassionate care but upon safety, 
risk-avoidance and efficiency: 
 
“We really need to aim for these 11am discharges, it’s all around 
   77 
the safety. If we don’t push to get patients home or in 
the discharge lounge it has a knock-on effect. There are patients 
in A&E who are at the beginning of their journey, if it gets later 
there are fewer staff on a late to sort out the discharge, they 
sometimes think if they keep a bed full its less work for them to 
do … for example on Sunday I looked at the reports and they 
opened up ward 9 which is the extra capacity ward they 
highlighted medically stable patients to move there. Because you 
see we also have to meet ambulance targets. We need to have a 
15-minute turnaround because otherwise the ambulances don’t 
get back out on the road and they are more likely not to meet 
their 9 minute targets so if we exceed 15 minutes to get a patient 
transferred from the ambulance then we get fined.” 
 
Patients could be ‘slept out’ if a bed was required on Bluebell Ward, which 
meant that - as long as they were medically stable - they could be moved to any 
other ward in the hospital to create space. It was not just patients who could be 
moved. Staff could be called to work a shift on another ward if there was a staff 
shortage somewhere else in the hospital. Both of these practices were generally 
negatively perceived by nursing and medical staff but for Liz, the Matron, and 
Alice, the hospital’s Clinical Site Commander, these were seen as an essential 
component of patient safety and avoiding risk, although the latter was often 
framed in terms of financial penalty rather than absolute risk. Even though it felt 
as though the ward was a ‘tight little island’ (Coser 1962), it was clear that the 
broader machinations of the hospital and in particular the focus upon safety 
could dictate and change ward activity at short notice. 
 
Another common practice to maintain safety across the hospital was to move 
nurses from one ward to another to meet shortfalls in staffing or deal with 
particular pressures. The following extract is from a conversation with a senior 
nurse about it, a few minutes after one of ‘her nurses’ was extracted from the 
ward to go and ‘fill in’ on a surgical ward: 
“It’s sickening really. I can see it from both sides but if they move 
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someone they need to do an incident form, but nothing ever 
happens. Then if something happens on our ward because we 
are lower on staff we have to do a root cause analysis and if 
someone was moved that would be a contributing factor, but 
again, nothing ever gets joined up. We ended up having to 
change our workload model because of it. We used to have 4 
and 3 on an early and 3 and 3 on a night but they’d always take 
someone; they don’t realise how complex it is here.” [“They” 
refers to the Site Commanders, who oversee staffing levels 
across the hospital]. 
 
Nursing staff were unanimously opposed to this practice for two reasons: Firstly, 
the ward was often perceived (by management) as being relatively well 
resourced compared to other wards in the hospital, but staff perceived this to be 
a disadvantage as they felt it led to them being readily deployed elsewhere, 
often to areas where the clinical work was unfamiliar and they felt out of their 
comfort zones. Further, they thought that the perception that Bluebell Ward was 
well staffed reflected a broader perception that care of older people is not 
complex; a misconception that they were frequently at pain to clarify, and which 
has been reflected in recent calls for recognition of older people’s care 
(Cornwell 2012). 
 
Nursing handover was one of the most important events of the day in dictating 
what will happen to each patient during that shift in terms of clinical 
interventions. Pam explained to me that its main purpose was safety: “just to 
communicate who’s for a call9, who needs doubles or hoisting and things”. A 
range of plastic tags adorned the pod walls (Fig. 4) to be attached above each 
patient’s bed to convey the most essential aspects of care in relation to safety.  
 
 
                                            
9 This term is used colloquially on the ward to refer to those who are or are not for resuscitation in the 
event of a cardiopulmonary arrest. The ‘call’ refers to the ringing the crash team to implement advanced 
life support once chest compressions are commenced 
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Figure 4: "It's all about the safety" 
 
 
Patient ‘Flow’ 
 
‘Discharge meetings’ were held daily in the ‘Patient Flow’ office in the main 
hospital corridor. This is where the larger pressures on the hospital became 
apparent. Each ward had a discharge coordinator and these were expected to 
update the ‘virtual hospital’ - a series of whiteboards along a wall with the bed 
numbers listed, and the gender of the occupant. Here, the Visual Hospital 
Symbols observed on the ward board were replicated, to give an overview of 
patient flow throughout the hospital. Bluebell Ward had a high number of green 
crosses, the symbol for delayed discharge. It was overseen by the appropriately 
titled ‘Lead Clinical Site Commander’, Alice. There was a computer screen 
showing activity in A&E.  
 
“This is where it all begins really”, Alice explains. “The greens 
are for patients within breach times, amber for those about to 
breach, and red for breaches, we haven’t got any at the 
moment.” So, we have an overview of all ward activity - patients 
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who are on cardiac monitoring are a bit different, because as 
soon as they have their monitors taken off they have an 8-hour 
target for moving on before they breach. The targets on the ward 
are for one discharge per day before 11am”. The “bed” meeting 
includes a video-link with the sister hospital in the Trust. She 
explains: “so if one hospital has some spaces we can 
transfer patients between sites”. It is clearly quite a feat of 
coordination. She summarises the hospital activity: “We have 
had 74 through since midnight, no breaches, 16 are in 
department, those referred have a plan and a bed waiting. There 
are ten ”queries” in medicine but I am not optimistic... [I later find 
out that this means 10 potential discharges, but she tells me 
these are frequently held up by a range of things - unexpected 
deteriorations, blood results, social issues, problems getting care 
packages] …If my other queries firm up I might be able to pull 
through the others" 
 
Alice enjoyed talking about her role; she liked the challenge, the buzz. She felt 
that Patient Flow was often misunderstood by hospital staff: 
 
“they think we just walk around hauling staff from one ward to 
another and sticking our noses in; they don’t see that we read 
the notes, assess patients…wards are so busy, the staff can’t 
see the wood for the trees…the knives I have to take out of my 
back every night. You have to be very Teflon-coated” 
4.2.3 Ward Environment 
 
“Human bodies are placed into situations that produce affective 
capacities and situations that entail new times, new spaces, and 
new modes of embodiment” (Wolf-Meyer and Taussig 2010) 
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The physical environment of the space was understood to include architectural 
features (more permanent characteristics of the environment such as spatial 
layout of hospital, room size and window placement), interior design features 
(less permanent features such as furnishings, colour and artwork) and ambient 
features (lighting noise level, odours and temperature). 
Bluebell ward was one of two ‘care of the elderly’ wards at the hospital. The vast 
majority of fieldwork occurred here, although my research also took me to other 
parts of the hospital, including the ‘patient flow’ office, the café, the corridors 
and grounds. Access to the ward was through an intercom; nurses could see 
visitors through a camera and enable access. Once on the ward, the door 
closed and locked automatically behind. To exit required a nurse to release the 
lock. As a nurse, I was relatively familiar with these kinds of arrangements, but 
having been away from wards for some time I found myself somewhat 
resensitised to the subtle sense of incarceration. Once in, you were in.  
Figure 5: The corridor 
 
The door opened on to a long corridor, comprising three nursing ‘pods’. Each of 
these had a floor to ceiling cupboard for patient notes and ward documentation, 
a computer, and a telephone. Three times a day, nursing handover took place at 
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the pods, and they were also the locus of activity at the start of the medical 
ward round. The pod surfaces were often home to at least one half-drunk cold 
cup of coffee and a handful of chocolates, a pile of sets of patient medical 
notes, and a variety of forms and documents.  
The corridor was bare. Fittings lined the edges but there was a clear 
thoroughfare for the passage of the many wheeled objects that trundled up and 
down its length – a whole host of trolleys: for meals, patient notes, phlebotomy 
equipment to remove blood, commodes, drinks, wheelchairs, hoists. The 
corridor was visually confusing; it was difficult to work out how long it is. Sound 
seemed to funnel and distort, voices appeared to belong to nobody and 
everybody at once. There were posters on the walls, mounted at regular 
intervals, that read ‘It’s Your Health: We Are Never Too Busy to Put Your Mind at 
Rest’. Looking down the corridor gave a first impression that there were people 
everywhere. Sitting halfway down the corridor and looking across, the large 
spaces between people became clearer. It was a strange illusory effect that the 
angle at which it is being observed produced a different sense of pace and 
activity. Sitting in one of the side rooms looking out through the small glass 
window in the door, it was possible not to see another human for several 
minutes, giving a further illusion of relative solitude despite the noise.  
 
Side rooms were laid out in such a way as to enable the nurses to see the 
patient easily, through the glass panel on the door, without entering the room. 
This meant that all the beds in the single rooms faced away from the windows. 
Patients with infections were in side-rooms, to which the doors remained closed 
other than to allow access for members of the team or visitors. The windows did 
not open. These patients did not leave their room at all, other than to go home 
or to attend investigative procedures. Patients in side rooms had more of their 
own space than those in a bay, who only have curtains separating them from 
other patients. However, the boundaries of the side room could be transgressed 
at will by health professionals. Many knocked before entering but this was a 
formality; no patient would have declined to permit entry so in effect the knock 
was a signal of an imminent visitor rather than a request for access. When 
health professionals were in the room, they usually closed the door behind 
them, re-creating the patient’s room as a bounded space. 
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Spaces and Places 
 
Ingold (2011) proposes that it is insufficient to merely consider the architectural 
and fixed aspects of the field. Indeed, the way in which the people occupy and 
experience spaces is crucial, and it is constituted through this activity. He 
contends that it is the movement within and through the space that provides the 
meaning. In this next section I describe the way that the spaces were embodied 
and the ways in which actors used them. Like Ingold, I have adopted the term 
‘emplacement’ drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that the body is not simply 
“a collection of adjacent organs but a synergic system, all of the functions of 
which are exercised and linked together in the general action of being in the 
world” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p234)(Merleau-Ponty 1962). Pink (2011) suggests 
that we come to know those spaces we occupy by virtue of how we are within 
them. Through this means, space is understood to be equivalent to an event, 
that is constituted through lived bodies and we understand the immediacy of 
perception in relation to space, as well as the nature of our engagement by 
means of the senses with the material and social environment.  
4.2.4 Ward Routine 
 
When the early nursing shift arrived at 07:00am most patients were asleep. 
Those who were awake were being washed and dressed in preparation for 
breakfast by the healthcare support workers still here from the night shift. A 
gradual increase in noise and busyness accompanied the next couple of hours, 
until by the time the doctors arrive there was a cacophony of rattling cups and 
cutlery being cleared away. The patients were mostly awake and the phones 
were ringing. The morning drug round commenced at around 07:00am, and 
generally took over an hour. Most patients were taking large numbers of 
medications - as is relatively common for older people - and drug rounds were 
often complex.  
 
At roughly 9:00 am each morning the medical round took place. There was one 
permanent consultant and one locum at the time of the study. Although patients’ 
names on the whiteboard were associated with the initials of one or other of 
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these consultants, in reality they did not always get reviewed by ‘their’ doctor - 
this was dependent on other factors such as the numbers and locations of 
‘sleep-out’ patients. The consultants were accompanied on their ward round by 
up to three registrars who generally arrived on the ward around half an hour 
before the consultants in order to get the patients’ notes correctly stacked in the 
wheeled trolley that they took with them. Consultants were rarely accompanied 
by nurses on their rounds; the time of the ward round coincided with the busiest 
time of the morning in terms of patients requiring washes and food. If something 
specific was required the doctors would notify a nurse. Shortly after the medical 
round commenced, a number of other members of staff appeared - this included 
allied health professionals, social workers, phlebotomists, pharmacists. The 
mornings were very busy, activity being constituted by the tasks that had to be 
conducted. Nurses took on a coordinating role during this time,  
 
There were two separate times when friends and family could visit. The ward 
operated ‘Protected Mealtimes’ which meant that these times fell outside of 
mealtimes. Generally, when visitors were on the ward there was not much 
clinical activity. Medical reviews (unless urgent) and consultations by other 
professionals took place outside these times.  
 
Night times had was a different pace and feel. Unless there was an emergency 
or new admission, the nurses and healthcare assistants were largely in control 
of the routine and they each chose to undertake the nights’ tasks slightly 
differently. Cheryl, who worked mostly nights, informed me that this pace 
changed when early morning arrives:  
 
“and then when it’s about 5:00am or so you weigh up how many 
wet ones you have …but that’s tricky because they have a sleep 
policy”.  
 
This rationalisation of routine was often observed, a ‘weighing up’ of the 
different pressures on staff. It is an example of a felt tension between policy and 
practice; staff felt obliged to ‘start cares’ early to save the day nurses from 
having to do too much, too fast, in the narrow slice of time between 
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commencing a shift and the arrival of the doctors for the medical round. But this 
needed to be balanced against the ‘sleep policy’ which prohibited the waking of 
patients for the needs of staff rather than patients. Interestingly, this nurse did 
not describe that the tension is founded upon balancing the needs of patients 
and staff, but instead describes it is a tension between two sets of rules – that of 
helping out the early shift nurses, and that of adhering to policy. Such 
constitutive rules were shared, and create a sense in which behaviour of 
nursing staff was shaped in predictable ways, whether on a night or a day shift. 
This tension highlights the interface between the governance of the hospital, 
nurses’ personal interpretations of practice, and the meaning systems and 
behaviours that arise through the interpretation of the governance structures. 
 
Most nursing and support staff preferred weekends to weekdays. They valued 
the space offered by the weekend: 
 
Domestic assistant (leaning on mop) “Floors are easier to clear 
because there are fewer people in the way” 
Becky (nurse) (nods): “There are no doctors’ rounds, no physio 
and dieticians, social workers and OTs…we have more time to 
spend with patients, we don’t have to worry about finishing 
washes before the doctors arrive”.  
 
This view was not shared by all. Rachel hated them - “they’re so slow. Sunday 
lates, I often just find myself thinking - I could be at home”. She was more 
attracted by shifts that were exciting and fast paced, even though she admitted 
that these exhausted her. At the time of the study, however, there were external 
pressure to increase medical cover and core hospital activity at the weekend. 
Jeremy Hunt, the Health Secretary, had responded to a piece of research 
identifying increased mortality at weekends compared to during the week, made 
a promise to increase weekend working in acute hospitals in the NHS. There 
were claims that Hunt had misused the research by claiming such causal links, 
and the medical professional were at pains to point out that they were already 
working excessively long hours (Oliver 2016). A Twitter campaign gained 
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momentum, with over ten thousand NHS staff responding to the 
#ImInWorkJeremy hashtag.  
 
Staffing was a constant source of discussion and complaint among the nursing 
staff. In particular they were ambivalent about the use of agency staff who they 
perceived to be paid more money than them to take on less responsibility. Pam 
told me about a Bank Holiday when an agency staff nurse had worked 
alongside her on a 14-hour shift for almost double her pay, but was unable to 
administer intravenous antibiotics, set up enteral feed pumps, or reprise syringe 
pumps, so all three of these tasks had fallen upon her.  
Readily available data related to the hospital staffing levels, or ‘Fill Rates10’ for 
the month of the study illustrates that registered nursing staffing during day 
shifts was at 94.3% of recommended level for qualified nursing staff, and 87% 
for healthcare support workers. Night shifts showed a different pattern, with 
registered nurses being at 75.3% of recommended levels, but healthcare 
support workers being over-utilised at 118.3%. This practice, I was told, is 
common in the hospital where wards have been advised to cut costs. The 
numbers of nursing staff on the floor was unchanged, but they were comprised 
of a different skill mix to that which is recommended. This reflected a further 
concern of nursing staff, which related to the perception that Older Peoples 
Medicine (OPM) was a relatively unskilled and heavy area to work in. This had 
two consequences; firstly, they considered that from the perspective of 
management, it meant a healthcare support worker was not viewed as any 
different to a qualified nurse in terms of their role. From another perspective, 
staff felt that wider views of OPM as an unattractive clinical area in which to 
work were reinforced. 
 
The ward was a busy and challenging place to work although staff differed in 
how tolerant they were of the level of busyness and the nature of the work. 
There were ongoing tensions in relation to pressures on (and from) the wider 
hospital, as personified in the input from the Matron and the Clinical Site 
                                            
10 ‘Fill Rates’ are a business term that refers to the percentage of customer or consumption 
orders satisfied from stock at hand. It is a measure of ability to meet demand. 
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Commander. The apparent rigidity of the physical environment and the routine 
served to convey to staff and patients a sense of order and safety. 
Going Home 
We leave his room. “He thinks he’s going home”, I say to Kirsty.  
“They all think they’re going home”, she replies. 
 
The ethos on the ward was to commence discharge planning from the moment 
a patient was admitted to the ward. Coloured magnetic symbols were placed 
next to the patients’ names on the whiteboard in the corridor. Sue (the 
Discharge Coordinator) began her day by going through her ‘green crosses’. 
These were the patients who for social or functional reasons were unable to 
leave the ward, although they have no clinical reason to be there. Sometimes 
this was because they can no longer be at home but there were disagreements 
as to how to fund placements in care homes, typically between social and 
health care as these were different funding streams with different mechanisms. 
The ritual for discharging patients was complex.  
 
To try and make it comprehensible to all staff it had been formalised as a tick-
list, although usually the order of things was not linear. ‘Patient medically 
predictable’ was the first criterion to be met, whereupon three further criteria 
were required. The italicised reasons were what I was told by staff when I asked 
what the rationale was for each criterion: 
 
1. Medical stability (avoiding readmission) 
2. Mental capacity (avoiding incidents) or family happy (avoiding litigation) 
3. Mobilising safely (avoiding litigation) 
 
Medically stable patients would often become medically unstable again, at 
which point the ‘Section 2’ referral to Social Workers would be revoked and the 
process would begin again. The order of events was often variable dependent 
on staff and patient factors, such as the relationship between different 
professionals.  
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4.2.5 The Sensory Ward 
 
In this section I describe Bluebell Ward by drawing on the principles of sensory 
ethnography outlined by Pink (2015). The ward was a sensorium; being there 
was an embodied experience. I describe different sensory aspects of the ward 
in turn, attending to vision, hearing, touch, smell and taste. I have also added 
places and spaces, movement and time. Even though these were not strictly 
bodily senses, they are components of what Pink calls ‘emplacement’ - which 
can be summarised as attending to the experience by accounting for the 
“relationship between bodies, minds, and the materiality and sensoriality of the 
environment” (p11). 
 
Engaging the senses other than sight because easier over time, but felt far from 
natural at the start of the study. Particularly those senses other than sight 
required a process of internally blocking out one sense or another until over 
time it became a more natural skill. For example, I spent a day just studying 
noise and sound from different vantage points (inside a patient’s side room, the 
nurses’ station, the staff room, the kitchen, the corridor). Distinguishing 
individual sounds was challenging, as was separating out the sound from trying 
to visually locate its source. To facilitate attention on to those senses less used, 
I spent some time with my eyes closed (to the amusement of staff). The 
following extract is an example of how multisensory data was recorded in the 
field notes:  
 
Macerator in the dirty utility room chews up cardboard commode 
pans & effluent contents and flushes them away, opening like 
magic to reveal a still-gleaming yaw. Trolley wheels rattle - the 
newsagent trolley w/ papers, chocolate, drinks and sweets. 
Smell in V’s room – is it old tobacco, stale urine, illness? - can’t 
quite capture the nature of the latter. His breath, I think, and an 
acrid smell that comes from his skin. Slippers frayed and worn, 
slightly damp and cold to touch. I take them off his feet: the smell 
hits the back of my throat. 
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Light  
The corridor had no direct daylight; it was flanked by single rooms and bays, all 
of which had at least one window. These could not be opened, for safety 
reasons, so although there was a view of the sky and surrounding town it was a 
purely visual experience. The sky may have been blue, but once you were 
inside the ward there was no telling whether it was a warm and balmy day, or a 
crisp autumnal one, or whether the cooking scents from the nearby pub drifted 
this far downwind. All patients had a view of a window, although for those in bed 
(the majority of patients) the view was of the sky alone as the windows were too 
high to afford a view. Several of the beds faced away from the windows. Usually 
these belonged to patients in side rooms who needed to be observed by 
nurses, via the small windows in the doors. These patients had few choices 
about what to look at. They could lie back and look at the ceilings; grids of light 
and white tiles, or they could look at the window but generally the beds were 
placed too low to be able to see the view, and the blinds were frequently closed: 
(Fig 6 and 7).  
 
Figure 6: View from a bed (1)         Figure 7: View from a bed (2) 
 
 
  
There were three main sources of light. Fluorescent strip lights and bright spots 
in the rooms illuminated staff activities. Overhead lamps by patient beds were 
available but rarely switched on; the light these emitted was a warmer colour 
than that from the overhead lights, but given that the latter were almost always 
on they were rarely used. If a patient was awake at night, they would be 
encouraged to switch off their light and go to sleep, or if they needed to be seen 
by the nurse it would usually be by torchlight to minimise disturbance of other 
patients. Even with all the lights in the bays and side rooms switched off at 
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night, there was still a spilling over of light from the corridor, through small 
windows and under doors. Nowhere on the ward was truly dark at night.  
 
The corridor floor was highly polished, reflecting objects and light. Research 
suggests that this can cause glare which can be disorientating for older or 
visually impaired people (Dalke et al. 2004). Most of the other surfaces on the 
ward were highly reflective too; furniture had a sheen to it; a consequence of 
being manufactured from materials that were easily washed and wiped clean in 
accordance to infection control procedures. The overall impression was that 
everything is somewhat hard and plastic, with the exception of the bed sheets 
and pale blue waffle-weave blankets. 
Objects 
The ‘personalised patient care’ whiteboard behind one patient’s bed contained a 
section called “What matters to me most”. Most of these were left empty, but 
occasionally they were completed (as in Figure 8 below). These boards were 
rarely completed if the person had difficulties communicating. 
 
Figure 8: What's important to me 
 
 
Most patients wore standard issue hospital gowns, drank from plastic cups or 
feeders, and a small collection of cards or flowers were clustered on bedside 
lockers alongside sputum bowls, mouth care swabs or other hospital 
paraphernalia. It was rare to find objects of sentimental or personal value in 
patients’ possession. Further, there were few objects that belied individual 
identity; objects belonging to patients usually had some kind of utility - for 
example, alleviating boredom, as shown in Fig 9 below:  
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Figure 9: Objects of occupation 
 
 
As well as ‘occupational’ objects, patient’s spaces often had the kinds of 
paraphernalia associated with visitors coming to see a sick friend or relatives; 
bowls of fruit, flowers, cards. In one extreme case, a patient (‘Dot’, who will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 7) was moved to a side room 
because she was thought to be in the last weeks of her life. Over a period of a 
few days and numerous visitors the room gradually filled with helium balloons 
attached to plants, bouquets of flowers, hand-drawn cards tacked to the walls, 
drawings by her many grandchildren. Although she wasn’t eating, her locker 
was piled high with her favourite foods. If a nurse needed to access the 
medicines locker by the bed, it was first necessary to negotiate a range of 
physical obstacles - in the form of things and visitors. She was never alone. 
This was not popular with the nurses - they found it frustrating to have to “do 
cares” because they first had to clear the room of visitors. They also expressed 
concern that it might be oppressive for Dot to be surrounded by so much 
hubbub. Staff had to prioritise access to patients, equipment and the patient-
specific drugs lockers over the lesser need to create a homely space; and when 
the latter was taken into the hands of families, there was frequent resistance 
from the nursing staff on the grounds of access and infection control.  
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Outside the Day Room the walls were covered in paper chains, posters - both 
handmade and printed - to raise awareness of dementia and person-centred 
care, and a rack of leaflets about living with dementia (Figure 10). This space 
was an area of high traffic. Located in the centre of the ward where the corridor 
widened out to enable a range of activities, lunch trolleys were temporarily 
parked while the trays were removed and distributed, groups of staff 
congregated on their ways in and out of the various rooms flanking the space 
(Day Room, Clean Utility, Sluice, Kitchen), and patients who were able to 
mobilise were drawn here - often sitting on the row of chairs opposite the wall 
where this was displayed. When sitting on this row, it was not possible to 
discern any of the content of the posters on the opposite wall. Instead the 
impression was of ‘visual noise’. The somewhat more restful image behind the 
seats was only visible when walking past; there was no seated vantage point 
from which to look at it. It has been suggested that ‘visual noise’ can be 
disconcerting to older or visually impaired patients (Dalke et al 2004).  
 
Figure 10: View from the seats 
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Sound and Noise 
 
“I wanted, I thought, only a little, 
two teaspoons of silence”  
(Hirshfield, 2015, p63) 
 
From the moment I entered the ward I became immersed in a soundscape that 
was characterised by continuous sounds. Even during the night, when it was 
relatively quiet, the hiss of alternating pressure mattresses, the low-pitched hum 
of the oxygen piping and intravenous infusion pumps was superimposed on to 
other sounds. Some of these sounds were sporadic – a patient calling out, 
muttering, footsteps, the clatter of the nurse checking the medication stock in 
the trolley. By morning the volume and complexity of the sound increased. 
When the morning nurses arrived for 07:00am there were buzzers beeping, 
trolleyed commodes being wheeled in and out of rooms with squeaks and 
rumbles, running taps, flushing toilets, and the metallic clanks of hospital bed 
cot sides being raised and lowered. During nursing handover, there were three 
small clusters of nurses and healthcare assistants a low murmur of voices as 
they plan and allocate tasks, overlaid with calls from the healthcare workers: 
“Bed 4’s ready for a shave”. Cheryl, the night nurse was trying to hand over “her 
little lot”. She grinned at me, said “I can’t bloody hear myself think here” and 
returned to the crumpled sheet of paper from which she reads important events 
relating to each patient. Some patients banged objects to try and attract 
attention; spoons on tables, mugs against metal cot sides. Foot pedal controlled 
bin lids squeaked open and clanked closed, plastic aprons rustled as they were 
opened up, tied on, then torn off and crumpled up. There were calls and cries, 
and the patient call bells emitted their intermittent sharp beeping almost 
continuously. An intravenous infusion, having delivered the required volume of 
fluid, gave a different type of beep; higher pitched, quieter. In the sluice, the 
macerator growled as it is fed cardboard bedpans and their content. Some 
patients, identified as being at risk of pressure damage to their skin - especially 
those who were bed bound or particularly underweight or overweight - had 
alternating pressure mattresses. These created a sporadic hissing sound as the 
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cells under the plastic mattress filled with air and then emptied, accompanied by 
the low hum of the motor that controls this process. Other, more mobile patients 
considered to be at risk of falling had clips attached to their gowns. If they 
ventured beyond a certain distance from the wall by their bed, the clip pulled a 
magnetic cord which set off an alarm to alert the nurse that the patient is 
moving. Sometimes these alarms were pre-recorded with a message: “Horace, 
get back into bed please”. These disembodied voices could often be heard 
several times an hour. Other times the alarms just set off a buzzer. 
Eating and Taste 
 
I had limited access to eating together with patients, too - meals were swiftly 
handed out and those who required assistance were fed, generally by the 
healthcare support workers, but sometimes by staff nurses or student nurses. 
Sometimes I helped patients to eat, as in the following reflection:  
 
In side room with Sheila. spooning porridge into her mouth. 
Dabbing her chin when some falls. Less on the spoon next time, 
I think to myself. I sit in silence, she chews and swallows, her 
eyes looking out of the window. Sometimes spits it out, 
sometimes seems to enjoy. I find myself mirroring her act of 
eating (like when my children needed feeding) licking my lips, 
saying “mm”, and swallowing when she did. Occasionally a 
baffled expression would move across her face and she would 
stare, first at her food, then at me. I came to learn that this was a 
sign of impending anxiety. During these times, she might throw 
her food across the room, reach out to slap my hand, shout out 
“no!”. Eating takes as long as it takes. 
 
Olfactory 
 
The following excerpt illustrates how the particular combinations of odours on 
the ward had become normalised for staff who work with them daily:  
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Walking with Eve, a healthcare support worker. She wheels a 
commode - cardboard bedpan of malaena - faeces, mucous and 
blood to the sluice. She deftly opens the lid of the macerator, 
dumps the bedpan inside, and closes it as it emits a grinding 
noise. The contents are pulverised and disappear into the waste 
pipe. She washes her hands, pumps a couple of squirts of 
alcohol hand rub on to her hands. Then she says, “I’m starving” 
and we go to the kitchen. She takes a plastic container of pasta 
bolognaise from the fridge and puts it into the microwave. I ask 
her how she manages to keep her appetite, to move so swiftly 
from excrement to food. “Oh, you just get used to it”, she tells 
me.  
 
I recognised this. As a nurse, I would have thought nothing of doing what she 
just did. Several years out of clinical practice and I noticed that my sensitivity to 
the aversive experience of disgust had returned. The kind of body work that 
nurses and healthcare support workers undertook required that they were able 
to manage the habituated responses to the smells of deteriorating human 
bodies. “Cadaverous, sick, disabled bodies…are all part of nursing work” 
(Holmes et al 2006, p305).  
 
Stoller, when describing his ethnographic research in Niger, Africa, described 
how his initial experience of the field was an assault on his senses. Over time 
he found that his sensory vulnerability was diminished: 
“I quickly lost touch with those scenes of abject deprivation which 
blended into those of insensitive consumption. I soon lost scent 
of the nose-crinkling stench of the open sewer that gave way to 
the aromatic aromas of roasting meat. My ears soon deafened to 
the moans of a sick child that were overwhelmed by the happy 
laughter of a healthy one. I had become an experience-hardened 
Africa hand. My immersion in Niger, in Africa, had been, in short, 
distanced, intellectualised - taken out of the realm of sensual 
sentiment. The world of ethnographic things had lost its tastes.” 
(Stoller 1989, p20)  
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Abjection, or distancing, is one way in which it is thought that nurses manage 
disgust (Lawler 2006). If abjection was important in order for nurses to engage 
in body work, and this is - as argued by Menzies Lyth - a means of self-
regulation, then it also has implications for the broader understanding of 
compassionate care.  
 
I argued in chapter 2 that one cannot study suffering without analysing the 
impact of intersubjectivity. I also suggested that this process requires embodied 
awareness. The same is true of the kind of body work carried out by nursing 
staff; it is through the body that many subtle aspects of relationship are 
identified. It might be suggested that the process of abjection led to a state of 
disembodied nursing, a distancing that could have adversely impacted upon 
sensitivity to the embodied aspects of suffering. Losing one’s dignity emerged 
as an important aspect of participants’ suffering. If nurses had become 
desensitised to bodily functions and processes then they may have also 
inadvertently have lost sensitivity to how this might be perceived as an affront to 
dignity. Edvardsson and Street (2007) suggest that the process of socialisation 
into nursing often involves ‘tuning out’ aspects of sensory experience that are 
associated with the bodily elements of nursing practice, that which Lawler 
termed “somology” (Lawler 2006). They suggest that this desensitisation may 
be a reason that much of nursing observational research is surprisingly 
disembodied, a view echoed by (Gadow 2001, p90) who suggests that 
disembodied nursing philosophising is akin to “trying to persuade us through 
argument that there is more to life than reason”.  
Motion 
 
Many kinds of walk were observed. Nurses tended to walk rapidly, purposefully, 
with the exception of a relatively new nurse and the student nurse. The rapidity 
of the walk seems aligned with the imperative to get things done efficiently and 
rapidly. One morning Kirsty walked from the patient bay towards the pod to 
hand over the patients she had been caring for that shift, she theatrically 
dragged her feet, with a pained expression. I asked her if she was alright.  
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“I’m so tired today. When I woke up I didn’t lift my feet high 
enough walking over the threshold of my bathroom. Cut my foot. 
I’m on autopilot today, feel like I’m running around without 
direction” 
 
Doctors’ walks were different again. They moved purposefully between patients, 
pushing the wheeled trolley of patient notes from one room to the next. The 
consultant would lead, and two or three junior doctors would follow. They 
parked the trolley outside the door, then went in - the consultant first. The junior 
doctors hung back and listened. Once the consultation was over, they 
regrouped as a huddle around the trolley to discuss their findings, differential 
diagnoses, investigations to be planned, clinical conundrums, leafing through 
the file. On the consultant’s say so, usually indicated by a change of tone of 
voice and closing of the patient’s notes, the huddle moved on to the next 
patient.  
 
At times the different staff walks clashed. Medical rounds generally started at 
around 09:00am, and often the patients were still finishing breakfast, having 
washes, using the toilet. On one occasion, the notes trolley was parked in the 
entrance to a bay, and Edith moved to push it aside so she could fit the 
commode past; she was taking it, somewhat hurriedly, to a patient who had 
been calling out to use the toilet. The consultant told her to wait, that he is in the 
middle of his medical round. She flushed and coloured, and retreated.  
 
For patients, walking was generally disapproved of, unless in the safe contained 
space of an encounter with a physiotherapist or rehabilitation assistance, where 
the prudent use of a range of devices (banana boards, walking frames, wheeled 
zimmers) enabled walking to take place safely. Cheryl believed that patients 
were often prevented from walking by staff because of a perception that it was 
easier and safer, but expressed concern that this led to a loss of independence, 
as well as tension when patients were required to navigate different staff 
expectations: “then the patients expect to be helped and when I’m telling them 
to walk they say, ‘well that other nurse, she gives me a bedpan…”. It was 
challenging when patients’ levels of mobility were variable: “like him, when you 
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stand him he can’t take his weight but I found him down the corridor with a 
visitor's chair the other day”. 
 
Figure 11: Walking a mile in their shoes 
 
 
Walking could also be seen as a proxy indicator of general health; one morning, 
Doris asked Dr Roberts how her general health was, and he responded “well, I 
just saw you walking back from the bathroom with your zimmer, I would say that 
your general health is not bad walking on this floor”. This was clearly 
understood. Doris beamed, adding “well at home I’ve got carpeted floors”, 
implying that things would be even easier. Being able to walk safely is the best 
ticket out of the ward (along with having mental capacity, a stable medical 
condition, and a family who agree with the decision to discharge). 
 
The speed of activity on the ward meant it was easy to forget to be still. Leaving 
the ward one day, I suddenly remembered my body: 
 
first breath of fresh air since 6:30 this morning and the sun is 
shining and it's warm, I can see it sparkling off the windows. It 
might have been sunny while I was inside, but I didn't really look, 
it's that kind of sterile one temperature environment in there, so it 
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passes you by. I haven't really had a feeling of what time of day 
being, and have not really been aware of hunger. I got my period 
and forgot about it, and forgot to do anything about it. It's a weird 
sort of distancing from my body and it seems like it happens to 
the nurses as well. They sit down on their breaks and it's kind of 
endlessly talking about their ailments and tiredness and backs 
on the ankles and things like that, so it's an effect. I think of being 
around bodies that are in such decrepit states that naturally 
forget about your own.  
Temporality 
 
In Phase 1 of this study where I was a participant observer I spent each shift 
following different staff, becoming acclimatised to their routine. My abiding 
memory of this time was of speed; there were always so many things to be 
done and seemingly so little time in which to do them. Staff continuously 
informed me - either directly or through behaviour - about how busy they were, 
and how there was never enough time to do the job. Those staff who were fast 
and efficient were talked about in admiring ways: “she gets the job done”, and 
“she is very experienced, very competent. No tasks get left over at the end of 
her shift”. Being motivated was more desirable than being unmotivated, being 
happy was more desirable than grumpy and in the following example, being fast 
was preferable to being slow: 
 
At the start of a shift I greet Becky, one of the nurses, a young 
and energetic staff nurse. “How are you?” I ask. “Alright”, she 
says, “Except I’m working with a bloody snail today”. She rolls 
her eyes and grins. Her right-hand nurse is Dot. A few days 
earlier, Dot describes herself as a spiritual and creative person. 
She practices mindfulness meditation, and tells me this helps 
with the stresses of the job. In her spare time, Dot writes poems 
and paints pictures. 
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Dot did not fit the ideal of the efficient nurse. She took her time over seeing 
patients, which sometimes meant the medications get given out late, or she was 
unavailable to help the healthcare support workers ‘finish washes’ before the 
doctors arrived for their morning round. In her attentiveness to each individual 
patient, Dot made herself less popular with her nursing colleagues. She 
regularly broke the rules that constituted the script of efficiency. It was not only 
nurses who prided themselves on speed. One morning, a junior registrar 
proudly reported to me that he had finished the medical round in under two 
hours. “18 patients” he grinned at me.  
The	Clock	
 
Patients experienced time very differently. When I entered Phase 2 of the 
fieldwork and began to spend time primarily with the patients I became 
increasingly aware of this discrepancy in the perception of time. There was a 
discernible change of pace. Staff rarely considered that boredom was an issue 
of concern for patients because as far as they were concerned, there was never 
enough time on a shift to get everything done. Time flew. Conversely, patients 
frequently perceived staff as busy and this often meant they did not ask for help 
as they felt they were imposing.  
 
 
At first, I was restless. It seemed there was always something happening 
somewhere else. I could hear the bustle of the ward but it was distant and the 
causes of the sounds were incomprehensible. I watched the clock and each 
hour takes an age. I found my concentration drifting, at times I became unsure 
as to what I was supposed to be observing. The early days of this practice were 
the hardest. Sometimes I was impatient for something to happen. When 
someone enters the room - to empty a catheter bag, to take a temperature - I 
was elevated, energised. When their visit is brief and perfunctory I was 
resentful. I wanted to be able to observe how they interacted with patients, but 
often these interactions were perfunctory, functional.  
 
It struck me that patients must feel similarly. Several patients had mentioned 
watching or staring at the clock. My enforced stillness gradually became a 
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valuable means of observing. Whilst it produced much less in the form of the 
voluminous field notes of the earlier days, it offered something new and 
different. It slowed down the field of observation, enabled me to separate out 
different sensory experiences, make use of imagination to feel into what it might 
be like to lie in these beds, sit in these chairs, and watch these clocks (Fig 12).  
 
Kermode refers to human endeavours to impose structure upon time, which is 
essentially disorganised and chaotic.  
“the clock’s ‘tick-tock’ I take to be a model of what we call a plot, 
an organisation which humanises time by giving it a form; and 
the interval between ‘tock’ and ‘tick’ represents purely 
successive, disorganised time of the sort we need to humanise” 
(Kermode 2000, p45) 
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Figure 12: Staring at the clock 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
The environment of Bluebell Ward was a ceaseless flow of stimuli. To an 
outsider the activities presented an impression of order and purposefulness, 
against a backdrop of various sensory phenomena that in aggregate conveyed 
coordinated activity and intentional movement. Patients often described that 
they were aware of how busy the staff are. Staff carried out their various 
activities while simultaneously prioritising and planning the remainder of what 
needs to be done.  
 
In Christopher Alexander’s celebrated ‘Pattern Language’, a series of 
connected patterns of design for interior and exterior spaces are presented, 
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placed in a context of the purpose for which the space is intended. In his vision 
of a pattern for complex healing environments he notes the importance of 
flexibility of space: 
 
“in a complex, social fabric, human relations are inevitably 
subtle. It is essential that each person feels free to make 
connections or not, to move or not, to talk or not, to change the 
situation or not, according to his judgement. If his physical 
environment inhibits him and reduces his freedom of action, it 
will prevent him from doing the best her can to keep healing” 
(Alexander 1977, p628) 
 
Alexander observes that because hospitals depend on sickness, in a sense 
they also contribute to its creation. Death is a human rite. Rites of all kinds 
cannot take place in an environment which specifically ignores them or makes 
them trivial. Seen in this light, the idea of a ‘care of the dying’ pathway 
prohibited the experience of dying as a psychosocial and spiritual experience. 
On the one hand, such tools seek to capture and guide best practice in many of 
the skilled aspects of caring for a dying person – controlling distressing 
symptoms, communicating with the person and their family, attending to spiritual 
needs. On the other hand, such pathways were filed in drawers along with 
weight charts, fluid intake and output charts, and other highly clinical aspects of 
care. They were not marked out as being different or special in any way, and so 
were treated as any other clinical pathway might be. Sudnow’s critique of dying 
in hospital (1966) although now almost half a century old, observed that the 
hospital dealt with the biological aspects of death, and many people underwent 
social death prior to the moment of the cessation of bodily functioning. This 
observation is still pertinent; there is little on a care pathway to identify this 
person as any different from anyone else whose biological body is dying. 
 
The content of this chapter has served two purposes. Firstly, it has established 
for the reader a sense of the field of study in order to place all subsequent data 
in context without the need to again describe the physical environment. This 
‘field’ has been conceptualised in sensory as well as functional terms. Secondly, 
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it has laid the groundwork for what will be returned to in chapter 9 when I 
explore the role of the environment in iatrogenic suffering. In the next chapter I 
examine more closely the kinds of practices involved in direct patient care in the 
context of end-of-life care.   
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Chapter 5: Rock, Paper, Scissors 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The subject matter for this chapter is the way in which professional identity and 
personal beliefs informed the direction of care. Care of older people was 
provided in a complex environment, by a dispersed multi-professional team, to 
patients whose illness trajectory was characterised by ambiguity and frequent 
changes in condition. This chapter continues the work of describing the ‘field’ 
that was begun in the previous chapter, but now focuses this on to the team and 
its practices. I begin by describing Bourdieu’s ‘logic of practice’ (1990, 1992) as 
the theoretical lens. I continue with an overview of ward culture (comprising 
various subcultures), supported with selected examples from the fieldwork. I 
draw on the concepts of field, habitus, doxa and capital to explore mechanisms 
of power at play within and between these subcultures. Three distinct 
discourses were suggested, each constituting a different ideology of care where 
ideology was understood to refer to a system of ideas, or set of beliefs, adhered 
to by a group of individuals. 
 
I term these ideologies rescue, rehabilitation and release. I describe ways in 
which they differ in their historical roots and clinical foci. For each ideology, I 
present an illustrative case study from the data, then I examine what happens 
when things were not quite as clear, as for example when people transitioned 
from ‘living with’ to ‘dying from’ a condition. I suggest that the ideologies were 
often closely aligned with particular professionals, and each dictated a particular 
direction of care. By way of illustrating how these positions interact, the example 
of the game ‘rock, paper, scissors’ has been chosen as the title for this chapter. 
Like in the game, decisions in practice must be made at speed and without 
knowing what the outcome is going to be. If I were to choose ‘paper’ and my 
opponent’s choice was ‘rock’, I would win. However, if they were to choose 
‘scissors’, my paper would be ‘cut’ and I would lose. The ideological positions 
stood alone; a rock has no insight into what it is like to be a piece of paper, and 
vice versa. Clinical situations presented uncertainty; pursuing the goal of rescue 
means that simultaneously considering palliative needs was difficult. However, 
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the relationship between ideologies was, I shall argue, not an equal one as in 
the game. I will demonstrate through exploring the clinical disciplines most 
closely associated with each ideology that there were differences in power 
which meant that there was usually a dominant ideology, and that this was likely 
to be the default position in situations of uncertainty.  
 
The ideology of rescue - located in the clinical practice of acute medicine and 
regulated within the broader context of neoliberalism and healthcare 
bureaucracy - dominated over the other two when ethically problematic clinical 
decisions needed to be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty or ambiguity. I 
suggest that the dominance of the rescue ideology was a consequence of the 
unequal distribution of symbolic capital between the different professional 
groups who were involved in the decision-making process, and was reinforced 
by risk-averse practices that characterise ward and hospital culture. This could 
in some cases cause or exacerbate patient suffering, particularly where it 
resulted in inappropriate or burdensome interventions at the end of life.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Perspectives: Bourdieu’s Logic of Practice 
 
This chapter considers the relevance of Bourdieu’s theory of practice for 
understanding how the different clinical positions relate in the ‘field’ of the ward 
and wider hospital. Firstly, I define his main concepts that will be increasingly 
drawn upon as the thesis develops. For each of these, I briefly explain why this 
concept became useful in understanding the practices that were observed. 
 
Pierre Bourdieu was a prolific anthropologist and sociologist who was 
concerned with ways in which power is sustained within societies and is a 
product of both individual and societal processes (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992; Grenfell 2014). He rejected the traditional division between 
subjective and objective explanatory theories, and proposed instead a simple 
explanation that sought to examine the interface between the individual and the 
societal, particularly focusing on the ways in which power is transferred across 
generations. His conceptual framework posits an interaction between individual 
agency and structures where neither can determine lifestyles or practices. He 
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rejected the notion of freedom, suggesting instead that the construction of 
individual identity takes place within constraints presented by social legacy.  
 
Bourdieu’s philosophical position was that people’s actions are neither 
determined by structure nor by complete freedom of choice. Instead, people are 
bound by a legacy of characteristics and dispositions, formed of their upbringing 
and social standing which collide with their objective circumstances at a given 
point in life. It is the combination of these events which dictate the extent of 
freedom one has, the degree of power to act within a particular field, and the 
comparative social standing with others in that field. He believed the 
constraining influence on freedom of choice results from a combination of field 
and habitus, where the former refers to the context in which the individual is 
seeking to act, and the latter refers to a set of dispositions that have resulted 
from objective conditions (Robbins 2016).  
5.2.1 Habitus 
Habitus refers to a system of “durable, transposable dispositions” that exists in 
relation to the objective structures that constitute the social world (Bourdieu 
1977, p72). Habitus includes the thoughts, emotions and perceptions that a 
person acquires within their social position, which leads to people having a 
natural way of thinking about things that is consistent with others who share 
their location in the social world (Williams 1995). Importantly, habitus 
establishes a set of social practices that are outside normal conscious 
awareness; these practices have their own logic. Bourdieu describes agents as 
having a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1990, p61) when enacting aspects of 
habitus, implying an intentionality, yet one without consciousness (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). Bourdieu suggests that habitus is what gives an individual 
consistency in the ways that they act. It is perhaps best understood as a set of 
internalised structures that have themselves been produced by the environment 
in which an individual finds themselves. So, habitus is formed of the objective 
structures of the world, but it dictates how one acts in the world too.  
 
Habitus is unconscious, so internalised are the patterns. It is also pre-reflective, 
such that an individual asked about a particular action may not be able to 
articulate a rationale for said action. Bourdieu suggests that for this reason it is 
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unhelpful for researchers to ask why a person is performing a particular action, 
as the action may well be a product of habitus and result from a taken-for-
granted set of circumstances that defy explanation and explication. Habitus is 
shared, to an extent, between members of the same societal group. Although 
not identical, such members will have more in common with habitus of others in 
the group than with the habitus of people in a different group. Finally, habitus is 
specific to a particular field and only operates within that field. The kinds of 
values that are defined as normal by a particular group are operative only in one 
context; in another context, their accumulated set of dispositions may be very 
different and they may demonstrate a different degree of symbolic capital.  
 
The reason for adopting habitus as a theoretical perspective in this thesis is as 
a way to understand the differences between what people did, and what they 
said that they did. It also provided a valuable mechanism for making sense of 
how various practices were reproduced over time by different agents in the field. 
For example, patient habitus was unlikely to be compatible with this new and 
unfamiliar field. They had not yet developed a ‘feel for the game’ or the kinds of 
internalised structures that give preconscious awareness of how one might 
need to operate in order to gain status within the field.11  
 
Another example was the way in which professionals on the ward shared 
habitus more closely within their perceived in-group (primarily defined 
professionally in this context). The doctors occupied a different room on the 
ward during their breaks, one which could only be accessed using a key code 
and which housed a shelf of medical textbooks, a computer and a telephone. In 
this space topic of conversation were varied; talk of holidays, analysis of the 
comparative generosity of different consultants with regards to expectations for 
on-call cover. The computer in the doctors’ room was never switched on. 
Should a doctor need to access information about a patient or disease, they 
would do so on the computer terminals in the nursing pods, in full view of the 
staff. Nursing and ancillary staff spent their break time in the ‘day room’ a space 
                                            
11 Note that this can change over time when patients become institutionalised; the ‘feel for the game’ can 
be learned and patients can develop the knowledge and skills to enable them to successfully navigate the 
field and acquire capital despite beginning from having diminished agency. 
   109 
intended for use by patients and families as well as staff, but which in reality 
was only accessed by relatives when there were difficult conversations to be 
had, and as far as I could tell, never accessed by patients. It primarily 
functioned as a space for nursing and ancillary staff to spend their breaks. The 
day room had no computer. There was a small pile of glossy magazines, 
“Hello!”, and “Yorkshire Life”.  
 
The differences between these groups of staff was particularly noticeable when 
the spatial boundaries were transgressed. Fran, a new medical registrar on the 
ward, arrived on a day when the regular Consultant was not working. Not 
knowing about the place where the doctors took their breaks, she sat herself at 
the table in the Day Room and took out a piece of fruit. Two nurses, sitting 
opposite, sipped their drinks largely in silence, sometimes exchanging 
pleasantries. On one level this interaction can be seen as simply the arrival of a 
new person in an already-established social group, and the resultant 
dissonance is there as mutual scrutiny. Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic capital is 
resonant here; symbolic capital is automatically assigned to members of a 
particular group. Fran, as a doctor, transported her habitus with her into this 
new field; her habitus, a composite of her capital, resulted in a state where she 
knew how to behave with the other medics despite not having met them before, 
but when she met the nursing and ancillary staff there was an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and dissonance as the staff evaluated Fran, apparently seeking to 
ascertain what ‘type’ of doctor she would turn out to be. 
5.2.2 Doxa 
Doxa refers to commonly-held beliefs and is used by Bourdieu to describe the 
relationship between the senses of reality that is created by habitus. Bourdieu 
uses the term to explain that which is taken for granted in a particular societal 
group; it describes what is thought by members of that group to be self-evident 
and require no explanation or elucidation (Bourdieu 1972, p164). Doxa is 
predicated upon how closely there is a connection between the field and its 
objective structures, and the internalised structures in a person’s habitus 
(Throop and Murphy 2002b). There is a relationship between doxa and the 
dominant classes in that the latter have a vested interest in defending such 
taken-for-granted beliefs, whilst those with less power would potentially benefit 
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from exposure of such beliefs. The concept is similar to Husserl’s idea of the 
natural attitude, discussed in chapter 2. Doxa became an important theoretical 
concept during the observations as it became increasingly clear that staff spoke 
about dying people in ways that were taken-for-granted by them, but not my 
relatives. The narratives featuring Arthur, Ellen and Dot were key examples of 
doxa. Crucially, when questioned about various decisions in the context of end-
of-life care, few staff were able to explain exactly what it was they had done, or 
why. Doxa was closely related to the type of dying most commonly seen on the 
ward. Typically, this was an episode of rapid decline following a prolonged 
period of uncertainty. The movement of responsibility between the medical and 
nursing staff followed predictable patterns, which will be explored further later in 
this chapter.  
5.2.3 Field 
Bourdieu describes the field as: 
 
“a network, or configuration, of objective relations between 
positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their 
existence and in the determinations they impose upon their 
occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential 
situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of 
power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their 
objective relation to other positions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992, p97)  
 
The field refers to a network of people with shared habitus. Society comprises a 
network of fields – each of which has a particular internal logic. The ward can 
be seen as a set of autonomous but related fields occupied by different 
professional groups and by patients and visitors. Agents within a particular field 
belong there because of their particular capital. There is a constant struggle to 
maintain or improve one’s position within that field. The field is the context 
within which the habitus operates. Agents within a field will possess a particular 
attitude and aptitude which dictates action. Within the field, there are 
   111 
‘regularities’ in the form of continually reproduced practices, shaped by habitus 
but also involved in shaping habitus.  
 
Here, the field refers primarily to Bluebell Ward and is bounded by the 
geographical margins of that space. However, Bourdieu’s notion of field was 
useful in more ways than just delineating a physical space. It refers to the 
particular context in which action happened, and also considers how fields 
interacted within one another. So, nurses were attached to the ward and work 
set shift patterns. Leaving the ward during a shift was unusual except for 
specific purposes – fetching a piece of equipment, for example. Doctors worked 
across a number of wards and their arrival on Bluebell ward heralded a 
particular change in activity. Allied health professionals such as 
physiotherapists occupied a field that includes the whole hospital, and they 
must prioritise their interventions each day according to clinical need. Patients 
and families occupied a different field; one that was often restricted to a single 
room. The same applied for the matron, and the site commander. The edges of 
the various fields occupied were unique, if porous and overlapping. 
Understanding how the different fields interfaced provided useful perspective on 
the different practices observed, in particular some of the struggles that took 
place both within and between fields. This is further explored later in this 
chapter and in chapter 9. 
5.2.4 Capital  
 
A final central concept drawn from Bourdieu is that of capital. Capital dictates 
one’s position within the field. There are five forms of capital. Economic and 
cultural capital refer to legitimate knowledge, as acquired through (for example) 
training as a medical doctor or other professional. Social capital describes one’s 
position as being involved in relationships with other people; nurses acquire 
social capital through their interactions with patients and their families, matrons 
hold relationships with those at a hospital managerial level that conveys a 
degree of social capital upon them within the broader field of the hospital. 
Symbolic capital describes prestige; it is conveyed upon an individual by 
another individual. Positive public perceptions of doctors are an example of how 
symbolic capital is transmitted to particular groups in society. Finally, one has a 
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degree of capital that relates to one’s body; this is termed physical capital.  
 
Not all forms of capital are equal. There is always a dominant group of people 
who possess cultural capital that bestows upon them power over other groups. 
This enables members of that group to define what is considered to be normal - 
a situation which then dictates how those with less power are expected to act. 
This also enables the creation of what is considered to be abnormal. There are 
no objective normal rules that govern societal activity; actions that are 
considered to be acceptable are only thus because this has been established 
by the dominant group or class of people. Within the network of fields in the 
hospital ward, patients are essentially stripped of their social capital; their prior 
worlds are seldom incorporated into how they are treated. In Homo Academicus 
Bourdieu identifies medicine as a form of social art that “uses a legitimately 
invested social power … that is more linked to tradition than to science” 
(Bourdieu 1984, cited in Lopes 2013, p821) It is this investment of social power 
that confers symbolic capital on to doctors and results in the perception that 
medicine is - in terms of absolute knowledge - superior to other agents within 
the field of health. As an example, nurses may have acquired symbolic capital 
by practising at advanced levels, which confer upon them greater cultural 
capital and hence greater power to act within the field (Lopes, Sobrinho and 
Costa 2013). However, as discussed earlier older person’s medicine is 
generally poorly perceived within nursing (Cornwell 2012) and none of the nurse 
participants had undertaken any additional study or qualifications following their 
core registration degree or diploma, other than that which enabled them to 
mentor student nurses. As a group, they were restricted in acquiring additional 
capital that might facilitate greater agency.  
 
5.3 Three Ideologies 
 
Next, I describe three discourses identified in the range of clinical care provided 
on Bluebell Ward. I present these as ideologies, each informed by a particular 
set of historical and social circumstances, and consider how each of these were 
enacted in practice. To do this I apply the theory of each of these to a particular 
example from the fieldwork, describing an exemplar of that approach to care.  
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5.3.1 Rescue 
Acute Medicine 
 
Patients experiencing acute exacerbations of their conditions, or those admitted 
with new medical problems, were treated using a traditional acute medical 
approach. Acute care refers to the “health system components, or care delivery 
platforms, used to treat sudden, often unexpected, urgent or emergent episodes 
of injury and illness that can lead to death or disability without rapid intervention” 
(Hirshon et al. 2013, p386). An acute care intervention is defined by the urgent 
temporal nature of intervention, rather than the location of care or the use of 
technology. This approach is focused on the intended outcome of improving 
health, which is at the core of the rescue ideology. The model includes trauma 
care and surgery, emergency care, urgent care, pre-hospital care, critical care 
and short-term stabilisation. 
The Ideology of Rescue  
Although hospitals, historically, evolved as places of care for the poor and were 
run by charitable and religious groups, in recent decades they have become 
centres of teaching, medical technology and increasing professionalisation. 
Society often views hospitals as symbols of medical technological progress 
(Van Der Geest and Finkler 2004; Finkler et al. 2008; Mol 2008; Chapple 2010). 
Chapple (2010) suggests that hospitals recreate broader societal values around 
heroism and rescue by giving priority to effectiveness and efficiency.  
Rescue Exemplar: “Scoring 4 on the MEWS” 
The following excerpt from the field notes shows an example of a patient for 
whom the goal of care was rescue. The title of this section refers to the use of 
the “Modified Early Warning System”, or “MEWS”, which aggregates 
physiological observational data such as blood pressure and pulse, to predict 
patients at risk of deterioration or death (Cei et al. 2009). In the following 
example, I went with Hannah to see ‘David’, a patient, who I recalled from 
having talked with him in the corridor the previous day. I encountered a very 
different man. The first thing I recall noticing was the odour. This was difficult to 
describe in words but I remember a mentor, early in my nursing training, 
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describing it as a ‘poorly smell’. David was drowsy, his eyes sunken, and his 
upper false teeth had become somewhat detached, dropping to the floor of his 
mouth. Hannah lifted his blanket to look at his catheter bag, which is bright red 
with blood:  
 
Hannah (to Kirsty): “He’s not for a call12”  
Two doctors arrive - a flurry of questions, palpation, verbalising 
out loud, looking at his chart. Things are noted which are later 
explained to me – blood in the catheter bag, sleepiness, low 
oxygen levels, fast heartbeat  
Dr Rockwood (to Dr Burton): “Bilateral hernias, nice soft liver, 
good bowel sounds”  
Then (to David): “Are you alright?”  
David raises eyebrows in an effort to open his eyes and nods 
slowly, then doses off again. Meanwhile, nurses record vital 
signs – oxygen levels, blood pressure, pulse. All of these 
parameters are captured on the “MEWS” (Medical Early Warning 
System) sheet. He’s scoring 4, meaning - requires “immediate 
medical review”. 
Within minutes oxygen is given through nasal cannulae. Another 
tube is inserted into a twisted, tortuous vein on the back of his 
hand - an infusion of saline to boost his blood pressure. A 
second drip is started - broad-spectrum antibiotics for what is 
presumed to be a severe urinary tract infection.  
 
Throughout this activity, David was oblivious. He remained drowsy and grey. I 
went home sensing I would not meet him again, but when I returned the 
following day, I was astonished. David was sitting up in the chair by his bedside, 
                                            
12 This was commonly used language to mean a patient was not for cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation in the event of a cardiac arrest. It was one of the key pieces of information 
handed over between shifts, and patients who were not for a call were also identified on the 
patient whiteboard on the corridor with a magnetic red heart displayed by their names. 
   115 
drinking a cup of tea, commenting loudly on the activity of the other patients in 
the bay. I asked Hannah what happened: “Oh, yes, it was a UTI. He’s loads 
better today”. She was almost dismissive of this, as though it were merely an 
everyday occurrence on the ward. Which, I reflected, it was.  
 
This event was an example of where the focus of care was narrowed and 
prioritised with relative ease. Doctors made the decisions, and the nurses 
enacted them. David’s clinical deterioration dictated all activity, with little 
discussion required. Wordlessly, the nurses gathered up oxygen masks, tubing, 
fluid monitoring charts, sharps boxes for disposal of needles; the tools of their 
trade. The miracle of antibiotics is largely taken for granted these days. Seventy 
years ago, he would have been likely to die.  
5.3.2 Rehabilitation 
Roberts explained that he chose to work in older people’s care because 
“geriatrics is the last true generalism. Everyone is a mystery to be solved”. He 
enjoyed the “detective work”, an example of which is shown in the following 
example, in which Dr Roberts is thinking out loud through the process of 
differential diagnosis, to an audience of his registrars and myself: 
 
Dr Roberts: “So when did she come to hospital to begin with? 
She comes in, starts this …so she comes in with what they think 
is a stroke and she goes straight across and she’s on Stroke 
Unit…do we have the stool…so she starts with type 4 and then 
she goes to type 6…she starts on lansoprazole on 13th…and 
when did she start the loose stools. She’s having type 4 loose 
stools on 24th and there isn’t any evidence that she was having 
diarrhoea before she was admitted. Well it’s probably worth 
having a look to see if we can find her previous, her baseline if 
we can. So, she’s having type 7 on 16th and when does she go 
to nursing home…so she goes on 17th. So, it looks like she 
came to us because..”  
At this point, he took his eyes of his notes and turned to Dr Burton, his junior 
registrar, and said, “Well?” She floundered a little, and he rescued her with a 
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detailed explanation of his differential diagnosis. Once finished, the juniors were 
suitably impressed. A treatment decision had been made and sense created out 
of chaos. 
The Ideology of Rehabilitation  
The aims of contemporary geriatric medicine are twofold. Firstly, reversibility, or 
the accurate identification of reversible conditions in order to avoid inappropriate 
or burdensome interventions, and secondly, rehabilitation, or the restoration or 
maximising of function to enable, as far as possible, independence and 
wellbeing. Rehabilitation aims to narrow the gap between what the patient can 
do and what the environment requires (Barton and Mulley 2003) necessitating 
changes to the patient - in the form of medicines and rehabilitation - or to the 
environment, in the form of home adaptations, changes in the place of care, or 
increased support. The ideology driving geriatric medicine has been termed 
rehabilitation for the purposes of this discussion, although it includes the 
element of reversibility discussed above. Obtaining a balance between 
investigations and treatments was intended to enable avoidance of 
inappropriate interventions, as suggested by the following extract from the field 
notes: 
 
Dr Roberts introduces himself to a new patient, who is just two 
months short of her 100th birthday. He palpates her belly, asks 
questions, notes features of her physical appearance that may 
offer clues as to her pathology (flushed cheeks, tremor). Outside 
her room he discusses her lack of formal diagnosis with his 
cluster of junior doctors. "At nearly 100 I'd look to put her through 
as few invasive investigations as we can get away with" he 
concludes. 
 
Several members of staff from a range of professional backgrounds were at 
pains to tell me they only worked on the ward because it was part of their 
training, or because it was the only place where a job was available. Dr Frank 
told me he hoped to work in “gastro, where it’s acute. I don’t like care of the 
elderly; it’s just generalist care really”. This division between generalist and 
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specialist care appeared to be associated with a differential degree of capital; 
doctors working in specialisms were afforded greater status.  
 
Geriatric Medicine 
 
The divided views between geriatric medicine and acute care could to an extent 
be traced back to the historical roots of older person’s care. In the United 
Kingdom in the early 20th century older people considered ‘incurable’ were 
placed in workhouses, institutions largely run by nurses. Here, they lived 
alongside people with physical and learning disabilities and severe mental 
health problems. In 1935, when the Isleworth Infirmary adopted responsibility 
for a neighbouring workhouse, a physician named Marjory Warren assumed 
responsibility for its management. She found many residents living in squalid 
conditions and in varying states of neglect and decrepitude. Many had infected 
pressure sores and signs of mental distress. She began a process of 
assessment and management that was to later lead to the development of the 
clinical speciality of geriatric medicine (Warren 1943; Ritch 2012). She 
recognised that many of these conditions were reversible or treatable, and 
objected strongly to the notion that old age was a reason for dying in and of 
itself; a person always dies from some condition or complication. Warren was 
the first doctor known to implement discharge planning. One of her most 
significant contributions, which remains a core tenet in geriatric medicine today, 
was the notion of assessing rehabilitative potential. On returning from a visit 
to Warren’s county hospital, George Adams wrote that “she gave me a practical 
illustration of what we might one day hope to achieve with the human wreckage 
in the overcrowded wards of the City Hospital” (Barton and Mulley 2003, p230-
231). Yet it was to be a further thirteen years before the first consultant 
geriatrician was appointed, and even longer before geriatric medicine was 
integrated into acute hospital care (Evans 1997).  
 
The first British consultants were in the main located within workhouses and 
hospices, with restricted access to private medicine. This division contributed to 
the view at that time by many in other clinical areas that geriatrics was a lesser 
profession than other specialisms. This professional schism was partly reduced 
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following widespread recognition that the expertise of the expanding workforce 
of geriatric medicine could be useful in hospitals, and as their role extended to 
hospitals, many other specialisms have drawn from the acquired wisdom of 
geriatrics to apply the principles to their own areas - including rationalisation of 
treatments reduction of un-necessary medication, rehabilitation and the creation 
and maintenance of a healthy environment. However, older people’s care has 
perhaps never quite fitted in to the busy acute hospital world, consistently facing 
challenges in how best to meet the complex needs of older people whilst 
satisfying the political demands of the hospital and its economy - notably the 
omnipresent requirement for ‘patient flow’ and freeing up hospital beds.  
 
Nursing staff had different motivations drawing them to work in older people’s 
care; for some, it was the first place they found work after qualification and they 
had grown to love it, despite some feeling admitting a level of ambivalence in 
the early days. For Becky, going into nursing was accidental; she had wanted to 
enter the police force but for physical reasons was unable to do so. She loved 
the busyness, the buzz, and the challenge. She hated weekends: “They’re so 
boring” she told me. For Kirsty, it was a chance to meet people; she preferred 
weekends, when there were no doctors’ rounds “and you can just focus on the 
patients”. Helen hoped to progress in her career, having only recently qualified, 
but considered that older person’s care “gives you all-round experience in 
medical”. For some, the attraction was faith-based or cultural. There were 
several staff who were born or trained as nurses in countries other than the UK. 
Alvar, from Spain, entered nursing after caring for his dying grandfather. He told 
me that caring for older people could be satisfying “when you can reduce the 
suffering”. For Mercy, a devout Christian from Namibia, it was God who sent her 
to work, to fulfil her duty in helping people to find their strengths. Brett was 
originally from the Caribbean and had worked in different clinical settings, but 
loved working with older people because “they know things. They make you 
humble.”  
Ned’s Shepherd’s Pie  
 
Ned had dementia and was admitted with a severe chest infection. Initially 
treated as though he were dying, he had improved over recent days and a new 
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problem had arisen; the fact that he had not eaten for several days but that he 
had lost his ability to swallow safely. The following excerpt was taken from a 
longer conversation between Dr Basu and his daughter, Gail, in the Day Room. 
It is a particularly lengthy entry because it demonstrates the oscillation that took 
place while trying to come to the decision, and the various influences upon the 
doctor and on Gail.  
 
Dr Basu: “Your dad, he was admitted with a water infection - his 
blood tests are showing that he is much better and he has had 
some but not all of his medicine, because he pulls the cannula 
out. The only thing he's had since admission is fluid. I know he is 
95 but if we don't give him food soon his body will break down, 
his albumin is already very low and this will get worse. SALT saw 
him and think that if he eats food it will go into his lungs and 
cause a chemical pneumonia which is not nice, so there is a big 
question mark about how now we are going to feed him. If it is by 
mouth it is a big risk, a big danger. The other better option from a 
nutritional position would be an NG tube. This is not easy 
because we have to insert it blind - we would withdraw some 
gastric fluid and test it to make sure that it is in the right place, 
and he would have an X-ray to be certain it has passed into his 
stomach. Antibiotics will be much easier to give this way, but the 
main problem is that he might pull this out. If he does, we will put 
it back in again, and if he pulls it out we would put it in again but 
with a clip to hold it in his nose. A third option is a PEG feed, but 
this is a very drastic option” 
Next, he explains the procedure…”we use a light to locate...there 
is a string...the catheter is withdrawn....the tube is inserted... The 
advantage here is that you can maintain nutrition. There are 
some side effects...infection, pulling it out...usually this is done 
as a last resort”, concluding with: “We thought it would be nice 
before we take action to talk to you”  
Daughter: “But yesterday he had shepherd's pie...it's not very 
pleasant, the thought of having a tube”  
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Dr Basu: “But to keep someone alive they can only be kept alive 
for a few days on fluids. We need to think about quality of life. Is 
he independent?”  
Daughter: “I've noticed since my mum's died that he's sort of 
given up”  
Dr Basu: “Has he ever expressed that he's had enough?” 
Daughter: “Yes, he has”  
Dr Basu: “We try and prolong life with any means we have as 
doctors. We could take a risk, perhaps give him food and see. If 
he gets pneumonia he has had a good life but now as you say 
he is lonely...on the other hand though, he is improving. 
Confusion is much better and whether he has underlying 
dementia is another question.”  
Daughter: “I don't know how he would react” 
Dr Basu: “I think of it as a battlefield, when we have someone in 
front of me who is moribund we do everything. But my other hat 
is as a human being...he's 94, lives alone, wife died...is it treating 
with all the tubes and things that are giving more trouble? The 
only reason I support the feeding is that he wasn't bedbound, he 
was mobile. If he had been bedbound, incontinent, needing all 
cares, I would have been different. I will be guided by you. We 
can take a risk and feed him by mouth” 
Daughter: “It's difficult, isn't it? How long would it be for? 
Forever?” 
Dr Basu: “It's not a pleasant thing, he might pull it would so we'd 
put a bridle in on the third time and by that time we would make 
a decision about PEG feeding. IF the tube stays properly...by 
Monday if we still have to feed him by tube, if he pulls it out at 
least we'll have done something” 
Daughter: “It's difficult, isn't it? Could we not give him a try with 
food?” 
Dr Basu: “Yes, I am probably insisting a bit much...yes if that is 
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the feeling we will try food” 
(Dr Basu turns and asks me what I think. He seems uncertain, 
and in need of support for this decision. Tricky!! do I answer with 
researcher hat, nurses hat, or daughter's hat.)  
Me: "If it were my dad, he loves food. He would be mortified to 
think he wasn't allowed to eat anymore"  
Dr Basu: “If I was wearing another hat I would agree with Laura”  
Daughter: “Yes, I am happy with that”  
She leaves.  
Dr Basu shrugs and looks at me, clearly concerned. "What can 
you do?" The junior registrar looks relieved, smiles at me.  
 
A few minutes later, Ned’s daughter went into his room and took the NBM13 sign 
from the door. "Guess what dad, they've said you're allowed some lunch", she 
said. Ned smiled and said “Oh, good”. A mug of soup was brought and she 
began to feed him. He slurped a spoonful, coughed wetly, and smiled. "I were 
bloody starving" he sighed. 
5.3.3 Release 
 
In some instances, the transition from recovering or stabilising to dying was 
uncertain. A person may still have been actively treated in the hope that they 
might respond, even while they deteriorated. For patients with comorbidities or 
non-malignant diseases the timing of this transition was particularly ambiguous, 
and often this meant that dying was identified late (excerpt 1, from an informal 
conversation over lunch with a group of nurses) or that there was uncertainty 
regarding how likely the patient was to die (excerpt 2, from an MDT meeting): 
 
1. Rachel: “There was a man in that middle bay, he was a 
youngish man with a family. The doctors pumped him so full of 
                                            
13 ‘Nil By Mouth” 
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fluid even though he had no output, he literally ballooned, there 
was fluid on his lungs, his skin was breaking down, it was just 
awful. It was over the weekend that it got really bad - none of the 
on-call doctors wanted to make a decision to stop because they 
were frightened about going against the consultant’s orders, they 
don’t want to overrule a consultant decision.”  
2. Dr Fischer: “The next patient, in 4 - we’ve had her before”...  
Sue: “She’s the one who nearly died then didn’t then sat about 
for ages waiting for home…can’t recall what they’ve doing with 
her treatment-wise…is she dying again?"  
Dr Burton: “She’s practising…"  
 
The point at which a patient was considered to be ‘end of life’ was subject to 
much debate (see for example Christakis and Lamont 2000; Brereton et al. 
2012; Bristowe et al. 2015). Individual patient variables and responses to 
treatment can confound prognosis, leading to both over- and underestimates. 
Most of the patients on the ward had chronic long-term conditions, usually more 
than one which could be considered life-limiting. The point at which a person 
could be said to be ‘dying’ was also unclear. A patient could be at the ‘end of 
life’ in the terms of the End of Life Care Strategy (implying that they had a 
prognosis of less than a year), or they could be actively dying, as articulated by 
the former Liverpool Care Pathway, implying a prognosis of hours to days. 
Those who were actively dying were much more readily identified than those in 
their last year of life.   
 
Resuscitation 
 
Authorising dying meant that it was usually necessary to make the decision to 
withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation from those for whom it was considered 
to be futile or harmful. Indeed, an outcome measure for quality of care in the 
hospital was the proportion of patients who died with a valid ‘Do Not Attempt 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation’ (DNACPR) order in place. The End of Life Care 
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Strategy advocates enhancing the identification of people who are likely to be in 
the last year of life (Department of Health 2008a). The following field note was 
written during morning handover: 
 
 “Bert, not for a call, came in with…Rita, she’s still for a 
call…Paul, not for a call.”  
They are talking about cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Why the 
euphemism?  
 
Reflecting later on the above note, I wondered if this happened because some 
doors are open and patients might hear if the terminology were more accurate. 
Or perhaps the nurses felt discomfort at speaking out loud of a status that 
ultimately equates to a decision made that a person’s illness is too severe, or 
their body too frail, to survive cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Such a life-
and-death matter, it had over time become as routine as discussing bowel 
charts, fluid intake, and other such information. 
 
Identifying those for whom CPR would be unlikely to be beneficial was not an 
exact science, for the same reasons that presented difficulties in 
prognostication. Doubts diminished once dying appeared imminent. Care in the 
last days of life was relatively standardised, and a part of this was issuing a 
DNACPR form. Although no longer shaped by the Liverpool Care of the Dying 
Pathway (LCP) which had been withdrawn the previous year (Neuberger et al. 
2013). In its place, the Integrated Care of the Dying Plan (ICOD) had been 
implemented in all clinical areas in the hospital; this looked remarkably similar to 
the LCP and had even been slotted into the same section the filing cabinet (Fig 
13). Commencement of the ICOD indicates that the patient was thought to be in 
their last days of life.  
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Figure 13: A pathway by any other name 
 
 
The ICOD gave staff permission to shift the focus of care. Once a patient was 
commenced on the ICOD the doctor’s involvement reduced significantly, and 
care became almost exclusively the remit of the nurses. When a person was 
commenced on the care of the dying pathway, nurses were able to follow 
protocol. The majority of symptoms could be controlled using four ‘anticipatory’ 
medications. This seemed to mitigate against any anxiety they may have 
expressed during the liminal stage where death appeared inevitable but had not 
been explicitly articulated by the medical team. 
The Ideology of Release 
The ideology of palliative care relates to ideas of quality of life and the holistic 
care of people with life-limiting conditions. Core to this is Saunder’s notion of 
‘total pain’ (Saunders 2006), which I return to in chapter 814. If a patient’s illness 
was thought to no be longer amenable to curative intervention, there were two 
                                            
14 Note that the palliative care ‘ideology’ has been recently critiqued; see, for example (Randall and 
Downie 2006; Paley 2014b) 
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options. If their condition was stable and their prognosis reasonable, the aim 
was to rehabilitate them to restore their function to a level at which they could 
function ideally in their usual place of care, but if not, at a level which enabled 
them to be discharged from the hospital to a different place of care. If, however, 
their condition was poor or their prognosis guarded, the focus of care shifted to 
palliation. This change in gear was accompanied by a discernible switch from 
medicine to nursing in the enactment of day-to-day practices. Once deemed 
‘palliative’, there were certain key medical tasks to be completed. These 
included signing the ‘Do Not Attempt Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation’ 
(DNACPR) order, writing up anticipatory medications for injection in case of 
common symptoms, and informing the patient’s family of their approaching 
death. Other clinical decisions often also needed to be made, such as the 
withdrawal of certain treatments that were no longer deemed to be being 
effective, or the conversion of oral medications to a subcutaneous route. After 
these medical decisions had been made, care was effectively handed over to 
the nursing staff: 
 
I ask Dr Basu if Dot is his patient. “No”, he tells me, “I reviewed 
her on Friday and have spoken to the family. But she is palliative 
now”.  
 
I was curious about the “but”. It implied that she was no longer requiring 
anything by way of medical input. Releasing a patient from attempt to cure, or 
rescue means absolving the doctors of their key responsibilities. Often, 
however, care was transferred to the nurses with some aspect of these tasks 
left undone. This was a source of irritation and frustration for the nursing staff. 
The absence of a DNACPR order, for example, could mean that nurses were 
obliged to perform resuscitation in the event of a cardiopulmonary arrest on a 
patient who was dying - an intervention which was rarely successful in older 
patients who were dying and which could therefore be distressing for families 
and staff alike.  
Palliative Medicine 
Palliative medicine is a relatively recent addition to the acute hospital care 
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setting. Palliative medicine was only recognised as a clinical subspecialty in the 
UK with the establishment of the Association of Palliative Medicine in 1987 
(Clark et al. 2005; Clark 2016). Two years later the World Health Organization 
defined palliative care. Five years later it was given status as a specialty in its 
own right. Today, specialist palliative care is provided in many settings, and 
even though hospice care continues to be promoted as the ‘gold standard’ for 
end-of-life care, the provision of care for dying people in acute hospital settings 
is firmly embedded in policy at least, if not yet fully in practice (Department of 
Health 2015; National End of Life Care Programme 2015). 
 
The nurses varied in how they felt about caring for people who were dying. One 
lunchtime I spoke with Rebecca and Salina (a bank nurse) about what it felt like 
to be around someone who was dying - especially if they deteriorated suddenly:  
 
“I get butterflies in my stomach and feel sick” says Rebecca. “But 
I think it happens less and less the more you work here.” Salina 
is a bank nurse - tells me that this is hard because everyone 
assumes you have already seen and done everything. She 
vividly describes seeing a patient die of internal haemorrhaging, 
vomiting thick, jet-black coffee ground vomit. She describes how 
she sat in a room on the ward, quietly, feeling very afraid. I ask 
what happened next. “After that, I got strong”, she tells me, “and 
now I don’t mind.” During a separate conversation, Sonia, a 
healthcare assistant, told me that she once came on shift and 
asked, “where’s bed 21?” and she had died during the night. “I 
mean, I knew she was going, but not when. And it was all, like, 
business as usual.” … 
Paul: “The Gift of a Good Death” 
 
Transition from acute care to a palliative approach did not take place until what 
was commonly referred to as ‘the conversation’ has taken place. There was a 
shared understanding that this refers to a difficult conversation in the context of 
end of life care. The following excerpt is an example of the conversation; it took 
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place in much the same way whenever a patient was deemed to be dying. In 
the example the patient, Edward, was very close to death. The consultant 
introduced himself.  
 
Dr Roberts: “What have you been told so far?”  
Son: “That his kidneys are weak and his heart is not working and 
that to treat one means harming the other and that they have 
reached the end of treatment really”  
Dr Roberts; “And what are you expecting?” 
Son: “Well, that’s it, now. He told me 6 months ago that he was 
quite happy and ready to join my mum” 
Daughter: “He’s distressed at the moment”  
Dr Roberts: “It is clear that he is getting close to the end of life 
but it sounds as though he is prepared for that. Death is never 
good, we always want more. But we don’t want to prolong things, 
we wish now to give him the gift of a good death” 
… 
Daughter: “He’s 93 but even so, we keep telling ourselves…but 
still...” 
Son: “I think in years to come there’ll be too many old people and 
you’ll need to...”  
Daughter (quickly): “Just keep him comfortable, won’t you, keep 
him quiet” 
Becky (staff nurse): “I’ll go and start the syringe driver now” 
 
Following this conversation, the doctor began to complete the ICOD and the 
nurse left the room to collect the medications and equipment to commence the 
syringe driver. The powerful rhetoric in offering “the gift of a good death” served 
an important purpose here. It framed what was happening as inevitable but 
located and defined the role of the clinical team in making the experience a 
positive one. His daughter’s priorities throughout the conversation were to 
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restore comfort; at times, she seemed agitated at how long things were taking, 
and when Dr Roberts eventually mentioned the word “death” seemed almost 
relieved. This relief was shared by the nurse who was waiting by the bedside for 
an indication to commence medications to settle him. Paul’s daughter’s request 
to “keep him comfortable” was that permission.  
5.4 Disciplines as Ideological 
 
Bourdieu cautions against efforts to over-interpret, instead suggesting that the 
sociological task of his theory of practice is to examine the dialectical relations 
between the so-called objective structures which can be accessed by objectivist 
knowledge, and the “structured dispositions in which those objects are 
actualised and which tend to reproduce them” (Bourdieu 1972, p3). This is an 
important link between symbolic structures and actions. According to Bourdieu, 
habitus informs actions dependent on the degree to which agents are 
possessed by (as opposed to in possession of) their internalised world view. 
Habitus as a generative principle produces practices which reproduce certain 
regularities. So, patterns that were seen in the enactment of the various 
ideological positions, can be considered generative of habitus, rather than 
objective aspects of reality that can be described and therefore predicted. The 
idea of habitus was particularly valuable because it offered insight into 
situations in which individuals were neither guided purely by their own free will, 
but nor did they automatically enact of societal structures. Instead, there were 
internalised form of societal values which influenced behaviour within a 
particular field, and sets of values varied between individuals and professional 
groups. Differences between individual practitioners, and in different situations, 
with different patients, attested to the unique nature of agents within the field. 
 
Bourdieu suggests that habitus is situated outside consciousness; that the 
reproduction of discourse takes place habitually and often in the absence of 
cognitive intent. This may partly explain why when asked directly about their 
perspectives on care of the dying, participants were unable to readily describe 
what they do, and why they do it. Care appeared to be given as a result of 
assessing not only the particulars of each patient scenario but also according to 
a particular set of beliefs or ideology pertaining to the goal of care. Each 
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ideology was associated, albeit not exclusively, with different professional 
values and shared common-sense understanding of how they ought to go about 
their practices. Habitus was unconscious, although agents may become 
conscious of some ways in which they reproduce objective meanings. The 
different professionals on the ward each ‘inherit’ a particular legacy, a 
professional discourse that dictates their interpretation of their circumstances 
and predicts their responses.  
 
Thus, in the scenario described above, we saw practices that arose as a result 
of the interplay between the situation and the habitus of the doctor. Not every 
doctor would respond in this way to this scenario, and even this doctor might 
respond differently in another encounter with a dying person. Bourdieu’s 
position allows for this by demonstrating that an individual’s habitus is not only 
comprised of their shared understanding with others in their social group, but 
their own stock of experiences, social position and education. The scenario was 
used here not to argue for generalisable explanatory potency, but to deepen 
insight into how adopting a critical sociological perspective can offer alternative 
perspectives that challenge the idea of agency and individualism that dominates 
so much of our current cultural formations.  
5.5 Ideological Tensions 
 
I now consider what happens when things were not quite so straightforward. For 
example, what happened when (as was common) the reversibility of an acute 
deterioration could not be predicted, or when different professionals were in 
disagreement about the appropriate approach to care. To explore the 
problematic edges around these ideologies I discuss two examples of tensions 
or conflicts between ideologies. The first examines what happened in an 
environment of uncertainty, and postulates that the default position was rescue. 
The second example explores transition - when a patient’s condition changed, 
necessitating a change to care. This was not necessarily a coordinated process, 
with different members of the team making the transition at different times. In 
both of these examples, I suggest that these tensions could have caused or 
exacerbated patient suffering.  
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5.5.1 Comorbidities and the ‘Recursive Cascade’  
 
Issues around social functioning were frequently at the forefront of patients’ 
minds. The acute model of care was difficult to apply when a patient’s problems 
were social or functional. In such instances, when asked what medical 
professionals can do to help them, patients may be at best baffled, and at worst 
confrontational:  
 
Doris (to me): “I’m here because I had a fall. I could go home but 
family don’t want it. They're trying to keep me safe. I don't like it. 
The noise! I moved from Scotland to be near my daughters but it 
didn't make me any better”.  
(The nurse comes in) 
Diane: “Is there anything you need? Are you in pain? Do you 
want a paracetamol?” 
Doris: “No, thank you” (angrily) 
 
Hospital care of older people is complex. Alongside acute events there are often 
chronic conditions that make clinical care challenging. Acute hospital treatment, 
often for a single prioritised condition, can fail to take into account the 
confounding influence of these other problems. The focus on rehabilitation 
within geriatric medicine could be problematic in the hospital setting. Rescue 
was prioritised which could mean that rehabilitative approaches were delayed 
until a patient was medically stabilised. For older people who may take longer to 
recover from acute illnesses this could mean prolonged bed rest and 
deconditioning, leading to loss of function and reduced rehabilitative potential. 
This is a frequent cause for concern within the physiotherapy and occupational 
therapy literature (Clift 2017). The idea of returning to ‘normal’ function is 
problematic when a patient has stayed in the hospital for a long period. Warren 
and Manderson (2008) observe that the discourse of ‘normal function’ is 
problematic when patients in a hospital experience increasingly complex health 
issues. Their notion of ‘recursive cascades’ (Manderson and Warren 2016) 
refers to a pattern of hospital stay for older people that is characterised by “one 
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thing after another” (p479). There was rarely a clear point at which a patient can 
be deemed medically stable. Often, one comorbidity will be resolved or 
improved, only to find that another problem arises. This can lead to extended 
hospital stays which in turn can be associated with a range of functional and 
clinical problems. 
 
Furthermore, problems were seldom if ever solely medical. Among an array of 
reasons for admission to hospital people may be failing to cope with existing 
social and practical support at home. Indeed, this was so common that it had 
acquired its own unofficial name on the ward- never written in the notes, but 
often quoted in the nursing handover and the multidisciplinary meetings – 
‘acopia’. The ‘a-‘ referred to the Greek prefix common in medical terminology, 
meaning “without”. This word was thus intended to literally mean ‘without 
coping’ and to function as a pseudo-scientific way to convey the situation of a 
patient being admitted without specific medical needs.  
 
5.5.2 Changing Lanes  
 
One concern with the acute care or rescue model of care was that it could be 
difficult to identify the appropriate time to stop or withdraw active treatments 
when they were futile, no longer effective or potentially harmful. Ellen, who is 
discussed further in chapter 7, presented a poignant example of suffering 
resulting directly from a delay in making the transition from curative to palliative 
care. Hers was not an isolated example; after she died, I spoke to a group of 
nurses about their opinions on her care. Kirsty described the following:  
 
“Sometimes we are forced to do DNACPR because of acute 
illness. It shouldn't be a decision based on age but I think 
sometimes if you've got so many ailments and background that 
you suffer with…. We had a lady admitted and I said - and the 
physio agreed, and the reg - that she would not be getting out of 
here alive. But they still carried on doing things to her, almost like 
she was a guinea pig for the doctors, for statistics, I don't know. 
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She was full of fluid, her kidneys were knackered, she had heart 
failure and they couldn't balance the medications without causing 
one thing or another to start failing. You couldn't get rid of the 
fluid, and you could see she was done for. She'd had a CVA too, 
could hardly walk. Nobody asked her if she wanted to be left 
alone in relation to the treatments she was having. Mind you, she 
wasn't one to speak for herself, sometimes patients just accept 
that doctors just do stuff. But you just knew with her.”  
 
This extract identifies three concerns; the patient’s comorbidities, aligned with 
various social issues resulting from her frailty such as difficulty walking, were 
seemingly separate from the core motivation for rescue. Once that cascade was 
set in motion it became difficult to know when to stop. The concerns that Kirsty 
described here are common in nurses providing end-of-life care acute settings 
(Wotton et al. 2005; Thompson et al. 2006; Bloomer et al. 2011). Nursing may 
feel frustrated and morally disturbed when a lane change is not possible.  
 
The onus was upon medical staff to make the decision that a patient had 
become ‘palliative’. Some found this transition difficult and this meant that The 
Conversation (in which this news is broached with family members) could 
become challenging or – as in the following example – fraught with contradiction 
and conflict:   
 
Jane (Ellen’s daughter): “She seems to have got worse” 
Dr Frank: “She’s been here 11 days and obviously we didn’t 
know why. We passed her NG tube to make sure she got 
nutrition. She is being monitored and the usual path is 
improvement. When not improving we look for a specialty to 
come and help us - like last week when we got Dr X from the 
Stroke Team. So, we use different specialties for different things. 
We saw her today again and we don’t think she is improving so 
we are wondering if we should get people from palliative team to 
make her more comfortable…” 
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Jane: “What will palliative care do?” 
Dr Frank: “Comfort”  
Jane: “But that’s what you are doing anyway…” 
Dr Frank: “We are involving another specialism, we stop 
unnecessary treatment, prescribe meds if she’s in pain” 
Jane: “How will you know if she’s in pain?” 
Dr Frank: “We look in her eyes, you can tell, if I pull your arm 
here I see in your eyes. So, we’ll give her something if she’s 
vomiting. But we don’t lose anything by getting specialist team to 
look at her, may consider ICOD pathway, we haven’t reached 
that yet” 
Jane: “I don’t think I’ve seen her like this” 
Dr Frank: “At the same time we’ll get palliative care in, she 
shouldn’t be in pain…basically we are doing everything we 
should and I’ll get the specialist team to look at her. If we think 
she’s not improving and she’s dying then we put her on a 
pathway” 
Jane: “So what does that involve?” 
Dr Frank: “But for now we haven’t reached there, I’m getting a lot 
of people involved. Do you have any questions?” 
Jane: “I’m concerned that she is uncomfortable”  
Dr Frank: “Palliative care professionals are trained to recognise 
agitation better than us” 
Jane: “I’m worried that she is agitated and distressed” 
Dr Frank: “We can give her diamorphine for pain, midazolam for 
agitation, haloperidol for vomiting and buscopan for secretions 
prn, based on our judgments, I’m going to prescribe them now 
while we wait for the palliative care consultant” 
Jane: “I’d like you to try more. Chest drain, antibiotics, maybe I 
don’t want to face it but she’s just being left there” 
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Dr Frank: “She’s been on antibiotics” 
Jane: (begins to cry)  
 
The continuous tension between rescue release is evident in this excerpt. The 
questions posed by Jane (such as what was involved in putting her mother “on 
a pathway”) were not answered by Dr Frank. It seems that his discomfort 
around the transition to dying was mitigated by ongoing efforts towards rescue. 
These were precisely the kinds of conversations which were found to be lacking 
in the investigations into failures in implementation of the Liverpool Care 
Pathway. Doubtless, such topics cause distress both to the instigator and the 
receiver of such information. Later that day in the corridor he mentioned to me, 
almost in passing, that Ellen “could not keep bouncing back for the rest of her 
life.”  
 
Research suggests that transitioning from curative to palliative is easier when 
there is “compelling clinical evidence” that recovery was not possible, and when 
patients and their families were actively involved (Thompson et al. 2006). Other 
studies confirm that clinicians often find it difficult to acknowledge when 
treatment is no longer working (Chan and Webster 2010) and this can lead to 
moral distress (see for example Oberle and Hughes 2001; Back et al. 2015). As 
medical and technological advances continue to progress, there is increased 
blurring between what is considered to be a reversible medical problem, and 
what is a natural consequence of advancing age (Van Hooft 1998; Dunphy 
2000; Back et al. 2015). Efforts to cure patients vary between medical settings, 
with the hospital offering the highest intensity of technological and medical 
intervention. As medical technology expands, so does the likelihood of being 
able to reverse conditions. Even within chronic illnesses once considered 
terminal, there are opportunities for extending life expectancy and managing 
exacerbations and crises. The lines between rescue, rehabilitation and the 
natural process of ageing and dying are increasingly blurred. Choices about 
when to intervene were rarely clear, but it appears that - at least in this case - 
the default position was to treat unless it is universally accepted that a particular 
treatment is likely to be futile (Kaufman 2005, 2015). 
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Conflicts in care occasionally arose as a consequence of being unclear as to 
the overarching goals of care. The tensions between forms of power at play 
between competing individuals and their ideologies were not unidirectional. 
Scripts could be reversed and social capital can be acquired by nurses adhering 
to the ideology of rescue. When a patient was clearly and unequivocally dying, 
and had resisted attempts to rescue, the power inherent in the ideology of 
rescue appeared to diminish and the nursing profession (who shared the 
terminology and practices associated with end of life care) appeared to acquire 
additional capital.  
 
5.5.3 The Conversation 
 
There was a tendency for doctors to talk to families of dying patients using a 
variation of a core script (which I have called The Conversation). There was 
little deviation from the content of this script. Indeed, there was tacit recognition 
of this patterned way of speaking about such topics as nurses would often refer 
to The Conversation and would each grasp immediately what this was meant to 
imply. Talk of The Conversation invariably contained such discussions as 
whether or not the patient was “for a call” (for cardiopulmonary resuscitation).  
 
To adopt Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is to see this kind of event as an example 
of when practices arise that are “patterned after the social structures that 
formed them” (Wacquant 2013) and are characterised by an ‘inbuilt inertia’ 
(Navarro 2007). The situation of speaking with families of dying people 
presented a particular set of challenges, and habitus provided the rules by 
which doctors navigated this challenging terrain. The inertia of habitus testified 
to the way that The Conversation served its required purpose. In each case it 
appeared to follow a broadly similar structure and give the impression of being a 
script of sorts. This was despite the heterogeneity of the dying trajectory and 
individual patient and family experience that makes every encounter with dying 
unique.  
 
The following excerpt demonstrates the way in which some doctors appeared to 
find the transition from curative to palliative treatment difficult. The two doctors 
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in the excerpt looked and sounded uncomfortable throughout this observation, 
that took place as they both re-evaluated their role in the care of a patient who 
when last seen was being treated for a chest infection, but had been ‘put on the 
ICOD’ the previous evening as he was thought to be dying. Paul had advanced 
dementia and a bilateral pneumonia that has not responded to intravenous 
antibiotics. I was informed at handover that morning that the doctors would see 
him and his daughter to have “the conversation”. I had been sitting with Paul 
and his daughter for the hour before the doctors arrive. His cheeks were 
sunken, eyes rolled back in his head. His daughter, red-eyed, was draped 
against the pillow, stroking his cheek. His breathing was ragged.  
 
Dr Basu enters with Dr Burton, wheeling notes trolley in front of 
him. Dr Basu leafed through the notes, underlines something. Dr 
Burton peers over his shoulder:  
Dr B: “the full sepsis bundle” (Sighs. Walks to bedside)  
Dr B (to Paul who is unconscious): “Good morning. We have met 
before” (Unsurprisingly, no reply).  
He examines him, pulls eyelids back, listens to his chest. 
Cheynes-Stokes breathing15. He instructs Dr Burton to make a 
note to the effect that Paul was “comfortable”.  
Dr Basu (turning to Paul’s daughter): “I’m sure the nurses have 
had a conversation with you. They have told you that our plan is 
to keep him comfortable”.  
She nodded, her face a kaleidoscope of grief, exhaustion and 
something else. Was it anger? We left the room and before 
moving on to the next patient, the Consultant again consulted the 
notes.  
“I’m sure we have seen him before”, he repeats, turning back in 
                                            
15 Cheynes-Stokes respiration is an abnormal breathing pattern that characterises 
instinctual, brain stem breathing. It features progressively deeper breaths followed by a 
period of no breathing. In this case it was caused by imminent death although clinically 
there are other reasons for it. 
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the medical notes. “Cause of death will be pneumonia”, he tells 
his Registrar, Dr Burton, who clarifies “sepsis secondary to 
pneumonia”. “I think pneumonia will be sufficient. And dementia.” 
“Are we doing observations?” Dr Burton asks. Dr Basu shakes 
his head. “He is on the pathway, I don’t think he is going to last 
very long”. He sighs, murmurs “anyway”, and replaces the file in 
its appropriate slot on the trolley before entering the next room.  
 
Where habitus matched the field, the doctors were comfortable. The patient 
manifested the kinds of problems that fitted with their expectations and fell 
within the physician’s professional remit to alleviate. However, when the rules 
were changed by forces outside their control - in Paul’s case, because the 
antibiotics had not worked and he had entered the dying phase of his illness - a 
struggle resulted, in which the medic sought to regain equilibrium. When death 
approached, the resources at their disposal were severely curtailed - in fact, 
they were limited to two primary functions. Firstly, as doctors they could 
prescribe ‘anticipatory’ medications (injectable drugs to palliate the most 
common symptoms experienced in the last hours and days of life, such as pain, 
death rattle, and agitation). Secondly, they were expected to complete the death 
certificate. The former function requires little in the way of clinical decision-
making, as the drugs of choice during the terminal phase were generally 
established by local policy. The latter function did, however, require a degree of 
clinical skill, hence the extended conversation between the consultant and 
registrar regarding the death certificate. They were referring to a situation that 
has not yet arisen; Paul was still breathing.  
 
Beyond this, their role was undefined. They removed themselves from the 
difficult situation, leaving an unsatisfactory open-ended event that appeared to 
have no therapeutic value to either Paul or to his daughter. There was a shift in 
the symbolic capital at the point where the medical profession could no longer 
direct the outcome. The kinds of interactions described above have also been 
identified in other observational work on end of life care. For example, Sudnow 
(1967) observed practices in which dying patients were talked about as though 
already dead, even to the point of having their eyelids closed whilst still 
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breathing. Taken in abstraction and in another context, the conversation 
between the medics regarding Paul’s death certificate could be seen as 
ludicrous, even grotesque. He was breathing his last breaths whilst holding on 
to life, and the doctors were concerned over the documentation of cause of 
death. Yet in the context of the hospital, and aided by the actual and symbolic 
barrier between Paul’s death bed and the busy, ordinary corridor outside his 
room, the conversation does not seem out of place. A final reflection in relation 
to Paul was that the team were unanimously in agreement that his was ‘a good 
death’. Yet this was not Ruth’s perception.  
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The three ideologies described were broadly aligned with the three clinical 
disciplines of acute care, geriatric medicine and palliative medicine. Although all 
three clinical disciplines were nominally physician-led, the shared values of 
each ideology resonate more strongly with some professional groups than 
others. For example, geriatric medicine’s strong emphasis on rehabilitation and 
maximising function means that there was a natural place within the specialism 
for the allied health professionals, specifically physiotherapists and occupational 
therapists. Acute medicine, with its emphasis on diagnosis and cure, was 
dominated by physicians. Palliative care does not have quite such clear 
professional ‘ownership’, but its origins illustrate that it was largely nursing led 
until its recognition as a distinct medical specialism in the 1980s. As such, it 
was reasonable to presume that nurses have a traditional relationship with 
caring for dying people that was newer and less integrated within the medical 
professional identity. 
 
The dominant ideology refers to the belief system reproduced by the most 
powerful members within a particular society, that enables the oppression of 
individuals within that society (Abercrombie et al. 1990). Cultural (in this case 
medical) hegemony leads to many members of society accepting the tenets of 
the dominant ideology often without question. The hospital is often portrayed as 
an iconic institution of medical expertise and traditionally doctors hold the power 
within the hospital walls. In this study, recent political changes within the health 
services had seen a shift in this balance of power such that doctors held 
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relatively less sway over everyday practices, and this power was largely held by 
hospital managers. However, on the ward itself, doctors retained power over the 
other clinical and allied professionals. Multiprofessional working, generally 
considered to be exemplary practice in older people’s care, was often fraught 
with difficulty as a consequence of such power imbalances. This reproduced a 
situation whereby those without power enable the dominant ideology to 
continue to reproduce patterns of practice.  
 
The point at which a person was dying was the point at which the acute 
ideology was enfeebled, and the medical model failed to produce solutions. At 
such moments, efforts were made by doctors to mitigate against the damaging 
effects of this unmasking. Devolving responsibility to nursing staff was one 
mechanism by which this mitigation took place. Another was to make use of the 
remaining medical processes and technologies - the syringe driver, the 
treatment algorithm, the ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ order - in order to seek restoration 
of power. These processes and technologies were what Bourdieu might refer to 
as the kinds of symbolic systems that usually helps to consolidate ideas of 
dominance, the objects of symbolic capital. The mobilisation of these resources 
can be seen as an assertion (or a reassertion) of power in the face of the 
existential threat posed by the dying person. This pattern could also be 
understood by considering the extent to which contemporary medical practice is 
‘death-denying’. Although beyond the scope of the current thesis, it has been 
argued that Western society is generally death-denying (Becker 1973; 
Zimmermann and Rodin 2004; Walter 2014) and medical practice reflects these 
wider societal values.  
 
The ideological conflicts described can also be seen as social practices, that 
are influenced by power relationship between members of the multidisciplinary 
team. The direction of care, and the decisions that are made, appear to be 
influenced by the interplay between these ideological positions. Viewing these 
dynamic interactions as a manifestation of habitus may illuminate phenomena 
such as inertia in clinical practices. Whilst great progress is being made towards 
understanding the constituents of ‘good care’, bad care remains highly resistant 
to change. The social order is continuously reproduced by the enactment of 
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capital.  
 
These practices in caring for older people at the end of their lives took place 
within a broader societal context which continued to hold that dying was 
primarily a medical event. The dominant, rescue model of care denied 
complexity by seeking reductionist explanations for the kinds of suffering 
experienced. Opportunities to improve practice were everywhere; yet the 
resources to enable them were not. These opportunities were locked into sets 
of objective circumstances within which agents’ freedom to act were structurally 
constrained.  
 
In the next chapter I turn to the participants themselves and examine the 
phenomenon of suffering in context. The influence of the ideologies of care 
remains apparent but the spotlight turns to the patients’ experiences 
themselves. This is to make suggestions regarding how these competing 
ideologies impact directly on patients.  
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Chapter 6: Here, there is nobody 
“In the field, one has to face a chaos of facts…in this crude form 
they are not scientific facts at all; they are absolutely elusive, and 
can only be fixed by interpretation” (Malinowski 1916/1948, 
quoted in Geertz 1988, p81) 
“Yo soy yo y mis circumstancias” [“I am myself and my 
circumstances”] (Ortega Y Gasset 1914/2004) 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the first group of participants16. Field notes relating to 
each patient have been organised into individual narratives. For each 
participant, key themes relating to suffering have been identified and supported 
by using extracts from the fieldwork. Each account attends to a different aspect 
of suffering, and although each narrative stands alone, there were common 
themes which I have drawn together in the conclusion. Theory will be drawn 
upon lightly, for the purposes of contextualisation rather than abstract concept 
development. It is my hope that the stories will speak for themselves, the 
pictures of suffering that were portrayed were vivid accounts of what was 
witnessed. I have not yet introduced the broader literature relating to the nature 
of suffering. This is because I intend to let the data lead the analysis 17 whilst 
also acknowledging that there is “no view from nowhere” (Nagel 1989). Prior to 
starting the field work I was already familiar with some of the literature, but 
decided to set it aside during the data collection return to it after analysis. This 
was to avoid shoehorning my findings into that which was already known.  
 
                                            
16 For full list of participants see Appendix 3 and 4 
17 This body of scholarship will be introduced in chapter 8 
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Figure 14: Here, there is nobody 
 
 
I considered each of these participants to have been suffering. Some told me of 
their experiences directly; others hinted through story or expression or non-
verbal behaviour. Their accounts have been used here to address the following 
key questions: 
 
1. What was the nature of suffering for patients on the ward?  
2. How do participants conceptualise their experiences?  
3. What was the broader context for their suffering experience? 
 
This is an interpretive account of those words, behaviour, sounds, smells, sights 
and actions that resonated with me, and that taught me something of the 
multiple nature of suffering. I chose encounters and events by following 
Mason’s (2002) suggestion that when researching one’s own practice, one 
should pay attention to “brief but vivid” moments acknowledging that “there is 
choice in what I notice, a selection from the totality of the unreflected upon, the 
primary experience” (Riessman 1993. p222) I aim to show rather than tell these 
stories. Identifying and exploring suffering was easier with some patients than 
with others; this sometimes related to how verbally articulate the participant 
was, but other times it was more to do with their receptivity to my presence, or 
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an ambiguity to nonverbal expression. Rita was a bright, sharp and witty 
woman, continuously watching the activities around her. She was bored and 
keen for company, and spoke in detail about her experiences. In contrast, 
Vincent was contented to let me sit in his room but by his own admission was 
“not a talker”. Much of his suffering experience I gleaned from observing his 
interactions with staff, rather than through direct conversation with him, although 
in the latter days of the study this shifted and he initiated several brief 
conversations about mortality. Michael was withdrawn, some might say 
depressed, and he offered little in the way of verbal interaction. But his face was 
often an open book. Much of his experience was described through the sounds 
and expressions he made in response to encounters with myself and staff.  
 
The key participant for the chapter was Vincent. This was because his suffering 
captured something that typified many of the other participants’ experiences. 
Also, a significantly greater time was spent with him than with the other 
participants. This was in part because of pragmatic reasons - his hospital 
admission was the longest. He had arrived the day before I began observations, 
and died three days after I left. I was therefore able to observe almost his entire 
journey. It was also because Vincent was alone almost all of the time. Only on 
one occasion was there a visitor which led to me leaving the room. There was 
extensive opportunity to spend time with him, which provided both a rich source 
of data, and ongoing companionship for a lonely and dying man.  
 
6.2 Vincent: “Making a Drama Out of a Question Mark” 
 
Vincent was 84, admitted to the ward with an exacerbation of his long-standing 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). He lived alone, having been 
widowed six years previously in a car accident in which he was the driver. 
Following the accident, he had awoken in Intensive Care to discover she had 
died. Since then he had shunned nearly all attempts at helping him, although he 
had been taking mirtazapine (an antidepressant) which had been prescribed 
before he was discharged home after the accident. At home, he passed the 
time listening to the radio, watching television and smoking cigars. He had few 
close friends or relatives, but was visited regularly by a neighbour, Andrew. He 
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was gaunt; his movements were slow. His long beard was nicotine-stained. His 
chronic cough caused frequent paroxysms that left him exhausted. During this 
admission, his COPD had been treated with intravenous antibiotics and oral 
steroids. At three different times during his five-week admission he was deemed 
to be “medically fit” for discharge, but each time this decision was revoked. 
Twice this was because he developed a further acute medical problem, and 
once because there were concerns about his safety at home - he smoked 
cigars yet required long-term oxygen, and he had not ‘complied’ with 
physiotherapy and was felt to be unsafe ascending his stairs. 
We had a conversation about consent but I was not sure that he fully 
understands; he didn’t really want me to explain, said he can’t be bothered. So, 
I ask him whether he would be happy for me to sit and spend some time with 
him, that I am researching how the different people in the team provide care for 
him. He shrugs. I have seen him eject people in no uncertain terms when he 
doesn’t want them around, so I take this as consent and mentally make a note 
of trying to explain the study a bit more later if he gives me the opportunity.  
 
Little eye contact at first - looks at me suspiciously. Interrupted 
by Rebecca who, apologising for the intrusion, says “I’ve just 
come to do your tablets”. He rolls his eyes at me. I am aware 
that I am supposed to be observing interactions but right now it 
feels right to try and engage with him. When she leaves we talk 
about his wife, about relationships, the reasons they didn’t have 
children, he told me about the day they met at a dance, musing 
out loud how differently life might have ended up if her house 
wasn’t in the same direction as his “we ended up walking home 
together that night”. He describes the companionship that 
characterised their marriage, how they would often think of 
something at the same time and say, “I was just thinking the 
same thing”. His voice tails off and he leans back. “What’s the 
point of having this bone marrow thing?” I ask him if he wants to 
feel better, and he tells me “every day I think ‘tomorrow might be 
better’ and then I wake up next day it isn’t, and I get disappointed 
but I’m not surprised. I just can’t be bothered" 
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We mostly sat in silence. His breathing was noisy and bubbly, his chest mottled, 
ribs protruding. He often sighed. He stared straight ahead. His pyjamas usually 
gaped open, his catheter bag on the bed next to him. He clutched a tissue in a 
shaking hand. Antibiotics were becoming progressively less effective at dealing 
with his frequent infections:  
 
I find myself sometimes forgetting to breathe as I watch the 
rhythm of his chest, and listen to the bubbling sounds of his 
breathing, punctuated by liquid coughs, an occasional louder 
sound as he expectorates yellow-green mucous into a tissue 
which he replaces on the bed table.  
It was not just Vincent’s lungs that were failing. Each treatment for his lungs 
entailed giving him steroids, to enhance the resilience of his lungs towards the 
bacteria. One of the side effects of steroids is muscle wasting; his legs were thin 
and weak, and wobbled visibly whenever he tried to stand.  
6.2.1 Losing Independence: “It’s a Distant Place to Me Now” 
 
It was common practice to discuss individual patients with nursing and other 
staff outside the room before they enter. On one occasion, the team discussed 
that Vincent had “failed stairs”, had a presumed diagnosis of MDS 
(myelodyplastic syndrome)​ which would be likely to lead to repeated anaemia, 
and was a smoker but seemed unaware of safety issues. They were all in broad 
agreement that he was unsafe to go home. They then entered his room, 
ostensibly to ask his opinion on the matter:  
 
Dr Rockwood: let me ask you a very serious question…you have 
this problem with your blood, some problems with your chest 
…taking everything into consideration do you feel you can 
manage at home?  
V: yes 
Dr: is that where you want to go?  
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V: yes 
Dr Rockwood: in order to get home you will have to cooperate 
with the physio…I know you have some pain but we have given 
you paracetamol, yes?…anything to ask?  
V: yes, I want to go  
 
This interaction was framed in such a way as to suggest that there are likely to 
be problems with going home. The “very serious question” and the fact that the 
doctor repeated his question “is that where you want to go?” belied an 
underlying sense that this was not the answer he sought. Over time, concerns 
over safety meant that Vincent experienced multiple assessments by various 
professionals tasked with enabling him to go home safely, but each time there 
were problems raised until he became increasingly aware that going home 
would not be as straightforward as he had originally hoped. His fear about 
coping was compounded when he was asked questions.  
Jo (Social Worker): “I am here to help get you some help at 
home. Are you wanting to go home?” 
V: “It must be better than being here” 
J: “The carers I can set up for you will be excellent”  
V: “In here they're marvellous. There's toast whenever you want 
it” 
J: “Well that’s what I'm here to help with, to make sure this care 
continues when you are home....What about washing and 
dressing?” 
V: “Oh, I shall certainly need that” 
J: “They're called the re-ablement team. That means they will try 
not to take away your independence, just to give you help when 
you need it. They'll do as much or as little as you tell them, just 
what you need. Is that okay?” 
V:  (Laughs – but cynically, there is no humour. His eyes are 
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blank. He looks away, stops eating his trifle and stares at a blank 
spot on the wall)  
J: “Is that what you want?” 
V: “Anything love, anything” (resigned slump. She leaves) 
 
Vincent was torn between a desperate need to get home to his former 
normality, and fear about how he would cope. His ambivalence was exemplified 
in the apparent contradiction: “it must be better than being here”, followed 
closely by “in here they’re marvellous”.  
Sometimes interactions that detracted from Vincent’s independence, or else 
implied an increasing level of need, led to expressions of anger or frustration. In 
the following excerpt, Claire (a student nurse) enters with a wash bowl and 
flannel. On seeing me by the bedside she backs away: 
St/N: “I’ll come back, I were going to give you a wash” 
V – “Yippee. Yippee. I’ll enjoy a wash (faking enthusiasm) I’m 
kidding. I’m not telling the truth”  
(apologetically when he sees student nurse looking flustered) “I 
just get a bit stressed up worrying about it all” 
 
Again, in the following extract Vincent was talking with Jo, a social worker about 
his exact care requirements when something that is said triggers an angered 
response: 
 
Jo: “Do you think you'd like 4 carers a day?” 
V: (stares straight ahead) “Too much” 
Jo: “Three?” 
V: “Once in a morning and then leave me be” 
Jo: “What about your evening meals?”  
V: “No, I don't want anybody” 
Jo: “What about bedtime?” 
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V: (angrily turns to look at her) “I don't want anybody in my home 
at bedtime! I want to bloody go upstairs, switch on the electric 
blanket, smoke a cigar, put it out, go to bed” 
 
During his admission, Vincent gradually surrendered his autonomy as decisions 
relating to his future were taken on by different professionals. The excerpts 
suggest he was both aware of this and simultaneously powerless to do anything 
about it. In the following conversation, he describes the sense of continuously 
waiting - although for what, he cannot say:  
 
Vincent: “I just want each hour to pass. I’m stuck like a pig in a 
poke” 
Me: “What would you do if you were at home?” 
V: “Sit on the sofa, watch the telly, lock the front door. Go 
upstairs, switch the blanket on 10 minutes before I go in” [eye 
contact, looks at me, frowns and rolls his eyes, appears angry] 
Me: “Are you cross?” 
V: “I’m always cross. I’m a cross person. I don’t know when, why, 
what is going to happen” 
Me: “Is going home the most important thing for you?” 
V: “No” 
Me: “What else is, then?” 
V: “I don't know, I’m just waiting, don't know what’s happening, 
and you don't know either” [coughs, liquid] (lifts legs up and lets 
them ﬂop down again. Eye contact only when angry, rest of time 
stare ﬁxed ahead). 
 
6.2.2 Choicelessness 
 
Time after time, the decision for Vincent to go home was revoked for one 
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reason or another. On one occasion, it was because his blood results have 
come back abnormal. Routine blood tests revealed an abnormality thought to 
be unrelated to his primary condition; he was severely anaemic. Doctors were 
concerned that he had myelodysplasia, a precursor to leukaemia. A repeat 
blood test was ordered to ascertain the anaemia’s severity. A definitive 
diagnosis could only be gained through a bone marrow biopsy, which Vincent 
was offered but declined (this aspect of his care is discussed further in 
Iatrogenic Suffering).  
The absence of a diagnosis contributed to Vincent’s ‘unimaginable futures’ 
(Kaufman 2006, p198). Vincent was invited to consent to investigation based on 
the probability that the disease, if diagnosed, was treatable. Doctors were quick 
to point out that MDS is a precursor to leukaemia that may or may not develop 
into the full-blown malignancy. Even if it were to develop doctors could not 
estimate the potential timescale for this conversion and there was every 
likelihood that Vincent would deteriorate and die from his existing advanced 
respiratory disease prior to then. So, in the absence of leukaemia, the treatable 
element of MDS was to have repeated blood transfusions to manage the 
anaemia.  
This made sense on one level; anaemia can cause fatigue and breathlessness, 
and these were already serious problems for Vincent that impacted daily on his 
quality of life and sense of wellbeing. However, the likelihood would be that he 
would require regular admissions to hospital for transfusions and given the 
recursive cascade he had undergone on this admission it would be unlikely that 
he would ever be admitted for a simple intervention like a transfusion. In 
summary then Vincent was being asked to make a choice about an 
investigation for a disease which may or may not become life-threatening, and 
for which the ongoing treatment may or may not be feasible. Given that he had 
already expressed ambivalence about being in hospital in the first instance and 
a determination to avoid coming back in again, coupled with his fears about the 
investigative procedure itself, it was easy to see the root of his reluctance. It 
was not mere belligerence. Choicelessness framed as choice was a recurrent 
theme in Vincent’s care. Often, he had little or no agency in what was 
happening, and yet was presented with various choices as though he were in 
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control. It appears that he was well aware of this choiceless state hence his 
resistance to many of the apparent choices he was offered.  
Vincent’s frustration with the many changes in plan were most apparent at 
night, when he frequently becomes agitated and angry – most often because he 
was apparently trying to leave the ward to smoke a cigar: 
 
It is 1:20 in the morning. V is on the move again. Keelie, a 
healthcare assistant, finds him leaning in the frame of the 
doorway to his room. 
K: “You’re not going anywhere if you hurt yourself”  
V: “I want to see my friends, they’ll be wondering where I am. 
Where’s all my money and my keys?”  
K: “I do understand, sweetheart”  
V: “What do you bloody understand?”  
K: “That you want to go home”  
V: “They’ll bloody change their minds again tomorrow”  
K: “No, they won’t. Now go to sleep, there’s no transport to take 
you home now, it’s the middle of the night. I don’t drive so I can’t 
take you”  
V: (loudly now) “I just want a bloody cigar”  
K: “You can’t smoke in hospital”  
V: “Course you bloody can”  
Pam, the senior nurse, comes in:  
Pam: “The facts are these: you’re going home in a few hours, we 
can’t get you home now, if you keep acting like this you’ll make 
yourself poorly. Calm down now and get some sleep. The 
doctors going to come and see you to make sure that your hip is 
okay. Do you want your light off?”  
V: “No” (turns over)  
Pam, to me and Keelie: “It’s all so complicated, this mental 
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capacity thing. Like, he’s got his wits around him during the day 
but still, earlier we had a chat and he was happy about going 
home. I reassured him about his money, and like now he’s 
forgotten and he’s got himself into such a state and I just think 
about his stairs at home…” 
He is calming down now. I sit with him and listen to him 
wondering out loud: “Can I manage at home? Can I get up and 
down the steps?”  
He falls asleep. 
 
While on the ward he fell numerous times, most usually at night when 
disorientated and trying to go outside for a cigar. He would get out of bed, 
momentarily forgetting that his body was too weak to walk. Staff were aware of 
his smoking and there was some talk about nicotine replacement., but this didn’t 
happen; Vincent laughed that you can’t compare a patch to a cigar. They 
viewed his agitation as a physiological withdrawal from nicotine, but for Vincent, 
cigar smoking seemed more than that. It was a symbol of normality and 
autonomy: 
“Sometimes… I just want to lift a cigar to my lips, light the bloody 
thing, and inhale” (slowly)…(he leans back, closes his eyes, and 
smiles) “…like normal.” 
6.2.3 Uncertainty: “Making a drama out of a question mark”  
 
Vincent received mixed messages about whether or not he was going to get 
better. For example, when he declined the bone marrow biopsy, the doctors 
cautioned him that he would not get better; this was a source of some confusion 
as the anaemia was not the problem for which he had been admitted to 
hospital, it had been an additional finding on investigations once his presenting 
disease had been treated. Vincent’s perception about getting better was 
informed not only by the medics. The rehabilitation assistant who encouraged 
him to get out of bed echoed this by telling him that if he did not mobilise he 
would not get better. Of course, the rehabilitation assistant was referring to his 
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strength and functional status rather than his disease. The nurses, trying to set 
up an intravenous infusion of antibiotics for an infective exacerbation of his 
COPD, suggested that it was important for him to have this medicine so that he 
could get better, and in this they were referring to his chest infection. Vincent’s 
idea of ‘better’ could not be mapped to any of these three interventions and he 
had unanswered and unanswerable questions:  
V: “I just wish it were done with, all this palaver getting home. 
Why hasn’t it happened? [grimaces] oh never mind, I’m making a 
drama out of a question mark. I don’t want to make the decision. 
I want someone else to do that. Just MAKE the decision what to 
do next”  
It was not only Vincent who was dealing with the consequences of uncertainty 
regarding his future. Confusion regarding the plan of care was reflected in many 
of his interactions. The following extract demonstrates a mixed message that 
Vincent was both too poorly to go home yet too stable to stay in hospital. His 
interpretation of being told that he was fit to go home was that he would 
immediately be discharged. However, this did not happen, as there remained 
numerous further bureaucratic processes that required attending to. His 
suffering notably increased at this point; home had been promised, and not 
delivered. Subsequently, his nights became more agitated, and his interactions 
became angrier: 
Vincent: “I want to go. I want my own place” 
Louise: “You’re going in the morning”  
V: “It’s bloody morning now” 
(Louise has asked for Nick, a healthcare assistant (HCA), to sit 
with him as she is concerned about his increasing risk of falls. 
V: (waking, suddenly) “What is this place?” 
Nick: “Try and get some sleep” 
V: “What for?” 
N: “Because you are poorly, you are not well and you need to 
have a rest. Try and have some rest” 
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V: “Why?” 
N: “Because you are poorly” 
V: “I was but they told me I could go, they released me 
yesterday” 
 
The following extract illustrates a paradox. Vincent was determined to go home 
often expressing this with some vehemence. At the same time, he was fearful of 
doing so because of a range of issues including security, his ability to self-care, 
privacy and money. Staff sought to identify practical solutions to his concerns, 
but occasionally this meant that his expressed concerns were overlooked, as 
happens in the following extract where his use of humour belied a sense in 
which he was gradually surrendering his autonomy. The following response to 
Social Worker Jo’s questions suggested resignation and surrender to this crowd 
of professionals, each charged with helping Vincent perform a different daily 
function18 : 
 
Jo: “Has anything changed? Do you still want washing and 
dressing?”  
Vincent: “I need help with everything now”  
Anne (Social Worker): “Do you want more help? … How many 
times a day would you like?”  
V: “I don’t know, love”  
A: “Four times a day? If you need help with everything….you’ve 
been in here for a while now. Do you need help with medicines?”  
V: “Yes”  
A: “And meals?”  
V: “Yes”  
                                            
18 The issue of personhood and the role of depersonalisation in iatrogenic 
suffering will be further explored in chapter 9. 
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A: “And toilet?”  
V: “Yes, it’s hard work. Make me an offer I can’t refuse” (laughs, 
wryly)  
A: “So, up, washed, dressed, toilet, medicines, catheter care...”  
V: “Form an orderly queue outside” (laughs again)  
A: “I’ll put this forward to assessment” 
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6.2.4 Vulnerability 
 
A further facet of Vincent’s uncertainty was a perpetual feeling of vulnerability. 
He readily admitted that he felt frightened. There were certain predictable 
triggers to this including the prospect of going home and the potential for his 
property to be at risk of theft. One day he told me that he felt fearful about going 
home because of the thought of people breaking into his home while he was too 
weak to defend it. One night a patient from another room walked into his room 
by mistake. Vincent was frightened and helpless and in his disorientated drowsy 
state had presumed the intruder to be a thief. The next day, he asked the 
nursing staff several times to report the incident to security. Each time he was 
reassured that the intruder was no more than a lost patient. That afternoon, the 
doctors reviewed him, but the incident was still clearly on his mind. 
A few days later a healthcare support worker found he had been hiding his 
wallet containing a large amount of money under his pillow. Staff were keen to 
put it into safekeeping, but he again expressed fears that it would disappear.  
V: “Have you seen the thief?” 
Me: “What thief?”  
V: “That elderly gentleman who comes in here” 
We talk about it. It sounds like a patient came into the room, but 
V realised it wasn’t a thief but a lost patient  
V: “Terrible thing, mental illness” (finishes porridge, lies down. 
Trolley wheels rattle, locker beeps and whirrs as the nurse gets 
out his medication) 
Nurse peeps head around door: I understand there’s a wallet in 
here with rather a lot of money – picks it up from bed table 
V: “I want it in my pocket”  
Nurse: “It’ll be safer locked away. We will take it to the office for 
safekeeping”  
V: “Just give it to me”  
Nurse (opens purse, looks inside): “What do you need all that 
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for?”  
V: (shrugs) “Safest with me” 
 
6.2.5 Grief  
 
Vincent often spoke of his wife. His grief, four years after her death, remained 
palpable. He recalled driving to France with poles and a canvas and setting up 
tent in the shade of a cypress grove with her. He told me how their words 
seemed to pre-empt one another’s and that there was never a cross word 
exchanged between them. They never had children – he shrugged and told me 
it never seemed to be what they were about. “She were the love of my life”, he 
would say. His most recent mental health review followed an observation from 
the physios that he was “low in mood and self-deprecating”. The mental health 
worker documented that he showed many “depressive symptoms” including 
“early morning wakening, poor motivation, issues around grief, regular thoughts 
about suicide, has considered hanging himself but afraid of being unsuccessful 
and being in pain…” She noted that he was “socially isolated, neighbours help 
out…a loner and prefers it that way.” Her summary of the assessment was “as 
physical condition improves his mood might too…no further input from MH 
services…ring if needed etc.” The following entry, by an FY1 Doctor, stated that 
Vincent appeared clinically stable, somewhat contradicting the view from Mental 
Health services that his mood could be ascribed to his physical condition. 
Vincent had a good appetite and usually cleared his plate. This was often taken 
by staff as a proxy indicator of wellbeing. Yet one of the most common side 
effects of mirtazapine is increased appetite and weight gain. This increased 
appetite was not necessarily accompanied by enjoyment of food. Vincent often 
ate while staring straight ahead spooning food into his mouth and swallowing 
without appearing to even taste it.  
 
Staff appeared uncomfortable faced with his low affect and his lack of 
communicativeness. They often recoursed to jollying him along as in the 
following excerpt:  
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Dr Roberts (kneels beside V): “I noticed yesterday that you were 
constipated, we’ve increased the laxatives but nothing has 
happened as yet” 
D: shrugs, does not make eye contact 
Dr R: “You look down in the dumps. Fed up. Miserable” 
D: “I’m like that all the time” 
Dr R: “Well let’s see what we can do about getting you a bit 
brighter” 
 
There was an existential quality to Vincent’s suffering. Occasionally he spoke 
directly about this. The following conversation took place around a week before 
his death:  
 
Me: “How are you?” 
V: “You know” (shrugs) 
Me: “I don’t know” 
V: “Thinking about it all...” 
Me: “About what?” 
V: “You know. How long all this is going to last” 
Me: “What do you mean?” 
V: “How long before the end” 
Me: “Do you mean before you die?” 
V: “Yes, love” 
Me: “Have you been thinking about that a lot?” 
V: “Well you can't not, really. You lie here and they do this and 
that...and some days I feel alright and like I'm getting stronger 
and back on my feet and other times” (closes eyes, flops head to 
one side, mimicking death) 
Me: “You think about which way you're going?” 
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V: "Well you only get one go at it, one shot. Unless you recover 
from being really ill, I think you only get one try” 
Me: “That's true. Unless you believe in reincarnation I suppose” 
V: “No, I don't. I think we are just dust. Or compost” 
Me: “Do you worry about it?” 
V: “Ooh no, it's just what happens” 
Me: “You're no stranger to it, really, you've talked about people 
you have lost” 
V: “She were the love of my life. Ah well,” (we sit in silence. 
There is a rattle outside the door) “Is that breakfast? This is a bit 
morbid. I'll have my porridge now” 
Me: “Thank you for talking to me” 
V: “It's nice to talk about it. Nobody here talks about that. They 
just do things” 
 
6.2.6 Last impressions  
The following extract was written three days before Vincent died. 
Lying on bed, trousers open, net pants visible, twisted around his 
legs. His long legs are folded awkwardly to one side. Semi-
recumbent, stares straight ahead, with that gasping breath of his. 
One breath: two sounds. his mouth looking as though it is trying 
to gulp the air, and a deeper, bubbling in his chest, that sounds 
like there is a cough waiting, but doesn’t come because he is too 
weak. “I didn’t think you’d still be here today” I tell him. “well I 
went home in the night but I decided to come back” he replies. 
I’m not sure if he is joking or not. 
He looks up at me. I am writing.  
“Are you going to turn that into a book?” he asks “Maybe”, I 
reply, “I’m not sure many people will read 100,000 words about 
people in a hospital.” He tells me his neighbour wrote a book, 
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and it sold for £7 but she only got about 8 pence per copy. He 
shakes his head. Smiles at me. Hangs his head and closes his 
eyes. 
When I arrived the next day, I was told he had got up in the night again to try 
and have a cigar. He had fallen again, only this time had fractured his pelvis. He 
had been taken for emergency surgery to pin the damaged bone, and from 
there to an orthopaedic ward for rehabilitation. I was told that he had died there 
two days later, but I never found out the cause of death. This upset me deeply; 
having spent so much time getting to know him, I wanted to understand how his 
life had ended. Perhaps the preceding uncertainties had evoked a need for 
clarity and finality for me, a neat ending to the narrative. He might have had a 
sudden acute event, such as a blood clot. Or perhaps his lungs, weakened by 
having been under anaesthetic, succumbed to a further infection that he was 
unable to defend against. In any case, I would never know the end of his story.  
Although burdened by the symptoms of his disease, Vincent’s rarely 
complained of his cough, fatigue or weakness. His suffering was related to 
ongoing uncertainty about his future. This uncertainty was itself comprised of 
numerous elements; the uncertainty of his diagnosis, prognosis and recovery, 
uncertainty regarding going home and uncertainty pertaining to his safety and 
security. During his hospitalisation he became progressively weaker, 
succumbing to further infective exacerbations. One after the other, obstacles 
arose, either relating to his physical condition or to issues around care. From 
the day he arrived, it was never quite clear whether he would be able to go 
home and his autonomy and agency were gradually eroded. As each obstacle 
arose it became clearer and clearer that going home was an increasingly 
unobtainable goal, a distant place. The behaviours that hinted at his suffering 
included irritability, withdrawal and non-compliance. He never described his 
suffering directly but alluded to it in terms that were frequently existential, 
peppered with references to doubt, uncertainty and fear. His suffering was 
palpable in both his verbal and his nonverbal language but all that could be 
offered was screening for depression. Suffering was never addressed 
specifically. It was invisible, or remained in peripheral vision such that staff felt 
discomfort or dissonance about something, which usually led to them 
withdrawing from the relationship or seeking out quick solutions – replacement 
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nicotine, a definitive answer regarding plans for home, or a change in dose of 
his antidepressant.  
Staff had aimed to rehabilitate Vincent to the point of going home; each time he 
was deemed medically stable, something happened to prevent this. Through 
discussing his daily care needs, and liaising with the occupational therapists, 
decisions were made about the kinds of risks he would be exposed to in his 
daily activities - how he would get to the bed, use the toilet, prepare his meals, 
and so on. But for Vincent, discharge represented a starting point of the next 
stage of his life. The hospital admission had been a liminal zone, a period of 
waiting and anticipating, where the treatments he received and the 
investigations he endured were seen as incidentals rather than the focus of his 
admission. His future unfurled as an alarming and unknowable path, and one 
which he admitted he could not imagine. In the interceding time, however, 
things had taken their own paths and his life had ended in hospital. He never 
did get to smoke another cigar. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
6.3 Florence: “And the Rest of Me Too?” 
 
Florence had bilateral leg ulcers, and a bowel infection that caused frequent 
and uncontrollable diarrhoea, nausea and vomiting. As the door to her room 
was opened, a foetid odour emerged. She was an overweight woman, dressed 
in a hospital-issue nightdress. She lay in bed most of the day. She had been 
admitted for management of the two infections and had received intravenous 
antibiotics for this purpose. When Florence was comfortable she conversed 
readily. She made wry observations and comments about her situation. She told 
me a story about when she used to be a credit collector, recalling the most 
ridiculous excuses she came across for reasons people defaulted on payment: 
“The best one I ever heard was a woman who said she hadn’t paid it back 
because her lightbulb had gone and she couldn’t see to write out the cheque”. 
 
Florence experienced daily severe pain when the wound dressings to her leg 
ulcers were changed. Replacing dressings involved slow removal with saline of 
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the existing dressings that often adhered to her red raw broken skin, followed by 
irrigation of the wounds, followed by tight rebandaging of both legs. Florence 
expressed pain loudly: she cried, suffered palpitations and panic attacks, her 
breathing was rapid and she sweated profusely. This often began some time 
before the dressings were actually changed, indicating that an aspect of her 
pain was fearful anticipation of the actual physical pain. She had begun to 
request higher and higher doses of analgesia before her dressing changes; staff 
were increasingly alarmed at the potential for addiction. The dose had therefore 
been capped pending a review by the chronic pain team - for which there was 
known to be a wait of several weeks.  
6.3.1 Alienation 
 
My impression was of an isolated and alienated woman. She was symbolically 
separated from her family, and literally separated from the ward as a result of 
being in a side room. All contact had to comply with ‘barrier nursing’ principles 
for infection control (Figure 15). The door to the room had to be kept closed. 
‘Contact precautions’ had to be taken by anyone in contact with her, whether or 
not they have actual physical contact with her body. This included a white 
plastic disposable apron, and blue disposable nitrile or rubber gloves. The strict 
infection control measures served to protect staff and other patients from cross-
contamination, yet they had a profoundly isolating effect. 
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Figure 15: Contact Precautions 
 
 
These had to be disposed of in the Clinical Waste bin before exiting the room, 
marked with a bright orange ‘biohazard’ symbol. On several occasions, I 
observed how this approach to her care left her feeling degraded and 
humiliated. The following excerpts are from a reflective piece I wrote after 
witnessing an encounter with a senior registrar:  
 
Pippa, the senior registrar, examines Florence, who has been 
admitted with infected leg ulcers. She has tested positive for the 
C Diff gene and has been ‘symptomatic’, in other words, has 
been experiencing severe diarrhoea. She is in a single side room 
and the hospital policy stipulates that the door has to remain 
closed at all times, and that anyone going in must wear 
protective clothing - a white plastic pinafore, and pale blue nitrile 
gloves. As the registrar talks to her, she stands by the bedside, 
her arms folded. Florence complains that her belly hurts and the 
Registrar visibly blanches. She asks her junior whether there are 
any disposable stethoscopes on the ward. When she is told that 
there are not, she realises she must use her own stethoscope. 
She performs the required examination rapidly, reassures 
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Florence that “everything sounds okay, some good bowel 
sounds there” and walks briskly to the foot-pedal bin where she 
disposes of her pinafore and gloves. Outside Florence’s room, 
she wipes the bell of the stethoscope repeatedly with sterilising 
alcohol gel, wrinkling her nose while she does so. 
6.3.2 Loss of Hope 
 
The main plan for Florence was to cure her infections. The other focus was on 
rehabilitating her so that she would be well enough to go home. Staff were 
concerned that this was increasingly unlikely and that she was ‘giving up’:  
 
One of the nurses emerges from Florence’s room, quietly closing 
the door behind her. She has just finished changing the wound 
dressings on Florence’s legs. The sister asks how she is doing, 
and the nurse replies “it’s like she doesn’t want to make 
progress, like she’s giving up. You have to talk to her now to get 
her to talk to you; before, she would ask you stuff. It’s like she’s 
lost everything”. The sister responds that Florence has been in 
the hospital for a long time. “All her obs are fine, nothing acute 
happening, but she’s just giving up. It’s sad, really.”  
  
Staff tried to encourage her to sit out of bed, to encourage her to build up 
strength and independence. The mental health team had concluded that she 
was “very much taking on a sick role” through her reluctance to get out of bed. 
Staff were concerned about how little effort Florence was making to walk. She 
had been discharged from the physiotherapy service because the pain from her 
legs prevented her from doing the prescribed exercises.  
 
On one occasion when the sister was giving her morning tablets, I observed the 
following interaction: 
 
Sue (ward sister): “Let’s get these legs out of bed today, yes 
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Flo?” 
Florence: “And the rest of me too?” 
(both laugh) 
 
Intended as a joke, this interaction nonetheless points to the ongoing imperative 
for staff to emphasise rehabilitation. This interaction is further examined in 
chapter 9 where I consider the potential for interactions to cause suffering. The 
humour in Florence’s response appears to be a relief for both of them but it also 
indicates poignantly how the focus on one part of her body risks inadvertently 
disconnecting her as a person. Her body – or rather, the sum of problematic 
body parts – becomes the focus of care.  
 
The general perception among staff was that she was gradually becoming more 
and more dependent which went against the grain of the agenda in which 
patients were rehabilitated and discharged as fast as possible. When patients 
did not also share this goal, it led to tension and conflict:  
 
Rebecca (about Florence): “I don’t mean to sound mean but 
she’s not helping herself. Her husband is on at her too about 
needing to walk again, and she’s not ever even really sick”. 
Conversely, patients who know the rules demonstrate at least an 
intention to walk, even if they lack the ability. They then earn 
approval from staff, as overheard when staff were marvelling at 
the fit and motivated 98-year-old patient admitted the previous 
day: “She’s really good, this lady, she just wants to get going”.  
 
Florence’s perspective was predictably somewhat different. She pointed at her 
legs and told me how the pain felt as though her skin were on fire. Her eyes 
filled with tears as she described what the wounds looked like underneath the 
bandages. She did not think they were improving and was gradually trying to 
get her head around the possibility that she faced the prospect of daily wound 
dressings for the rest of her life. Her wounds signified her suffering, but it was 
not purely physical. Her face visibly recoiled at the odour as the bandages were 
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removed, and she averted her eyes from the sight of the raw weeping flesh. I 
asked her what her current goal was, and she told me “to get through the day”. 
Getting back upon her feet was low in her list of priorities at this time. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
6.4 Rita: “I’m Fed Up of The Nothing” 
 
During her 94 years, Rita had acquired four children across two marriages. She 
was stoical in the true sense of the word. She was a slight, hunched woman 
with short grey hair and startling blue eyes, deep in a craggy, wrinkled face 
whose topography suggested a great many smiles and frowns. With end-stage 
heart failure, she now required oxygen through a nasal cannula, and her 
sentences were often punctuated with gasps and pauses. Her fingers were 
gnarled with arthritis, pointing in every direction except that intended as she 
wagged them emphatically. Despite the effort in conversation, Rita enjoyed 
meaningful interaction greatly.  
 
 “I’m fed up”, she says. “It’s like this”, and she draws a long line 
in the air with her finger. “They don’t tell you what is wrong with 
you. Something’s failing, I can feel it.”  
I ask what she has been told, and she tells me it is heart failure. 
But this is all she knows. She resents having to hear her heart 
being spoken about out loud in a shared bay of patients;  
“It’s not public information. Everyone can hear. They think I don’t 
want to know, but my feet are on the ground and my head is on 
my shoulders, not in the clouds.” 
“Do you like things being told to you straight?” I ask. She nods. 
“Yes, just like it is. I know I’m going but they don’t tell you. They 
talk about me as though I am invisible, as though I am not even 
here. It’s like the information doesn’t belong to you. But this is 
me” - she points at her chest. Then she leans back against her 
pillow. “I’m fed up of the nothing”. 
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When I spoke to Rita she told me several times of her anger about not having 
been included in discussions about her illness. She tells me that the doctors 
arrived and listened to her chest, rummaged through her notes and charts, 
scribbled something on her prescription chart and left, swishing the curtain 
closed again behind them. From inside the curtain, she heard them discussing 
her ‘case’. She couldn’t remember what they said, but recalled specific words - 
heart failure, titration, meds, oxygen. They had left without explaining anything 
to her, or giving her an update about when she might be able to go home. The 
impact of being excluded from clinical discussions in this way can be seen as 
iatrogenic suffering. Although burdened by physical symptoms such as her 
breathlessness, and the pain from her arthritis, the issue Rita attested to 
repeatedly was the suffering that resulted from being spoken about as though 
she were absent - or worse, as though she did not have the ability to 
understand what was being talked about. 
 
6.4.1 Disempowerment: "As if I don't know this body" 
 
Rita’s husband has a marginal role in her world. She refers to him with pity, as a 
nursing home resident who has “lost interest in people”. For her this was a 
defining feature of being alive, to maintain one’s sense of social reality. By 
comparing herself with her husband, Rita reveals the human trait that she 
equates with carrying on, with not giving up - that of being interested in people. 
That Rita’s social world was so important was evident in the vehemence of her 
reaction to being apparently ignored by the doctors; she felt that she had been 
framed as a non-person. Her assumption was that they had treated her as they 
might treat an older person who was lacking in mental capacity. Their actions 
deprived Rita of social capital. Being interested in people conveyed a sense of 
how important relationality was to her. She interacted regularly with others for 
the purpose of interest alone. In the hospital, the purpose of the majority of 
interactions were clinical, brief, perfunctory. Curiously, when given an 
opportunity to speak to one of the doctors about her concerns, Rita declined. 
This may have reflected a sense of pointlessness, a recognition that relations 
between them had now been established, that she did not have faith that she 
would be given the responses that she seeks - the opportunity to be treated as 
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an equal, to find that the doctors were interested in her as a person and not just 
as a disease to be treated.  
 
On the walls behind patients’ beds were small whiteboards, for their names and 
consultant. At the bottom was an extra section that reads “what is important to 
me”. Most of the whiteboards were blank. Rita’s reads “coffee in a real china 
cup”. Most of the warm drinks for patients were served in plastic mugs, blue or 
brown in colour. Patients with shaky hands or a tendency to spill things were 
given theirs in clear plastic cups with tightly fitted sip lids to prevent spillage. 
The drinks were cooled before handing out to reduce the risk of scalding. I 
made myself a cup of tea in a patient cup; I was told off by one of the healthcare 
assistants. “They’re for patients, not staff. Infection control”. I made it anyway, 
and sat in the staff room to drink it.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
6.5 Alfie: “Watching the bloody clock" 
 
Alfie was nearly seventy and something of a mystery. He arrived on the ward 
having been sent in by his GP following admitting that he had taken an 
overdose. In A&E it transpired that no overdose was taken, but he was drowsy 
and sweating, and he was admitted to the ward for observation, taking the bed 
opposite Ned. He had numerous life-limiting illnesses: poorly managed diabetes 
and renal failure. His blood sugar regularly fluctuated from dangerously high, 
putting him at risk of a potentially fatal hyperosmotic hyperglycaemic state, to 
dangerously low, where a lack of sugar to the brain can lead to coma and 
death. He would not eat, drink or take medications, or allow his blood sugar to 
be tested. He was taciturn and testy, seemed suspicious of each and every 
member of staff:  
07:40am, staff nurse asks Alfie how he slept: 
A: “you bloody people, I’ve had two people checking the exact 
same thing today, I was up at 2am with doctors seeing him” [he 
gestures towards Ned, in the opposite bed]…  
Nurse: “We just want to do the best for you”  
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A (seems to ignore her): “That nurse who was on last night 
blackmailed me to have medicine, she knew she was off today”  
(Nurse flinches, her lips tighten, and she moves swiftly on to the 
next patient)  
 
Alfie was young in comparison to many people on the ward. He was admitted 
following an attempted suicide but assessed as not suicidal whilst in Accident & 
Emergency. However, he then collapsed, and was transferred to the ward for 
investigations which had been inconclusive. Alfie was suffering in the absence 
of a diagnosis, which uncertainty compounded the situation. He felt unsafe on 
the ward, ill at ease, and angry. He was a medical enigma with a cluster of 
curious symptoms - unexplained transient loss of consciousness, anorexia, 
confusion, and profound weakness. He had pain in both legs presumed to be 
related to his diabetes yet investigations excluded this. He gave a different 
history to each medical professional who tried to assess him. His responses to 
the nursing staff were largely curt and clipped.  
 
At times his drowsiness became so severe that he would become completely 
unarousable for a period of time, not even responding to staff when blood tests 
were taken or oxygen clips attached to his finger. During these episodes, his 
eyes were glazed and staring, his mouth open, his body floppy and pliant. Then 
he would spontaneously return to normal and bark at the nurses to go away and 
leave him alone (which they hurriedly did). When he was asked what he 
wanted, he would always say “home”. Sometimes he accepted my presence 
and we talked; he told me which of the nurses he trusts the least, and which 
were out to get him. At other times, he scowled when I approach him. At these 
times I left him alone, gleaning snippets about what was happening for Alfie 
through conversations overheard outside his room. 
 
During one of the weekly multidisciplinary team meetings, the staff discuss his 
potential diagnosis. “Functional”, the consultant suggests – a word generally 
used to describe any presentation of symptoms that cannot be ascribed to a 
physical cause. At one time, his presentation might have been described as 
psychosomatic, and there was even talk of Munchausen’s Syndrome, but it was 
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more politic to describe unexplained symptoms as functional. There was clear 
discomfort among the staff at this. Dr Roberts took a £5 note from his pocket 
and waved it at the gathered staff. “This is for anyone who can tell me what is 
going on with this man.” The team laughed, but nervously. His junior doctors 
looked uncomfortable. The nurses were exasperated - “if we are not doing 
anything for him, why is he blocking a bed that could be used by someone more 
deserving?”.  
6.5.1 Boredom 
 
One day, when asked how he was feeling, Alfie told me: “I’m just watching the 
bloody clock. Tick, tick. I don’t know why I’m here, I want to go home.” The 
nurses had told him he can’t go home until he was ‘compliant’ with treatment. 
“It’s just not safe”, they told me. They were concerned about the effect of not 
eating on his diabetes. Alfie had no control over his situation. He was bored, 
confused and frustrated. He had little leverage to influence what was happening 
to him. His only way of controlling thing was to refuse to comply with treatment. 
Paradoxically, it was this that was delaying his discharge home, and so he and 
the staff were caught in an ongoing struggle for power. I was mystified as to 
why staff were so reluctant to permit him to go home.  
 
The reason was revealed to me one morning in a conversation with Brett, a staff 
nurse: “if we send him home, it will be a failed discharge.” 
6.5.2 Uncertainty 
 
Staff found it challenging to look after him. He did not want anything to be done, 
but as each day passes it was increasingly clear he was unwell. His 
encephalogram report read:  
 
“EEG19 is abnormal due to background slowing from excessive 
and intermixed, intermittent delta/theta activities from both 
                                            
19 Electroencephalography 
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hemispheres in wakefulness” …"aetiologically nonspecific 
abnormal findings suggesting bihemispheric cerebral 
dysfunction”…the letter goes on to explain that this may be seen 
in certain encephalopathies, and some neurodegenerative 
disorders. 
 
I asked the neurologist what this means. “No clear diagnosis but a few 
possibilities. We would need to do further tests”, he tells me.  
 
After a week of being in hospital undergoing various (inconclusive) tests, an 
MDT was held. One of the doctors suggested sertraline, an antidepressant, but 
Dr Roberts was reluctant to give what he calls “black magic drugs” without a 
clear rationale. Alfie did not agree to see the mental health team, so no 
diagnosis of depression has been made. A nurse commented that his blackouts 
appear to be voluntary:  
 
“one morning he were out of bed having a cup of tea and he 
asked if I could help him back to bed and I said ‘just finish your 
cup of tea’ and because I wouldn’t put him back to bed he went 
like this (gesticulates) flung his arms out and started going 
(gurgles) like that. And anyway, I put him back to bed and as 
soon as he knew I were putting him back to bed he stopped 
doing it”.  
 
Without a clear diagnosis, some doctors were uneasy, but others described his 
‘case’ as a “refreshing change from the usual falls and chest infections.” The 
nurses consider that he was ‘blocking a bed’ and suffering from mental illness 
with “nothing actually wrong with him at all”. Other staff think that he was trying 
to kill himself through starvation and plans to stay in the hospital until he dies. 
“He knows exactly what he was doing”, I am told, “but I kind of think - if you 
want to die, go home to die.” For the nurses, hospital was not the right place for 
him to be cared for.  
 
One day, I arrived on the ward to find that Alfie had self-discharged - two weeks 
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after admission, with no definitive diagnosis. The nurses shrugged, rolled their 
eyes and got on with their day’s tasks. During his stay, he endured nerve 
conduction studies, an electroencephalogram, blood sugar monitoring (when he 
was too drowsy to decline), urine and blood tests, and a screening for infection. 
None of these found any physical cause for his drowsiness and blackouts. He 
had visibly lost weight. I wondered out loud how he has managed to stay alive 
with no food or drink, and one of the healthcare support workers muttered “oh, 
he ate, but only when we weren’t looking.” No pathological cause for his cluster 
of symptoms was found, and none of the staff connected with his emotional or 
his spiritual suffering. Alfie’s story was left unfinished. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
6.6 Michael: “Just Put Me on The Scrapheap” 
 
I asked the nurses which patients at that time they would describe as suffering. 
Kirsty pointed at the door of room 2. “Michael”, she said without hesitation.  
 
“He has pressure sores all over him, incontinence, depression. 
He’s come from supported accommodation where carers saw 
him four times a day, they usually found him lying in his own 
excrement because he was faecally incontinent. If I were in his 
position I’d want someone to put a bullet to my head. Earlier I 
had to give him a suppository and I apologised first, I said “sorry, 
this is going to be a bit uncomfortable”, and he said “nowt new 
there. Just put me on the scrapheap”” 
 
Michael was a quiet man in his late seventies. He came into the ward from a 
warden-controlled housing. When he arrived, his state was - according to one 
staff nurse - “shocking”. Malnourished, with a grade four decubitus ulcer to his 
sacrum, and wearing soiled pyjamas, he hungrily swallowed the soup offered to 
him. His hands shook as he spooned it into his mouth, and lumps were caught 
in his tangled beard. Doubly incontinent and unable to walk, Michael had been 
utterly reliant on three carer visits a day. At home, these visits had usually been 
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brief and functional. Carers often found him lying in his own excrement. His 
incontinence meant that the pressure sore, regularly covered in excrement, had 
worsened to the degree that at the bottom of the gaping wound, it was possible 
to see only a thin layer of connective tissue over the bony prominence of his 
sacrum. The wound was the size of a fist. He required regular suppositories and 
enemas to manage his chronic constipation, but these usually led to faecal 
matter oozing into the wound which caused agonising pain. His response to the 
physical pain was to clench his eyes closed and turn his face into his pillow. He 
rarely spoke. Sweat beaded on his face and neck until the wound had been 
cleaned out with gauze and saline and the soiled adhesive dressing replaced. 
The wound dressing needed replacing whenever there was a leakage of faeces, 
which was usually at least daily. I observed the procedure several times. As the 
nurse arrived pushing the trundling dressing trolley and equipment, he showed 
no visible reaction. This was a marked contrast to Florence’s anxious and 
tearful response when her wounds were dressed. Michael appeared resigned, 
surrendered, and powerless. The nurses had insight into how painful the 
procedure must have been, and always apologised beforehand. They often 
looked uncomfortable as they enter the room, only to smile brightly at Michael 
as they introduced themselves and explained what they were about to do. 
6.6.1 Resignation 
 
I asked Michael how he was. “I’m fed up of my body”, he replied. Yet when 
asked by a Registrar how his mood was, he replied “not too bad”, although his 
voice was flat, his eyes averted. The extract below describes a review on ward 
round, by the locum consultant and registrar.  
 
(Long discussion between Dr Basu and Dr Frank about medical 
situation - bilirubin, diabetic review, surgeons…Over 5 minutes)  
So far, they have been discussing him at the foot of his bed in a 
single room without introducing themselves. M watching them 
but not listening particularly attentively - more a gaze in their 
direction. Now they are looking at the bloods. The discussion 
goes deeper - Dr Basu turns to me and summarises the story: 
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“he came in with infected pressure ulcers, there are no 
communications between the ulcer and rectum. He also has 
autoimune hepatitis and has a past history of PE20 and AF21. He 
has had antibiotics and now needs K22, LFT23, RBC24. His INR25 
is on the slightly high side, he tells me. We need to keep an eye 
on it” 
19 minutes after they first enter the room they finally talk to him  
Dr Basu: “Good morning sir, how are you?”  
Michael: “Not too bad”  
Dr Basu to Dr Frank: “What was the outcome of the MDT?”  
Dr Frank: “He was referred to the social worker”  
Dr Basu to M: “How are things at home?”  
Michael: “I don’t live at home”  
Dr Basu: “Where do you live?”  
Michael: “England”  
Dr Basu to Dr Frank: “Has anyone done MMT26?”  
Dr Frank doesn’t know. Dr Basu goes through the MMT, or mini-
mental test. These include what year it is, how old he is, what 
month it is…and questions which I would find hard to answer if I 
had been in a room with no access to the outside world for 
several months, as in Michael’s case.  
Dr Basu: “How old are you?”  
Michael: “38”  
                                            
20 Pulmonary embolism 
21 Atrial fibrillation 
22 Potassium 
23 Liver function test 
24 Red blood count 
25 International normalised ratio (a measure of clotting capability of the blood) 
26 Mini Mental Test 
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Dr Basu: “And looking at me, what job do you think I do?”  
Michael: “Looking at you? Well, you’re well-dressed. A good job, 
I imagine”  
Dr Basu lifts the blanket to look at his feet. Listens to his chest. 
Does not ask permission. Does not ask about pain.  
He leaves.  
Afterwards, I ask Michael how he is: “Oh, 90% okay”  
Me: “And what about the rest?”  
Michael: (shrugs) 
 
It was curious that the doctors elected to pursue assessment of cognitive 
function in this encounter. Michael had very little sight of daylight to orientate 
himself to diurnal or seasonal rhythms. He had lived alone with no access to 
newspapers or television to be aware of the current prime minister. Visitors to 
his room were frequent, and only that day included a surgeon, three nurses and 
a dietician. Some wore uniform, others did not. The question about the job that 
Dr Basu did may have felt something of a challenge in the light of this. Yet Dr 
Basu notes that Michael failed many of the MMT items. I reflect that he did not 
actually introduce himself when he had arrived, and furthermore that his name 
badge was on back-to-front. I wonder how difficult many of these questions 
would be for anyone in this setting, with all the comings and goings of strangers.  
 
When asked how he was, Michael’s most frequent response was to shrug. 
Although able to speak, Michael chooses the shrug as his means of 
communicating his resignation. The overall tone of his shrug was clear to 
observers yet the volition behind its expression was open to interpretation. A 
shrug conveys either that someone does not know the answer to something, or 
that they do not care. It conveys uncertainty, or that something is to be 
dismissed. So, either Michael did not know how the rest of him was faring on 
this day, indicating a state of disconnection from his body and his subjective 
sense of wellbeing, or he was communicating that he did not much care about 
how he was. Alternatively, the shrug might have been intended to challenge the 
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observer to push for more information; being subject to being ignored, and the 
resulting sense of invisibility, may have placed Michael in a position of wanting 
to hold on to his own information until he felt the listener was ready to listen. 
 
Efforts made by nursing staff to improve his hygiene and appearance were well-
intentioned but did not appear to ultimately have the desired effect. It was not 
his beard (or lack thereof) that made Michael suffer, but his ongoing pain, the 
indignity of having a wound that permanently leaked faecal matter, and the 
vulnerability and dependence of being confined to bed and surrounded by 
strangers. In the face of these obstacles it was hard to see how Michael could 
maintain his sense of self and adulthood. The clinical examinations of his 
wound not only caused physical pain but involved transgression of bodily 
boundaries. Examination of his wound and anus to establish whether the 
tissues between them had broken down was a profoundly degrading and painful 
intervention, and one which would normally be expected to cause vulnerability 
and anxiety. However, Michael’s response was one of resignation. His 
statement that he was “fed up of his own body” implied that he saw his body as 
separate from himself. He had come to accept passively not only the shaving of 
his beard, but two painful (and probably futile) examinations of his pressure 
sore. Before he had come into hospital Michael had spent his time at home 
alone in bed, sometimes listening to the radio, but mostly sleeping. The only 
interruptions to his day came from visits from carers who – under pressure to 
achieve the required number of visits – often spent less than half an hour with 
him, washing and dressing him or preparing his food. On some visits, they 
would ask him whether he wanted something and he would wave them away. 
They would write in his notes “declined cares today” to cover themselves from 
potential litigation. 
 
Michael’s unkempt experience was often equated to a lack of wellbeing. In 
handover one morning, nurses were concerned that he had refused a shave. 
One staff nurse said “we’ll go back to him. Maybe Jasmine can work her magic - 
he’ll feel better with a shave”. The others nodded their agreement.  
 
Later that day, suitably shaven, the nurses were pleased to report that Michael 
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is “doing much better”. I ask them what changed. “We gave him a shave, he’s 
had a right good fettle”. Another nurse nodded, “he looked really unkempt.” I 
peered around the door to say hello and see him. I hardly recognised him 
without his beard. His white, wispy hair was combed to one side. A cold cup of 
tea sat on the bed table in front of him, and he stared ahead, into space. He 
was the same person as before. I asked him how he is, and his shrug was the 
same. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented aspects of suffering relating to five of the 
participants: Vincent, Florence, Rita, Alfie and Michael. The extracts and 
discussion allude to the complexity of the suffering experiences of these 
patients. The accounts demonstrate numerous ways in which suffering was a 
shared human experience, with common and shared elements. Yet they also 
illustrate ways in which suffering was unique for each of these participants, and 
was a product of the situation in which they find themselves and their individual 
constitution. It was necessary to contextualise these accounts and this has 
taken the form of accounts of parallel conversations with staff, or environmental 
features. These contextual issues will be further examined in chapter 9 which 
attends to the issue of iatrogenesis – the potential for suffering to be caused or 
exacerbated by interactions, interventions or the environment.  
 
Suffering took on a variety of forms for these participants that cannot easily be 
encapsulated in themes or categories. Particular events were selected from the 
field notes to examine facets of suffering that were felt to typify the experience 
of that participant. However, the accounts are by necessity both limited and 
limiting. Participants rarely conceptualised their experiences as suffering, but 
used a range of proxy terms or phrases to indicate suffering. True, these could 
also be conceptualised as distress, or dis-ease, or any number of synonyms 
that have been associated with suffering. However, the purpose of the chapter 
was not to drill down to an ‘essence’ of suffering but to present a series of 
stories that attest to the idiosyncratic and complex nature of suffering for these 
participants. The narratives in this chapter will be returned to in chapter 8 when 
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I undertake a theoretical analysis of suffering, locating the kinds of themes 
identified here within the broader context of the literature. This chapter will deal 
with issues such as alienation, loss and disconnection, drawing on a range of 
disciplinary perspectives to gain deeper understanding into the kinds of 
phenomena that contributed to the suffering experiences of these participants.  
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Chapter 7: White Knuckles, Tapping 
Spoons 
7.1 Introduction 
“Distress may be hidden, but it is never silent” (Regnard et al. 
2007)  
“the materials required to understand suffering are of such a 
different order that we believe research approaches to it must 
deal directly with an experiential domain which heretofore, 
perhaps with the exception of the work of phenomenologists 
(which has its own problems) has been the grounds of 
art” (Kleinman and Kleinman, in Jackson 1989)  
“Suffering is at once everywhere and nowhere. It seeps through 
the cracks, through silences left in conversations, mundane or 
profound. It oozes through the pores of the ill and dying, grey 
and weighty. It sparks jaggedly, from the needles, syringe 
drivers, infusion pumps and shiny metal and plastic objects, the 
symbols of palliation” (extract, reflective diary, field notes) 
 
This chapter introduces the next group of participants – those who were unable 
to verbally articulate their experiences. Participants had been deemed to lack 
mental capacity for the purposes of participating in the study, as well as for 
many of the day-to-day decisions that therefore needed to be made on their 
behalf. For these participants, the ethnography is presented in a different way, 
and attention was paid to the embodied expression of suffering. As with chapter 
6, use of theory is minimal and the chapter aims to present a set of patient 
narratives, each illustrative of a different facet of suffering. Because there was 
less verbal interaction, these narratives have been constructed using a 
combination of informal conversations with relatives and staff, and by using the 
principles of sensory ethnography outlined in chapter 3. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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7.2 Ellen: Agitation 
 
Ellen was unconscious when she was admitted to the ward. It was suspected 
that she had had a brain stem stroke or seizure. She had experienced seizures 
in the past, but usually recovered within a matter of hours. This time she had 
been unresponsive for over a day. She was 68 and also had stage IV heart 
failure and end-stage renal failure.27  
 
I watch Ellen sleep. She seems peaceful, incongruous with the 
distress of her family around her. I do not think she is suffering. 
I’ll observe her anyway as her journey will tell me lots about how 
end of life care is managed on the ward. She looks like she is 
dying. She is put into a side room, accompanied by her two 
daughters, Anne and Fiona. (Day 1 of admission) 
 
Over several days she drifted in and out of unconsciousness. When awake, she 
turned her head to identify the source of voices, but her eyes were glazed and 
did not focus and there was no response to the words of staff or her family who 
sat vigil by her bedside. Doctors were absorbed with task of trying to diagnose 
the cause of her unconsciousness. The question of whether it was a stroke or a 
seizure was significant because it impacts upon the likely reversibility of her 
condition, and hence her prognosis. During her first day of admission she 
underwent a battery of tests and scans which failed to draw any conclusions. 
That weekend Anne and Fiona, her daughters, became concerned that Ellen 
seemed to be becoming weaker, and demanded a review with regards to 
whether she might need a feeding tube. The regular dietician was not available 
so she was seen by the on-call, who was given the history from Ellen’s 
daughters and the nurse. That day a nasogastric tube was sited, and a pump 
                                            
27 these two conditions often accompany one another, as the fluid accumulation resulting from 
a weakening circulatory system puts increasing pressure on the fragile vascular system of the 
kidneys. Management of end-stage heart failure often involves a difficult balance of medications 
that eventually cannot be adjusted any more. At this point, a palliative approach is generally 
thought to be appropriate (Gott et al. 2007). 
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set up by the bedside that drip fed the tan-coloured suspension of nutritional 
supplement directly into her stomach. When I returned to the ward on Monday 
Ellen seemed very different. Still mostly unconscious she had begun to open 
her eyes and make twitching movements in response to certain stimuli. Her 
daughters took this as a sign of recovery, and it affirmed their earlier assertions 
that she needed to have a feeding tube. However, when she opened her eyes, 
they usually rolled back in her head, and were unfocused. Her swelling had 
become much worse, particularly her legs which were shiny and taut. She made 
small retching sounds, and her neck occasionally twitched as though she were 
trying to lift her head. That evening, she began to vomit. Nurses were quick to 
attend to her, talking in low, reassuring tones as they wash her face and chest 
with warm water. Ellen seems oblivious, her eyes open momentarily then close 
again.  
 
Ellen’s daughters have gone. Her hands should be warm and dry 
but they are so swollen, they feel cold, like plastic. Her fingers 
are swollen, a sign of worsening heart failure as the fluid builds 
up in the interstitial spaces in her tissues. Her ring is tight on her 
wedding finger; she still wears it, even though Fiona told me she 
was widowed years ago. There are cracks that leak fluid. Despite 
myself I feel aversion to holding her hand but I continue to do so. 
I notice she is wearing silver nail varnish, but the varnish only 
goes halfway down the nails. It is growing out; a hearkening back 
to a brighter time, when she had a special event or was 
pampered by a loved one. Maybe a time when she wasn’t 
thinking about hospitals or mortality. I realise my aversion to the 
texture and sensation of holding her cold hands has passed; it 
only took a moment to tune into the person who owned these 
hands, and it vanished. She became a person with a history, a 
family and a life (Field diary entry, Day 6 of admission) 
 
Over the next two days the frequency of her vomiting increased. She often 
tensed her muscles and tried to lean forward; sinews on her neck protruded 
with the effort. Her veins were swollen against her white throat. Her face - 
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smooth and unlined when admitted - became pinched, pale and furrowed. 
Although at times she seemed almost awake, she was unable to communicate 
with her family. When she heard the sound of Anne’s voice she would frown, try 
to turn her head, but then her eyes would again roll back in their sockets and 
she would disappear back into her state of diminished awareness. Over time 
and after much discussion between the team and Ellen’s family, the feeding 
tube was removed. The evening after the tube was removed, Ellen died.  
 
Anne calls out from her room and a nurse rushes in; I follow. I 
see her tongue sticking out, it is dark. Her face swells and she 
makes a strange sound. Then she flops back against the pillow, 
exhales noisily. She does not breathe in again. Anne and Fiona 
are distraught; they lean over her, pulling at her nightgown, 
stroking her sweaty face. “Mum”, they say, over and over again. 
“Mum”. They are both crying. The nurse moves to stand beside 
them, a hand on their shoulders, in silence. I slowly back out of 
the room (Field entry, Day 9 of admission) 
 
Ellen’s story is discussed in greater detail in chapter 8 where I suggest that 
although she was not suffering on admission to the hospital, a cascade of 
interventions led to a situation where she began to suffer, immediately prior to 
her death. Further, I argue that this was preventable, had she been accurately 
identified as approaching the end of life when first admitted to the ward. Ellen 
suffered the physical impact of a range of symptoms. It was not possible to ask 
her what was bothering her, whether she had any pain, or whether she felt 
anxious. The tension in her face at the effort and sensation of vomiting were the 
only external signs of distress. However, it was possible to intuit that there was 
suffering that accompanied the sense that she was unable to communicate with 
her daughters, and possibly fear at not knowing where she was when she 
awoke.  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
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7.3 Sheila: “White Knuckles, Tapping Spoons” 
 
Sheila was 82 and had had dementia for 6 years. Originally admitted from home 
with a urinary tract infection, she needed intravenous antibiotics and the 
infection was now resolved. She was in a side room because she had a positive 
MRSA screen on a previous hospital admission. She had been living at home 
but her family had been increasingly worried about safety. None of them lived 
nearby, but I spoke to her son and he said they were all hoping that she would 
soon be “back on her feet, eating and drinking again”. It was clear that she has 
deteriorated beyond the point where this was a realistic aim. She had been in 
hospital for over a month and most of that was in bed.  
 
One morning, the consultant his rounds enters her room. He 
flicks through the notes, turns to the nurses, and asks: “is there 
anything else we need to do for her?”. She is looking at him, 
frightened. The nurses shake her heads. “She’s social now”, they 
tell him.  
 
Despite being medically stable, her protracted recovery and prolonged 
bedrest meant that she no longer had the ability to function as she had prior to 
admission. It looked increasingly as though home would be impossible, but 
discharge to a care home was being hampered by disagreements between 
social services and health funders as to how much of her care requirements 
were ‘social’ and how much related to ongoing ‘health’ conditions. This was an 
important question, since the former would require a means-tested contribution 
from Sheila and her family, whilst the latter would be funded from within the 
health budget. However, the result of failing to settle on a plan meant that days 
had become weeks and then months.  
 
Sometimes she was able to eat, although slowly and with much examination 
and manipulation of her food with her hands before it reached her mouth. On 
other days, she did not want to eat or drink, and shouted at staff to go away. 
When she needed help she would not press the call bell but would tap her cup 
on the edge of the bed table in various rhythms. At first, the plan was to move 
   183 
her to a nearby hospital so she can be closer to her family, but over a period of 
several weeks she had become less amenable to rehabilitation according to the 
physiotherapists.  
 
Sheila could often be heard calling out loudly “what about me? What about 
me?” when she as alone in the room. Alongside this cry, she would hit her cup 
or spoon against the bed table at ever increasing amplitude until someone 
would arrive at her doorway. However, more often than not, the person would 
simply admonish her and ask her to keep the noise down, before leaving again. 
When people entered her room, she responded in different ways depending on 
her mood. Sometimes one was met with a smile and greeting, but at other times 
that fearful wide-eyed look would dominate and she would shout “no” and throw 
things at the person. She was particularly fearful when staff attended to her 
personal hygiene needs and would often scream “help me! Somebody help 
me!” during bed baths. Staff would often try and defuse the situation through 
being jovial and friendly. Once, in the middle of a night shift when all was quiet 
on the ward, I heard her plaintively call out “Nobody here. Here there is nobody” 
and then begin to cry, sounding like a frightened child: 
 
1:05 am: Sheila is calling out, frightened. In the room, in full light, 
two HCAs are trying to get her to put her top back on. She 
doesn’t know what is happening. The staff are laughing, joking, 
attempting to be jovial but in the middle of the night in the glare 
of fluorescent strip lighting it seems peculiar, out of place, 
incongruous. Even a bit alarming. I sense her agitation and 
confusion. She is saying “help me, help me”.  
 
It was not possible for an observer to accurately glean the meaning behind the 
action of casting aside her clothing. Staff discomfort was mitigated by the use of 
humour, to defuse the situation. For most people, the thought of accidentally 
exposing one’s body to strangers is unsettling. Staff may well have been aware 
of this and have been using humour and light-heartedness to mitigate against 
the discomfort. Sheila was unable to enlighten us. So, it was made light of, 
negated, her clothes hurriedly replaced and her dignity temporarily restored. 
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The interpretive schemata for the healthcare support worker was that Sheila did 
not know what she was doing, that behaviour of people with dementia was often 
unfathomable, but she was also aware that it was important to maintain dignity 
and keep a positive attitude. These three perspectives combine in a bizarre way 
to render Sheila’s behaviour laughable, and even though the healthcare support 
worker seemed to be aware that this was inappropriate, she was unsure of an 
alternative route that might have been taken.  
 
I did not know whether Sheila, in an earlier time before dementia had taken 
hold, might have laughed at herself as she removed her clothing, or whether 
like many women of her generation the idea of immodest dress would have 
been abhorrent. Any assumption that I made could only ever be based on what 
limited knowledge I have of people I have met who were similar to Sheila. My 
assumption that she was shocked by the question was really my own shock, a 
condition respect for my elders, against a backdrop of deep embarrassment at 
seeing her unclothed in this way, and being in no position to leave the room 
without causing further distress. 
7.3.1 Loneliness  
 
When alone in the room, Sheila tapped her bed table. Sometimes she used her 
knuckles, but if a tool is within reach she would make use of it. A spoon, a cup, 
a bed pan. These objects were used to create sound to supplement her cries 
and screams of “what about me?”. There was a characteristic percussive 
rhythm to her tapping that cut through the background noise and could be heard 
as soon as one entered the ward.  
 
Sheila’s suffering was highly embodied. It was palpable in the expression on her 
face for much of the time, a combination of fear, confusion and sadness. 
Further, it was evident in the intensity of the screams and cries and sounds that 
she makes. These sounds were her means of interacting with the world, trying 
to call in some help and support and company to alleviate her loneliness and 
her fear. For Sheila, interaction with the outside world was a combination of 
primordial actions and socially conditioned behaviours, which sometimes 
conflict - as in the example where she takes off her hospital gown. The tension 
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between Sheila’s instinct to remove her hospital gown, and her reaction on 
becoming aware that she had done so was illustrative of a tension between her 
need to express herself in a primordial, preconscious sense, and the 
sociocultural boundaries that were drawn around such behaviours and of which 
she still has awareness.  
 
Even though Sheila could speak, and demonstrated insight and understanding 
in relation to many of the direct questions that she was asked, when she was 
alone in the room and needed attention her verbal communication was limited 
to repeatedly calling “what about me? What about me?” but louder than this was 
a banging that was much more likely to being the staff to her bedside. She 
would hit a spoon or other hard object against the metal of the bed cot sides or 
the plastic of the bed table rhythmically, getting louder and louder, until attention 
arrived. Sheila could be heard screaming and calling so often that many of the 
staff had learned to tune out the sound, as demonstrated by a failure to react or 
respond. They told me that even if you went in and addressed one particular 
thing, she would begin making noises again almost straight away. Even as they 
were explaining this, Sheila was wailing, thumping on her table. I realised that to 
an extent I had also learned to tune it out whenever in conversation with 
somebody else. It was necessary; the sound, intensity and words were 
distressing to hear.  
 
Sheila was often unable to articulate her needs in a comprehensible form. She 
was at risk of having her suffering go unrecognised, so frequent were her 
expressions of distress. Staff found themselves forced to tune out her cries, with 
the undesirable consequence that Sheila became even more invisible. One of 
the contributing factors to her suffering seemed to be being ignored. Her verbal 
and behavioural agitation and calling for help intensified when staff ignored her 
or talked over her. This was compounded by the environmental situation; she 
was in a side room. Sometimes her calling was for a particular and identifiable 
physical need, as in the following example: 
 
She has been crying out “I want a wee” for about 25 minutes. 
Some minutes pass; she is screaming now: “I want a WEE! Oh 
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my god, oh my lord who do I have to ask?" 
The lunch trolley is being loaded up with trays of empty plates, 
nurses cluster around the pod. This is a time of busyness - 
nurses from the early shift have not finished but the late shift has 
just arrived and received handover. In this environment of noise 
and crowds, Sheila screams out again: “Why not me? Why not 
me? Nobody wants to listen! I want a WEEEEEE!” 
I’m exasperated. I have counted three people over this lunchtime 
period who have been in to tell Sheila that they are nurses and 
therefore cannot help her to have a wee.  
There is a crash; Sheila has thrown her plate across the room.  
Edith goes in: “What are you doing?”  
Sheila: “I want a wee and nobody is here”  
Edith:” I’ll get a nurse, they’ll come to you now”  
 
At other times, it seemed that she just wanted human contact and her demand 
for attention was not followed through with any particular request: 
 
Being washed by 2 nurses: Sheila tries to get involved in 
conversation with the staff. The nurses are leaning over her and 
washing her; they talk to each other about their summer shift 
patterns, holiday plans. Sheila’s neck cranes forwards as she 
looks at one, and then the other. She smiles, her mouth forms 
the shape of a word that never emerges. The conversation has 
moved on to a different topic with great rapidity. Sheila looks 
confused. It becomes a formless sigh, then she rests her head 
back on the pillow as they begin to roll her on to her side to get 
access to check her bottom. 
7.3.2 Disorientation 
 
One day I went in to Sheila’s room. She responded to me, said hello, then after 
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a few seconds she frowned and looks away, I felt she was about to say 
something but she’s not quite sure what. I fed her porridge; she ate a few 
mouthfuls then seemed to forget what to do with it, played it around her mouth 
with her tongue, then spat it out again. A sip of coffee; the ﬁrst went down, the 
second - she looked away (as if ashamed about dribbling) – came out of the 
corner of her mouth. Breakfast was finished: 
 
Me: “I’m going to leave the room now, I’ll come back and see you 
later”  
S: “Oh no, don’t do that, please. I’m frightened”  
Me: “What of?”  
S: “I don’t know”  
(Looks scared - keeps pointing at the printed sheets on the wall 
at the foot of her bed. Details about the local area, but in type too 
tiny for her to see anything other than black dots) 
Me: “Shall I take those pictures away?”  
S: “Ooh, yes please”  
Me: “Do you want a different picture there?”  
S: “I’m not bothered”  
We have a brief conversation about holidays. I thought I heard 
her murmur “Malta” and when I asked her if she had ever been, 
her eyes brightened and she leant forwards.  
“Oh yes, Malta...” Her face was suddenly awake.  
Me: “What was it like there?”  
S: “Ooh, lovely. All the ins and outs of it” (eyes brighten, leans 
forwards) 
Later, I printed off a picture of Malta, and wrote in big script Malta’. I stuck it to 
her bedside locker. She looked at it blankly. I asked her if she has ever been to 
Malta. She didn’t reply and looked confused. She looked out the window and 
frowned as though she didn’t really know what I have just said. When she 
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looked back at the picture her gaze was blank, and she showed no sign that 
she recognises me - indeed she seemed fearful at finding a stranger in her 
room.  
7.3.3 Indignity 
 
Sheila was one of the patients identified as a “double”, meaning that two people 
were needed to “do cares”. The following reflective account, written after a 
morning spent in her room, gives a sense of what this experience was like for 
her. 
 
I helped the healthcare assistants to wash Sheila. Sheila is a 
large woman, difficult to wash because she does not move her 
own body in any way that facilitates the task we are doing. She 
does move, but these movements are seemingly unrelated to her 
having a wash. She swats away an invisible object from in front 
of her eyes, she clasps the blanket and draws it up underneath 
her chin. When she does something with her body she appears 
disconcerted, ashamed almost.  
Sonia deftly and capably rolled Sheila this way and then that, 
streaking the warm wet flannel over invisible dirt. Porridge and 
soup have been dropped on to her hospital nightgown. She 
needed to be cleaned where she has been incontinent. A small 
red pressure sore on her sacrum needed a new dressing 
applying to protect it from excoriation. 
Flings off clothes then covers up her nakedness with her hands, 
fingernails long and grimy, eyes wide. The healthcare assistant 
is talking to me, chatting, telling me about what she thinks about 
her job, why she loves it, why she wouldn’t want to be a 
registered nurse - ”you lose the patient contact”, she says. Over 
the top of Sheila is - confused by the chattering  
 
She did not seem to know where she was and was easily frightened by sudden 
noises. Often, she undressed herself, throwing her nightgown out of the bed 
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and flinging back the blanket. Occasionally she realised she had done this, 
rapidly becoming mortified and frightened. At such times, she would clasp her 
arms across her chest to hide her body, her eyes would widen and she would 
glance around with jerky movements of her head and neck. When this 
happened, she would invariably notice at some point that she had done so. 
Then, she would become distressed and seek to cover up her modesty with her 
hands – which was difficult, as her breasts were large - or with the hospital 
blanket if it hadn’t also fallen to the floor. Most often she would be found sitting 
upright in bed, completely naked, by whoever went into her room. 
 
Sheila (takes off hospital gown and throws it to the floor) 
HCA: (smiling) "Were you a stripper when you were younger?"  
Sheila frowns: "Dear god I most certainly was not"  
(HCA grins at Student Nurse- they are amused but the question 
has caused distress - she doesn’t know why she is doing it and 
looks alarmed when she discovers that her genitalia are 
exposed) 
 
Sheila’s suffering was related to loneliness, fear and separation. She called for 
attention but then could not follow this through with a particular request. She 
was disorientated and confused which meant that even when someone was 
present she was unable to express her needs. Although she sometimes 
seemed less frightened with company than when alone, this situation could be 
reversed in certain interactions, such as if more than one member of staff was 
there, it was night time, or she was having her body washed or other 
intervention that appeared to compromise her dignity.  
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
7.4 Dot: Worn Out and Weepy 
 
Dot wept from the moment she arrived on the ward. She was an 88-year-old 
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woman with purple pyjamas, wild, tangled grey hair, and an enormous family. 
She was never alone. Within a day of her arrival on the ward, the walls of her 
room were covered in cards, scrawled pictures from grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Bunches of flowers and ‘get well soon’ printed balloons filled 
every spare space in the room. The lines on her face were deep but follow the 
shape of one who has laughed and smiled a lot. Her face when she arrived was 
not smiling; her eyes were crumpled closed and she cried continuously.  
 
Dot had three cancers in three places in her body; her bowel, breast and 
endometrium. At a Calman-Hine meeting28 prior to her admission it was decided 
that care would follow a ‘palliative route’ although staff differed in their 
understanding of what this means (the impact of this has been discussed further 
in chapter 5). Her wall was covered in birthday cards from yesterday, and more 
flowers. There was a picture from her great grand-daughter: "goodbye nan" it 
says. Mary, her daughter, told me that the consultant had told them all to say 
their goodbyes.  
 
Her weeping had a unique sound; a weary, worn-out kind of crying. Sounds 
escaped through the open door into the ward corridor; chatter, the clink of cups 
of tea and coffee, an admonishment of a grandchild trying to pull on the bar of 
the ceiling hoist. This sound was placed against the backdrop of Dot’s relentless 
weeping; a strange juxtaposition. Sometimes her crying took on a different 
pitch, increasing in intensity and conveying fear rather than exhaustion.  
 
I introduced myself to Dot’s family and explain the study. They 
nod their agreement, sign the Consultee Consent form. We talk 
about her crying, wondering out loud what is wrong. “I think 
those net knickers are too tight”, her daughter volunteers. A 
cousin says, “I think she needs the toilet.” “She always does 
that”, her son tells me. Her granddaughter, a lively girl wearing a 
                                            
28 Regular multidisciplinary meetings are held place within UK hospitals in which patients 
recently diagnosed with cancer are discussed. These arose as a result of a report into 
cancer care (Calman and Hine 1995)  
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purple primary school uniform, corrects him: “she’s crying 
because she’s sad.” He ruffles her hair. Another grandchild 
rummaged through her hospital notes at the foot of the bed.  
 
Even within Dot’s family there were multiple interpretations as to the meaning of 
her weeping. I reflected that if her family could not agree on what was wrong, 
then the prospect of staff understanding Dot’s suffering were even more remote: 
 
Me to Dr Frank: “It’s hard to know what is happening for her”  
Dr Frank: “Yes”  
Me: “Does she have dementia?”  
Dr Frank: “No, but she has been like this since she came in, for a 
long time, even her last clinic letter said so”  
me: “But if we were taking a palliative approach would the fact 
that she is crying continuously be something to attend to? would 
we think about that?”  
Dr Frank: “Well the CT will show if she has brain mets, we have 
a strong justification for doing a CT29 
me: “Do you think she is suffering?”  
Dr Frank: (after a pause) “She is a scared lady”  
 
As in many cases, the priority for the medical staff was trying to ascertain any 
underlying physical pathology that might be contributing to her current condition. 
Throughout the following interaction, Dot was unable to answer the question of 
whether she had pain or not. She looked frightened and gripped the bed sides. 
She wailed more loudly when strangers were in the room, clutching the blanket 
to her chin and staring ahead, wide-eyed.  
 
The doctors arrive: (they do not introduce themselves)  
                                            
29 Computerised tomography scan 
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Dr Basu pulls up the blanket and touches her feet with his keys 
to check her sensations are normal. She cries out loudly, 
drawing her knees up to her chest. He puts his stethoscope on 
the part of her chest that is exposed by a gaping button in her 
nightgown - “Chest is fine”, he says, but to his registrar rather 
than to her. She clenches her eyes closed and the pitch of her 
crying increases to a wail.   
Dr Basu: “Just open your eyes please”  
She does so  
Dr Basu: “Both pupils are fine”  
… 
to D: “Would you like some oxygen through a tube?”  
Dot: “NO!”  
Dr Basu “You’ll feel better”  
Dot: (cries loudly)  
 
Dot was often talked about as though she was not there, both by healthcare 
professionals and her family. Although she did have cognitive problems, there 
were times when I saw her respond to simple questions, but most were 
answered with increased weeping and distress. This gave the impression that 
trying to involve her has caused, or worsened, her distress. Yet she was also 
clearly distressed by the conversations that take place around her of which she 
was not invited to be a part.  
 
The sound of her cries was tuned out through necessity (in much the same way 
as Sheila’s calls for help) by those involved in the conversations. The weeping 
eventually took up a continuous place in the background. Seeing her relatives 
not reacting to the sound seemed to make it easier to ignore; they were not 
concerned and did not think it was unusual behaviour for her, so staff soon 
adopted this position as well: 
Dr Basu: “Good morning. How are you today?G  
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No answer  
Dr Basu: ‘Can you hold out your arms for me?” (her crying gets 
louder. She sounds frightened)  
Dr Frank: “This sound is normal for her”  
 
However, when a new member of staff encountered her it was common for the 
staff member to appear disconcerted and alarmed - as illustrated in the 
following example. On first meeting Dot, Claire – a student nurse – had looked 
alarmed at the sound of her crying – she had glanced at her mentor behind her 
as she entered the room as if to ask whether she should do anything. Her 
mentor was called away and Claire entered the room alone. She seemed 
uncomfortable; she talked rapidly over the top of the sound of Dot’s weeping:  
Claire telling Dot a story about fluffy socks. She is smiling while 
she talks. I’m not sure Dot is understanding the story but it 
seems to settle her momentarily.  
Now Claire is talking about the Yorkshire Show. Too much. She 
speaks quickly, a little nervously, smiling brightly (too brightly) all 
the time. It is incongruous against the backdrop of Dot’s crying. 
She cries louder. Tracey wraps Dot’s hands in her own – Dot 
stares down at her hand, recoils visibly. 
“ooh your hands are lovely and warm. I bet you don’t get cold in 
winter…my dad’s are like yours, he radiates heat. Crikey you are 
warm, I might just end up sitting next to you all day” keeps on 
chatting, smiling …  
Eventually Claire seems to realise the incongruity and quietens 
down. She looks at me (approval?) Doesn’t look at all 
comfortable with the silence.  
Suddenly:  
Dot: “My feet are cold!”  
Claire: “Shall I get you some socks?” (Jumps up quickly, eager to 
do something) 
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Although Dot was still eating, drinking and swallowing her medicines, it was 
decided to prepare for future deterioration and the probability that she would 
become unable to tolerate oral medications. Standard practice in such 
instances was to site a ‘butterfly’30 in the tissue (usually the arm or stomach) to 
enable repeated pain-free administration of injections:  
Helen (staff nurse): “I want to put a tiny tube in your tummy 
because I don’t want to keep having to give you injections. 
Would that be okay?”  
D: “I don’t know”  
H: “It would feel like a little scratch when it goes in but after that 
it’s all sorted. Would you like me to show it to you?…she shows 
and describes it, slowly, gently….do you think that would be 
okay?” 
D: “Yes”  
H: “And when I am doing it I will talk to you so you know when I 
am going to do it. Do you want Claire to hold your hand?”  
(holds her hand up, Claire gratefully takes it)  
H and Claire have brief conversation about how long to rub with 
alcohol wipe for to ensure it is sterile.  
H: “Is that okay? It feels a little bit cold but not too bad”  
She washes her hands, opens a wound kit on the bed, quickly 
and skilfully places the butterfly  
H:”Aall done, that’s sorted now. Let’s get some mouth care 
swabs. Bring me a kidney tray and some Vaseline”  
At the sound of these words, Dot’s eyes open and she cries out 
in alarm. She is trying to say something but it does not sound like 
formed words, more like a low-level moan.  
(I find myself thinking about how alarming Helen’s words had 
                                            
30 subcutaneous cannula 
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sounded but actually how benign they were for someone who 
understood the objects she was referring to - a kidney tray is just 
named after its shape, and the Vaseline is for her chapped 
lips….)  
The following morning Dot was awake when I arrived, lying on her side facing 
the door. She was not crying today, at all. I go into her room. During handover, 
they mention ‘anticipatories’. Despite staff being in broad agreement that she 
was for a palliative approach, there was still resistance to implementing the 
kinds of medical interventions that were associated with this, such as 
anticipatory drugs: 
 
Dr Basu: “Citalopram or midazolam? I would like to hang on 
before we write up anticipatories, because I saw her yesterday”  
Dr Frank: “But just in case?”  
Dr Frank is writing up the anticipatories. He doesn’t seem to 
know why or to be able to articulate his rationale for each of the 
drugs. He writes a range for the haloperidol, 0.5-3mg. I ask him 
how the nurses would know when to give the lower end of the 
range and when to go for the higher end. He says, “if the nausea 
is not actual vomiting go for lower, then if there is a lot of really 
bad vomiting go for the higher amount” ….  
Long discussions about pain…Dr Frank wants to cross off the 
zomorph if he is writing up diamorphine. But I tell him that if she 
is already on a regular analgesic it is almost certain that she has 
continuous pain - to manage this with pens only is to invite the 
pain. And we know that pain is at least part of her distress 
because of how settled she was after having oramorph in the 
night. Eventually he agrees. I have stepped outside researcher 
role again.  
I spent a long time the following day sitting beside her. That day there were no 
visitors until the late afternoon and she was asleep most of the time. I found out 
she had two lots of morphine overnight. She was not crying anymore. Outside, 
the telephone rang; it was her daughter. I heard the nurse saying, “she had a bit 
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of an unsettled night and the nurses gave her some medicine and it has settled, 
she’s been quite comfy ever since.” I wondered why it took such a long time to 
get analgesia for here, and I also wonder (paradoxically) if she was now over-
sedated. I reflect on the complexities of interpreting her weeping. Was her 
suffering really as simple as unmanaged pain all along?  
_____________________________________________________________ 
7.5 Bert: The Rain Came and Thunder and Lightening 
 
Bert was 94 years old. He was the main carer for his wife Elsie who has 
dementia, they lived at home prior to admission. He had been feeling on edge, 
trapped and anxious. Constantly worried about Elsie’s safety and his own ability 
to look after her long-term, this hospital admission was (in his daughter’s words) 
the “thing he had been dreading”. His wife had been taken into emergency 
respite care. He was admitted because of chest pain and dizziness. On 
admission, he said that felt as though he were dying. He had been diagnosed 
with a ‘vasovagal episode’ largely ascribed to the heat of those summer weeks. 
Alongside this issue he had developed septic arthritis and cellulitis in his hand. 
His physical condition had deteriorated. The infection had led, quite suddenly, to 
an episode of acute delirium. During this episode, he lost capacity to consent to 
the study which was obtained from his daughter as consulted. When I first saw 
him, he was still in the throes of his delirium but I went to see him again a few 
days later when he was able to recall much of the content of that frightening 
episode, helped by his daughter. Bert retained clear and frightening memories 
of the experience. He referred several times to the image of his mother, 
daughter and son sitting upright in chairs but being dead. The realisation that 
Elsie, his wife, had reached the stage where she would most likely need 
someone to care for her day and night had precipitated a crisis of anxiety when 
he developed the infection. Bert had been finding it increasingly difficult to care 
for Elsie although according to Kate found it hard to admit this, as he had made 
himself a promise that he would not let her ever go into a home. Kate felt that 
his infection had been caused by a lack of sleep and ongoing stress. 
  
 Bert continued to refer to the memories of his delirium, almost as though he 
was trying to make sense of them. The following excerpt is taken from a 
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conversation with Sally, the mental health liaison nurse: 
B: “It were getting darker and darker and I came across two 
women and they pushed me into bed, I thought I were dying, I 
thought my son and daughter were dead. All dead” 
Daughter: “It’s been hard, dad”  
B: “I can’t look after her no more” (daughter glances at Sally and 
mouths “mum”) 
Sally: “It might be that you don’t have to look after her any more”  
B: “Why am I here?”  
Sally: “Because you’ve burned yourself out. She probably should 
have been in a home years ago but you persevered”  
B: “Well I’ve thought so for a while now but I didn’t want to say 
anything. I can’t go back to that flat” [suddenly, as though he’s 
just remembered home] “but there’s my money and my telly and 
things” [leans back in chair] “If I could just sit somewhere and 
watch the telly and do my crossword I’d be happy”  
Daughter: “He’s deaf, he’s blind, he’s knackered - aren’t you, 
dad?” 
 
For Bert, the delirium precipitated a crisis in which he realised that he was 
becoming unable to care for his wife any longer. Over the following days 
However, he was full of worries, about what would happen to her, where she 
would go, and how he would be able to contact her. As the memories of the 
delirium receded he was faced with the new reality that his whole social world 
was about to change. His wife would need to go into a care home, and he would 
be left at home, alone.  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
7.6 Lilian: They’ve Taken My Eyes 
 
I first met Lilian lying on a trolley in the corridor when I arrived for a morning 
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shift. She was admitted overnight, an emergency, through A&E. The healthcare 
assistants were in the bay getting her bed ready. She had been ‘parked’ here so 
the nurses could keep an eye on her, and so that the noises she was making 
did not disturb the sleep of the other patients in the bay. She was grasping the 
hospital blanket tightly and pulling it up to her chin. She wore a pink nightgown 
that was rucked up over thin, mottled legs. Her black slippers looked too big. 
There was a cannula in her left arm and she glanced at it repeatedly, frightened.  
 
The ward was noisy, as was usual at 7.30 in the morning. The lights were all on, 
and up and down the corridor were the sounds of patients waking, water 
running, sheets being snapped open, pillows plumped, commode wheels 
rattling, the macerator in the sluice grinding. Lilian looked fearful, and her head 
darted to follow the source of different sounds.  
 
The nurses told me she has come in from the Medical Assessment Unit. She 
had a diagnosis of dementia but had developed a delirium which they were 
presuming has resulted from pneumonia. For this, she was having intravenous 
antibiotics twice a day. I looked back at her and see she was crying. “My eyes”, 
she moaned. “They’ve taken my eyes.” The nurses were concerned about her 
degree of agitation - “she’s a big falls risk”, they told me.  
 
Lilian was unable to tell me about what was happening to her. I tried to piece 
things together by observing her. Once she was moved into the shared bay, I 
took a seat in the opposite corner to watch and listen. It was clear that she was 
distressed by strangers, by noise, and by different kinds of stimuli. I did not want 
to add to her distress. Every time there was a sound, Lilian jumps. Hannah, a 
staff nurse, has noticed how sensitive she is: “I ruffled her hair in a friendly way 
and she nearly shat herself, literally…but…she is so scared. The doctors won’t 
prescribe anything for her hallucinations, we need to talk to them today.”  
 
The following day, there were concerns that Lilian’s voice sounds different. Her 
throat sounds constricted and there was a whistling as she breathes. She could 
not seem to swallow food or drink; she choked, spluttered, and spat it out. Her 
agitated shouting was now more of a croak. It was decided that she needs to be 
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reviewed by the Ear, Nose and Throat consultant, who decided that an 
endoscopy was indicated. This involved using a long, flexible tube with a 
camera at the end to examine her throat. The following extract from the field 
notes relates the event:  
 
Around the bed: ENT consultant, Kirsty (staff nurse), Dr Basu 
(geriatric consultant). 
ENT: “In what way is her swallowing worse than before?”  
K: “She can't eat or drink at all”  
ENT: “They've asked me to scope her. Will she let me?”  
K: “Well she's had haloperidol an hour ago”  
ENT: “Okay I'll get my scope”  
Her son Ben arrives. He watches for a minute; Lilian looks like 
she is swatting away flies. Her eyes seem focused on something 
in the distance, and her forehead is furrowed with worry. She 
makes a low, growling noise.  
Son: “How is she?”  
K: “Hallucinating quite a lot, she would shout I’m sure, if she had 
a voice to shout with. It's like something's blocked”  
K (to Lilian): “This doctor has come because of your sore throat”  
L: (no answer, grips blankets, looks terrified - her eyes are 
darting from one person to the next, then at her son, then at the 
doctor)  
K: “The doctor needs to look at your throat. Don't be scared. I'll 
hold your hand. This is going to go up your nose” 
son: “Her nose?”  
L: (cries, flings her head from side to side)  
son: “She can't hear what you're saying, that's the trouble. I don't 
know where her hearing aid is”  
ENT: “I don't think she will tolerate this”  
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Suddenly L is smiling and looking at the doctor. She grabs both 
of his wrists and tries to pull him down to her and laughs. ”Hello", 
she says.  
ENT: “Let's try again”  
(She struggles. They hold her head still but she is strong in her 
fear. They give up, discuss the option of using midazolam to 
sedate her for the procedure. This is rejected. ENT suggests a 
barium swallow)  
K: “But she can barely swallow”  
ENT: “I'll discuss with my colleagues. Her chart says she has 
had some intake so maybe we just leave it”  
So, she didn't have her hearing aid battery in, or her glasses on, 
plus an acute delirium. I am trying to imagine how that 
experience must have felt for her. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
7.7 Roland: He’s in That Graveyard There 
 
Roland - although able to talk - had quite severe cognitive impairment. His 
suffering was not told literally but was possible to explore the richness of the 
symbols embedded in the stories he told (graveyards, brothers, being lost, good 
shoes) and the questions he asked.  
 
Roland was a tall, thin man, distinguished despite dressing gown and pyjamas, 
his glasses hung on a cord around his neck. He did not like it in the shared bay; 
the man in the bed opposite him called out, day and night, and disturbed his 
sleep. The nurses had had to intervene on more than one occasion to prevent a 
fight. So, Roland spent much of his time walking the corridors of the ward. He 
greeted those he met, usually with a smile, but sometimes with agitation, 
irritability or anger. One day, he stopped me as I was walking past:  
 
“Will you come into my room and tell me what you see out of the 
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window so I know which way to go?” I walk with him.  
 
As we navigate the corridor, he tells me he was looking for his friend. We sit 
down together on the plastic covered seating halfway down the corridor and he 
continues:  
 
“He’s not in this graveyard here, he’s in that graveyard there. 
We’ve been friends for 51 years and now in five years’ time I’ll be 
dead, I shouldn’t be surprised. All I want is some cash and half 
an hour to go and visit him on my birthday. I haven’t gone home 
because there’s a lunatic in my room swearing and shouting. 
Look, I haven’t even got shoes on.” 
Three nurses walk past and he stops talking to follow them with 
his eyes. 
“All three of them said they’d help but none of them did. They 
don’t have the power. Fifty-one years. I want to be able to go 
down the road and feel gracious, feel free. I’m not expecting 
fees, I just want to be able to say “hello John, how are you 
settling down? I know your wife died, but…” we grew up together 
for 90 years.” 
It sounds like you were a bit like brothers, I tell him. 
“We were, yes we were. I fail to understand why people can’t say 
“oh all we’re doing is taking this bloke by the hand and talking for 
a couple of minutes and then pulling back…”  
His head turns and he looks at my shirt. “it’s no good talking to 
you, you’ve no authority to help me.” 
More nurses walk past and he tries to get their attention. They 
are avoiding eye contact and speeding up slightly as they go 
past. We sit together for around twenty minutes. 
“I’m just looking to see him say ‘by Timothy, I’m glad to see you’, 
that’s all. 
He stands up and leaves, walks across to the Clean Utility Room 
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(this is where the medications are dispensed). Hannah is coming 
out through the door as he approaches. 
“This is a sterile room, sweetheart, and only staff can come in. 
Have you got one of these?” (she shows him her NHS lanyard). 
He stares. “Why don’t you go and find your shoes?” she 
suggests. 
He turns and walks away.  
He was told that if he did not possess a staff badge, then entry to the room was 
forbidden. He never came to understand what was inside the room. He was 
refused entry at the point of expressing curiosity and his curiosity remained 
undiminished. Through this action, he was excluded from the population of 
people permitted access, and left with little or no agency. Roland was only too 
aware of the limitations that power impose on his agency. Further he was aware 
somehow that I lack the power to help him in his endeavour. It was unclear 
whether this was because of my gender, my lack of official hospital 
identification, or the absence of a stethoscope around my shoulders or a 
nurses’ distinctive uniform.  
 
On another occasion, Roland was searching for a shoe shop: 
“They need to be good and strong, enough to get me far”, he 
tells me. “Do you know anywhere that sells them?”. I tell him I 
don’t, and we compare my shoes and his bare feet, agreeing that 
neither would be suitable for a particularly long walk. He walks 
off again, still searching. He is frowning, he looks perpetually 
lost. Despite his restlessness and ceaseless walking, he is tired; 
his arms and legs shake when he stops, but he seems too 
agitated to stand still for long. He doesn’t want to wear his 
slippers and rejects staff offers to help him put them on.  
 
Roland sometimes seemed aware that he was in hospital but at other times 
looks bemused at the prospect of wearing slippers. He was firmly of the mind 
that walking boots would help him to continue on his journey, even though he 
was not entirely certain of his destination. He was rarely in his bed; when not 
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walking, he often sat on the row of plastic-covered seating halfway down the 
ward. Sometimes he said he is waiting to be met by a friend, other times he 
asked if the bus as due soon. Sometimes, however, he just sat and stared into 
the space in front of him, a space occupied only by three identical doors on the 
opposite side of the ward. All of them state ‘Staff Only’.  
Nurse: “Get out of Sheila’s room, Roland” 
R: “I’m looking for John. Have you seen him?” 
Nurse: “No, I haven’t”  
He appears at the door and catches my eye.  
R: “Have you seen John? He was just on the other side of the 
building when I lost him…” 
7.7.1 Depersonalisation 
 
Embedded in Roland’s suffering was a sense of lost identity. He was 
continuously searching and dealing with his nagging sense that someone or 
something needs to be found. References to objects and people from the 
outside world seem to help him in his endeavour to orientate himself to this 
present peculiar environment. Without reference to John, or the bus, or good 
shoes Roland sensed his identity to be at risk. He understood himself in relation 
to others but most of his interactions on the ward were functional or involved 
him receiving instruction or admonishment from a staff member.  
R is following Lucy, a healthcare assistant, down the corridor: 
R: “Can you show me?” 
L: “Right, just take a seat for me because we are going to be 
busy with dinners soon and the nurses with meds”  
 
In the hospital Roland had very little social capital. Surrounded by rooms he 
was forbidden to enter and spending his nights in a room full of strangers who 
were all wearing the same standard-issue hospital pyjamas, Roland’s social 
capital had been eroded. Social capital was sustained by social networks; 
therefore, these kinds of depersonalising events eroded Roland’s sense of self 
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and added to his suffering.  
 
For some reason John was a recurrent topic of conversation in Roland’s talk. It 
was significant that Roland was searching for his friend in a graveyard. A 
graveyard is not a neutral location. Many questions remained unanswered 
about John’s identity. Perhaps he was an old friend from work or army days, 
perhaps he was still alive or maybe he had died many years ago. Perhaps he 
was a lover, hidden for many years through Roland’s marriage and after his 
widowhood.  
 
Roland did not know the reason he did not want to wear slippers. One 
possibility was that slippers are often associated with homeliness and comfort, 
and with bedtime. Roland was unsettled by this as he clearly does not feel at 
home. He was looking for robust shoes in which he could leave the ward and 
walk to his destination. It was impossible to know where he would walk to if 
suitably shod in sturdy boots and if permitted to leave the hospital gates. 
Despite being rebutted several times a day, Roland was unceasing in his efforts 
to find his friend. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
7.7.2 Afterthought… 
 
I include the extract below to illustrate how simple and effective interventions 
that promote personhood could be.  
 
I arrive one afternoon on the ward and see Roland walking, arm 
in arm, with Jasmine, a healthcare assistant. They are chatting, 
but I don’t hear what they are talking about. He seems relaxed, 
his stride is more purposeful than the shuffle I remember. As I 
get nearer, I hear: 
R: “If there is another bed in this hospital I’ll bite their hand off” 
J: “I’ve put your chair outside your room so you don’t have to go 
in there with him. Come on, let’s go back together” 
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Throughout the rest of that shift, Roland seemed relaxed, affable and calm. 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has addressed the topic of suffering by describing examples where 
participants could not directly describe to me their experiences. Suffering in 
these narratives required a degree of interpretation, and this was done using 
sensory ethnography. The focus was on the nature of suffering, and on placing 
this within its broader context. The stories of Sheila, Ellen, Bert, Lilian and 
Roland added to the picture painted by the last chapter, in that they support the 
premise that suffering could be identified and described even when little or no 
verbal interaction was had with the sufferer. These aspects of suffering were 
less tangible; they defied robust explanation or theorising, and there was no 
way to validate the interpretations with the participants. Interpretation of the 
behaviour and action observed was subjective, but where possible I have 
presented as much data to render the excerpts sufficiently ‘thick’ to permit the 
reader a degree of freedom of interpretation.  
 
The stories of suffering in this chapter attest to feelings of loss, fear, alienation 
and loneliness. They overlapped to some degree with the accounts in the 
previous chapter but also manifest distinct features that accompany the 
particular predicaments in which the participants find themselves. Again, the 
word suffering was not used directly, but the broad range of physical, social, 
psychological and spiritual distress that was represented was encapsulated 
under this broader term.  
 
In the next chapter I examine the phenomenon of suffering in theoretical terms. 
Led by the findings of Chapters 6 and 7 and the various facets of suffering 
described, I examine how these facets were supported or challenged by the 
existing literature from a broad range of disciplinary perspectives including 
sociology, philosophy, nursing, medicine and humanities. The experiences of 
the participants in this and the preceding chapter will be once again visited but 
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the focus will be on placing them in a broader theoretical context rather than just 
describing their stories.  
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Section 3: Analysis, Discussion and 
Conclusion 
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 Chapter 8: Suffering: A Reflective Analysis  
 
“Suffering is in us, like a pit in fruit, and all around us, like air, like 
life. Yet, we, and I think that I can speak for all of us when I say 
we, we are incapable of defining suffering, of dealing with it, of 
speaking about it” (Katz and Johnson 2006. p631)  
 
“Oh, help me, please doctor, I'm damaged 
There's a pain where there once was a heart 
It's sleepin’, it's a beatin' 
Can't ya please tear it out, and preserve it 
Right there in that jar?” - Mick Jagger 
 
suffer early 13c., "to undergo, endure" (pain, death, punishment, 
judgment, grief), from Anglo-Fr. suffrir, from O.Fr. sufrir, from 
V.L. *sufferire, variant of L. sufferre "to bear, undergo, endure, 
carry or put under," from sub "up, under" + ferre "to carry" (see 
infer). Replaced O.E. þolian, þrowian. Meaning "to tolerate, 
allow" is recorded from late 13c. (Oxford University Dictionary 
Online no date) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, I aim to investigate how theoretical 
perspectives on suffering can illuminate or deepen understanding of participant 
experiences. Secondly, I consider the reverse; whether and how the 
experiences of participants can inform or develop existing theoretical 
perspectives. The participant narratives in the previous chapters identified 
multiple facets or themes of suffering. I argue that the participant narratives 
attest to the nuanced nature of suffering and consider the resonance of these 
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stories with what is known about suffering, according to the literature. In order to 
achieve this, I examine what the literature says in relation to each theme. 
Because it is such a vast topic, I adopted a pragmatic approach to the literature, 
searching clinical, philosophical and sociological perspectives, considering how 
each theme interfaces with existing literature. I propose that a missing element 
of healthcare practice lies in really understanding the complexity and variety of 
suffering experiences, and that improving compassionate care requires that 
suffering is foregrounded in research and education. To aid the reader in 
undertsnadinfg  identifying the main themes for exploration, an overview of the 
patient narratives and their corresponding themes has been presented in 
Appendix 5. 
8.2 Suffering: a theoretical background 
 
“When I think about suffering I sort of imagine a spider diagram, 
with all sorts of things linked to it, like pain and sickness and 
loneliness...it’s just too big a thing to think about as itself. We talk 
more in terms of problems, because here, there’s a person that 
can deal with each issue - so if its social, there’s a social worker, 
if it’s pain, there’s the doctor, and things" (Rebecca, Staff Nurse) 
“If illness did not involve suffering then it would present only a 
technical, instrumental problem” (Frank 2001, p355)  
 
In section 8.2 I provide a brief overview of some of the theoretical perspectives 
relating to suffering in general terms within the healthcare literature. In section 
to I examine literature relating more specifically to themes of suffering drawn 
from the patient narratives.  
In the medical and nursing literature, suffering is often referred to as a proxy for 
having a diagnosis of something (for example, 'suffering from dementia', 
'suffering from comorbidities') rather than viewed as a phenomenon in itself. 
Suffering is a shared human experience (Duffy 1992) that influences wellbeing. 
Kahn and Steeves (1986) posit that suffering is best understood as it relates to 
a perceived threat to some aspect of oneself.  
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A key theoretical perspective on suffering in healthcare comes from the work of 
Cassell. A physician in New York, he joined the Task Force on Dying at the 
Hastings Centre in 1971, which was to profoundly influence his personal 
philosophy of medicine and direct the next few decades of scholarship. 
Particularly interested in the moral issues that surround dying, he wrote 
extensively on the nature of suffering. He considered that suffering can be 
defined operationally as a “sense of impending personal disintegration” (Cassell 
1991, p25). Central to his thesis is the contention that failure to address the 
person as well as the body leads to failure in addressing the real issues at the 
heart of human suffering in clinical practice.  
Van Hooft, a philosopher, challenged Cassell’s efforts to distinguish suffering 
from pain, arguing that this equates to a form of dualism. Instead, he proposes 
that suffering is the manifestation of thwarted ‘teleos’. It can manifest in many 
ways, independent of consciousness; a person unable to speak or otherwise 
communicate their suffering can nonetheless suffer. In other words, humans 
strive towards the achievement of various goals (biological, social and so on), 
and suffering presents itself as an interception and interruption of this process 
(Van Hooft 1998). Based upon this idea, he claims that it is possible to frame all 
suffering within the four Aristotelian aspects of living: the biological, the 
appetitive, the deliberative, and the contemplative and it is only the person who 
is suffering who is in a position to evaluate their suffering. Furthermore, it is 
beyond the role of physicians to attend to a person’s spiritual suffering. This, for 
Van Hooft, is a matter for society.  
Edwards (2003) challenges Van Hooft’s approach, suggesting that frustrated 
teleos is neither necessary nor sufficient for suffering. Indeed, he rejects 
philosophical and scientific attempts to capture the nature of suffering. Instead 
he suggests we turn to language: we can know far more about suffering through 
exploring how it is used as a word in everyday language. To be useful suffering 
should remain an intuitive concept, and avoid being captured in the ‘net of 
science’. In an edited volume on social suffering, Kleinman et al. (1997) observe 
that suffering occupies a problematic place in cultures that place faith in 
biomedicine. The mechanistic conceptualisation of the body permits diseased 
organs to be replaced, or faulty systems to be supported by advanced medical 
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technology. One of the book’s key arguments is that although 
phenomenological and existential aspects of suffering are important, the 
experience of suffering is socially situated and shaped historically and 
politically. As such, experiences of suffering are both individual and collective. 
In a later paper, Kleinman argued for a difference in how we view disease and 
illness, where the former refers to a state of disrupted physiology, and the latter 
is socially and culturally defined. It is in the sociocultural realm that the differing 
paradigms regarding the nature of suffering become articulated. He observed 
that “culture fills the space between the immediate embodiment of sickness as 
physiological process and its mediated (therefore meaning-laden) experience 
as a human phenomenon” (1988, p27). Cultural differences between the patient 
and healthcare professional can affect not only whether and how suffering is 
recognised but also what is even considered to be suffering. The social and 
cultural nature of chronic illness, suffering and death has also been addressed 
by authors such as Corbin (1998) and Charmaz (1999; Charmaz and Paterniti 
1999). 
8.3 Facets of Suffering 
 
Section 8.2 provided a brief overview of some key theories of suffering. I now 
turn to seven specific themes that have been derived from the patient narratives 
in Chapters 6 and 7:  
 
1. Vulnerability and frailty 
2. Disempowerment and choicelessness 
3. Uncertainty 
4. Alienation 
5. Loss of Time 
6. Loss of Meaning 
7. Loss of Dignity 
 
This is not a comprehensive list. The narratives attest to a far more nuanced 
and complex description of suffering. The purpose of this chapter is to develop 
these seven themes to explore the potential utility of narratives in the 
development of theory around contemporary understanding of suffering. 
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8.3.1 Vulnerability and Frailty 
 
All informants demonstrated a level of vulnerability. Vulnerability has been 
defined as the “outcome of complex interactions of discrete risks, namely of 
being exposed to a threat, of a threat materializing, and of lacking the defences 
or resources to deal with a threat” (Schröder-Butterfill and Marianti 2006, p1). 
All people at some time will go through the experience of being dependent upon 
another human. The need for care is universal, although it manifests differently 
at different times of the life cycle. It may be perceived that for older people there 
is a shift in this reciprocity and the requirement for care returns to being 
unidirectional. To a certain extent, vulnerability is an inevitable part of the 
experience of older people admitted to hospital. There is bound to be some 
illness or debility-related need or other that cannot be met in their home 
environment that has necessitated admission in the first place. In some 
circumstances, vulnerability is exacerbated through well-intentioned efforts to 
remove responsibility and burden from patients, which can lead to 
deconditioning and loss of agency. Further, perceptions of patient vulnerability 
can become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby there is a gradual 
surrender of control to the health and social care providers, ultimately leading to 
the difficult position where the patient is no longer able to exert independent 
actions in some areas. Irurita’s (1999) grounded theory study of 23 patients 
identified vulnerability to be the most common shared experience of 
hospitalised patients; her study population included a broad range of ages and 
she identified that the self-perceived risk of vulnerability appeared to be greater 
in the older patients in her sample. The reasons for this are several; the impact 
of ageism and negative attitudes from staff was felt to influence subjective 
feelings of vulnerability. Further, periods of hospitalisation were likely to be 
longer, and the existence of comorbidities that compounded dependence were 
more common.  
 
Sarvimäki and Stenbock-Hult (2014) interviewed 14 people over 70 about what 
they understood vulnerability to mean. Participants described feeling 
progressively more exposed to the environment as they aged. Thwarted 
attempts to grow and develop were seen as contributing to vulnerability. 
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Further, there was a close link between perceptions of dignity and perceptions 
of vulnerability. Participants were predominantly female. Furthermore, they lived 
in either their own homes or supported accommodation, and none were 
cognitively impaired. Sarvimaki offers useful insights into perceptions of 
vulnerability in relatively well older people. Interestingly, the author had earlier 
conducted a study that explored nurses’ perceptions of vulnerability (Stenbock-
Hult and Sarvimaki 2011). Nurses considered vulnerability as an essential 
human attribute and a means of connecting with patients. There were 
differences in perception of what constituted vulnerability in an older patient and 
what constituted personal vulnerability as a nurse working with this client group. 
Vulnerability could alternately be seen as either a resource or a burden, 
depending on individual capacity to learn from the experience.  
 
Out of familiar surroundings, and subject to different routines, patients are 
vulnerable to feeling unsettled, exposed and at risk. This can be compounded 
by the physical and emotional burden of illness, which may add a further layer 
of unfamiliarity to their experience. It is not uncommon for patients to express 
feelings of vulnerability. These may manifest as anxiety, anger or other forms of 
resistance. Alternatively, vulnerability may be expressed through a withdrawal 
and resignation from active attempts to engage in the world. Vincent strongly 
resisted the intimation that he was vulnerable; each time an assessment of his 
'needs' was made he expressed fear at the rapidly changing future, and 
ambivalence about the nature of the care he would require, alongside a 
grudging realisation that his vulnerability was increasingly seen as a fact that 
was not just contingent on his current state of ill health and hospitalisation but a 
far more wide-reaching diagnosis of his future world.  
 
Garcia-Dia (2013) notes that when strategies to understand vulnerability 
through professionalised lenses are adopted the result tends to be one of 
disempowerment, whereas when vulnerability is framed from the person’s 
perspective there can be a sense in which it is rendered bearable and at times 
can even become a source of strength. One important objection to the notion of 
vulnerability is that viewing older people as inherently vulnerable risks 
worsening the disadvantage of older people in society. It can only be a useful 
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concept if it is applied judiciously to refer to those who are suffering directly 
because of their vulnerability. It is less useful when applied as a blanket term to 
all older people who are hospitalised with life-limiting conditions. Rita is an 
interesting example of a participant who - whilst disempowered and dealing with 
the impact of uncertainty in relation to her prognosis - did not perceive herself 
as vulnerable in the slightest. Her resilience appeared to be related to her self-
perceived ability to retain those things that she valued; interest in other people, 
her mental faculties. Her stories revealed that these were the things that she 
considered synonymous with deterioration and giving up, and by comparing 
herself firstly to her husband, and then to the others on her bay who had 
cognitive impairment, she distanced herself from such things and retained a 
sense of strength.  
 
Although vulnerability is a common human experience across the lifespan, 
attitudes towards it from those in caregiving roles are far from consistent. It is 
common in our society to observe that babies - who are dependent, incontinent 
and unable to make decisions for themselves - evoke caring and protective 
responses almost universally. Conversely, the same dependence in relation to 
bodily functions in an older person is frequently met with disgust and aversion 
(Lawton 1998; Goldenberg et al. 2001; Holmes, Perron and O’Byrne 2006; 
Simpson 2012). One of the contributory factors to a feeling of vulnerability 
voiced by participants in Sarvimäki’s 2014 study was the loss of dignity that 
arose out of changes in bodily functions. Loss of dignity and vulnerability are 
therefore closely related. 
Vulnerability or Frailty? 
Patients can perceive themselves as vulnerable, or they can be perceived as 
vulnerable by others. Recent developments in gerontology have seen the 
evolution of the concept of frailty which has been proposed as an alternative 
way of conceptualising the specific kind of vulnerability observed in older 
people. However, it has been argued that frailty is a more medicalised notion 
and focuses on objective measures of risk, rather than subjectively felt 
vulnerability (Clegg et al. 2013; Chen, Mao and Leng 2014). It has been 
suggested that vulnerability is one factor of frailty (Markle-Reid and Browne 
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2003) but more recently this notion was superseded by the argument that the 
converse is true; frailty gives rise to vulnerability on account of the increased 
risk that frail people will experience multiple morbidities, hospital admissions 
and life-limiting illnesses (Rockwood et al. 2005). Brocklehurst and Laurenson 
(2008) consider that vulnerability in older people incorporates not only the 
physical, social, psychological and spiritual dimensions but can also have 
impact through exclusion from research, lack of representativeness in policy, 
and additional issues around intersectionality, such as gender, sexuality and 
ethnicity.  
Van der Meide et al. (2015) suggest that viewing vulnerability as frailty alone 
ignores the important role of the hospital environment in creating situations in 
which patients are vulnerable. That is, they may be less vulnerable in their own 
familiar world but finding oneself in a new and unfamiliar environment 
engenders an additional type of vulnerability. A crucial difference between frailty 
and vulnerability is that frailty denotes a multidimensional loss of function that is 
largely framed in terms of physical function, cognition, energy and health 
(Rockwood et al. 2005) yet the definitions do not include a subjective element 
that relates to the impact of such limitations on the individual (which will 
doubtless be influenced by numerous buffering and aggravating factors such as 
personal resilience, support and so on). As such, it is an objective notion. 
Therefore, vulnerability is a preferable term as it applies both to how an 
individual is seen in their world in terms of risk (professional-centred view), and 
to how the individual might see themselves and the kinds of things that might 
prompt concerns for them. 
Disempowerment 
 
Disempowerment is closely related both to vulnerability and choicelessness. For 
Bourdieu disempowerment is a product of unequal capital - notably social 
capital - within the field of practice (Wacquant 2013; Pellandini-Simányi 2014). 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is a fluid one; individuals can adapt and change 
their orientation towards themselves and their surroundings in response to 
interactions with others in the field, and as a result their comparative levels of 
capital can change with time. Rita’s habitus prior to admission comprised social 
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and cultural capital that were enacted through roles such as matriarch of her 
family and so on. Once admitted to hospital, she entered and became a part of 
an unfamiliar field. She was ascribed certain characteristics by virtue of her 
status as a patient, some of which she resisted vehemently.  
 
In the encounters with the medical team, Rita perceived herself to be excluded 
from important information pertaining to herself and her body. These instances 
drew out a contrast between her common-sense understanding of people (as 
subjects of some interest) and the medical conceptualisation of the person (the 
disease or condition for which hospitalisation was required). Rita’s interpretation 
of events referred to her present moment situation and offered a window to her 
past and her broader habitus. Further, she repeatedly alluded that she was well 
aware of the progressive loss of her power in this new and unfamiliar hospital 
environment. Social categories such as age, race and disability create and 
perpetuate levels of disadvantage, and in some people the existence of multiple 
categories means that the impact of such disadvantage is potentiated through 
intersectionality. An example of this was brought out in Rita’s story because she 
was treated as though she has dementia, even though she did not. Withholding 
medical information was not seen as particularly unusual by the team, but for 
Rita it was a source of suffering. 
Withholding medical information from patients, particularly in life-limiting illness 
where prognosis is uncertain, is not uncommon (Lamont and Christakis 2001; 
Visser, Deliens and Houttekier 2014) despite increasing emphasis on shared 
decision-making in healthcare policy (Department of Health 2012). Multiple 
factors may influence this behaviour, including perceived socioeconomic status 
of the patient (Légaré et al. 2008) confidence of the healthcare professional 
(Heyland et al. 2009; Peters et al. 2013) and difficulties talking about dying. 
Information may be withheld because it is perceived that the patient will find it 
intellectually or emotionally challenging to process or understand the 
information. For example, in current guidance around 'Do Not Attempt 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation’ orders staff were instructed to discuss with the 
patient unless discussion is likely to cause physical or psychological harm. This 
guidance is somewhat circular; clinical judgement as to the patients’ likelihood 
to be harmed psychologically relies upon the establishment of rapport and 
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intersubjective awareness. The less of a connection is made, the more likely it 
is that it will be judged that the patient cannot deal with the information. 
Capacity to understand information can be easily misconstrued based on a 
minimal response or intermittent confusion, and 'psychological harm' is open to 
multiple interpretations. To a lesser extent this applies to discussions about 
illness more generally. In excluding Rita from such discussions there was a 
cumulative disempowering effect that was potentiated. Each example of 
exclusion served to strengthen Rita’s antipathy towards the team, and 
consequently to affect the manner of her communication with them. This then 
strengthened the team’s view that Rita was not able to participate meaningfully 
in discussions about her care.  
 
Some evidence appears to contradict what was observed in Rita’s case; Strull 
et al. (1984) suggested that doctors were far more likely to involve patients in 
decisions relating to their care if the patient is perceived as having an active 
interest, although there is admittedly a difference between active, positive 
interest and active, adversarial involvement. The situation here may have been 
different not least because a health service over a quarter of a century later was 
subject to a great many new and different pressures influencing the doctor’s 
perception of a patients desired level of involvement. More recent research 
observing older people’s involvement in planning gives cause for ongoing 
concern (Ekdahl et al. 2012) as staff were preoccupied with patient discharge, 
and perceptions were that patients were too tired, ill or cognitively impaired to 
involve in efficient and productive discussions. 
This example illuminates what is potentially a very common way in which 
doctors discuss patient care for people without capacity. Even with varying 
levels of cognitive capacity people may notice when someone is talking about 
them. They may hear themselves mentioned by name, or may notice a group of 
people looking at them. This can be a disempowering act in itself given that it 
excludes and objectifies the person. Maben et al. (2012) conducted a study of 
hospitalised older people to explore patient and staff experiences of care, and 
identified that around a third of participants felt that the doctors and nurses 
talked about them as though they were not there. Given that the study sample 
size (n=26) was taken from an initial sample of 111, there is some limitation in 
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the degree to which this can be generalised. Further, although there was little 
information on the condition or morbidity of the patients, it was likely that they 
had capacity in order to be able to complete the survey. This does not therefore 
reflect the experiences of those without capacity who may well constitute a 
large proportion of the 'parcels' to which Maben refers. 
By way of contrast to Rita's experience was that of Sheila, who was 
disempowered in multiple ways but was unable to articulate how this impacted 
her. Another contrasting example was Vincent, whose response to 
disempowerment was to further withdraw and become uncommunicative. In his 
current circumstances, he has little agency. His experiences of grief, chronic 
illness, social isolation and long-term depression have created an aggregate 
experience where his coping mechanisms were few, and these were placed 
against a backdrop of an existing chronic illness, increasing difficulty in caring 
for himself, and the threat and uncertainty of a potential additional life-limiting 
illness with all the incumbent decisions to be made. He draws some strength or 
solace through reflecting on his past. For Vincent, there was no purpose looking 
to the future. His only sense of agency and control was through either defiance 
in the face of interventions, or of taking his freedom into his own hands by trying 
to get out of bed and go to smoke a cigar. But without achievable goals there 
seemed to Vincent little purpose to the exercise of autonomous decision-
making. Even making goals relating to clinical treatment relies on at the very 
least a wish to live, and in Vincent’s case it was not clear whether he did indeed 
desire this. Both Vincent and Alfie made use of silence to resist the 
disempowering effects of hospitalisation. Latimer’s (1999) ethnography of 
hospitalised older people identified the active use of silence as a strategy for 
patients to resist being categorised in an undesirable way – for example, as 
having problems that were primarily 'social' rather than 'medical' (which was 
viewed to confer a lower status on them during their hospital stay and to invite 
judgements from staff regarding the extent to which they deserved to receive 
hospital care.  
8.3.2 Choicelessness 
A further aspect to disempowerment was the perceived absence of choice. This 
was where participants may appear to have been involved in exercising their 
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autonomy but in fact their choices were either limited or dictated by the 
requirements of the institution and care team. Being deprived of choice has 
been found to lead to disempowerment and subsequent feelings of vulnerability 
and exposure (Bridges et al. 2010). Vincent’s multiple discussions with the 
discharge team and social workers were examples of this. His real choice would 
be to go home and be left alone, to smoke cigars unhindered, to use the stairs 
shakily, and to live out a potentially shortened life in the way he wished. Over 
time and multiple discussions various factors were introduced that undermined 
these original choices, mostly focused around safety and resources. Eventually 
Vincent reached a state of choicelessness where he deferred all decision-
making responsibility to others: “I don’t want to make the decision. I want 
someone else to do that. Just MAKE the decision what to do next.”  
 
Ideas about choice are closely linked to theory on autonomy, whereby 
autonomy within healthcare has been variously defined as self-determination, 
freedom, independence, liberty of choice and action, individual control of 
decision-making and other activity, and human agency free of outside 
intervention and interference (Collopy 1988; McWilliam et al. 1994). Where 
choices were apparently presented, as in the number of carer visits per day, 
these were not the kinds of choices that might have actually empowered self-
determination. The rhetoric of choice was performing a function in relation to the 
public-facing role of the ward and the hospital, but was not acted out in practice, 
primarily because the options that would represent the full range of what 
patients might wish for were unavailable. For example, the social worker could 
not offer a time when home carers would visit which Vincent understood to 
mean that once home he would have to just lie in bed until they arrived, but 
furthermore he did not want to be asleep when strangers arrived at his home so 
he would have to set an alarm clock. There may be a wait between waking and 
the carer visit, potentially of several hours, during which time he would have to 
remain in bed and not have breakfast. Framed in this way, it no longer seemed 
like an enabling choice.  
 
Habitus transformation is often referred to in a positive sense, to explain 
phenomena such as high student professional achievement despite oppressive 
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social conditions (Lehmann 2013). However, transformation can also occur in 
the reverse direction. Habitus dictates many of the choices that a person is able 
to make, but the existence of external obstacles can impede this. Thus, there 
was an internal framework that Vincent referred to that limits his options, but 
this as reinforced by the repeated feedback he received from those involved in 
his care, strengthening his sense of choicelessness.  
8.3.3 Uncertainty 
 
"When a new disability arrives, I look about to see if death has 
come, and I call quietly, 'Death, is that you?'" (Scott-Maxwell 
1979, in Nanton et al. 2016) 
“Will you tell me how I am”? (Hilda, patient participant to doctor)  
 
A common theme relating to suffering was uncertainty. Uncertainty has been 
defined as “confusion about the meaning of the environmental configuration” 
(Lazarus and Folkman 1984). It is a cognitive state created when the person 
cannot adequately structure or categorize an event because of the lack of 
sufficient cues. Uncertainty occurs in a situation in which the decision maker is 
unable to assign definite value to objects or events and/or is unable to predict 
outcomes accurately (Mishel 1984, 1999). A concept analysis by McCormick 
(2002) argues that uncertainty is a neutral cognitive state and should not be 
confused with its emotional sequelae. However, other scholars have illustrated 
close connections between the state of uncertainty, and emotional states of 
suffering such as hopelessness (Morse and Penrod 1999; Van der Meide et al. 
2015) and it is conceptually closely linked with vulnerability, discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
 
The clinical literature on uncertainty largely relates to how this impacts on 
professionals, and locates it in the domain of prognostication, diagnosis and 
care needs assessments (Fox 1980; Meier et al. 2001; Rich 2015). The fact that 
professionals may fail to communicate uncertainty to patients can exacerbate 
patients' perspectives that it is only them who feel unsure about things whilst all 
around them the clinical team have access to some authoritative insight into 
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things as they are (Broom et al. 2015). I have already discussed the issue of 
uncertainty in relation to clinical practice and how this impacts on 
multiprofessional working, but the impact of uncertainty on patients is profound 
and extends beyond the realms of diagnosis and prognosis. Patients face 
uncertainty around immediate issues - how the next few hours might unfold, 
who might come to see them, whether a new medicine will make them feel 
better, and so on (Crunkilton and Rubins 2009). They also face medium and 
longer term uncertainty that relate to treatment, discharge from hospital, and 
future care and decline, including friendships, retaining control over care and 
dependence (Black 2011). 
 
Suffering and uncertainty are inextricably linked. Cassell (1991, 1992) observed 
that accepting illness or deterioration requires a surrender of firmly held ideas in 
relation to self. This liminal state is associated with uncertainty as a person 
needs to redefine many aspects of themselves in order to integrate their current 
suffering into their perception of who they are and who they might be (Karlsson 
et al. 2014) The experience of uncertainty can also be linked with existential 
doubt, particularly for those patients who had a sense that they were 
approaching the end of their lives (Arndt et al. 2005; Arndt and Vess 2008; 
Greenberg, Solomon and Arndt 2008; Yalom 2010). Vincent's reflection on 
being "just dust" poignantly communicates this sense, and needs to be read 
alongside his other concerns regarding the temporal aspects of suffering. The 
anthropological notion of liminality - the state of being 'betwixt and between' 
(Gennep 1960 /2004) is conceptually useful here as severe illness and dying 
constitute an important rite of passage, even if this is not framed as such within 
the biomedical model. The sense of being an outsider and of not belonging in 
this environment can contribute to feelings of uncertainty (Digby et al. 2017). 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, patients have not developed a 'feel for the 
game' and the field remains a confusing place, where it was not clear what 
stakes were being played for, or what strategies might be utilised in order to 
gain greater familiarity of the field. It was akin to learning a new language, but 
with the added complexity of having to believe in the goals of the field in order 
to engage fully in the game; this was the doxa, or the level of adherence 
between field and habitus. Those patients who resisted care were 
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communicating that they did not share the doxa with the staff on the field. Whilst 
this position allows resistance, it also seems to perpetuate the uncertainty with 
which patients were able to successfully navigate the demands of the field. 
 
The literature does not address the experience of uncertainty in dementia as 
experienced by the person with dementia. Again, it emphasises the experience 
of caring and planning for a person with dementia rather than examining the 
experience of the person with dementia (Dening et al. 2012; Pinkert et al. 2017). 
In some ways, though, all of the experiences of the participants with cognitive 
impairment convey a sense of how uncertainty contributed to their suffering. 
Lilian's disorientation in response to her various experiences were exaggerated 
when there was a new person, or a confusing situation. Bert's experiences 
during his delirious episode all spoke to a sense in which he feared the 
uncertainty of his future. Roland's search for good shoes seemed at times to be 
a metaphor for taking him from this liminal state to a place of familiarity and 
certainty. 
8.3.4 Alienation 
 
Alienation is recognised as an important aspect of suffering within the nursing 
and medical literature (Younger 1995; Best et al. 2015). The concept itself finds 
roots in both the existential philosophical traditions, and within sociology, 
although the latter largely refers to the alienation of workers within capitalist 
structures and societies (Seeman 1959; Seeman and Evans 1962). Alienation is 
a core facet of Illich’s thesis (1975) displaying important similarities between his 
position and that of Sartre. Conversion of the human body into commodity is a 
causative factor in the alienation experienced by humans at the hands of 
medicine. Furthermore, alienation was situational rather than an inherent trait of 
either Florence or Vincent. It was an emergent product of their current context, 
which in itself was an aggregate of being away from their usual worlds, unwell 
and in hospital. This theme will be further elaborated in the next chapter where I 
consider the phenomenon of iatrogenic suffering. For the purposes of the 
present analysis I identify three modes of alienation: alienation from self, from 
others, and from society. 
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Alienation from self 
 
Alienation from one’s lifeworld is an aspect of suffering. However, it is also 
possible to be alienated from oneself, particularly from one’s body. As well as 
the confusing array of new routines and practices that people were expected to 
conform to, there was an additional layer of alienation that arose through the 
experiences of illness and ageing. Illness led to changes in bodily functions, 
impaired level of independence, and symptoms such as pain and fatigue. 
Scheper-Hughes notes that the body can be viewed from three perspectives: as 
a phenomenally experienced body-self, as a social body, and as a 'body politic', 
or an “artefact of social and political control” (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987, 
p6). Sveneaus (2011) speaks of 'otherness' which is to be understood as a 
“foreignness that permeates the ill life when the lived body takes on alien 
qualities.” Drawing on Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, Sveneaus 
proposes that illness creates an unhomelike sense of existence. This is 
positioned in opposition to health, which he conceptualises as a state of 
transparent being-in-the-world in which the lived body is the point of access to 
ways of being in one’s environment. Illness is constructed as an alienation from 
a person’s past and future selves and as an intrusion into one’s life that requires 
a retelling of both past and future narratives. Illness forces re-evaluation of 
one’s relationship with one’s body. Sartre famously noted that it is only in a 
state of illness that one becomes properly aware of one’s physical, lived-in body 
as distinct from one’s imagined body, and that a discrepancy between these two 
develops in the state of illness. Certainly, when illness becomes severe and the 
body no longer performs as one wishes it to perform, the body can become 
difficult to control or predict. Havi Carel (2013) describes her experience of 
being diagnosed with a terminal lung condition as the moment when these two 
'bodies' separated and her biological body became at odds with her 
phenomenological body. This disconnection between the self and the body has 
also been considered in terms of ageing; the ‘mask of ageing’ concealing the 
unseen inner self, and people feel that they are different to the body observed in 
the mirror, or which fails to perform in its expected ways (Featherstone et al. 
1991). 
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Of course, despite the pervasiveness of Cartesian dualist thought regarding the 
separate existence of mind and body, to be alienated from one’s body is really 
to be alienated from oneself. As embodied beings, we experience our bodies as 
an indivisible part of our whole perceptual field, which includes our thoughts and 
emotions. Merleau Ponty’s notions about perception can help to illuminate why 
separation from one’s body is equivalent to separation from oneself (Merleau-
Ponty 1962; Carman 1999). According to Merleau Ponty, when we perceive 
something we do not do this through our separate individual senses and then 
aggregate them into a whole, whereupon we interpret the sense data to give us 
information about what it is we have perceived. Rather, perception takes place 
as a whole, through a process he equates to Gestalt. Thus, alienation from self, 
and alienation from body, were really two sides of the same experience.  
The body, once familiar, has become strange and liable to do unexpected and 
unwelcome things. Michael described himself as being “fed up with his body” 
illustrating the degree of alienation that he felt from his own physicality. It was 
not performing as it had done in his past. A combination of his immobility and 
the wound that continued to deteriorate, belied a body that had betrayed him. 
Sacks refers to this when he had the experience of a severe leg injury and 
found he could not move the affected limb. He described the experience of 
looking at this part of his body and having a sense that it did not belong to him, 
and that it was actually a 'thing' that was once his leg (Sacks 1984, p53). The 
pain from Florence's leg ulcers had become chronic, lasting for several weeks. 
She expressed bodily distress at the anticipation of dressing changes but also 
would visibly avert her eyes from the sight of her legs, even when bandaged, as 
for example when she was being transferred from her bed to her chair. It was as 
if she did not wish to be reminded that her legs were a part of her.  
 
The experience of pain is an aversive bodily sensation. People with pain may 
distance themselves from the source of the pain as a means of self-
preservation (Scarry 1985; Sofaer et al. 2005). This can lead to a form of 
alienation from the body or the offending body part (Scarry 1985; Charmaz 
1999). These psychological strategies are known to become more 
commonplace as pain becomes chronic (as opposed to acute) (Hughes 2008) 
and this is one reason that chronic pain requires a multidimensional approach to 
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management. Furthermore, Florence's body was regularly objectified through 
clinical examinations. Her body belonged both to her, and to the medical 
establishment. The part of it that was known to the establishment was alien to 
her. She was unfamiliar with the particular bacteria that were colonising her leg 
ulcers, and did not know that the stage of inflammation of her wounds were 
causing the release of a cocktail of inflammatory mediators that sensitised her 
nerve endings to alert her brain to the presence of damaged tissues. She only 
had her directly experienced body and her directly perceived pain.  
 
Cicely Saunders conceptualisation of ‘total pain’ argued for the integration of 
psychological, social and spiritual aspects into the care of people in pain 
(Saunders 2006; Middleton-Green 2008; Clark 2014). Any pain associated with 
life-limiting illness should be viewed as ‘total pain’ as the various elements 
would always be present in different degrees, in different forms, and to different 
intensities. Saunders was keen to broaden ideas of caring for the dying to 
include attention to these other facets of existence, and her philosophy has 
been highly influential in the development of the current World Health 
Organisation’s definition of palliative care in which suffering (not pain) is the 
focus of care (WHO 2010). The original impetus for this work was said to be a 
patient who - trying to describe how he felt - told her he had a sense that “all of 
me is wrong” (Saunders 1964, in Clark 2014). Despite Saunders’ work and 
extensive subsequent scholarship within palliative care, the majority of medical 
references to pain and suffering consider pain to be a biophysical phenomenon, 
or at least to be physiologically reducible (Chapman and Gavrin 1993; Ruijs et 
al. 2013). 
Alienation from one’s body can also come about through the experience of 
being a recipient of care, particularly when the effects of illness were bringing 
about some bodily dysfunction. Both the impact of having one’s body attended 
to by others, and the feelings that arise in response to its failings, can lead to 
suffering. When Vincent was offered a wash, he asked if he could be left smelly 
a bit longer. He would rather be left smelly than surrender his independence to 
the indignity of being washed by a student. By making this request he was 
seeking to retain his independence, and was also alluding to what he had 
intuited from the nonverbal communication of staff - that he was in need of a 
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wash in order to smell better. The purpose of the wash was not entirely for his 
benefit but was also for a general all-round sense of cleanliness that would give 
the staff satisfaction and help them to avoid the unpleasant smells that made 
the body work aspect of their role less palatable.  
 
Common to the experiences of Michael, Vincent and Sheila was a sense in 
which aspects of life that had previously been private had been rendered public. 
Depending on others for bodily care is a significant transition to make, and 
whilst for many this is a temporary state that accompanies illness and 
hospitalisation, for these three participants the transition was not to be 
reversible. They had all surrendered a level of autonomy and control of their 
own bodies to the hands of others, of strangers. This was accompanied by 
suffering. Twigg’s research into bathing, the body and community care reveals 
thoughts of older people associated with advancing age, increasing 
dependence, and changing relationships with the body. One of her participants 
(“Mrs Ostrovoski”) observed that something happens to one’s relationship with 
one’s body on admission to hospital in which the only way to survive was to 
distance oneself:  
 
“when you go to hospital…and you are there and you have 
twenty students….you lie naked and you are becoming example 
of the things…and twenty people touch you and you just close 
your mind and you say yourself it doesn’t matter, it doesn’t 
matter, it doesn’t matter…you are really a subject. You are not a 
person” (Twigg 2000, p55) 
 
By describing his experiences following a diagnosis of lymphadenopathy, a 
recurrence of his earlier cancer, Frank portrays suffering in the absence of 
physical symptoms. He contrasts his suffering during the time of investigations 
with another experience of physical pain, where he injured his shoulder 
reversibly. He described this as “pain with more annoyance than suffering” 
(Frank 2002, p354). Similarly, Alland’s autobiographical account relates how 
following admission to a psychiatric hospital she found herself: 
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“suddenly struck by poverty of speech it, to someone whose life 
has evolved around conversation, to be plunged into deep water 
when you’re unable to swim - the sense of drowning, the loss of 
solid ground, terrifying. The only noise is the babble of water 
spluttering over you as you sink deeper and deeper beyond a 
place where sound has meaning…a place where sound merely 
echoed the hollow empty void of life as I perceived it - nothing 
but an illusion of connection in an alien, dissociated space” 
(Alland 2004, p168) 
Alienation from others 
 
Alienation from others is different to loneliness. It refers to being alone without 
the desire for others, whereas loneliness conveys a sense of longing for others 
yet being alone. As social animals, it was perhaps inevitable that a move from a 
familiar world into the strange terrain of the hospital ward would be 
accompanied by disorientation and distress. Contact with those who were most 
familiar was restricted to visiting times, and the social roles of both the patient 
and the visitor were markedly transformed during these times. Even where the 
visitor previously had a caring role, this was largely supplanted by the ritual of 
visiting, sitting by the bedside and making conversation and speaking to staff 
about the current state of things. Very rarely were visitors observed to be 
involved in the act of caring, whether or not they might have wanted to be 
involved in this way.  
Solely because of having an advanced and life-threatening illness, all the 
participants were marked out as different from the world of healthy people 
outside the ward walls, and who constitute the healthcare team. The 
participants rarely formed a cohesive community with one another; they were 
diagnosed with different conditions, they were often isolated by being in 
different rooms from one another. Although I did witness on one occasion two 
female patients singing songs together across the bay, the majority of 
interactions between patients were non-existent, ambivalent or overtly negative 
- as with Roland and the man in his bay who, he claimed, was disturbing his 
sleep.  
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Even when in company of others it is possible to feel loneliness and alienation. 
The experience of illness could exaggerate this existential aspect of suffering 
(Sand and Strang 2006; Ettema et al 2010). The loss of one’s social networks 
and roles are part of this experience. Younger (1995) considers alienation in the 
context of ways in which suffering influences a person’s sense of 
connectedness with their community. Her argument centres on alienation from 
others. Importantly she discusses suffering and relationality and notes that 
suffering sometimes destroys the ability to communicate the experience to 
another human, and that this in itself intensifies the degree of alienation from 
others. Whether through the absence of a satisfactory language of suffering, or 
the intensity of the experience, the difficulty in conveying such subjective 
distress to others proved problematic to the sufferer. Alienation as such was not 
an absence of connection but a sense of negative connectedness as a process 
that unfolds through ongoing relationship in a particular context. It incorporates 
but is not confined to ideas about meaninglessness, powerlessness and lacking 
belonging.  
Alienation from society 
 
Vincent (on home): “it’s a distant place to me now” 
 
The hospital ward was an unfamiliar place for patients. The environment and 
the routine were standardised around the needs of the ill and it was incumbent 
on patients, as transient residents, to adapt to this as far as they were able. 
Feeling distanced from one’s usual surroundings and lifestyle was 
commonplace. The alienating effects of hospital admission have been 
addressed by numerous scholars (Goffman 1957; Seeman and Evans 1962) 
and there are several first-hand accounts of this (see for example Frank 2002; 
Carel 2013; Scully 2013). Oliver Sacks describes the process of hospital 
admission for a surgical procedure thus:  
“One’s own clothes are replaced by an anonymous white 
nightgown, one’s wrist is clasped by an identification bracelet 
with a number. One becomes subject to institutional rules and 
regulations. One is no longer a free agent; one no longer has 
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rights; one is no longer in the world-at-large” (Sacks 1984, p182)  
 
Foucault describes how the new ‘social order’ within the hospital requires that 
patients are segregated from society, so regardless of who that person might 
have been outside the hospital walls there is a process of homogenisation 
where the characteristics of being a patient must be adopted and the person 
effectively disappears, subsumed into the broader medical goal of surveillance 
and treatment (Foucault and Sheridan 1973; Jewson 1976) Patients become 
persons out of place and their usual sources of social, cultural, economic and 
symbolic capital are denied to them as a result. Rita's indignant responses to a 
lack of involvement in decision-making, as well as Roland's anger at being told 
to go and sit down, were just two examples of how this might manifest 
behaviourally. Both referred to situations outside their current circumstances in 
which their personhood was being asserted - Rita through a description of her 
family, and Roland through reflecting on his friendship with John.  
 
8.3.5 Loss of Time  
 
Pain - has an Element of Blank - It cannot recollect 
When it began - or if there were A time when it was not -  
It has not future - but itself 
Its Infinite realms contain 
Its Past - enlightened to perceive New Periods - of Pain 
(Dickinson 1960)  
 
 
Roland did not explicitly refer to feeling bored, but there was a repetitive nature 
to his searching behaviour. Often, such behaviour in people with dementia is 
assumed to be a part of the condition. However, work in Dementia Care 
Mapping which distinguishes between behaviours associated with wellbeing 
and behaviours associated with feeling ill-at-ease makes a distinction between 
associated activities and there is increasing recognition of the impact of 
boredom on the behaviour (Brooker 2005; Perrin 1997). Vincent and Alfie 
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referred more explicitly to their subjective sense of time and to the impact this 
had on their wellbeing. Alfie described himself as “just watching sitting the 
clocks go around and round. And being moved about like a piece of meat”. This 
not only hinted at the sense of boredom, but also revealed how for Alfie this was 
linked to a sense of purposelessness.  
 
Alfie did not want to be in hospital and rejected attempts to investigate and treat 
his pathology; his clock-watching was a behaviour associated with boredom, 
with waiting to go home, and with frustration about time wasted. Vincent, in 
contrast, awaiting key decisions about treatment, discharge and social care 
package, watched the clock in anxious anticipation. When his waiting was 
interrupted by a member of staff entering his room, there was often momentary 
hope. The concurrent monotony and anxiety was interrupted by the promise of 
action or activity. More often than not, these visits were simple assessments, 
reviews or repeats of earlier visits, and this led to an accumulated sense of 
frustration which served to amplify his ambivalence towards staff. Further, 
Vincent was patently aware that his health was deteriorating. The paradox of 
running out of time, whilst still experiencing boredom and anxiety about the 
future, was not lost on him.  
 
Phenomenological studies of lived experience of suffering at the end of life 
portray the temporal aspects of suffering (Charmaz 1999; 2008). Suffering 
relates to a ‘self’ which is understood by selected aspects of the past, is 
experienced in the present, yet relates to a future threat.  
 
Another important temporal aspect of suffering was boredom; an indicator that a 
person was not actively engaged in the world around them. The majority of 
scholarly work in the area has been in the field of psychoanalytic psychology, 
although more recently there has been burgeoning interest within occupational 
therapy (Martin 2009). It has been theoretically linked with reduced pleasure 
(anhedonia), depression and aggression (Greenson 1951). Fenichel (1934) was 
the first to address boredom from a psychoanalytical perspective, noting that 
the bored person is in a state of tension where their objects and aims are 
repressed. He considered it to be a heterogeneous phenomenon, pointing to 
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the fact that some people become agitated when bored, and others become 
withdrawn and silent. Greenson defines boredom as “self-administered 
deprivation” that leads to a “state of dissatisfaction and a disinclination to action” 
(Greenson 1951, p7). Leahy et al. (2012) undertook a survey of boredom in 71 
inpatients across three specialist palliative care units and found a prevalence 
rate of 79%. Boredom is known to have a significant psychological impact on 
wellbeing. The subjective perception of time is dependent on one’s emotional 
state; it appears to slow down when one is bored or apprehensive, and to speed 
up when one is excited or joyful. Slowed down perception of time can 
exacerbate subjective perception of symptoms such as pain, which is one 
justification for using distraction techniques to help manage such symptoms 
non-pharmacologically.  
 
William James proposed that subjective time may be perceived of as shorter or 
longer than chronological time; when things are going badly, suffering 
increases, and subjective time is perceived as being longer than chronological 
time (James 1898, in Stanley 2012). This notion was taken up by Bayes et al. 
(1997) in their development of a tool purported to assess suffering based on 
how long time seems to the sufferer. Passik et al. (2003) suggest that boredom 
possesses enough unique qualities to distinguish it from depression. Their 
sample of 100 people with cancer asked about boredom-specific factors 
including having a sense of time passing slowly. However, the assumption that 
suffering makes time appear longer might be confounded when prognosis is 
poor; time may seem more precious and the rapidity of its passing may itself be 
the source of suffering. Being admitted to hospital causes a disruption in the 
usual flow of time, where the past becomes hazy, a source of nostalgia, an 
impossible goal to recreate, and the future becomes an opaque expanse of 
unknown outcomes - at the core of which for nearly all of the participants was 
the possibility of death; closer now, since the most recent admission and 
deterioration of health. The overlap between the studies by Passik and Bayes 
demonstrates the conceptual difficulties in restricting subjective perception of 
time to a particular phenomenon (whether boredom or suffering, or both), but 
nevertheless there appears to be sufficient evidence that temporal aspects can 
contribute to subjective suffering. 
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8.3.6 Loss of meaning 
 
“the prisoner who has lost faith in the future, his future was 
doomed. With his loss of belief in the future he also lost his 
spiritual hold; he let himself decline and become subject to 
mental and physical decay. Usually this happened quite 
suddenly in the form of a crisis, the symptoms of which were 
familiar to the experienced camp inmate. We all feared this 
moment. Not for ourselves, which would have been pointless, 
but for our friends. Usually it began with the prisoner refusing 
one morning to get dressed and wash or to go out on to the 
parade grounds. No entreaties, no blows, no threats had any 
effect. He just lay there hardly moving. If this crisis was brought 
about by an illness he refused to be taken to the sick bay or to 
do anything to help himself. He simply gave up. There he 
remained, lying in his own excreta, and nothing bothered him 
any more.” (Frankl 1964, p82) 
 
A theme in Michael’s story was that his life has lost meaning and that he has 
lost purpose. His request about being put “on the scrapheap” was intended to 
be light-hearted but there was a very poignant sense of loss in this statement. 
The concept of social death is associated with these kinds of suffering 
experiences and echoes Cassell’s argument that suffering is essentially related 
to a loss of meaning. Opportunities for meaning-making were restricted when 
one is in hospital. The normal social activities that provide meaning were 
replaced by hospital routines, restricted visiting times, and agendas set by 
illness, symptoms and professionals rather than by free choices. Although it is 
outside the remit of this thesis, there is a strong association between loss of 
meaning and requests for assisted dying (Hendry et al. 2013; Ruijs et al. 2013). 
This suggests that loss of meaning is a highly significant aspect of suffering for 
people with life-limiting illness. Because the concept of personhood is intimately 
associated with what gives a person’s life meaning, diminished personhood 
poses an existential threat. Depersonalisation as a facet of suffering can be 
compounded by illness, hospital admission and the state of uncertainty that life-
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limiting illnesses bring about.  
 
Patients may suffer when they perceive that their personhood has been 
reduced to their illness. The practice of medicine can inadvertently have a 
depersonalising effect on those it seeks to cure. Kleinman (1988) uses Weber’s 
notion of the 'iron cage31' to critique the preoccupation of health professionals 
with physical illness and pain, and a technologically narrow vision of treatment. 
A loss of personhood means a disruption to one’s biography and history, as well 
as one’s usual social and cultural sense of place. If - as Frankl suggests - we 
are not destroyed by suffering but by suffering without meaning, then it is 
important to consider the implications of what it means to lose this sense of 
meaning. For Cassell, a person is  
 
“an embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, emotional, reflective, 
relational, human individual always in action, responsive to 
meaning, and whose life in all spheres points both outward and 
inward. Virtually all of a person's actions—volitional, habitual, 
instinctual, or automatic—are based on meanings. Persons live 
at all times in a context of ever present relationships in which a 
variable degree of trust is necessary both in others and in the 
self” (Cassell 2010, p50) 
 
Personhood refers to those elements that make an individual who they are; 
personhood can exist in the absence of being able to make autonomous 
decisions. It relates to a sense of self, and is biographically based and unique. 
Further, it is intersubjective. Zeiler (2014) draws upon Laitenan’s theory of 
personhood to draw distinctions between monadic cognition-orientated ideas of 
personhood (which equate more closely to the notion of autonomy discussed 
above) and dyadic conceptions, in which the person is an individual but one that 
participates in various practices that situate her/him such that he/she becomes 
viewed as a person by another. This notion is echoed by Kitwood, who argued 
                                            
31 a metaphor for increasing rationalisation of everyday life. Weber’s iron cage is inflexible 
and dehumanising, a manifestation of the bureaucracy that characterises modernity. 
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that personhood is a standing bestowed on one person by another (Baldwin and 
Capstick 2007). 
 
Kitwood and Bredin (1992) conceptualise personhood as having both subjective 
and intersubjective elements. Central to this is a view of personhood as being a 
social rather than an individual phenomenon. As such, interactions can either 
promote, conserve or diminish personhood. Within Kitwood’s framework, 
dementia is seen as having neurological elements that can lift function, but also 
psychological and social elements that impact on wellbeing. One example here 
was the way in which Sheila avidly tried to follow the conversation that the two 
care assistants were having about their holiday while they were giving her a bed 
bath. Her eyes moved from one to the other and several times she seemed 
about to say something, only to break eye contact and look away, seeming to 
be trying to find the right word. Ultimately, she did not participate in the 
conversation at all; it all took place over her. This interaction could be seen 
through Kitwood’s framework as an example of malignant social psychology. 
Kitwood and Bredin allude to behaviours common in people with dementia that 
are often labelled as difficult or challenging, but that can also be seen in terms 
of attempts to exercise agency and control over one’s environment or destiny.  
 
8.3.7 Loss of Dignity 
 
Regarded strictly as object, part of the material world of decay, 
the aging body can only destroy the dignity that consists in the 
self remaining at the center of its experience, freely determining 
the nature of its relation with the body. When experience is 
dominated by the body's dysfunction and disfigurement, dignity 
seems salvageable only through a sharp distinction between 
body and self to prevent the person's being defined in toto as 
disabled: the self repudiates the body to escape being 
contaminated by its deterioration. The body becomes a mere 
shell, a disguise. (Gadow 1983, p143) 
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Suffering indignity was an important feature of Sheila’s experience. When she 
realised, repeatedly, that she had removed her hospital gown and was lying in 
bed naked, the sheets bundled at the foot of the bed and the gown cast on to 
the floor, she was mortified. A sense of modesty was retained despite the fact 
that it was her that had removed the gown. Aligned (although not synonymous) 
with a loss of dignity was the experience of transgression of bodily boundaries 
as was observed when the surgeon attempted to examine Lilian’s throat with an 
endoscope. She did not know who he was, and there were numerous other 
strangers clustered around the bedside. She was unable to articulate her 
distress but it was evident from her nonverbal body language that she felt 
something to be profoundly wrong with what was happening. Her distress 
conveyed a sense of outrage and fear at what might have been a sense of 
violation due to the intimacy of the procedure. 
 
An important related concept to dignity is that of stigma. Stigma refers to 
something that is deeply discrediting (Goffman 1963) but something that should 
be considered in the language of relationship rather than attributes. It is not a 
thing in and of itself, but something that is manifest in the encounters the 
stigmatised individual has with others. Rita’s rage at being classed as “one of 
those" (referring to people with dementia) not only illuminated her perception of 
wrongful treatment from staff, but also belied her own act of stigmatisation of 
those with dementia or confusion, as it contained an inherent judgment about 
the comparative extent to which a person’s involvement in their care was 
worthwhile for those with and those without cognitive impairment. By not 
qualifying as a valid patient Alfie as stigmatised and his problems ere 
dismissively labelled as functional. Reactions of staff to Alfie’s mysterious 
illness presentation alluded to this phenomenon. He did not fulfil the criteria for 
sickness as no definitive diagnosis is possible; yet he clearly did not belong in 
the “kingdom of the well” (Sontag 1978, p7). In Alfie’s case, stigmatisation took 
place through the assignation of blame to his condition. Florence was 
stigmatised through being labelled as lazy, unwilling to help herself rehabilitate. 
A further criterion for being a proper patient is that of wishing to recover (as long 
as that is a realistic option), and staff were clear in their approval of this: "she's 
really good, this lady, she just wants to get going". Conversely intending to 
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recover when that is not an option is framed negatively and associated with 
being in denial. In essence then, most of the patients on the ward were subject 
to one form or another of stigma, and anyone subject to stigma was at risk of 
social exclusion as well as psychological problems such as anxiety, depression 
and self-esteem (Burgener et al. 2015). From a Bourdieusian position, stigma 
could serve the interests of the dominant group in the field by maintaining 
patients in their positions via the unspoken rules that align to ideas of how to be 
a proper patient (Link et al. 1999). 
 
Closely aligned with loss of dignity is the notion of social death. Social death 
refers to how a person may cease to exist as a social being even before their 
physical body dies. A recent literature review (Králová 2015) proposes that the 
literature centres around three components to social death: loss of identity, loss 
of social connectedness and losses that accompany bodily disintegration. This 
is not a new notion; Sudnow’s seminal work (1966) describing the end of life 
experiences of people in institutional settings identified various ways in which 
social death precedes biological death. Glaser and Strauss (1964, 1980) 
examined ways in which social and biological death were distinguished, with 
dying people losing aspects of their social worlds as they approach death, and 
point out how this process is enabled in ways in which they were viewed by 
others. Subsequently it has been proposed that social death is most likely for 
those with terminal illnesses, the very old, and people who have lost their 
essential 'personhood' (Sweeting and Gilhooley 1991). More recently, social 
death has been referred to as the loss of identity experienced by people as they 
enter the 'fourth age' (George 2010; Gilleard and Higgs 2015). As such it can 
occur long before biological death. A particularly strong example of social death 
witnessed during the fieldwork was the way in which Dot's family had gathered 
to say goodbye and surround her with cards, essentially awaiting her death 
while – surrounded by their grief - she continued to live. 
A systematic review by Bridges et al. (2010) synthesised 43 qualitative studies 
relating to the experiences of older people in hospital. The three most prominent 
themes all alluded to different aspects of relational care: authentic connection, 
being seen as an individual, and being involved in decision-making. All three 
themes illustrate that the biomedical aspects of care are far from prominent in 
   237 
the expressed concerns of older adults in hospital. The issues of importance to 
patients are social and psychological. The perspectives of participants in the 
majority of the studies in Bridges’ review are reflected in the findings of the 
present study 32 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have drawn on selected aspects of suffering that emerged 
through the course of the fieldwork. I have attempted to deepen insight into 
each facet and its relationship with suffering. The resulting synthesis points to a 
concept of suffering that is broad-ranging and complex, and supports existing 
literature on the phenomenon of suffering. The first person narratives and 
second person observations of chapter 6 and 7 present complex and messy 
accounts of suffering through illness. The subsequent discussion in the present 
chapter has considered suffering from a more academic position, deliberating 
over concepts and contrasting philosophical perspectives. The former offers a 
way of conceptualising the themes of suffering experienced by the participants. 
The latter seeks to impose some kind of academic structure and rigour on these 
experiences. Neither endeavour stands alone; they rely on one another for a 
sense of wholeness. Each example from the fieldwork intersects with the 
literature in various ways and scholarship on suffering has been shown to 
extend across disciplines and to span epistemological traditions. The concept of 
suffering remains complex and expands with each new account of human 
experience. However, this chapter has examined some common threads to the 
concept and illustrated how identification with the literature can add richness to 
the narratives and vice versa.  
 
Suffering is not a simple biomedical phenomenon. At a recent conference on 
the future of palliative care, Kellehear commented that palliative care is “a 
social, psychological and spiritual concern with medical elements, not the other 
way around” (Kellehear 2017). Despite this, hospitals, where much palliative 
                                            
32 However only four of the 43 studies adopted ethnographic methods and of these only one (Costello 
2001) included those who were actively dying. The remainder utilised interview or survey-based studies 
and the participants had capacity and illnesses that were largely amenable to treatment 
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care takes place, are primarily designed around the biomedical model of illness. 
Suffering as it has been portrayed here did not readily offer itself up for 
therapeutic intervention within such a biomedical institution. Even though each 
of the healthcare professionals had differing and overlapping notions of what 
constitutes suffering, suffering and its alleviation did not fall within the remit of 
any particular profession.  
 
In the next chapter I examine how the ideological positions considered in 
chapter 5 interfaced with the individual suffering experiences described in 
Chapters 6 and 7. I suggest that rather than biomedicine offering the cure to 
suffering, in many of these cases it was in fact the culprit, and much of the 
suffering that was observed was created or exacerbated by some aspect of the 
participant’s hospitalisation. I draw on Illich’s notion of iatrogenic harm to 
suggest that caring for people at the end of life within a biomedical paradigm 
was generative of suffering.  
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Chapter 9: Iatrogenic Suffering 
“Suffering, healing, and dying, which are essentially intransitive 
activities that culture taught each man, are now claimed by 
technocracy as new areas of policy-making and are treated as 
malfunctions from which populations ought to be institutionally 
relieved” (Illich 1975b, p210)  
9.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I consolidate the perspectives in the thesis up to this point. To 
summarise the relevant threads: the ideologies of care discussed in chapter 5 
served to create particular cultures on the ward that were informed by different 
ideologies of care: rescue, rehabilitation and release. These ideologies at times 
clashed and this impacted on decisions and care. Further, the practices that 
characterised these ideological positions were largely taken-for-granted by staff. 
Patients admitted to the ward manifested a range of suffering experiences, 
which have been described in Chapters 6 and 7, and analysed in chapter 8. 
Suffering was frequently less to do with a patient’s clinical conditions and more 
to do with the experience of hospitalisation and the social, psychological and 
spiritual consequences of illness, ageing and dying. This brings me to this 
present chapter, which addresses the question of why compassionate care was 
on the one hand such an obvious requirement for people in such vulnerable 
positions, yet appeared to be the exception rather than the rule. Geertz 
describes that one of the tasks of anthropology is to sort out the “structures of 
signification… and [to] determine their social ground and import” (Geertz 1973, 
p9) in a cultural group. To this end, I consider how the culture on Bluebell Ward 
contributed both directly and indirectly to certain forms of suffering. Finally, I 
suggest that this suffering remained largely invisible to the staff on the ward not 
because of a culture of cruelty or neglect but because the suffering originated 
from within the very culture that was expected to alleviate it in the name of 
compassionate care.  
I argue that much of the suffering observed was either created or worsened by 
the experience of hospitalisation - either as a consequence of the environment 
of care, or through interactions with staff that were not compassionate, or 
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through having to undergo particular burdensome or distressing clinical 
interventions that were unnecessary or inappropriate. I develop this argument 
by exploring the concept of iatrogenesis, originally posited by Ivan Illich (1975a, 
1975b). I provide a brief overview of Illich’s work and suggest that many of his 
concerns have been actualised in contemporary healthcare, particularly as 
technological advancement has continued apace. Of particular relevance to the 
experiences of participants in my study were Illich’s ideas about social and 
cultural iatrogenesis. Much of the suffering that I observed seemed to result not 
from participants’ illnesses or symptoms, but from the lived experience of being 
a patient in hospital. This experience arose from the interventions and 
interactions that took place, and from the environment and culture of care. 
There were multiple ways in which the social, physical and psychological 
aspects of suffering appeared to be caused or exacerbated by aspects of being 
in hospital. 
In order to explore this further, I propose that there were particular routes to 
iatrogenesis. I present examples in which interaction itself caused or provoked 
suffering. I explore the interpersonal context of care and demonstrates some 
facets of alienation and ambiguity that contributed to suffering. I then consider 
examples of where clinical interventions themselves caused suffering. Issues 
of futility and ethics are discussed. Finally, I examine how the ward 
environment contributed to iatrogenic suffering, including aspects such as 
social and physical isolation and fragmentation. 
The chapter concludes with a reflection on why iatrogenic suffering persisted 
and moreover, how it appeared to go unheeded and unaddressed. Iatrogenic 
suffering appeared to be less readily recognised by staff than suffering that was 
more directly and explicitly related to the patients’ clinical condition, such as that 
related to physical pain. I propose that the effect of clinical habitus was to 
render staff unaware of the environments of care that they co-created. They 
were like Bourdieu’s ‘fish’ – unaware of the water in which they were swimming 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p216). The healthcare environment had 
become so familiar to those working within it that it was possible to overlook the 
kinds of iatrogenic suffering described. Iatrogenic practices formed part of the 
taken-for-granted worlds of many of the staff; the connections between the two 
appeared not to be apparent to those habituated and socialised into the 
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environment of care. 
9.2 Iatrogenesis 
Illich proposed three types of iatrogenic harm. Clinical iatrogenesis referred to 
ineffective and unsafe practices, which in today’s terms can be understood as 
clinical negligence, or malpractice. Social iatrogenesis referred to the impact 
of medicalisation on society more broadly, as manifested though the creation of 
dependence upon medicine for validation of a healthy status. Finally, cultural 
iatrogenesis resulted from the way in which medicine influences how a 
particular culture deals with illness, suffering and dying. Illich described 
medicine as a totalising system of knowledge that was productive of significant 
aspects of the social world.  
9.2.1 Clinical iatrogenesis 
Illich defined clinical iatrogenesis as the “clinically verifiable, specific health-
denying or disease-making effects of specific medical interventions” (Illich 
1975b, p79). This aspect of his work heralded what has become in today’s 
healthcare climate a strong emphasis on patient safety (Sharpe and Faden 
1998; Stollery 2007; Thornlow at al. 2009). Concerns about harm being inflicted 
as a direct consequence of medical practices have always formed part of the 
physician’s mandate, since the time Hippocrates cautioned the physician to 
“first do no harm” (Hippocrates of Cos, transl.1923). In relation to the present 
study, clinical iatrogenesis included giving unnecessary, burdensome or harmful 
treatments or interventions. Paradoxically, attention to patient safety was 
sometimes interpreted as meaning a default to treatment over non-treatment, 
and intervention over non-intervention. The practice of medicine itself was not 
necessarily seen as productive of harm; it was the potential for neglect or 
oversight of some clinical diagnosis, fuelled by the ever-present threat of 
litigation. In this sense, even though patient safety was an explicit attempt to 
avoid clinical iatrogenesis, narrow interpretation of the meaning of safety was 
seen to be productive of patient suffering. Suffering was not, however, included 
in the list of recognised ‘harms’ within the organisation, and it was therefore 
possible for this effect to be reproduced. 
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9.2.2 Social iatrogenesis 
Two aspects of iatrogenesis that were, for Illich, a much broader concern than 
clinical iatrogenesis, are the ideas of social and cultural iatrogenesis.  
 
iatrogenesis referred to “impairments to health that are due precisely to those 
socio-economic transformations which have been made attractive, possible, or 
necessary by the institutional shape health care has taken” (p40). Illich argued 
that the practices of medicine, particularly in normal human experiences such 
as birth and death, had harmed society as a whole (1975). He was not the first 
to critique medicalisation in societal terms (see also the work of Parsons’s work 
on ‘the sick role’ (1951), Zola’s essay on medicine as an institute of social 
control (1972) and Foucault’s description of the totalising impact of medicine 
(Foucault and Sheridan 1973)). But Illich’s work heralded a turning point in 
recognising the responsibilities that medicine had taken on that were outside of 
its original boundaries, and – of particular relevance to the present thesis - he 
claimed that this had impacted adversely on society’s innate resilience.  He 
claimed that this process of ‘medical colonisation’ (p11) had eroded the internal 
supportive mechanisms of supportive societies, especially those around 
previously ‘normal’ activities such as ageing and dying, leading to a societal 
dependence on medicine. This in turn had given doctors power and control over 
what were once considered to be normal human events, such as birth, ageing 
and death.  
Some thirty years after the establishment of the NHS, Illich observed that there 
was a flaw in the presumption that provision of free healthcare would lead to a 
healthier population and consequently a reduction in demand for its services. 
He claimed that the opposite had happened, a phenomenon he described as 
the ‘Sisyphus Syndrome’, wherein the more healthcare was provided to society, 
the more society came to depend upon it. Healthcare, he argued, in effect 
sponsors sickness by reinforcing a ‘morbid society’. This concept has much in 
common with Kitwood’s later description of the way that ‘malignant social 
psychology’ impacts on people with dementia (Kitwood 1997), depriving them of 
self-respect and diminishes their sense of personhood. 
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9.2.3 Cultural iatrogenesis 
Closely associated with the idea of social iatrogenesis is Illich’s notion of 
cultural iatrogenesis, whereby the medical enterprise “saps the will of people to 
suffer their reality” (p133). This was for Illich the most damaging form of 
iatrogenesis. He considered cultural iatrogenesis to be at work when health 
care is contextualised within medicine rather than being framed as societal 
wellbeing. When suffering is medicalised and illness is institutionalised, Illich 
suggested people lose their ability to experience their own bodies without the 
validation of the medical profession. This is in part what Foucault (1973) alluded 
to with his notion of the medical gaze. Illich argued that health professions have 
a culturally health-denying effect in that their practices damage individuals’ 
abilities to manage the ‘normal’ events of human fragility, such as birth and 
death. He suggested that this had resulted from the progress of medical 
technology, and stemmed from a reluctance to accept suffering as a normal part 
of life, expressing concern over the “effects of the social structure, social 
behaviour the social rituals built around the application of medical technology to 
people who are supposedly sick or who might become sick” (1975, p80). Illich 
was influenced by Marxist perspectives on production, and considered that 
medicalisation was linked with over-industrialisation. He described a 
phenomenon whereby certain experiences that have cultural connotations – 
notably, birth and death - have become subsumed into medicine to the extent 
that the cultural aspects are diminished or lost. This has both an individual and 
a community aspect. Illich distinguished between pain and suffering in this 
regard, pointing out that pain has become just another biomedical phenomenon 
to be addressed with medication or other intervention. I suggest that suffering, 
with its broader social and cultural connotations has little or no place in the 
modern discourse of medicalised dying.  
Kellehear (2009) notes that in general, patients seem to be suffering more 
despite medical advancement - “not physically, perhaps, but emotionally. And 
his needs have not changed over the centuries, only our capacity to gratify 
them” (p8). This perspective was echoed by Mercy, an agency nurse who 
worked several shifts across the hospital “Medicine doesn’t make you whole”, 
she told me one evening. “It doesn’t heal.” She was a Christian, and explained 
to me that ‘healing’ meant two very different things in Christian and medical 
   244 
terms: 
“You can’t be dying and healing at the same time. Why do 
people say things like - oh, she is ‘fighting’ an illness? It reflects 
their whole belief system, believing in aggression as the way we 
treat illness. I want light to shine here”  
9.2.4 Section Conclusion: Iatrogenic suffering 
Although Illich’s work remains popular among undergraduate and professional 
healthcare workers, the extent to which his ideas filter into contemporary 
healthcare discourse is debatable. Current understanding of iatrogenic harm 
tends to refer only to the first of his three ‘harms’ - that relating to the 
consequences of unsafe or ineffective practices, which I term clinical 
iatrogenesis. Patient safety has become a key driver in UK health policy 
(Department of Health 2000; Vincent, Burnett and Carthey 2014) as shown for 
example through the establishment of organisations like the Patient Safety 
Agency. Iatrogenic harm has been interpreted within contemporary medical 
literature as measurable actual or potential damage to a person’s physical or 
mental health. Adverse events or harms are generally referred to as 
measurable negative consequences of clinical care, such as hospital-acquired 
infections or pressure sores, or mortality within 24 hours of surgery, and so on. 
The four significant ‘harms’ identified in policy at the time of this PhD study were 
pressure ulcers, falls, urinary tract infections and venous thromboembolisms 
(Madsen 2014). Suffering was not considered among these, despite earlier 
definitions of adverse events in the health services as being “an event or 
omission arising during clinical care and causing physical or psychological injury 
to a patient” (Department of Health 2000, pxii). One reason for this emphasis 
aside from impacting on patient wellbeing was the cost to the NHS of adverse 
events due to litigation - estimated at over £1 billion (Frontier Economics Ltd. 
2014).  
Contemporary definitions of harm do not include the concept of suffering. I 
therefore wish to draw attention to the overlap between iatrogenic harm and 
iatrogenic suffering, where the former refers to Illich’s original thesis, but the 
latter extends to include broader ideas of wellbeing including ideas of health as 
being inherent ‘aliveness’ (Illich 1975b). Illich claimed that the purpose of 
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healthcare is to enhance the autonomy of a person to sustain or restore that 
aliveness or to adapt to changing environments. Suffering as a loss of aliveness 
transcends the narrow contemporary interpretations of iatrogenesis. Suffering is 
possible in the absence of disease, just as disease is not necessarily 
associated with suffering. Cassell (1999) cites numerous examples of people 
who appear to manifest severe suffering despite the relative absence of 
burdensome physical symptoms or disease, and vice versa - people who 
appear to have serious illnesses or distressing symptoms but nevertheless do 
not consider themselves to be ‘suffering’. Most forms of suffering for the 
participants in this PhD study had little or nothing to do directly with clinical 
concerns.  
This study was conducted in Northern Britain in 2015, under a relatively newly 
elected Conservative government and shortly after publication of the Francis 
Report, one of the most damning indictments of care in recent years. This was a 
very particular environment of care, from a political point of view, which meant 
that the priorities of care centred upon patient safety, efficiency and risk 
avoidance, rather than wellbeing and compassion. The term iatrogenesis is 
derived from iatro (physician) and genic (producing). It refers to harm caused by 
the action or inaction of the physician, although for the purposes of this thesis I 
frame iatro as referring to the healthcare system more broadly rather than just in 
the hands of individual physicians. I suggest that the political environment of 
care at the time of the study, with its focus on risk aversion, introduced (I 
suggest) additional aspects of iatrogenesis that were not explored in Illich’s 
work because they were not at that time a prominent part of healthcare 
discourse.  
9.3 Pathways to Suffering 
In the next section of this chapter I argue that participants’ suffering was caused 
by particular routes, or pathways, to iatrogenesis. I draw on examples from the 
fieldwork to illustrate these pathways, demonstrating the presence of clinical, 
social and cultural iatrogenesis in the practices on the ward.  
9.3.1 Interventional Iatrogenesis 
Interventional iatrogenesis refers to suffering that resulted from clinical 
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intervention in its broadest sense. This could be broadly linked with Illich's 
notion of clinical iatrogenesis and includes aspects arising from polypharmacy, 
adverse drug effects, hospital-acquired infections, and unnecessary or 
ineffectual surgery (Sharpe and Faden 1998; Mitty 2010). To this list I have 
added interventions in the context of end-of-life care. Therefore, this theme also 
includes tests which were considered invasive if associated with risk or 
discomfort, and particularly if their results were unlikely to lead to a change in 
treatment direction. The interventional route to iatrogenesis was perhaps the 
most obvious of the three routes, and the resultant suffering more tangible than 
those associated with interactions or the environment.  
The examples I have selected demonstrate how interventions that were 
originally intended to have therapeutic effect, or to minimise risk, became 
associated with reduced wellbeing in the patients I observed.  
Medicalising Intervention 
The discussion with Ned’s daughter (chapter 5) was an important example of 
this tension. Potential iatrogenic suffering - in the form of no longer being able to 
enjoy food - was narrowly avoided. If Ned’s prognosis was thought to be good, 
then to withhold feeding through an enteral tube and risk aspiration through 
giving him oral food and fluids would have been tantamount to neglect. Yet if his 
prognosis were poor and quality of life had been the agreed priority, then 
forbidding him to eat the foods that he loved would have increased his suffering. 
Eating is a social and cultural act (Harris et al. 2002; Crogan et al. 2004), yet 
here it was framed as little more than a biological necessity. 
Dr Basu framed the decision about Ned's feeding tube using the metaphor of a 
'battlefield'. On the one hand, use of metaphor when explaining things to 
patients or relatives can avoid medical jargon by reduction of clinical 
interventions to easily comprehensible processes. Metaphors enable us to view 
one kind of a thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). However, the 
use of this potential metaphor also has the ability to cause harm. A battlefield is 
not a pleasant image. Metaphors do not just describe similarities; they have a 
tendency to embed them. Suggesting that this clinical decision was akin to a 
battlefield was potent, conveying a sense of conflict and implying a clear sense 
of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as in a war between two sides. Using a conflict metaphor in 
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this context was unlikely to help collaborative decision-making.  
Uncertainty about prognosis was associated with iatrogenic suffering. These 
concerns may have been worsened by aspects of the investigation into the 
misuse of the Liverpool Care Pathway (LCP) in which it appeared that patients 
had fluids withheld even when it was not clear that they were dying. Media 
reporting of this aspect described that death had been hastened intentionally 
through dehydration and malnutrition. However, at the end of life, artificial 
hydration through an intravenous drip can cause harm, for example by causing 
swelling or oedema of tissues around neoplastic tumours and hence increasing 
pain, or by placing pressure on kidneys that may be failing as a result of the 
dying process (General Medical Coucil (GMC) 2015). This was another 
example where a simple intervention could be seen as either necessary or 
inappropriate, depending on whether the team were in mutual agreement about 
the goals of care and the patients’ prognosis. By focusing on the potential of the 
intervention to cause suffering, the appropriate way to act could become 
clearer. An important turning point for the conversation with Ned's daughter was 
the point at which she reflected on how much he loved shepherd's pie.  
Ned’s story can be viewed through each of the three ideological lenses 
discussed in chapter 5, and the ‘right’ decision would be different in each case. 
For example, if the goal was ‘rescue’ then the decision would be 
overwhelmingly in favour of enteral feeding to strengthen him, physically, and 
reduce his risk of aspiration. Any suffering associated with artificial feeding 
would have been acceptable because it would have been framed as a 
temporary measure, rather than a prohibition of eating ever again. If the goal 
was ‘release’ then quality of life would take precedence and his choice to eat 
shepherd’s pie would be honoured. If ‘rehabilitation’ was the aim of care, then 
intensive input from speech and language therapists and dieticians might be 
indicated, perhaps involving testing out his swallow reflex with foods of different 
consistencies and amounts. Importantly, however, information about his own 
wishes and the perspective of his daughter had not been gathered prior to the 
clinical decision being essentially made in advance of the meeting described. It 
was through acquiring this additional information by ‘accident’ during this clinical 
encounter that Dr Basu shifted direction. It may have been that some distress 
could have been alleviated had a discussion about quality of life from Ned’s 
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perspective taken place prior to the meeting. Importantly, Ned’s own position 
was not considered as a part of the discussion, following his having been 
deemed to be without mental capacity. Yet even though he may not have had 
capacity to fully integrate the pros and cons of consenting or declining the 
feeding tube, meaningful involvement might still have been possible by – for 
example – finding out what his priorities more broadly were.  What, for example, 
did he enjoy? And what gave his life meaning? 
The literature illustrates that for people with dementia, clinical interventions such 
as enteral feeding and intravenous antibiotics are often carried out at the end of 
life without good evidence as to their effectiveness (Sampson 2010; Mahin-
Babaei et al. 2016) and despite concerns about potential harms (Hughes et al. 
2007). Eating and drinking were common causes for concern and presented 
challenging ethical dilemmas for the team and for patients’ families. Conflicts 
often arose (as demonstrated through the discussions about Ned and Ellen).  
For those approaching the end of life, iatrogenic suffering was a particularly 
important consideration. There came a point when the balance between risks 
and benefits of certain treatments shifted, and the risk of suffering through 
inappropriate or burdensome interventions became unacceptable. This difficulty 
is reflected in the literature. Concerns around dehydration, 'giving up' and 'losing 
the strength to fight' (Amella et al. 2005) are often cited reasons that families 
often insist on feeding beyond the point of utility and even to the extent that 
visible suffering ensues. This pressure from families could be informed by the 
impact of denial in the context of anticipatory grief, or it could indicate a lack of 
sufficient information regarding the perceived risks and benefits of the 
intervention. 
Purposeless intervention  
Michael's story was described in chapter 6. He had received two invasive 
surgical examinations for a suspected fistula33 between his pressure ulcer and 
his rectum. Each examination was performed without anaesthetic. His ulcer was 
a Grade 4, which means it extended deep into the connective tissue around his 
                                            
33 Abnormal connection between two hollow parts of the body; in this case, between a 
cavity pressure sore, and the rectum. 
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sacrum. It was large enough to accommodate an apple. The skin around it was 
red and raw. When examined, he pushed his face into his pillow but I could still 
hear his scream. If there had indeed been a fistula between Michael’s wound 
and his rectum, the continuous passage of faeces would have meant the wound 
would be unable to heal and would remain continuously infected. In such 
circumstances, the appropriate intervention would have been surgery. However, 
it was generally agreed that because of Michaels poor condition overall, surgery 
would be unlikely to be well tolerated and there was therefore a question over 
whether it would proceed even if a fistula were diagnosed. This begged the 
question as to why he had to endure not just one but two invasive examinations, 
and furthermore why these examinations were conducted without anaesthetic. 
The decision may have been informed by the fact that pressure sores were 
considered to be one of the primary 'harms' to be avoided, used as a quality 
measure in auditing patient safety across the hospital. Pressure ulcers were 
considered to be 'adverse events', and even though Michael was admitted with 
his ulcer already present, a worsening of the conditioning of the wound would 
render the staff vulnerable to investigation. 
Interventions can cause suffering in the way that they often involve a 
transgression of bodily boundaries, as illustrated by Michaels' experiences and 
also by Lilian’s, described in greater detail in chapter 7, when the surgeon 
attempted to examine her throat with an endoscope. She did not know who he 
was, and there were numerous other strangers clustered around the bedside. 
She was unable to articulate her distress but it was evident from her nonverbal 
body language that she felt something to be profoundly wrong with what was 
happening, some sense of violation. Suffering was caused when aspects of life 
that had previously been private were rendered public, and was associated with 
a loss of dignity and control.  
Cascading Interventions 
Ellen has already been discussed in detail in chapter 5. Her experiences 
exemplified the concept of iatrogenic suffering as a result of a cascade of 
clinical interventions. 
On my way out of the ward I can hear the nurse and sister 
having a conversation about what time to restart Ellen’s 
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nasogastric feeding pump for her. 4 am is agreed. Each decision 
relates to quality of life but it is a ﬁne balance - the family are 
undoubtedly also being treated by siting the NG tube, I ﬁnd it 
really difficult to see her having this. She is oedematous, her legs 
are so swollen that they are shiny, they look as though they are 
made of plastic. They are cold to touch. Clear ﬂuid seeps from 
an ulcer on her heel. As I leave the ward to go home, her family 
are milling around outside the entrance to the ward. “She 
vomited” they tell me, "so she’s just being cleaned up”. 
Ellen experienced a cascade of iatrogenic interventions, beginning from her 
family's concerns about the lack of feeding and hydration she was receiving, 
and culminating in a nasogastric tube and intravenous infusion of fluids, and 
culminating with the establishment of a syringe driver with antiemetic and 
anxiolytic medication in the final hours of her life. Commencing a treatment was 
much less ethically challenging than withdrawing it, and furthermore no single 
clinician was in charge of her treatment plan from admission through to her 
death. Over the weekend, two different locum doctors reviewed her. This 
staffing structure meant that it was possible for her concerned family to continue 
to pursue the need for Ellen to be fed until a willing clinician was found. The 
dietician who eventually authorised the nasogastric tube had never met her 
before and responded to the demands of her distressed family, who were 
making it very clear that they considered that the hospital was starving their 
mother to death. This was the focus of much of the media’s response to the 
misuse of the Liverpool Care Pathway and was therefore a particular Achilles 
heel for hospital staff in the political climate at that time.  
Placing the feeding tube satisfied Ellen’s family that the right thing had been 
done. Yet as the situation escalated, it transpired that this intervention led to far 
more suffering than she would have experienced had she been left to die 
naturally. Her family would not have been able to anticipate this. To do so would 
have demanded two things; firstly, that the clinicians spoke frankly and openly 
with her family about their uncertainty regarding Ellen’s survival and the 
probability of her imminent death - undoubtedly an emotionally difficult and 
demanding conversation. Secondly, it demanded a confidence in the diagnosis 
and prognosis. Right until Ellen’s last breath, clinicians remained uncertain as to 
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whether she had experienced a seizure or a stroke. This debate was something 
of a distraction from the real issues as she was dying in any case, as a result of 
the increasing burden of heart failure and renal failure. The focus on diagnosing 
stroke or seizure distracted the doctors from paying attention to what was 
apparent to many of the nurses, myself included, that she was dying from the 
day of her admission. Delaying open discussions about dying was associated 
with increased suffering for Ellen and for her family. Clinicians did not feel they 
were in a position of sufficient authority, or that they lacked some key clinical 
information to support their belief that she was dying. It was also perceived that 
her family were not ready to hear the news or that they were placing 
unreasonable demands, when in fact it is well established that normative 
responses to grief frequently entail a degree of denial and disbelief (Kübler-
Ross 1973; Neimeyer et al. 2014). 
Ellen was not alone in having experienced cascade iatrogenesis, and it was a 
story that many in palliative care will be familiar with. In an environment of 
uncertainty as to the potential success of a treatment, the default position is 
often to treat (Thornlow et al. 2009). I propose that Foucault’s notion of 
biopower is useful in understanding the context of interventional iatrogenesis. 
He argues that there is an accepted characteristic of human beings and the 
degree of acceptability is defined and boundaried by certain authorities who are 
perceived to have the right type and depth of knowledge in relation to this truth. 
Furthermore, biopower dictates a particular relationship between ‘letting die’ 
and ‘making live’. The examples used in this section have illustrated some 
tension between these two strategies which were both mechanisms of exerting 
control over human life. It was often considered safer in terms of doctors’ duties 
to preserve life, as well as the pressures of potential litigation, to offer a 
treatment that doesn’t work than it is to decide not to treat. However, knowing 
what is 'enough' in end of life care can have a huge impact on minimising 
iatrogenic suffering (Dunphy 2000).  
9.3.2 Interactional Iatrogenesis 
"We began before words, and we will end beyond them. 
It sometimes seems to me that our days are poisoned with too 
many words. Words said and not meant. Words said ‘and’ 
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meant. Words divorced from feeling. Wounding words. Words 
that conceal. Words that reduce. Dead words" (Okri 1996) 
I use interactional iatrogenesis to refer to iatrogenesis that arose or worsened in 
association with particular interpersonal interactions. It is well established that 
poor communication can increase suffering (Weiner and Roth 2006; Collier et 
al. 2016; McDonald 2016) and has the potential to reproduce situations of 
disempowerment and alienation. This can result from attending to difficult 
subjects in a way that causes distress, perhaps through a lack of sensitivity, or 
through omission or failure to talk about a subject that requires attention. In this 
section I explore examples where the consequences of interactions were not 
therapeutic, and where they arguably caused or worsened suffering.  
Alienating Interaction 
Rita (chapter 6) had end-stage heart failure, which caused severe 
breathlessness to the extent that she required continuous oxygen and could not 
complete a full sentence without pausing for breath. But her suffering was not to 
do with these aspects of her condition. The issue of greatest concern to her was 
the apparent invisibility she experienced as a result of her encounters with the 
doctors on their rounds. On the ward, it was common for patients to have some 
degree of cognitive impairment - whether a result of existing dementia or a 
consequence of delirium resulting from an acute condition - therefore the 
doctors were habituated to respond to acute problems without necessarily 
involving the patients about whom they were making plans and decisions. This 
was an example of the medical habitus; there were assumptions that a person 
with cognitive impairment would be unable to participate in discussions relating 
to their care, and that therefore it was unnecessary to try and involve them. 
Theoretically this kind of interactional iatrogenesis can be linked with Foucault’s 
concept of the ‘medical gaze’ (Foucault and Sheridan 1973). Essentially, this 
refers to the dehumanising effect for a person to be regarded by a physician 
with a view to diagnosing or evaluating the state of some disease or other, 
rather than being seen as a whole human being. This gaze for Foucault is 
uninterested in the person, specifically in their spiritual or emotional self, unless 
this relates in some direct way to the disease state of interest.  
When Rita was first admitted staff considered that she was probably dying. 
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However, over a period of two weeks she had stabilised, and there was now talk 
of discharge. The fact that her mood had lifted somewhat after her clinical 
condition improved affirmed to staff that it had not been necessary to investigate 
this aspect of her condition. After her assessment by the mental health team, 
her mood was not mentioned again until the team began planning her 
discharge: 
Doc: “She is medically fit for discharge and has capacity”y 
Nurse: “RAID saw her, recommended antidepressants but she 
declined, then she picked up” 
Physio: “When her physical condition is bad her mood is terrible, 
she has such breathlessness, but then when she is better she 
brightens up” 
 
Staff agreed that any low mood that might have been expressed while she was 
in hospital was related to her condition and to breathlessness rather than to 
anything else but, as explored in chapter 6, there were many complex and inter-
related factors that impacted on Rita’s suffering. Addressing her wellbeing only 
went as far as considering the interconnectedness with her apparent low mood 
with her physical ill health. It did not extend to consider the possibility for any 
other influencing factors. There were triggers to her mood that she herself was 
able to identify, such as the feeling that arose as a consequence of being 
treated as though she were invisible.  
Apparently as a result of feeling ignored, Rita had withdrawn further and further 
from interactions with staff, particularly in relation to her mood. She conveyed 
the sense that there was not point as she considered that her concerns would 
be addressed in any case. This withdrawal in itself might have been viewed and 
framed as being related to low mood. Her answers to questions focused 
primarily on the clinical aspects of her condition such as her breathing, rather 
than the things that she had explained to me were really bothering her. This 
gave rise to a two reciprocal, mutually strengthening interactional process 
where Rita only gave staff information she thought they were looking for. Staff 
then became less aware that anything was wrong other than these physical 
concerns, and so their assessment narrowed further, exacerbating Rita’s 
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original sense of being looked at without being engaged with.   
Recent research observing older people’s involvement in planning substantiates 
this further (Ekdahl et al. 2012) as staff were preoccupied with patient 
discharge, and perceptions were that patients were too tired, ill or cognitively 
impaired to involve in efficient and productive discussions. A patient survey 
(Maben 2008) conducted as part of a study on patient and staff experiences of 
care identified that around a third of patients in the sample considered that 
doctors and nurses mostly or always talked about them as though they were not 
there.  
Meaningless Interaction 
 
John, a physiotherapy assistant, comes into the room - glancing 
at me. “Hello, my name is John”, he says to Vincent.  
“I know your bloody name is John”, Vincent retorts, “You were 
only here this morning”.  
“I know”, John shrugs, “we have to say that. It’s policy.” 
 
The above excerpt was selected for inclusion here because it was emblematic 
of many other interactions that I observed. The key points that I intend to 
discuss here relate to how processes and policies aimed at enhancing and 
improving interpersonal skills actually had the opposite effect in some cases. 
This was further supported with examples from the fieldwork of other 
innovations and interventions on the ward which at face value appeared to 
contribute positively to the climate of care, but in practice were characterised by 
tokenism at best, or ineffective and wasteful interventions at worst.  
John commented that policy required him to introduce himself by name, even 
though both he and Vincent shared a sense that this was somewhat ridiculous 
given that John had already been in once that day. The policy had arisen as a 
result of a recent national campaign in the UK. In 2015, a British doctor with 
terminal cancer spearheaded a campaign to encourage health professionals to 
introduce themselves by name (Granger 2015). Her campaign was far-reaching, 
with over a billion Twitter impressions for the #HelloMyNameIs tag. Many 
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healthcare embedded it in their person-centred policies, including distributing 
name badges with the #HelloMyNameIs prefix. The need to enhance 
communication skills in the hospital environment is broadly recognised, and the 
'Hello My Name Is' campaign was just one example of many. John’s statement 
that “We have to say that, it’s policy” also suggests that he may have felt he had 
little agency in the judgement of whether or not it is appropriate to say 
something. Following policies and processes to the letter was one of the 
reasons suggested for the failure of the LCP (Neuberger et al. 2013).  
Dr Kate Granger’s original message was born out of a feeling that she was not 
being treated as a person, that she was confused by the array of professionals 
who were speaking to her, and that she required a level of connection with her 
healthcare team in order to feel safe. Yet subsequently her message was 
bureaucratised. Kate was talking about authentic connections, yet the above 
excerpt is an example of what Okri (1996) identifies as “words just said”, as 
opposed to “words said and meant”. This also resonates with Goffman’s notion 
of scripted interaction (1971), in which the person uttering the words has a 
sense of ‘line’, or their performative strategy, as well as with the tokenistic use 
of innovations such as the Blue Butterfly scheme described in chapter 4.  
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Shaming Interaction 
Sometimes, iatrogenesis could be caused through interactions, as in the 
following example. Florence (discussed in chapter 6) experienced alienation 
that was linked to staff reactions to her infections and odour. Increasingly, she 
withdrew from interacting with staff, culminating in a referral to the mental health 
team. In this section I focus specifically on those elements of her story in which 
the interaction might have exacerbated her feelings of shame and others’ 
responses that conveyed disgust and caused stigmatisation.  
The following excerpt from the field notes was taken from the day we first met:  
[the room smells terrible. She has C Diff and is taking a strong 
antibiotic, vancomycin, for this. I am conscious of breathing very 
shallowly - it is a combination of the actual smell and the 
knowledge that it is highly infectious. She is in a side room, there 
is a warning notice on the door. We don plastic pinnies and 
gloves on even those who are not going to touch her.  When we 
emerge, the locum doctor says “We can breathe again”] 
Almost all staff involved in Florence’s care expressed aspects of disgust 
although most did so outside the room. For staff, there were numerous ways in 
which dealing with human waste was made tolerable. Most common seemed to 
be a process of desensitisation, which I address in chapter 4 through discussion 
of how the aversive smells of everyday clinical practice became something that 
staff just got used to over time. Although 'getting used to it' and 'tuning it out' 
were clearly effective methods of self-preservation for staff, they may have 
inadvertently caused suffering to patients who were unlikely to have been able 
to simply tune out these aspects of their bodies. One way in which this 
happened was that the bodily functions of eating and excreting ended up taking 
place in the same physical location.  
Body work is recognised to be a core aspect of nursing practice. However, 
within nursing there are variations in status that are associated with differential 
levels of involvement with the body. Healthcare support workers have the most 
intimate contact with bodies and their effluents, whilst staff nurses have 
somewhat less. The charge nurse and sister have relatively little direct physical 
contact and the specialist nurses who visit the ward, such as the pain nurse or 
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the infection control nurse, have no physical contact at all. This is a subject that 
has been attended to in the literature, although perhaps more so in nursing than 
in medical scholarship (Holmes et al. 2006; Schnall et al. 2008; Simpson 2012). 
Doctors have less direct contact with the body; pathology results can be derived 
by looking at the online patient record, and nurses provide sufficient history 
regarding frequency of vomits and other embodied aspects of illness. Lawler 
suggests that this distancing is associated with the status of the medical 
profession as compared to nursing (Lawler 2006).  
Douglas notes that dirt is only dirt when it is perceived to be out of place (1966, 
1970), and that in the ordered and sterile environment of the hospital such signs 
of bodily effluent are particularly offensive. The doctor seemed indignant about 
having to use her own ‘personal’ stethoscope. Even though wiping it with 
chlorhexidine would have killed any bacteria or other pathogens she appeared 
to remain aggrieved that she had had to use her own equipment to examine 
Florence. She seemed to view its contact with Florence as somehow polluting 
her clean equipment. Lawler’s study of somology identifies that body work is 
frequently hidden on the ward, and suggests that this serves to purposes. 
Firstly, it preserves the dignity of the patient. Secondly, it also protects staff from 
damaged esteem arising from association with messy bodily functions. The 
doctor in this case was accompanied by a junior colleague, and also was 
witnessed by myself. As such the encounter transgressed the usual unspoken 
rules of privacy about this kind of work. Further, the doctor had already alluded 
to the fact that she disapproved of Florence’s apparent reluctance to engage in 
rehabilitative activities: “She reminds me of my grandmother; bone idle.” It has 
been suggested (Twigg and Martin 2015) that liking a patient makes being 
involved with their bodily functions less aversive (Twigg et al. 2011). This may 
have exacerbated the doctor’s perspectives. 
Although Florence did not attest to it explicitly, it appeared that the cumulative 
effect of being isolated in a side room, witnessing directly a range of responses 
of health and social care professionals to the odours in the room, and the 
diagnosis of two pervasive infections would have had a profoundly isolating 
impact that was additional to the suffering inherent in her illness itself. Breaking 
this down, there may have been ways in which this could have been mitigated; 
some intentional human contact that wasn’t focused on a clinical intervention, 
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an offer to wash her hair, or some interaction that did not convey how 
stigmatised she had become. 
9.3.3 Environmental Iatrogenesis  
In this section I examine how the ward environment represented a third 
iatrogenic route to suffering. Even though the environment of care was a strong 
focus in acute care policy in relation to older people in hospital, numerous 
studies (Moyle et al. 2008; Porock et al. 2015) identify that there are aspects of 
the hospital environment that are unsuitable for older people - particularly those 
with dementia and cognitive impairment.  
Healthcare environments within the NHS are largely designed based on the 
principles of being able to deliver safe and effective clinical care (Devlin and 
Arneill 2003). Less prominent is the argument that the environment of care can 
be an end in itself, and can aid health, healing and wellbeing through well-
considered design. Evidence to date has demonstrated connections between 
the physical environment of the hospital setting, and its impact on wellbeing in 
older people (Firth-Cozens and Cornwall 2009) particularly people with 
cognitive impairment (Brereton et al. 2012) and those who are near the end of 
life (Waller et al. 2008; Reyniers et al. 2014). In an environment such as 
Bluebell ward that was characterised predominantly by brief admissions of 
acutely ill patients, it was less of a priority when compared to the safety and 
efficiency aspects of design.  
Isolating Environment 
The environment was not just physical. In considering how the environment 
impacted on wellbeing one must also think about the extent to which it permitted 
or inhibited opportunities for interaction. Perhaps the most obvious way in which 
opportunities for interaction were inhibited was through the use of side rooms 
on the ward. Side rooms on the ward were used for several purposes. Primarily 
they were for patients who could not be in a shared bay for reasons of safety. 
This might be because of cognitive impairment that meant they did not remain 
in their own allocated space, or it might have been because they had an 
infection. Both of these states were considered to pose a risk to other patients. 
A third reason for being given a side room related to their clinical condition. A 
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newly admitted patient who was unstable might be moved into a side room until 
their condition had stabilised. Finally, side rooms were often used when a 
person was thought to be dying - partly as a means of providing privacy and 
dignity and enabling their families and loved ones to visit freely outside the 
usual visiting times, but also partly to protect patients on the shared bays from 
witnessing dying that may cause distress (Kaufman 2005).  
Sheila was put in a side room to minimise disruption to other patients, and then 
when she developed MRSA she was kept there. Days turned to weeks, and her 
mood and level of disturbed and distressed behaviour worsened. Some studies 
suggest that the visible presence of staff can be reassuring for people with 
dementia (Edvardsson, Sandman and Rasmussen 2012). Kitwood (1997) and 
Brooker (2007) suggest that taking the perspective of the person with dementia 
can help to make sense out of certain kinds of behaviours, and that rather than 
view a behaviour as disruptive or difficult it is best seen as a means of coping 
with a particularly adverse situation. From this perspective, Sheila’s behaviour 
could be seen as a means of coping with the disruption of having been isolated 
from others. 
For people at the end of life there can be fear around being alone or being 
abandoned. This can be experienced directly or at times – as in the following 
example – experienced by a family member. Arthur had dementia, and came to 
hospital with a severe chest infection. He was given intravenous antibiotics but 
his vital signs remained unchanged, and it was decided after 48 hours to put 
him on the Integrated Care of the Dying Pathway. Antibiotics were stopped and 
he was given midazolam (an anxiolytic medication) to try and calm his agitation. 
He was placed in a side room 'for privacy'. His daughter Ruth remained with him 
continuously, the door closed and the curtain pulled around. Over the following 
day he spent more and more time asleep. In the following extract, two sides of 
the same apparently objective situation were demonstrated:  
Nurse to me (in corridor, around an hour after giving midazolam): 
“He is settled now. That daughter is wonderful, hasn't left his 
side"  
I spoke to his daughter by his bedside later that day. Ruth told me that she was 
worried he had been needlessly sedated quite soon after admission without 
   260 
giving him a chance to recover. She added that the agitated behaviour the 
nurses had identified was “normal for him” and was part of his dementia.  
Ruth to me: “It’s his dementia. They've written him off”.  
Once it was decided that Arthur was dying he and Ruth were essentially left to 
their own devices. Staff perceived that she was doing a good job of caring for 
him and mostly left them alone until he died the following day. They did not 
identify Ruth’s anger and concern about the possibility that his agitation had 
been misinterpreted by staff who did not know what was normal for him. Staff 
perceived that they were giving Ruth and Arthur privacy; Ruth perceived that 
they had been abandoned. The suffering created by this isolating environment 
could be seen as a manifestation of cultural iatrogenesis. Arthur’s dying had to 
be sanctioned by the doctors, and this dictated all of his subsequent interactions 
with the clinical team. However, Ruth’s reaction conveyed a sense in which his 
dying was potentially misdiagnosed, but she was powerless to influence the 
direction of care that had been decided upon and mandated by the 
implementation of the care of the dying pathway. 
Disruptive Environment  
The ward routine described in chapter 4 served the purpose of rationalising and 
coordinating care, but this routine was probably very different to what was usual 
for patients, even those who had been admitted from other institutions such as 
care homes. Institutional environments are known to increase physical and 
psychological dependency. Goffman’s notion of a ‘total institution’ described 
how the domains of everyday life (sleep, work and play) that are normally 
segregated, take place in the same location in a way that is organised by others 
(1968). Taking on the identity of a patient involved surrendering aspects of one’s 
former self, as symbolised by clothing, personal possessions, and routines. This 
was accompanied by a loss of power, or to use Bourdieusian terms, a reduction 
in social capital. 
In chapter 4 I described the sounds and noises that took place on Bluebell 
Ward. Sound becomes noise once it is perceived to be unwelcome (Devlin and 
Arneill 2003). The healthcare literature suggests that noise levels on wards are 
associated with perceptions of invaded privacy (Baillie 2009) impact on patients’ 
sleep (Xie et al. 2009), wellbeing (Cunha and Silva 2015)and impaired 
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communication. Florence Nightingale, writing more than 150 years ago, 
observed that “unnecessary noise…is the most cruel absence of care which can 
be inflicted either on sick or well” also pointing out that it is the sudden, sharp 
sounds that are more likely to disturb than the low, background level of noise. 
She added that “a nurse who rustles is the horror of a patient, though perhaps 
he does not know why”. Finally, she considered that “all hurry and bustle is 
peculiarly painful to the sick” (Nightingale 1959, p44). 
Sometimes sounds were neutral in terms of their impact on distress and 
suffering. But at other times they could be associated with suffering, either 
because of the confusion and intensity - as was the case for Lilian in her 
sensitivity to the adverse effects of overstimulation. Alternatively, the meaning of 
the sound could cause suffering as for example when patients heard other 
patients crying out, or - more obtusely - where the sound may have evoked a 
particular emotional response, as in the following example: 
Vincent is waiting for medical investigations of his anaemia. The 
doctors are concerned he may have myelodysplasia, a precursor 
of myeloma. The test for this is a bone marrow biopsy, which 
involves drilling into his pelvis to extract a small tissue sample 
which is examined under a microscope for abnormal cells. His 
room is positioned midway down the corridor, opposite a utilities 
cupboard where maintenance workers are rerouting some wiring. 
This involves a certain amount of hammering, and drilling. Also 
heard is the continuous sound of Sheila from the room next door 
"No! No!!" and Lilian, a little further down, screaming "They've 
taken my eyes". The drilling continues today. Hannah tells me it 
is driving her mad. She is the third person to tell me that today. 
“It’s been going on for months” 
I only notice this when I sit beside him; the sound enters my field 
of awareness and I realise I have just been thinking about his 
biopsy. I cannot separate the two – the thought of the procedure 
as his bone is drilled, and the sounds of the engineers at work. I 
recall how just the sound of the dentists’ drill used to make my 
teeth ache. 
   262 
When the procedure is explained to Vincent the doctor raises his 
voice over the sound of the drilling. "No, thank you very much", 
Vincent says, glancing at me and looking fearful. Small wonder, I 
reflect 
Merleau Ponty’s phenomenological account of perception identified the 
embodied nature of perceptual stimuli and the association of such stimuli with 
meaning for the perceiver (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Marcoulatos 2001). The 
stimulus of the drilling noise arrived already associated with a particular 
meaning, judged in a particular way. My interpretation was that it was an 
unwelcome reminder of the invasiveness of a bone marrow biopsy. The drilling 
sound, the imagined procedure, and the mingling of the inner and outer worlds, 
aligned with Merleau Ponty’s notion of ‘creative receptivity’, in which active 
perception created the meaning of the sensory stimulus.  
When patients were dying, there were attempts to create some protective wall 
of silence around them; for example, they might be moved to a side room, or if 
in a bay, have the curtains drawn around their beds. This illusion was visual 
rather than auditory, it offered a demarcation and separation from the hubbub of 
the rest of the ward, but even with the boundaries offered by curtains and doors, 
sound travelled easily on the ward. There was nowhere that was silent. The 
closest thing to a quiet space was the tiny doctors’ office tucked at the back of 
the ward, to which refuge junior doctors frequently escaped when they needed 
to make a decision or read through a set of medical notes.  
Little has been written about noise and sound in the context of dying on the 
ward. Sound is often associated with activity, and silence with stillness 
(Atkinson et al. 2008). The use of silence in caring for the dying person is 
generally considered to be an important means of creating a compassionate 
space (Back et al. 2009) yet much has been written regarding the noisy 
environment of care in hospital (see for example (Busch-Vishniac et al. 2005; 
MacKenzie and Galbrun 2007; Khademi and Imani 2015). Studies that do 
address perceptions of noise from the perspective of patients and staff do so 
through the use of interviews and questionnaires (Shiers et al. 2012). The 
impact of noise on patients who are seriously ill or dying, or who do not have 
capacity to complete a questionnaire, is not known although it might be 
reasonably presumed that noise would impact in profound ways upon wellbeing. 
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The fieldwork illustrates the impact of noise on patient participants, 
supplementing that which is already known from the literature. However, to the 
existing knowledge I suggest that the perceived origin and meaning of the noise 
or sound may have been as important as its level or intensity.  
9.4 Discussion  
A memoir of the work of Ivan Illich is subtitled “Less medicine, More health” 
(Scott-Samuel 2003). Perhaps this was the inspiration behind the title of the 
recent investigation into the Liverpool Care Pathway: “More Care, Less 
Pathway” (Neuberger et al. 2013). Illich was one of the first to challenge 
medicine’s dominance but at the time of publication his thesis was unwelcome, 
and criticised as being unempirical, idealistic and vulgar. During subsequent 
years, however, Illich’s thesis has been recognised as holding significant social 
import, and the development of palliative care has taken place alongside a 
growing critique of medicalisation that arose from the discussions catalysed by 
his work. His work offers important insights into the suffering experiences of 
people dying in acute hospital settings. Healthcare environments, and a range 
of processes intended to guide professionals in their care of the dying, have 
contributed to aspects of care that are less than ideal. This includes over-
zealous prescribing of investigations and treatments that have little chance of 
success, sedation, seclusion and ambivalence in discussing death and dying 
leading to last-minute discussions with families. This thesis has demonstrated 
that suffering does not relate solely to people's illness experience but to their 
broader experience of the hospital, and the environment, interactions and 
interventions that they encounter.  
Suffering in Peripheral Vision 
 
This chapter has drawn upon Illich’s work to examine iatrogenesis and has 
extended this idea to propose the existence of iatrogenic suffering. The most 
enduring of his propositions is clinical iatrogenesis, but I have suggested that of 
the three types of iatrogenesis that he discussed, it was the social and cultural 
elements that were perhaps the most intimately linked with ideas of suffering as 
a holistic experience. Simple avoiding unintended clinical harm did not address 
the wider goal of alleviating suffering but often caused unintended suffering. 
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During the study, iatrogenesis appeared to be recognised most readily where 
there was conflict between the ideological approaches underlying care 
decisions. Health professionals seeking to identify suffering related to illness, 
who were themselves enculturated within the hospital and its routines, may 
have been oblivious to the harm that was caused by this experience and to 
which they may have contributed through actions or inaction. The iatrogenic 
suffering observed was either not tackled by staff, or else it passed without 
comment among them. There was a paradox. All the staff I spoke to expressed 
a deep wish to care for patients properly, to spend time with them and to do the 
right thing. All expressed ambivalence about the increasing requirement for data 
collection about ward activity for regulatory purposes, and other activities that 
they considered detrimental to patient care such as moving nurses between 
wards to manage staffing levels. Yet in my observations there were many times 
that patients who appeared to me to be suffering were ignored by staff, who - 
whilst often busy - were just as frequently to be found talking in the nursing 
pods or chatting with patients who were cognizant and able to engage in 
conversation.  
Bourdieu's concept of habitus can explain both the continued causation of 
iatrogenic suffering, and the apparent obliviousness of some staff to 
iatrogenesis. The examples indicate that even where certain members of staff 
were able to recognise iatrogenesis, they were unable to act to alleviate it 
because of their comparatively poor stocks of social and cultural capital. Staff 
were aware of suffering, and could explain it with reference to particular 
patients, but they could not describe or define it. Moreover, much of the 
suffering I observed was peripheral; it was easy for it to go unnoticed. Morse’s 
work on conceptualising suffering (Morse and Carter 1996; Morse and Penrod 
1999; Morse et al. 2003) proposes that suffering expressed emotionally (for 
example, through crying, or through words) is only one form of suffering. She 
proposes that ‘enduring suffering’ is a significant phenomenon that is easy to 
ignore, takes place where a person does not feel sufficiently safe to express 
themselves and is intimately associated with ideas about the future, and hope. 
Vincent’s flat, emotionless responses to John belied much more than his words 
conveyed. Taken at face value, he was labelled as non-compliant with 
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treatment, belligerent, even disruptive but his stories demonstrated deep 
suffering. They included his ongoing grief for his wife, his reluctance to prolong 
his own life which he was now bored of living, withdrawal from nicotine as he 
was forbidden to smoke his cigars, his wish to go home and live freely against 
an increasing sense of fear that he would be unable to do so safely or 
affordably. All of these issues aggregated to suggest deep suffering, much of 
which was iatrogenic, yet to many of the staff, suffering was framed in terms of 
his breathlessness or his social care needs. 
Most nurses in the UK will have encountered Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ as 
part of their training or professionalisation (Maslow 1943) This needs-based 
model of nursing has shaped many shared practices across a variety of 
settings. Certainly, as nursing is increasingly influenced by medical and 
technological systems of care, hierarchical systems such as Maslow’s have 
become interpreted as meaning the meeting of physical needs should take 
precedence over the meeting of any higher-order needs. Some critics suggest 
this has led to neglect of the spiritual and social aspects of existence. Social 
suffering such as Sheila’s isolation, or Florence’s sense of alienation, may have 
been less easy to identify than physical needs such as an imbalance of 
electrolytes, a symptom requiring a medication, or a wound needing dressing, 
but they had a significant impact upon quality of life. 
In “Rhetoric”, Aristotle suggested that a prerequisite for pity is for suffering to be 
perceived as being sufficiently serious to warrant pity (Barnes 1982). So, the 
observer will make a judgement that relates to seriousness, and the response to 
suffering will be proportional to this. Every patient on the ward was there 
because of some decrepitude or disease relating to old age. It could be argued 
that they were all suffering, to differing degrees. It was necessary for staff to 
draw some kind of line between what was considered serious and non-serious 
suffering, in order that they could appropriately direct their finite resources and 
care for those most in need. On one level this may have been related to self-
preservation. On another level, however, staff might have responded to 
suffering only insofar as they felt able to do something about it. Suffering might 
have been recognised but not responded to, or it might not have been 
recognised in the first instance.  
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9.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter consolidates the findings of this thesis to present a theoretical 
perspective about the nature of participants’ suffering. I suggest that iatrogenic 
suffering not only involved biomedically-focused notions of harm but also 
incorporated social and cultural components. Focusing primarily on enhancing 
compassionate care did not address the core issue which was that there were 
forms of suffering that had just as negative an impact on patients as symptoms 
such as pain, but these tended to go unrecognised.  
I have opened up a debate as to why it was that these less tangible 
manifestations of suffering seemed less visible in the overall care of patients. 
This was explored by utilising Bourdieu’s theory of habitus in conjunction with 
Illich’s position to analyse the structures that enabled causation and 
reproduction of iatrogenic suffering. Those forms of suffering which arose as a 
consequence of hospitalisation often went unrecognised. I suggest that this was 
to do with the fact that the practices were deeply embedded in the social 
structures of the ward were the very ones that created or exacerbated suffering, 
and therefore those agents who played a part in their enactment were simply 
reproducing practices within their habitus. 
Broadly, suffering caused by aspects of the clinical environment of care had 
become so embodied as habitus that they were taken-for-granted, matters 
removed from consciousness. This habitus was formed of those aspects of 
professional life that staff have been socialised into – to greater or lesser 
degrees. The focus on risk aversion, for example, had become so embedded in 
clinical discourse that the practice of defensive medicine may not always have 
been have been something that clinicians were aware of doing. This argument 
leads to my final chapter in which I begin to explore what implications my 
findings might have for clinical practice and for education of healthcare 
professionals. If (as Bourdieu suggests) habitus was not fixed, then attending to 
internalised structures through providing ways of experiencing the clinical 
environment may enable future shaping of professional habitus in a way that 
enables recognition of iatrogenic suffering. 
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Chapter 10: Engaging with Suffering 
“For seven days and seven nights [Job’s friends] sat beside him 
on the ground, and none of them spoke a word to him, for they 
saw his suffering was very great” [Job 2:13] 
“If there is a meaning in life at all, then there must be a meaning 
in suffering. Suffering is an ineradicable part of life, even as fate 
and death. Without suffering and death, human life cannot be 
complete” (Frankl 1964, p88) 
“Constant exposure to suffering, coupled occasionally with a 
feeling of being taken for granted, can induce feelings of 
helplessness and even despair. Or it can happen that individuals 
may find themselves performing outwardly generous actions, 
merely for the sake of it – simply going through the motions [….] 
when left unchecked, this can lead to insensitivity towards 
others’ suffering” (Dalai Lama, cited in Scheler 1970) p.129) 
“So much suffering is unnecessary, invented, no good purpose. 
Good news: Because this type of suffering is made up, 
we can change it. 
We need to make the distinction between necessary and unnece
ssary suffering. 
Our role is to relieve suffering, not add to the pile” (Miller, 2016)  
“If I recall now that the possibility of stopping this infernal 
machine in its tracks lies with all those who, having some power 
over cultural, artistic, and literary matters, can, each in their own 
place and their own fashion, and to however small an extent, 
throw their grain of sand into the well-oiled machinery of 
resigned complicities” (Bourdieu 1972, p65) 
10.1 Overview 
The NHS Constitution states that its members “ensure that compassion is 
central to the care we provide and respond with humanity and kindness to each 
person’s pain, distress, anxiety or need” (Department of Health 2013, 05). At the 
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start of this thesis I set out to explore in greater detail the nature of compassion, 
suffering, and the experiences of older people in hospitals. I challenged several 
assumptions in contemporary healthcare policy and explored how factors 
outside individual volition contribute to the overall experience of compassionate 
care. In this chapter I examine to what extent I have successfully challenged 
this assumption. I propose that the thesis has demonstrated some of the 
complexities inherent in providing compassionate care and discuss some 
potential applications of the findings in education and clinical practice. Firstly, a 
model for guiding multidisciplinary team decision-making in older person’s care 
is considered, based upon the premise that suffering results from misalignment 
of goals of care within the dominant three ideologies. Secondly, I reflect on my 
experiences of observing care as a researcher, rather than as a nurse who 
might otherwise have become identified with the business of the tasks that 
required completion. 
10.2 Introduction  
 
The thesis has considered several less visible aspects of patient experience 
and clinical practice that impact on compassionate care – including presentation 
of suffering, conflicting ideologies of care, and iatrogenic practices.  
 
The aim of this concluding section is to suggest how this thesis might help make 
suffering, and its antecedents and consequences, more visible to stakeholders. 
This includes health and social care professionals and students who are 
involved daily in the planning and delivery of care, and managers who may be 
unaware of the unintended negative consequences of the kinds of monitoring 
and regulatory processes that they are beholden to. It may also speak to 
prospective and ex-patients and their families who may need to carefully 
consider the relative benefits of hospital admission near the end of life. I 
consider how these insights might lead into changes or improvements in 
practice for individuals and organisations. I consider the implications of my 
findings for healthcare educators, and critically examine the limitations of the 
study, making suggestions for policy makers, future research studies and 
innovations. 
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The launching point for this thesis was the Francis Report’s damning accounts 
of patient experience and subsequent recommendations regarding training and 
monitoring of compassionate care. I challenged the premise of a compassion 
deficit, suggesting that this is based on assumptions regarding the nature of 
compassion which are contested. The report categorised kinds of harms into a 
typology that included over-treatment, delayed or wrong diagnosis, failure to 
treat, and psychological harm (conceptualised as ‘feeling unsafe’) (Vincent, 
Burnett and Carthey 2014). In this, it adhered to a narrow view of iatrogenic 
harm and did not address the broader issue of suffering. The report 
recommended attention to developing a compassionate culture, in which 
members hold shared basic assumptions, learn as a group how to adapt, and 
teach new members of the group the ‘correct’ way to think. Proposing that 
culture can be changed by increased monitoring and regulation revealed an 
unquestioned premise that the potentially obstructive or immovable aspects of 
healthcare systems themselves were blameless in creating the kinds of 
conditions that were described in the report.  
 
My investigation took me on a journey which initially deconstructed the concept 
of compassion, identifying crucial elements within compassionate care such as 
the recognition of suffering, and the motivation and resources to take action to 
respond to that suffering. This in turn led to a detailed exploration into those 
people who were most vulnerable to the kinds of poor care detailed in the 
report; older people in acute hospital care. I was concerned with studying the 
nature of such suffering and finding out more about what gets in the way of 
compassionate care. This led me to present a series of narratives, each of 
whom manifested a particular complex picture of suffering. 
 
I found that such issues could not be meaningfully explored without examining 
the nature of suffering experienced by patients in this setting, the relationship 
between the goals of clinical care and the phenomenon of iatrogenic suffering, 
and the interactional processes taking place between professionals involved in 
delivering care to older people. The cultural context of task-orientated care and 
risk-aversion, within a bureaucratic organisational structure, appeared to have 
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created a system in which the provision of compassionate care was difficult, 
although not impossible.  
 
In my thesis, I have reflected upon moments of tension between my newly 
found practice as a novice ethnographer, and my prior (and more embedded 
and habituated) roles as a nurse and latterly an educator. Adopting the former 
role, I was an observer of the field, and even though at various times I became 
a participant (at times unwillingly), my role was primarily observational. 
Therefore, this concluding chapter is to some degree an expression of the 
tensions between these positionalities. I was able to sit and observe practices, 
write representative accounts of my participants, and consider theoretical 
perspectives that can offer insight into these stories. I was an observer in the 
field. As a nurse, however, I am a player in the field. I am a part of the system 
that I describe. I educate students to become players in that field.  
 
Prior to the thesis I considered that the needs of older, vulnerable people at the 
end of life were not being met. Having completed this investigation, I am more 
convinced of this than ever. A further aim of the thesis was therefore to make 
tentative suggestions about clinical practice and education. These suggestions 
are ideas. They have not been tested (although this might be a possibility for 
future work); they are born of my own reflections as to what I have learned on 
this journey. 
 
10.2.1 Summary of key findings 
 
In chapter 5 I proposed that the focus of care was often dictated by practices 
that were ideologically informed and often associated with particular 
professional roles. Further, I illustrated some ways in which problems could 
arise when care was transitioning from one ideologically-informed approach to 
another. I suggested that the ideology of rescue remained the dominant 
influence on decisions relating to care – particularly in this clinical environment 
where prognosis was plagued by uncertainty - and this was itself informed by 
wider societal and institutional priorities. Chapter 6 and 7 described different 
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ways in which suffering was manifested, alluding to the complexity and subtlety 
of many of the experiences of patient participants.  
 
This was placed in a theoretical context in chapter 8. I argued that 
comparatively little suffering resulted from the patients’ clinical disease; the vast 
majority of suffering experiences observed appeared to be derived from the 
experience of hospitalisation itself. chapter 9 proposed that the phenomenon of 
iatrogenesis can influence suffering in a range of ways. Iatrogenic interactions 
caused patients to feel disempowered, angry and anxious. Interventional 
interactions could provoke distressing physical symptoms or a sense of loss of 
control. Finally, environmental iatrogenesis could lead to isolation, 
disconnection or fear.  
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10.3 Implications 
 
Bourdieu resisted the idea that his sociology was just to be used for explanatory 
purposes, instead arguing for the utilisation of theory as a form of social action. 
For Bourdieu, social change becomes possible through the awakening of 
consciousness that can take place when there is successful identification of the 
dissonance between a particular field and a particular habitus. Habitus is not 
static, but is constantly reproduced through the interaction of agency and 
structure. He believed that habitus can be challenged and changed, through a 
process of reflexivity. This is fundamentally a pedagogic argument; through 
reflexive sociology, one can be made aware of these forces, and once in the 
conscious domain they are amenable to change and challenge. For Bourdieu, 
habitus enables one to transcend traditional dichotomies between the individual 
and the social or environmental and to demonstrate how these are mutually 
interdependent, and that agents are both formed by, and formative of, their 
environments. Habitus cannot be abstracted from field, and vice versa.  
 
This has important implications for thinking about compassion; arguments in the 
literature relating to the ‘compassion deficit’ focus primarily upon either 
individual attributes (including moral distress, burnout, desensitisation and so 
on), or institutional responsibilities (such as neoliberalism, autonomy and 
bureaucratisation). Yet few analyses recognise the interplay between these. 
Bourdieu offers a means of bridging this gap. The examples in this thesis have 
enabled an examination of how field, habitus and doxa work in different ways to 
create certain kinds of practices, and this permits the existence of some types 
of suffering over others. We need to understand the inhibitory forces that act on 
compassionate care rather that focus on regulatory interventions.  
 
The relevance of Bourdieu’s work to this thesis rests upon the fact that it 
attends to those aspects of culture that were not explicitly rational or 
meaningful; it offers explanation as to why habitual modes of action were 
perpetuated among rational actors, and this includes clinical practices that may 
seem counterintuitive, or inappropriate, or at times even potentially harmful. 
This is where the potential for iatrogenesis lies, it is invisible to those who are 
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causing it not only because they are habituated to ways of doing things but 
because it entails the reproduction of ways of knowing that are not known to the 
actors themselves. The actors are themselves blind. 
 
There are several areas where practice change might be indicated. For 
example, if we were able to identify the most appropriate approach to care 
based on patient preference, and equitable contributions from the full range of 
experienced and knowledgeable staff – rather than default to rescue - it might 
be possible to avoid iatrogenic suffering. Another example where care could 
improve is through enhancing understanding of sufferings’ complex 
manifestations. The two broad suggestions I make here pertain to how this new 
knowledge might inform practice. The first relates to the potential use of 
observational methods in health professional education to challenge habitus. 
The second refers to hospital practices in which decisions pertaining to older 
patients are made, and suggests approaches to multidisciplinary team 
discussions that can draw out a patient-centred approach by refocusing on 
goals rather than defaulting to traditional professional alignments with particular 
approaches to care.  
 
10.3.1 Observational Methods in Health Professional Education  
 
A key finding of this study has been the extent to which many clinical practices 
were taken for granted. As such, many such conflicts were played out multiple 
times along familiar themes.  
 
One way of conceptualising this is to argue that individuals were blindly directed 
by habitus. Habitus dictates action and determines the type of agent an 
individual will be in the field. This means that individuals were largely unaware 
of the influence of habitus on their actions. Yet Bourdieu argues that doxa and 
its resultant habitus strongly directs actions in the field, and at times these 
actions were not in patients’ interests. Accordingly, any effort to render taken-
for-granted aspects of habitus more visible to the agent can contribute to 
changes in professional practice.  
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Bourdieu suggests that habitus - because it is formed of inherited ways of doing 
things - can develop its own momentum which can mean that these patterns 
can persist even after the original impetus for doing them has vanished. Thus, 
the investigation into the alleged misuse of the Liverpool Care Pathway led to 
the withdrawal of the pathway and instructions to create ‘care plans’ rather than 
‘care pathways’. Practice has been notoriously slow to change in the aftermath 
of this, even though the pathway was ostensibly withdrawn from use 
immediately. The habitus of capturing the pathway of dying in an evidence-
based algorithm had become embedded in the shared practices of the clinical 
team. As Bourdieu argues, “if agents are possessed by their habitus more than 
they possess it, this is because it acts within them as the organising principle of 
their action and because this modus operandi34 informing all thought and action 
(including thought of action) reveals itself only in the opus operandi”35 (1972, 
p18). 
Reflexivity: research experience and clinical implications 
 
Bourdieu did not consider it necessary to take a single perspective on 
sociological phenomena, and indeed within his broader framework of habitus 
this would not be considered possible (Bourdieu 1999; Kenway and McLeod 
2004). Reflexivity does not allow the observer to converge on a single truth; 
rather, it allows an individual to engage with their own habitus, in a “systematic 
exploration of the unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable 
and predetermine the thought” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p40). Reflexivity 
forms an important part of Bourdieu’s sociology and is also increasingly 
recognised as a powerful method for changing professional practices within 
nursing (Nairn et al. 2012), medicine (Neighbour 2005) and in research of 
health and social systems (Mason 2002; Rae and Green 2016). Reflexivity in 
this case involves intentionally place oneself in discomfort and to permit this to 
lead to insight into one’s habitus. This was certainly my experience during this 
study; my comfort zone was in my nursing experience, establishing myself in an 
                                            
34 Habits of working 
35 Need to work 
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accepted position within a professional group, and a range of other practise 
aimed at securing my position in the social field of the clinical ward. As a 
researcher I was repeatedly uncomfortable, moving between groups of 
professionals, resisting contributing to discussions about care that were taking 
place in my familiar language. But it was this intentional separation from the 
field that I felt enabled me to challenge so many of the things I had previously 
taken for granted. This led me to postulate about whether this process itself 
might be beneficial to other clinicians who have become accustomed to 
particular ways of being, and whose practices were deeply embedded in taken-
for-granted habitus.  
Habitus: inertia and growth 
 
My first suggestion pertains to the use of observational methods derived from 
anthropology in clinical education. As a nurse, I was new to ethnography. I 
learnt some skills by reading books and speaking to anthropologists and trying it 
out on buses, in libraries and shopping centres. I developed my own style of 
observation. It was a paradigm shift; suddenly I was observing a familiar world 
through eyes that were learning to unpick aspects of practice that I had hitherto 
taken for granted, and to see things from multiple perspectives. Most notably, 
time spent with patients illustrated to me how things I had previously presumed 
to be immutable (such as the passing of time) were subjective and shifting 
phenomena depending on the perceiver.  
This provided new insights into suffering. Despite many years of nursing dying 
people my understanding of the subtle nature of suffering was deepened 
through this ethnographic practice. Along the journey of the research, I met and 
engaged with many others who shared similar experiences when adopting 
ethnographic methods. To these individuals I owe many insights as well as a 
solid source of support when these new insights undermined and called into 
question the values and perceptions I had previously taken for granted.  
 
These experiences led me to reflect on ways in which nursing education might 
benefit from input from anthropological methods and theory, and how this might 
enable staff to examine and share taken-for-granted practices as individuals 
and teams in a supported and supportive clinical environment. Integration of 
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anthropology into nursing curricula has previously been restricted to content 
relating to transcultural awareness; the valuable methods of anthropology have 
not been implemented, despite their overlap with many aspects of nursing 
practice36. 
 
At present the approach to learning in practice is founded on competencies. 
Students were required to complete a book of core competencies that includes 
‘essential skills’ to be signed off by their mentors during their time in clinical 
practice (NMC 2015). The use of competence-based learning is closely related 
to the agenda for accountability within contemporary clinical governance 
frameworks (Nehrir et al. 2016). Among these were competencies relating to 
care of the dying, care of older people and maintenance of dignity. Increased 
emphasis on competency-based practice is also continuing apace within 
palliative and end-of-life care (Sawkins and Bawn 2010; Frey et al. 2011) 
although there is debate regarding whether it is possible to measure 
competence in this area.  
Over-reliance on nursing competence excludes other kinds of social processes, 
such as nurses’ own histories (Arbon 2004) in which being socialised as a nurse 
involves an ongoing interaction between experience, interpretation and the 
objective world. This interaction is what creates individual nurses unique 
understanding of practice.  
 
Nursing education is not simply a matter of supplying a stock of knowledge from 
which the nurse can draw, but entails facilitating socialisation into a profession 
that possesses its own identity, and into which aspects of the nurse’s habitus 
will develop whilst others will recede, in a continuously iterative process. 
Habitus enables socialisation of nurses to be seen as an embodied process, 
whereby the nurse draws on a backdrop of experiences and this is placed 
against existing values. Each one has the capacity to change the other. Habitus 
can change - this dynamism is crucial and is what enables one to rewrite one’s 
interpretation of a situation.  
                                            
36 As a nurse educator, I decided to focus specifically upon nurse education. This is not 
because I believe the nurses to be most in need of education but because I am most 
familiar with the structures and processes required for current NMC registration (2015). 
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Meyer and Land (2005) suggest that learning new ways to think about things 
engenders a degree of discomfort as it demands progress through a state of 
dissonance. Becoming a nurse is often described as transformational; it 
involves rewriting former knowledge, entering a liminal zone and then 
integrating a new way of thinking and feeling about something. Enabling 
embodied learning is to nurture a particular nursing praxis (Benner and Tanner 
1987). Contextual learning offers learners a kind of practical hermeneutic with 
which to understand their own and others’ practices.  
 
Reflective practice is considered to be a valuable means of increasing self-
awareness in complex clinical situations (Thorne 2006; Horton-Deutsch and 
Sherwood 2008; Allan and Smith 2010). Nairn et al. (2012) suggest that 
learners become adept at understand the process of reflection, but not 
necessarily enabled to understand the underlying complex circumstances that 
influence their ability to act. Including awareness of the influence of habitus 
could enable nurses to bring more of their own histories and accumulated 
capital to bear on understanding the field and the interactions they experience. 
Wishing to avoid inclusion of Bourdieu’s theory as yet another element of the 
nursing curriculum, this might be better translated into an active form of learning 
– using Bourdieu’s sociology as a form of activism. Theories of habitus can be 
used to guide students towards reflexivity in practice. 
 
Immersing oneself in the world of another has long been known to provide 
learning opportunities that are not just intellectual; half of pre-registration 
nursing hours in the United Kingdom are spent in clinical practice in recognition 
of the practical nature of nursing. Yet, there is no explicit method for enabling 
and facilitating the development of emotional insight in to suffering embedded 
within the curriculum. Indeed, it is almost assumed that simple exposure to 
patient experience will imbue the individual student with the required attitudes 
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and sensibilities. This is reinforced by the ‘6 C’s’37 (Cummings 2012). With no 
fixed consensus on whether compassion can be taught, and if so the best way 
in which to go about this, it seems timely to propose an additional inclusion into 
the nursing curriculum that is directed towards this affective domain of learning. 
I suggest that nursing education could be enriched by the introduction of 
anthropological methods to develop insight into the fluid nature of habitus and to 
actively recruit this process to support nurses’ reflexivity. My recommendation is 
for an additional and complementary approach to nurse education, based upon 
the methodological approach of this thesis and acknowledging the importance 
of embodied learning. I suggest that at least one of the pre-registration nursing 
placements in clinical practice is conducted without the use of core 
competencies. Instead this placement would involve the student taking an 
anthropological perspective and spending an amount of time engaged in an 
observer role. Because there would not be sufficient time within the curriculum 
to get to know a range of anthropological methods, this process could be 
facilitated by providing the students with a simple observational data tool (see 
for example Appendix 6). This period of observation could then be followed up 
by writing of a brief reflection which could be incorporated into their professional 
portfolios.  
 
Incorporating observational elements to clinical placements is likely to 
encounter objections from educators and practice coordinators alike. Yet it is 
precisely because of the busy atmosphere on many hospital wards that such an 
approach – whilst students are still (at least on paper) supernumerary – may 
enable the development of insight into patient suffering. Formalising 
observational approaches by embedding them in clinical practice 
documentation would provide the required legitimacy to satisfy busy mentors 
who currently may see this as students not ‘pulling their weight’.  
 
                                            
37 These are compassion, caring, competence, courage, commitment and communication 
as outlined in “Compassion in Practice”, the response of the Chief Nurse to the Francis 
Report. 
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Schon (1987) refers to the difference between reflection-in-action and reflection-
on-action. This theory can be applied to the acquisition of emotional intelligence 
through obtaining holistic understanding of situations. In the usual set up on 
clinical placements, students are assigned to work alongside or close to a 
mentor; as well as achieve their competencies there are other expectations, 
including the fact that they work well as a team member and behave 
professionally. At the end of the placement they are given a grade. For many 
years I have heard students tell me that - particularly in busy clinical 
environments - they are more likely to get a good grade if they immerse 
themselves in the busyness of the ward and ‘pull their weight’. They are often 
assessed on their usefulness in sharing workload rather than specific nursing 
attributes contained within their assessment documentation. If the observational 
placement was not graded but instead the student had an opportunity to feed 
back his or her findings to the team, there may be additional value as well as 
numerous transferable skills - not least diplomacy!  
 
Using anthropological observation engages the senses, enabling the use of pre-
reflective consciousness in becoming a witness to the suffering patient. Finding 
oneself in the real environment and exposing oneself to the world of the patient 
is not the same as reading an account of a patient experience, from the comfort 
of one’s home, on one’s computer screen, or in a lecture theatre. It is different 
too from clinical simulations which are used to try and enable the learner to 
imagine having poor mobility through wearing cushions under their shoes, or 
poor vision by wearing opaque glasses. Spending time in the real world 
provides embodied experience, and these may add to the authenticity and 
vividity of resultant learning.  
 
When a nurse encounters intangible aspects of human experience such as 
suffering, for which it becomes necessary to utilise subjective and relational 
aspects of the nursing toolbox to try to understand something of the experience 
of the other. This difference can be summed up in a comparison between the 
‘recording’ and the ‘perceiving’ eye, in which the former gathers information and 
compares it to existing patterns in order to make a decision or diagnosis. The 
latter in contrast engages with the fullness of perception (in Merleau Ponty’s 
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sense) and undergoes a gestalt of awareness – that may be pre-reflective – but 
that nevertheless offers the nurse some insight into what is important to that 
person. Each individual, exposed to the same set of circumstances and 
environmental stimuli, will respond in a different way. This is based on their own 
habitus - part of which may be shared as a member of a group (for example, as 
a staff nurse) but part of which will be uniquely related to an individual’s 
biography. As such it is the unique response to circumstances that can 
formulate exactly what it is that the nurse responds to in a given set of 
circumstances, what constitutes suffering, and so on.  
Observational methods for peer review 
There is no reason that observational methods need to be restricted to nursing 
education. Such an approach could be used in clinical practice for qualified 
health and social care professionals, whereby staff are afforded a clearly 
bounded supernumerary status to spend time observing and documenting the 
experiences of patients and then feeding this back to their colleagues. The idea 
of peer review is not new, and there are an increasing number of novel ways in 
which individuals are supported to reflect on their own and their colleagues’ 
practice (see for example Goodrich 2011; The Kings Fund 2011). Observational 
approaches have also been used to help staff to understand patient experience 
in context. A key example of this is in work around Dementia Care Mapping 
(Brooker 2005) although the majority of existing evaluation of this process 
relates to its impact on staff wellbeing rather than on issues around the 
observer and the impact of their own positionality on what they subjectively 
perceive in the person with dementia. 
 
Observational methods could be used for personal professional development, 
and the feedback process from this experience could be drawn upon to inform 
learning and feed into ongoing service improvement. This would serve to 
illuminate more subtle aspects of patient experience, as well as limit the amount 
of top-down regulation and monitoring. Observing patients is already 
established in other clinical and allied professional training, for example the 
psychodynamic training at the Tavistock Institute (The Tavistock and Portman 
NHS Foundation Trust 2016) yet is under-explored in the more conventional 
clinical professions such as nursing and medicine. The aim of utilising 
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observational methods as part of broader education (and socialisation) into 
nursing practice is to enable some new perspectives from the nurses who are 
ideally placed to be activists and advocates within the clinical setting.  
 
Staff could subsequently write a reflective piece based on their experiences of 
observation. For students, this could be integrated into the development of their 
portfolio required for registration with the NMC. For qualified nurses, such 
reflections could be included in the revalidation portfolio, as required since the 
changes in professional re-registration in the aftermath of the Francis Report 
(NMC 2015; 2015a).  
 
Of course, awareness of the limitations of power dynamics and the inhibitory 
impact of regulation will not suddenly liberate nurses to provide the care that 
they wish to, but the self-reference that results from reflexivity is an important 
step towards practice change. Individuals cannot easily transcend the social 
constructs that have led to their particular habitus and their stock of symbolic 
capital, but Bourdieu’s analysis challenges the structuralist notion that we are 
entirely at the mercy of our conditioning, and opens up the possibility for social 
change that results from reflexivity. This leads to my next suggestion which 
relates more directly to interactions between professionals in the context of 
acute hospital care.  
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10.3.2 Mapping ideologies to specialisms 
 
As already discussed, there are strong arguments in the literature over the last 
twenty years for the integration of palliative care into the hospital setting, both in 
the UK (Gardiner et al. 2011; Gott et al. 2013) and internationally (Pincombe et 
al. 2003; Bloomer et al. 2011; 2013) which is increasingly being translated into 
policies to guide practice (Thomas 2010; NHS England 2014; Department of 
Health 2015). But there continue to be examples of care that is lacking in 
compassion, particularly for older people at the end of life. The case has also 
been made for geriatric medicine and palliative medicine to work more closely 
together, as it has been suggested that each discipline can learn from the other 
in important ways that are likely to benefit the patient (Patterson et al. 2014, 
Albers et al. 2016). However, little has been written on the relationship between 
older person’s medicine and palliative care in the context of acute care and on 
the complex interplay between these three approaches.  
Ethical decision-making  
 
In 1978 Anselm Strauss described his popular theory of the ‘negotiated order’ of 
the hospital and demonstrated its influence on care (Strauss 1978; Degeling 
and Maxwell 2004). This remains the case; nurses continue to be attached to 
the ward and its routines, and to possess knowledge of patients and their 
families to which the medical staff are not privy. The physicians’ alliance is with 
the hospital more broadly; they work across several wards and are involved in 
teaching medical students within their specialisms. Strauss suggested that as 
such the hospital is merely a geographical site where different professions 
converge to carry out their work and although they may refer explicitly to holding 
a shared purpose of patient-centred care, this is frequently interpreted in 
diverse ways by the various individuals according to their identities. This 
apparent shared purpose masks a range of conflicts, and some of these have 
been described in this thesis. One of the key loci for conflict relates to decisions 
that need to be made when a person may be approaching the end of life, when 
they are no longer responding to active treatment or where such treatment is 
unacceptably burdensome. Such decisions are frequently ethically fraught, and 
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whilst moral frameworks such as Beauchamp and Childress principals (2008) 
can aid decision-making, these do not take into consideration subtle 
interpersonal processes such as power. Such approaches also presuppose a 
level of self-awareness regarding the nature of the ‘right’ thing to do in a context 
that is free from one’s own values, and free from the powerful forces of 
regulation and risk-aversion in practice. It is misleading to suggest that adopting 
ethical decision-making frameworks mitigates against subjectivism 
 
Approaches to improving compassionate care mean attending to personhood: 
what was the most appropriate goal of care for this person, at that particular 
point in their journey? How might the team have collectively and collaboratively 
avoided causing or worsening suffering? Particularly where patients lacked 
capacity to engage in this discussion and not have indicated any preferences, 
the difficulty of such decision could have been mitigated by attending to the 
context in which such decisions took place. The route to minimising patient 
suffering may not be obvious, particularly if it is at odds with the safety agenda. 
In some cases, the right thing was professionally counter-intuitive and yet in 
certain situations, the right thing may end up being the least harmful thing.  
 
Interprofessional disagreements regarding the most appropriate care are 
common, as evidenced both in this PhD study and within the broader literature. 
Many of the tensions described in chapter 5 spoke to the differences in capital 
between professionals involved in care, and loosely associated approaches to 
care with ideological positions and historical developments of clinical 
specialties. Agents in the field possessed different amounts of capital which 
were strongly related to their professional identity. Those with most capital were 
more likely to have their position adhered to by other players in the field, as this 
capital conferred on them a greater degree of power. This then informed actions 
taken in relation to care. Some clinical decisions were made not because they 
were medically or ethically ‘right’, but because the ultimate decision in the 
context of a multidisciplinary team discussion was a product of historical 
differences in capital possessed by the different members of the team. 
Furthermore, as shown in chapter 9, such actions could be constitutive of harm 
and could cause or exacerbate suffering in patients who were already 
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experiencing multiple obstacles to wellbeing. Adopting a particular approach to 
care could cause or increase suffering if it is informed by adherence to 
ideologies rather than patient-centred. I suggested in chapter 5 that over and 
above the social and cultural capital of the different healthcare professions there 
was a more powerful and diffuse source of capital in the form of managerial 
structures and regulatory bodies and that these often ultimately dictated the 
direction of care.  
 
An example of these kinds of difficult decisions is the identification of those 
patients who are at the end of life. As already described, at the beginning of this 
study when I spoke to the clinical team to identify which of the current patients 
they considered might be in the last months of life, I was told “none of them”. 
This was in spite of evidence that a significant proportion of hospital in-patients 
are likely to be in the last year of life, among these the majority are older people 
in acute wards (Clark et al. 2014). Of the eleven patients whose stories have 
been told in this thesis, all died within four months of my completing the 
fieldwork, most in the ward but three in other settings. As the implications of this 
attitude became clearer, I saw many ways in which treatment was offered or 
continued beyond the point of utility, and the implications that this had not only 
on patients but on their families and staff. This observation is not new and is an 
ongoing concern in the palliative care literature. Hospital deaths are so closely 
associated with adverse incidents that death continues to be seen as a failure of 
the system even where the person who has died had multiple chronic and life-
limiting conditions and death was predictable. Where death was predicted, this 
tended to be very close to the point of death, despite it being well established 
that early identification of deterioration can help to prepare patients and their 
loved ones, plan appropriate treatment, avoid iatrogenesis and facilitate 
transferral to the most appropriate place of death with adequate funding in 
place. This denial of patients being at the end of life has been explored in 
chapter 5 as the problematisation of the ‘rescue’ ideology, and is particularly 
problematic in the context of patients who have multiple comorbidities such that 
no clear prognostic indicators are available to facilitate clinicians to make such 
predictions.  
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Many existing suggestions in the literature for improving teamwork focus on 
training in interpersonal skills and collaborative working or focusing energy on 
developing rapport within the team. Other innovations such as Schwartz 
Rounds (Goodrich 2011) appear to help members of the team gain insight into 
the particular pressures and demands of other roles and enable mutual 
understanding so that members of the team can work towards shared goals 
with patients. However, these interventions lack an evidence base and there are 
structural barriers to their use on busy acute wards, primarily staff time and the 
opportunity to release key staff from duties. Yet multidisciplinary meetings 
happen regardless of how busy the ward is – they are embedded in the hospital 
routine and protected by policy – so there may be opportunities to consider how 
this existing structure might be utilised. 
 
Multidisciplinary meetings: current format 
 
Hospital teams in acute hospitals in the UK are expected to hold weekly 
multidisciplinary team (MDT) meetings to discuss issues such as investigations, 
treatments and communications. The Francis Report identified that the 
effectiveness of multidisciplinary working is a powerful influence on the 
development of shared plans of care. They cite from a current best practice 
document:  
“[Medical ward rounds] provide an opportunity for the 
multidisciplinary team to come together to review a patient’s 
condition and develop a coordinated plan of care, while 
facilitating full engagement of the patient and/or carers in making 
shared decisions about care. Additionally, ward rounds offer 
great opportunities for effective communication, information 
sharing and joint learning through active participation of all 
members of the multidisciplinary team” (Varo et al. 2012, p1) 
 
A ward round is a complex process of reviewing clinical care, and entails 
reviewing progress against the anticipated trajectory on the basis of history and 
other information. It is the place where decisions are made regarding future 
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care, and where plans for communicating this to the patient and their loved 
ones are clarified.  
 
Crucially, the MDT was perhaps the main opportunity to identify when a patient 
may be at risk of iatrogenesis and the potential place where decisions to pursue 
inappropriate interventions can be challenged. And yet there is still evidence 
that this does not happen, and the ideology of rescue is prioritised right until the 
last moment, with many dying patients not identified until the last hours of life. 
The MDT meeting offers a unique opportunity for intervention to minimise 
iatrogenesis. The current RCP / RCN guidance does not mention potential 
conflicts in care goals, nor does it mention decisions needing to be made 
regarding palliative or end of life care or of the need to withdraw or withhold 
treatments.  
 
The invisibility of end-of-life care in MDT discussions means there was no 
prompt to encourage staff to question the legitimacy and appropriateness of the 
interventions they were discussing. Although ‘ceilings of care’ were considered, 
these were not explicitly framed in terms of the patient reaching a point in their 
illness trajectory at which their disease was no longer amenable to curative 
intervention. When the needs of dying people are considered it is important to 
obtain detailed pictures of what these needs are throughout the dying trajectory, 
not just in the last days of life.  
 
This study identified that staff felt there were often multiple foci (which 
sometimes conflict) for team meetings: enabling them to be discharged was a 
primary goal, providing high quality safe care and a satisfactory clinical outcome 
was considered secondary to this. Some goals were associated with individuals’ 
specific profession, for example nurses in the study would refer to goals relating 
to medication and continence, occupational therapists specified particular tasks 
or activities, and so on.  
 
One way to change this current practice in order to open up a space for 
acknowledgement of the complexity of the kinds of patients cared for in such 
clinical settings would be to create a guiding structure for multidisciplinary ward 
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meetings. The present format for such meetings focused on the immediate 
tasks in hand relating to each individual patient. Decisions were informed by 
pathology results, professional opinions, family meetings and a range of other 
sources of information. Ultimately the accountability fell to the doctor in charge 
and the decisions related to avoiding risk and expediting discharge. A key 
element often missing from these discussions was an agreement about the 
overall goal of care for each patient (Baxter and Brumfitt 2008). 
Redesigning Multidisciplinary Discussions 
 
Two key elements frequently missing from MDT discussions that have been 
identified within this thesis as significant in impacting on suffering. The first is an 
opportunity to identify conflicting and contrasting goals of care, and the second 
is to agree when the efforts informed by one goal of care is no longer effective 
and a change in gear is indicated. Existing guidance in acute care relating to 
end of life care focuses upon care in the last few days of life. However, only one 
of the participants in this study fitted into this category – the rest were in the last 
weeks or months of their lives, as evidenced by the fact that every one of them 
had died within five months of the completion of the study, and yet none of them 
had been identified as ‘end of life’. Their journeys may have been very different 
had the MDT been agreed that they may be approaching the end of life.  
 
A structured approach to MDT discussions may make it possible for staff to 
acknowledge the personal impact of dealing with ambiguity and negotiating 
conflicting pressures, as a means of tackling the negative sequelae of moral 
distress in clinical practice. By refocusing team discussions on to the goals of 
care (rather than engage in discussions that emphasise professional conflict, 
draw on power, or highlight risk) the team may achieve a greater degree of 
cohesion and converge upon goals of care. 
 
The ideologies identified in chapter 5 could inform broad categories that dictate 
an overall approach to care, whilst acknowledging the complexity and likelihood 
of change that is common during the trajectory of a person’s hospital stay. 
Although rarely the case that patients adhere neatly to one picture or the other, 
there is nevertheless usually a primary goal that dictates care. A patient who is 
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suitable for rehabilitation can be identified as such during the MDT, and at the 
same time any unnecessary investigations can be discontinued. If the team 
were prompted to firstly agree on the current goal of care (with 
acknowledgement that this could change at any point) then subsequent 
decisions might be felt to be more coherent. For example, if a patient is felt by 
the team to be suitable for rescue, then decisions relating to their care can 
focus upon this goal and discussions of discharge can take a backstage 
position for the time being. If, however, a patient is deemed to be medically 
stable and for a rehabilitative approach, then the utility of continuing blood tests 
and other investigations ought to be questioned and the focus of clinical effort 
should be upon maximising independence and facilitating discharge to their 
chosen place of care. Finally, if the team agree that a patient may be dying, it is 
reasonable for them to have a discussion about what interventions remain 
valuable, who might be best placed to talk with their families, and whether 
moving them home or to another place of care is possible or desirable. 
Focusing the discussion on the goal of care rather than defaulting to dominant 
ideological positions may enable the team to question their approaches and to 
ensure that their focus remains patient-centred.  
 
The dominant ideology frequently dictates the focus of care even where there is 
evidence to contradict the argument that this is the most appropriate approach 
for a particular patient. The image below illustrates one example in which the 
broad framework relating to the ideologies can help to guide discussions about 
the goals of care. By way of example, three treatment choices have been 
superimposed on to the image to demonstrate how they can be seen as 
appropriate in one part of the model but would be possibly inappropriate 
elsewhere. Enteral feeding for a person considered to be at the end of life is 
one example of this. The schematic diagram (Fig 16) is not intended to be 
instructive but illustrative of the way in which clarifying the overall goal of care 
can naturally lead to ethical clarity about the right thing to do. 
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Figure 16: Goals of care 
 
 
This structure not only includes objective clinical data but also patient 
preferences such as a wish to discontinue treatment, or a perception of 
burdensome interventions. Such information may be derived from the patient, 
their families, or from staff who know the patient well. One of the findings of my 
study has been a remarkable lack of involvement of family members in the 
ongoing provision of care. Their involvement came into play when critical 
decisions needed to be made (such as withdrawing treatment, as in Ellen’s 
situation, or commencing on a syringe driver, as with Paul). However, in terms 
of the overall goals of care, there was little indication about what the patient or 
their families considered to be in their long-term interest in the wider context of 
their lives outside the ward. Incorporating wider perspectives of patients and 
families into this decision-making process 
 
One potential objection to this is the time that would be taken to gather these 
perspectives, coupled with a concern that families are not clinically trained. 
However, they were already being asked to make decisions when situations 
become emotionally fraught – a much more difficult process – so although this 
would be something of a cultural shift, it would potentially facilitate decision-
making in those overlapping areas between ideological approaches. Some 
patients and families will want everything doing, others will want to be left alone 
and for nature to take its course. Some will prioritise being at home over 
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accurate diagnosis of clinical conditions, while others will find the hospital 
environment reassuring and comforting. Utilising patient and family preferences 
in this way in the MDT meeting need not be tokenistic, nor should it form a 
vague background context against an overall medicalised decision-making 
pathway. It has the potential to enhance understanding about elements relating 
to each individual patient that can impact on the processes and outcomes. 
 
The areas of overlap of all three domains is the area where iatrogenesis is a 
risk. Here, the team can be prompted to identify whether there are any 
additional sources of information or insight that might nudge the direction of 
care in one direction or the other, for example a discussion with the patient 
and/or their family may be scheduled, or a nurse who knows the patient 
particularly well might be asked for their professional opinion.  
 
MDT discussions could be guided not by each professional taking it in turn to 
offer their opinion on a particular patient, but by a facilitator asking at the outset 
what the agreed priority of care is for that patient at that time, and then 
reviewing – having heard the evidence from the different professionals present 
– whether this is still felt to be appropriate. Exploring whether this might work 
would involve the development of a decision-making tool, ideally in collaboration 
with patients and families, that would then be piloted in an MDT context to see if 
it was found to be helpful in clarifying goals of care. One method of evaluating 
such an intervention would be to document changes of direction that result from 
MDT discussion, as well as to record all instances of treatments felt to be 
inappropriate or futile.  
Acknowledging uncertainty 
 
Healthcare professionals face a range of uncertainties during their education 
and subsequent socialisation into practice. Much of this relates to what has 
been described as a growing sense of awareness of the limitations of personal 
and professional knowledge (Fox 1980) or for nurses, an increasing sense of 
the ethical dimensions of clinical practice in an ever-more medicalised 
healthcare environment (Weaver et al. 2008; Van Der Zande et al. 2014). It has 
been suggested that clinical uncertainty can cause ambivalence and lead to 
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professionals demonstrating increased tendencies towards goal-orientated 
approaches to care (Timmermans and Angell 2001; Spafford et al. 2007) in 
which ambiguous elements of the clinical scenario are treated as problems.  
 
The real-world context of uncertainty is what has recently prompted 
development of the Amber Care Bundle, a planning and decision-making tool 
that recognises the complexity of treatment planning in cases of uncertain 
prognosis such as haematological malignancies (Etkind et al. 2014; Bristowe et 
al. 2015; Carey et al. 2015) although perhaps unsurprisingly, research into the 
utility of the tool has slowed since the withdrawal of the Liverpool Care Pathway 
and the resultant ambivalence around tools to aid end-of-life care decision-
making. The schematic diagram above could be used as the foundation for the 
development of a decision-making tool aimed at use during MDT discussions, 
one that recognises clinical uncertainty and enables the focus of discussion to 
be guided by the overall goal of avoiding inflicting suffering, rather than the all-
too-common default goal of patient safety and risk-avoidance. The schematic 
goals of care diagram recognises clinical uncertainty and may offer guidance to 
avoid iatrogenic suffering. Future research could explore implementation of 
these innovations, drawing on a broad range of approaches to evaluation to 
examine their impact on staff attitudes and interprofessional working, diversion 
of potentially iatrogenic interventions and recreation of potentially iatrogenic 
environments.  
10.4 Final Reflections 
Reflections on the Francis Report: safety and compassion 
 
During the fieldwork, the Francis Report was mentioned several times. The 
matron informed me that she was usually quick to approve requests for 
additional staffing “on the back of Francis” because “it needs to fit in with RCN 
recommendations”. But whilst the dominant message in the Francis Report is 
one of enhancing patient safety (the word ‘safety’ appears over 300 times in 
Part 3 of the report) whilst recommendations around compassion are slightly 
less clear (‘compassion’ appears 33 times). The primary message of the Francis 
Report centres upon patient safety. Many recent changes in practice reflect this, 
   293 
as do such attitudes as the Matron’s interpretation that “it is all about the 
safety”. Yet the Inquiry was initiated because of a group of relatives who were 
unhappy about the ways in which their loved ones died, the lack of 
communication they received and the dismissive way in which they felt treated. 
The inquiry was catalysed when these relatives approached the media with their 
stories; and the stories were tales of suffering and lack of compassion within the 
system, not explicitly about safety. It is the subsequent analysis and 
interpretation that safety has been foregrounded to this extent.  
 
My first reflection regarding the Francis Report relates to this overarching focus 
on safety – whilst evidently a vital component of a healthcare system that cares 
for people at vulnerable times of their lives - inadvertently omits the needs of the 
people who were most at risk of poor care. This thesis has demonstrated that 
often, patient suffering can go unnoticed in the busy environment of the hospital 
ward. Further, by attending to inspections, incidents and complaints as the 
primary sources of data on the quality of care means that the kinds of suffering 
described in these pages can easily go unseen. Recommendations for medical 
training again focuses primarily on team leadership, patient safety and other 
aspects of quality (but does not explicitly mention compassion, or ethical 
decision-making. This implies that compassion is solely the domain of the 
nursing staff, who are advised to spend three months working in direct patient 
care prior to entry into nursing training, evidence their compassion and care 
through a learning portfolio, and systematise contact with patients through 
regular ward rounds. The fundamental standards of behaviour were to be built 
into job descriptions and values-based recruitment for attributes including 
integrity, empathy, resilience, team-working and situational judgment tests.  
 
A further reflection is the assumption as to the nature of culture. Changing 
culture is addressed within the report’s 290 recommendations through two main 
avenues: managerial structures, and individual responsibility. Whilst the report 
claimed to have identified that a key concern in Mid Staffordshire was the fact 
that there was a “culture focused on doing the system’s business – not that of 
the patients” (Francis 2013b, p4) it appears that many of their recommendations 
risk perpetuating this practice through a failure to address the complexity of 
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healthcare culture. An emphasis of the report is upon changing to a ‘common’ 
healthcare culture to one which is more compassionate, and in which each 
individual shares the goal of putting the patient first. However, there is little 
explanation of what constitutes a culture, nor of the existence of multiple 
cultures and subcultures that constitute the field of care that I observed in this 
study. Assumptions as to the existence of a singular, cohesive culture 
presupposes that individuals possess equivalent agency when it comes to 
creating and sustaining compassionate environments of care. I have shown that 
different professionals possess different degrees of agency in different context 
and certain actions were much more readily permitted if they fit within the 
overall ideological approach of the ward. Even though the stated goal of the 
report was to transcend previously existing ‘cultures of fear’ that arose through 
individuals feeling beholden to achieving targets, the new recommendations 
simply provided a new set of targets, albeit more explicitly focused on patient-
centred care, but which did not address the core issue of staff feeling under 
pressure from regulatory processes. 
 
The most recent review of nursing in the aftermath of the Francis Report 
proposed that nurses adhere to six core values and that (in conjunction with the 
professional code of nursing ethics) would provide guidance at difficult times. 
This thesis has argued that regardless of the ethical imperative of nursing, the 
dominant policy directive with regards to patient-centred care, and the national 
publicity relating to compassionate care, there are forces at work in this 
institutional setting which had far more influence on daily practices than any 
external guidance or directive. To this end, enhancing the quality of person-
centred care needs to focus upon making this internal reality apparent to those 
outside. The field of the ward, the doxa and habitus of practitioners and the 
comparative jostling for capital that takes place between social groups in these 
overlapping fields all influence patient experience.  
 
Practical compassion often involves a person doing something to another 
person. A report on the progress of the 6C’s campaign in nursing highlighted 
through the use of numerous quotes and case examples the ‘little things’ (Smith 
2008) that nurses often feel constitute compassionate care - rearranging pillows 
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to facilitate comfort, providing a drink, personalising a care plan and the like 
(NHS England / Nursing Directorate 2013). However, this restricts the notion to 
the purely visible aspects of compassion and speaks to the broader political 
imperative of encouraging aspects of care that can be measured, under the 
broader umbrella of clinical governance (Department of Health 2015). Simply 
feeling for another person’s experience (usually conceptualised as empathy) is 
insufficient for the current institutional requirements of care. Also required are 
the skills to recognise a range of manifestations of suffering, and the 
empowerment and interprofessional insight required to challenge situations in 
which organisational, cultural or institutional priorities take precedence over 
patient-centred ones. Finally, unless staff feel themselves to be working in a 
compassionate environment themselves, then it appears less likely that they will 
be enabled to recognise and act on the suffering of their patients. The risks of 
compassion fatigue and burnout are extensively addressed within the literature 
and the sheer volume of exposure to suffering as happens in this kind of 
healthcare environment can have a deleterious impact on the emotional 
wellbeing of staff unless they themselves feel supported (Sabo 2006; Slocum-
Gori et al. 2013). 
 
Reflections on observational research 
 
The methods used in this study required an arduous process of ethical approval 
which I reflected upon in chapter 3. It is worth revisiting this to reflect upon how 
we might learn from what has been discovered about the risks and benefits of 
using observational methods in this way. The risks highlighted by the panel 
related to the vulnerability of patients to distress and indignity, and the potential 
for the terminology of the study to cause concern for patients. Potential benefits 
of the study were not really a consideration during the ethical approval process. 
In retrospect, benefits of such studies could feature more prominently in 
consideration of providing balanced ethical opinions. Benefits could be identified 
for both staff and patients, as well as for myself. For staff, my presence on the 
ward - whilst occasionally challenging and uncomfortable - offered opportunities 
to reflect out loud about a range of difficult ethical situations, such as when the 
dietician wished to discuss the issue of feeding tubes for people with dementia, 
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or where a new registrar commented that “we never usually think about this kind 
of stuff” after we talked about the study over lunch one day.  
 
A further benefit related to staff perceptions of wider opinion relating to the 
nature of the work that they did. There were many examples where staff made a 
point of telling me about their shift or about particularly difficult experiences, this 
was sometimes appended by a comment about what ‘they’ think geriatric 
nursing or medicine actually involves. It was not always clear who ‘they’ might 
be; it might refer to hospital management seeing the ward as a ‘Cinderella 
service’ (Kydd and Wild 2013) or to relatives who express concerns about poor 
care based on opinion received via the media, or to clinical staff working in 
other more acute and more popular areas. For patients, benefits were varied. It 
was clear that some found my presence a break from solitude, particularly those 
who were in side-rooms. The majority of informal conversations which have 
formed the bulk of the raw data were initiated by patients, not prompted by 
myself. Talking sometimes seemed to enable venting of difficult emotions. 
 
Research into the potential benefits of participation in observational studies is 
sparse but might provide useful supporting information for researcher wishing to 
undertake similar studies in the future. I have already discussed the importance 
of inclusion of vulnerable populations in the research literature, in order to 
ensure that their voices (or proxy) are considered in the development of policy - 
particularly as they form the majority of people who are affected by the kinds of 
issues raised in investigative reports that follow complaints about poor care. 
This would address the imbalance in the research literature that sees the bulk of 
research on suffering at the end of life as being conducted through interviews 
and surveys with relatively well and cognisant participants. The most vulnerable 
patients who are at greatest risk of being affected by issues relating to care are 
the least likely to participate in such studies. As such there is an ethical 
imperative towards inclusivity and representativeness.  
10.5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis has drawn a picture of events taking place over a single summer on 
a single ward in a UK hospital, drawing on the experiences of eleven key 
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patients. Although findings are not generalisable, the analysis has added to our 
understanding of the experiences of dying or acutely unwell older people in 
hospital. An account of suffering experiences has been presented, alongside 
perspectives of those responsible for diagnosing, treating and caring for those 
people. Clinical practice has been located within social, cultural, political and 
philosophical contexts, drawing on Bourdieu to view these worlds in a relational 
rather than a structural way.  
 
Compassion is both relational and contextual. Whilst not wishing to demean 
interventions such as communication skills training, transactional leadership, 
and ward-based practice-developments that focus on patient-centredness, I 
suggest that we might also consider helping healthcare professionals become 
reflexively aware of the complexities of the culture of the healthcare 
environment, the subtle and easy-to-ignore manifestations of suffering in older 
people, and their own ideologically informed preferences for care through 
drawing on Bourdieu’s theoretical perspectives regarding social action. The 
purpose of adopting these theories has been to engage in the task of 
uncovering some of the hidden workings of habitus, which for Bourdieu 
constitutes a form of sociological analysis that offered insight into why things 
were the way they were, particularly in relation to the place of social actors in 
the society in which they exist. This has been useful both in terms of the health 
and social care professionals who occupy distinct but overlapping fields within 
the hospital. It has also suggested some explanations for the kinds of 
responses to suffering that were observed in the participants, as well as insight 
into why these responses varied so widely and why this is an important finding 
for understanding why recognising suffering is not as simple as diagnosing a 
physiological dysfunction.  
 
My recommendations are aimed at making changes to practice that might 
enable an approach to care that prioritises the actual or potential suffering of the 
patient. The majority of suffering was psychosocial and embodied in nature, 
rarely relating directly to physical aspects of their conditions but almost always 
associated with existential aspects of experience. This is a key finding and 
challenges existing assumptions in the healthcare literature about the 
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predominance of concerns about symptoms for people in the last months of life. 
Much suffering was found to be iatrogenic, whether via interactions with staff, 
clinical interventions, or the environment. There are numerous ways in which 
this kind of suffering could be addressed with simple interventions.  
 
Cassell’s work continues to impress upon generations of clinicians the need for 
a refocusing upon personhood within the practice of medicine. And yet four 
decades on there is still no sign that medicine is any closer to addressing the 
roots of human suffering, as attested to by the narratives within this thesis as 
well as countless other first-person accounts and research studies. One reason 
for this is that the central thrust of Cassell’s argument is a humanitarian one; he 
urges doctors to focus upon the person in front of them and to consider the 
therapeutic role of medicine as strengthening of this relationship. But his 
argument does not take into consideration the limiting impact of the wider 
healthcare environment, constituted as it is of public expectations, institutional 
requirements, and broader political pressures. These have been shown 
repeatedly to exert strong pressure on clinicians that can inhibit any natural 
inclination towards person-centred care. 
 
Returning to the first aspect of my definition of compassion in chapter 1 - the 
ability to recognise suffering – chapters 6 and 7 illuminated some of the 
complexity of the concept and described ways in which suffering remains 
inchoate, despite efforts to quantify, reduce and theorise. These chapters lead 
to a critique regarding the extent to which the stated goal of palliative care -
recognition and alleviation of suffering - can be achieved in the ward 
environment. chapter 8 examined theoretical aspects of suffering to illustrate 
the porosity of theoretical perspectives on suffering between disciplines. These 
chapters led me to suggest that recognising suffering is not a simple process 
and that compassion may be thwarted right at the beginning of the process 
simply by virtue of the fact that the manifestation of suffering is too subtle, too 
complex, too intangible for staff to identify it clearly as a problem in need of 
addressing.  
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The second part of the definition – motivation to alleviate suffering – has been 
addressed by examining ways in which suffering does not belong to any one 
professional domain, and as such remains in peripheral vision as physical 
clinical problems are preferentially addressed. chapter 5 explored a range of 
competing pressures that shape staff priorities including regulatory 
requirements, patient safety needs, and the ubiquitous pressure on hospital 
beds necessitating rapid throughput of patients with little time to get to know 
them. Chapter 9 also addressed this issue by considering the phenomenon of 
iatrogenic suffering, and describing ways in which some of the practices that 
contributed to patient suffering were generated by the interactions, interventions 
and environment of the hospital but because they were constitutive of habitus 
they were largely pre-reflective; staff were not always aware of the suffering 
being caused by the well-intentioned actions of care. 
 
The final part of the definition – having the resources to act – was explored in 
chapter 5 through adopting Bourdieu’s concepts in order to illustrate that staff 
may not always possess the necessary capital to enable them to bring about 
particular compassionate actions. Professional differences in social and cultural 
capital have led to individual staff members lacking the required power to step 
outside the taken-for-granted way of doing things that is dictated by 
management, and to a lesser extent by the leading clinicians. Even where 
suffering is recognised and where staff have sufficient time and motivation to act 
they may still fail to do so on account of these forces. The overarching 
dominance of social and symbolic capital contained within the practices of 
hospital management structures inhibited any activity that was not explicitly 
directed towards explicit goals of these higher structures. Institutional and 
organisational forces have created and reinforced a culture of compliance. Staff 
members were under surveillance to such a degree that it became embodied 
and transformed into self-surveillance. This has created a set of priorities that 
focus upon efficiency and safety, and providing compassionate care is often 
placed in opposition, or at a lower level of priority, to these requirements.  
 
As long as hospitals are driven by economic and bureaucratic goals, and the 
lesser goal of compassionate care remains rhetorical rather than fundamental, 
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suffering will continue to go unrecognised in this and similar environments of 
care. Suffering is a part of the human condition, particularly when a person is 
approaching the end of their life. The palliative care goal of alleviating suffering 
at this time is admirable but (I would suggest) unachievable. A more realistic 
goal might be to understand that suffering is present and often unavoidable, and 
to seek to identify any potential for iatrogenesis that can cause or compound 
suffering. Central to this is understanding the difference between unavoidable 
suffering, suffering that is amenable to intervention, and suffering that is a 
consequence of care. Compassion requires that a patient’s suffering is 
recognised and that there are sufficient resources to respond appropriately. This 
is an ethical and a moral activity, not a bureaucratic one. A market-led 
healthcare system requires a profound change of direction if care is indeed to 
become more compassionate. In some small way, I hope that this thesis can 
contribute to change needed to protect older people’s quality of life in the last 
precious weeks and months of life. For those of us with the honour and privilege 
of witnessing those final months, I hope that the stories herein will act as a 
reminder of the humanistic imperative of care. 
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Appendix 1 – HRA and R&D Ethical 
Approval 
A Research Ethics Committee established by the Health Research Authority 
 
 
NRES Committee Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West 
Room 001, Jarrow Business Centre 
Rolling Mill Road 
Jarrow 
Tyne and Wear 
NE32 3DT 
 
Telephone: 0191 428 3387 
27 November 2014 
 
Mrs Laura Middleton-Green 
PhD Candidate, Lecturer in palliative and end-of-life care 
University of Bradford 
Division of Nursing, School of Health Studies 
Richmond Road 
Bradford 
West Yorkshire 
BD3 9LE 
 
 
Dear Mrs Middleton-Green  
 
Study Title: A qualitative exploration of healthcare professionals' 
recognition of suffering in patients at the end of life in 
the acute hospital setting 
REC reference: 14/YH/1208 
IRAS project ID: 149773 
 
The Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on 14 
November 2014. Thank you for attending to discuss the application. 
 
Provisional opinion 
 
The Committee would be content to give a favourable ethical opinion of the research, subject 
to receiving a complete response to the request for further information set out below. 
 
Authority to consider your response and to confirm the Committee’s final opinion has been 
delegated to a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the REC consisting of Dr Sheila Fisher, Dr 
Jane Orton and Ms Sarah Kirkland. 
 
Further information or clarification required 
 
1. Submission of any peer reviews which have been undertaken for this study. 
 
2. Clarification regarding whether private behaviours and care undertaken behind a 
curtain, for example, would be observed or not. If they would be, a simple consent 
form for patients and visitors to consent to this (or consultees to give advice if a 
patient lacks capacity) should be submitted. 
 
3. Clarification regarding who would transcribe the interviews. 
 
4. Submission of the posters and leaflets to be used in this study. 
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A Research Ethics Committee established by the Health Research Authority 
 
 
NRES Committee Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West 
Room 001, Jarrow Business Centre 
Rolling Mill Road 
Jarrow 
Tyne and Wear 
NE32 3DT 
 
Telephone: 0191 428 3387 
30 January 2015 
 
Mrs Laura Middleton-Green 
PhD Candidate, Lecturer in palliative and end-of-life care 
Division of Nursing, School of Health Studies 
University of Bradford 
Richmond Road 
Bradford 
West Yorks 
BD3 9LE 
 
 
Dear Mrs Middleton-Green  
 
Study title: A qualitative exploration of healthcare professionals' 
recognition of suffering in patients at the end of life in 
the acute hospital setting 
REC reference: 14/YH/1208 
IRAS project ID: 149773 
 
Thank you for your letter of 26 January 2015, responding to the Committee’s request for 
further information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the HRA website, 
together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier than three months from the 
date of this favourable opinion letter.  The expectation is that this information will be published 
for all studies that receive an ethical opinion but should you wish to provide a substitute 
contact point, wish to make a request to defer, or require further information, please contact 
the REC Manager, Miss Sarah Grimshaw, nrescommittee.yorkandhumber-
leedswest@nhs.net. Under very limited circumstances (e.g. for student research which has 
received an unfavourable opinion), it may be possible to grant an exemption to the publication 
of the study.  
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 
I confirm that the committee has approved this research project for the purposes of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. The committee is satisfied that the requirements of section 31 of the Act 
will be met in relation to research carried out  as part of this project on, or in relation to, a 
person who lacks capacity to consent to taking part in the project.  
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A Research Ethics Committee established by the Health Research Authority 
 
 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee 
Room 001, Jarrow Business Centre 
Rolling Mill Road 
Jarrow 
Tyne and Wear 
NE32 3DT 
 
Tel: 0207 104 8087 
 
12 July 2016 
 
Mrs Laura Middleton-Green 
PhD Candidate, Lecturer in palliative and end-of-life care 
University of Bradford 
Division of Nursing, School of Health Studies 
University of Bradford 
Richmond Road 
Bradford 
West Yorkshire 
BD3 9LE 
 
 
Dear Mrs Middleton-Green 
 
Study title: A qualitative exploration of healthcare professionals' 
recognition of suffering in patients at the end of life in the 
acute hospital setting 
REC reference: 14/YH/1208 
Amendment number: SA02 
Amendment date: 27 May 2016 
IRAS project ID: 149773 
 
The above amendment was reviewed by the Sub-Committee in correspondence. 
 
Summary of amendment 
 
This amendment was submitted to seek approval for the use of photographs within the 
student's thesis. Photographs would not contain any identifiable information.  
 
Ethical opinion 
 
The members of the Committee taking part in the review gave a favourable ethical opinion 
of the amendment on the basis described in the notice of amendment form and supporting 
documentation. 
 
The Sub-Committee queried how the presence of a person with a camera in a care 
environment would be managed to ensure that patients and relatives did not feel 
uncomfortable. 
 
Ms Laura Middleton-Green, Chief Investigator, confirmed that he photographs would be 
retrospective - the environment had not changed since the study and since none of the 
photographs would be of people, she believed they would still be of use in the project.  For 
example, Ms Middleton-Green stated that the design of the ward was found to strongly 
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A Research Ethics Committee established by the Health Research Authority 
 
 
 
Yorkshire & The Humber - Leeds West Research Ethics Committee 
Jarrow Business Centre 
Rolling Mill Road 
Jarrow 
NE32 3DT 
 
Tel: 0207 104 8117 
 
28 July 2017 
 
Mrs Laura Middleton-Green 
PhD Candidate, Lecturer in palliative and end-of-life care 
Division of Nursing, School of Health Studies 
University of Bradford 
Richmond Road 
Bradford 
West Yorkshire 
BD3 9LE 
 
 
Dear Mrs Middleton-Green  
 
Study Title: A qualitative exploration of healthcare professionals' 
recognition of suffering in patients at the end of life in 
the acute hospital setting 
REC reference: 14/YH/1208 
IRAS project ID: 149773 
 
Thank you for sending the progress report for the above study dated 15 March 2017. The 
report will be reviewed by the Chair of the Research Ethics Committee, and I will let you 
know if any further information is requested. 
 
The favourable ethical opinion for the study continues to apply for the duration of the 
research as agreed by the REC.  
 
14/YH/1208:     Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Rheanneon Fuller 
REC Assistant 
 
E-mail: nrescommittee.yorkandhumber-leedswest@nhs.net 
 
Copy to: Ms Jennifer Bellamy, University of Bradford 
Mr Lesley Argyle, Huddersfield Royal Infirmary 
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Appendix 2 - Ethics: A Reflection  
In this appendix I consider the primary concerns raised by the ethics panel. I will 
then discuss two situations that arose in the course of the fieldwork. Through an 
exploration of the ethical issues that they invoked, I argue that the current 
structure and format of the Research Ethics Committee approval process, whilst 
offering important safeguards for vulnerable research participants, does not 
attend to the situated ethical dilemmas that arise in the day-to-day practice of 
observational research. Indeed, such bureaucratic processes often present 
serious obstacles to undertaking research with, on and for the most vulnerable 
members of our society. By offering an insight into the daily practice of 
undertaking observational research in clinical settings, this paper offers a 
researcher’s perspective on situated ethics in the hope that it may serve to 
education REC panel members regarding the subtle nuances of observational 
research.  
 
The ethical concerns expressed by the panel related to three key points; (1) the 
protection of participants likely to lose capacity to consent to be observed (2) 
the use of the word ’suffering’ which was considered to be inappropriate (the 
panel requested that it be replaced with the term “non-physical distress”) (3) 
whether or not the study would be able to achieve its aims through observing 
less vulnerable participants. I argue that abstract research ethics standards as 
regulated by the United Kingdom’s Research Ethics Committees (RECs) offer 
little support with regards to the everyday ethical and moral dilemmas arising 
during the course of the study.  
 
Suffering was a problematic word for the panel. They voiced concern that it was 
a leading term, poorly-defined, and perhaps more poorly understood. I 
attempted to explain that this was precisely the reason for choosing to research 
it, yet the panel insisted on the use of clearer terms. Their suggestion was that 
all participant documentation be amended to state the object of research 
as “non-physical distress”. When I was explaining the study I readily used the 
word ‘suffering’ with both staff and patients/relatives. I did not perceive any 
instance of the use of the word itself as causing suffering. I was asked several 
times for clarification of what was meant by “non-physical needs”, to which I 
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responded that it was a “bit like suffering”. The latter was more readily 
understood. 
 
Concerns regarding day-today ethical decision-making were not voiced by the 
panel. The REC was satisfied by my explanation that I would intervene in a 
clinical situation if there was a risk of harm, in accordance with the professional 
code of conduct to which I adhere. They referred to my clinical experience as a 
palliative care clinical nurse specialist as adequate assurance that all 
communication around potentially distressing topics would be managed 
sensitively. “You have ample experience of talking about difficult things with 
dying people so we are reassured of your sensitivity to the population.” I 
suggest that the assumption that my relevant clinical background automatically 
leads me to be an “ethical” researcher is problematic. Further, I suggest that the 
processes adopted by the panel did not mitigate against some of the key ethical 
issues that arose.   
 
“Ellen” (discussed in Chapters 5 and 7) was admitted to Bluebell ward with 
a suspected brain-stem stroke, against a backdrop of end-stage heart failure 
and worsening kidney function. I could see that she was dying, yet over a period 
of five days she was intensively treated. Medically, the goal was to achieve the 
fine balance between encouraging her ailing heart to rid itself of the pressure of 
fluid building up in her lungs and the interstitial spaces in her bodily tissues, 
without putting so much pressure on the delicate microcirculation of her kidneys 
that they become unable to filter and rid the body of the excess fluid. No clinical 
professional had spoken to her family about her imminent death, yet I heard 
numerous corridor conversations in which staff shared their suspicions that she 
was dying. The family were keen for all treatment to continue to give her the 
best possible chance of survival. “Harm” was difficult to define in this case; by 
intervening and prompting the clinicians to recognise dying and act accordingly, 
I risked undermining the nursing staff. By empowering the nurses to discuss this 
with the medical team I risked aligning myself with one professional group and 
alienating myself from another. Ellen was unconscious, and the question of 
whether or not she was ‘suffering’ was a matter of opinion. Certainly, her family 
were suffering, and their imminent bereavement is likely to have been 
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influenced by the manner of Ellen’s death, the extent to which they would have 
been able to say goodbye. Most importantly by intervening I would be making a 
clinical decision and changing the course of her dying, which clearly fell outside 
the scope of my responsibility. To a non-clinical external observer, the hospital 
was acting in expected ways - seeking to rescue the patient from the jaws of 
death. The risk of harms that I perceived were professionally defined. The 
debate around withholding and withdrawing treatment at the end of life is a 
complex one, and certainly by intervening here I would have been clearly 
positioning myself as though there is a “right” way to act in such a situation.  
 
In the second example, “Mary” had consented to participate in the study. At this 
time, she was unwell and in the last weeks of life. The very act of breathing 
exhausted her on account of her failing heart; she woke from long periods of 
sleep to speak, only occasionally, in gasping and laboured single words. She 
told me she had been feeling “rather poorly” but that she was getting as much 
rest as she could to help her body get stronger. As days went on, her body 
ailed. Her son visited and I sat with him as the doctor explained to him that her 
death was near. She was in a shared bay with three other patients, one of 
whom was a lively woman with dementia. Staff were unable to move her to a 
quieter room and he was angry at her lack of privacy. He requested that I cease 
observations and destroy the data I had gathered up to that point. This was 
deeply challenging as the patient had consented for me to use the data, even if 
she were to subsequently lose the capacity to consent. I had spoken with her 
son as Consultee at the point at which she lost capacity. Given the emotionally 
charged nature of the conversation it was inappropriate for me to discuss in any 
depth the consent that she had given, nor to show him the signed consent form. 
I withdrew from subsequent observations and destroyed the detailed data on 
the few conversations and observations I had made about Mary’s situation up 
until that point. Yet I could not shake the sense that I had betrayed her in some 
way, given that she had been so keen for me to include her in the study, and 
also that she had spent so much of her valuable last days talking to me about 
her life. 
 
The fact that a project has received approval does not necessarily indicate that 
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the subsequent research will be ethical. RECs were originally established to 
safeguard the process of biomedical research, including testing of drugs and 
medical interventions, following the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA year). The 
expansion of qualitative research methods within healthcare means that these 
panels play a key role in approving studies that may have more flexible 
research questions and approaches to the data. A core tenet of many 
qualitative research methods is that they are inductive; that is, that they enable 
the study to evolve according to ongoing findings.  
Concern 1: Vulnerable participants  
 
Historically, the needs of doubly vulnerable groups of patients are ascertained 
through consulting proxies such as family members, or through interviewing 
staff such as nurses regarding the perceived barriers to care. Yet neither of 
these is satisfactory as both approaches are potentially biased through the self-
interest of proxies. According to Moore and Miller (1999) “some research 
questions can only be answered by members of a vulnerable group” (p1034). 
 
Yet concerns are often voiced in research about vulnerable participants feeling 
under pressure to participate in research. People approaching the end of life 
who are hospital inpatients are considered to be “doubly vulnerable by virtue of 
the fact that they are seriously unwell and in an unfamiliar environment. Some 
patients who lack capacity to consent are often thought to be at risk of harm 
through being involved in research. NHS Ethics Panels are particularly alert to 
the potential for harm for such people and there are numerous observational 
studies where people without capacity were intentionally excluded because of 
the perceived barriers to undertaking the research (Borgstrom 2014).  
 
This is a flawed assumption on two counts. Firstly, it is underpinned by a 
paternalistic assumption in relation to participants' agency. Particularly where 
the research itself does not involve an intervention and the researcher is not 
otherwise involved in care provision for the patient, then even the most 
vulnerable of participants are able to appraise their own agenda for becoming 
and remaining involved in the study. Secondly, there is an assumption that the 
research process is burdensome in its own right, and yet there is ample 
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evidence as to the therapeutic nature of being afforded an opportunity to speak 
or to otherwise express oneself, particularly in a healthcare environment as 
busy as an acute hospital ward where such chances are rare. The focus on 
avoidance of ethical harm can obscure the wider purpose of research which is 
to do good. 
 
The Declaration of Helsinki states that "groups that are under-represented in 
research should be provided appropriate access to participation in research" 
(Item 13), and furthermore that "research with a vulnerable group is only 
justified if the research is responsive to the health needs or priorities of this 
group and the research cannot be carried out in a non-vulnerable group" (Polit 
and Beck 2004). Doubly vulnerable participants are frequently excluded from 
research on account of perceived intractable ethical issues (Takesaka et al. 
2004) , yet are arguably at greater risk of experiencing unrecognised suffering if 
unable to verbally express their needs. Research asking palliative care patients 
about their views on participating in research has identified that concerns that it 
is harmful for patients who are dying to take part in research are usually 
unjustified, as long as sensitive and flexible research protocols are adopted 
(Gysels et al. 2006; 2012; 2013). 
 
Concern 2: Intrusion 
 
The layout of this hospital ward is in bays of between four and seven beds, with 
two side rooms. Most patients can be seen by anyone passing through the bay, 
so it should be possible to undertake observation of the entire ward without any 
undue intrusion. Indeed, many Trusts use observation as an approach to clinical 
governance. However, it was also necessary to observe care ‘behind the 
curtain’, as this greater proximity may provide insight into the range of care 
given. It is imperative that the patient's dignity is upheld despite their having to 
undergo such interventions. A study by Billings (2009) asked older patients in 
hospitals what sorts of things made them feel as though their dignity and 
privacy were not being respected. Interestingly they did not report that the 
number of HCPs that they encounter during their stay impacts upon their sense 
of dignity or privacy, or that being observed was felt to be invasive. Sources of 
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distress that were identified included being patronised, left on commodes or in 
soiled beds for extended periods of time, treated as though they were causing 
disgust or aversion, or addressed in inappropriate terms. 
 
Concern 3: Distress: cause and effect 
 
Patients may be distressed for a number of reasons. I did not want to add to this 
through my presence itself being a contributory factor. If there is any indication 
that observation of a patient is causing distress, whether to the patient or their 
relatives, I will immediately withdraw completely from the observation. However, 
it is anticipated that the patient may exhibit signs of suffering which relate to 
their actual situation, rather than to the fact that their situation is being 
observed. I would endeavour to respond sensitively to any indication that my 
presence is causing distress.  
 
One of the key concerns of the Ethics committee was in how I would manage 
distress arising in the course of my study. This was a topic of much discussion. I 
emphasised that the focus of the study is on suffering and so I anticipated that I 
would be highly likely to witness distress. I was keen to distinguish between 
distress arising from the patient's situation, and distress arising from my 
presence as an observer.  
 
The committee were also keen to know that I would not ask insensitive 
questions or mention anything that could worsen suffering. To this end, they 
requested that I re-word the participant information sheets to read “non-physical 
needs” in place of ‘suffering’, despite my attempts to explain that these are not 
synonymous.  
 
The committee seemed reassured by my professional status as a clinical nurse 
specialist (CNS) in palliative care, and by my additional training in advanced 
communication skills. I was intrigued that these were considered to be 
applicable to this context. I felt it was highly unlikely that I would be engaged in 
the types of conversations that I might have undertaken as a CNS and that 
becoming involved in this way might have impacted on the reliability of the 
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research as I stepped outside one role and into another. Nonetheless, the 
committee were content to grant approval on this foundation. 
 
Concern 4: Replacing ‘suffering' with ‘non-physical needs’ 
 
The revisions that took the longest based on the feedback from the Ethics 
Review Panel were those relating to the wording on the Participant Information 
Sheets. Changes included amending the wording from ‘suffering’ to “non-
physical needs” despite an attempt by me to explain why these terms are far 
from synonymous.  
 
The Ethics Committee Panel involved some discussion about the use of the 
word ‘suffering’ in the participant information sheets. After some debate, I 
agreed to re-word the sheets to read “non-physical needs” in place of suffering. 
Although this felt like a departure from what I was seeking to research, the 
panel considered on balance that ‘suffering’ was too emotive and negative a 
word. I have written extensively in my reflexive journal about this; I was torn 
between wanting transparency about the topic of interest, whilst at the same 
time not wanting to cause upset through my choice of terminology. I decided 
eventually that I would concur with the Panel's wishes for the Information 
Sheets, but that I would be open and honest about the subject I am researching 
when discussing it informally with participants. This could even be an 
opportunity for data in itself, as I imagine these kinds of discussions will be 
revealing about what participants, particularly staff, think that suffering actually 
means.  
 
When I was explaining the study I readily used the word ‘suffering’ with both 
staff and patients/relatives. I did not perceive any instance of the use of the 
word itself as causing suffering. I was asked several times for clarification of 
what was meant by “non-physical needs”, to which I responded that it was a “bit 
like suffering”. The latter was more readily understood. 
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Concern 5: Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
Because the data was collected on a single site, protection of individual 
identities was essential. To protect confidentiality, alteration of some 
demographic details such as the age and gender of participants, and other 
distinguishing characteristics will be undertaken in some instances. These 
changes were made in such a way as not to impair the quality of the data.  
 
Initially I planned that the site of study and the participants would be 
unidentifiable through the use of pseudonyms and changes of demographic 
data, and avoidance of lengthy verbatim quotes. Once I began collecting data I 
realised how difficult, in reality, preservation of anonymity would be. I had 
planned to return to the ward to present my findings - I wanted to involve the 
participants in their own data, although I realised that this would only be 
possible for the staff participants, as all of the patients had died or been 
discharged by the time I was ready to return to the ward. I knew that staff 
listening to the presentation would be able to identify themselves and their 
colleagues, as well as the patients, if I were to adopt the case study approach to 
presenting the findings. I therefore had to render the findings more abstract by 
engaging in the second wave of analysis. However, it felt disingenuous to use 
the full data set in the study yet present a filtered version to the participants 
themselves, who had given freely of their time to help with the study. 
Concern 6: Informed Consent 
 
Concerns have been expressed within anthropology about the emphasis on 
informed consent within healthcare research (Corrigan 2003). This did bring 
practical difficulties, particularly in relation to members of the team who were 
not based on the ward. In these cases, I would observe them first, explaining 
my role verbally, then find myself needing to scurry after them to give the 
information sheet and obtain a signature. This impacted on my observations, as 
often valuable thoughts and feelings were shared by patients after the health 
professional had left the room, but if I had waited they may have left the ward. 
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During my first few days I felt as though the stack of information sheets and 
consent forms I was carrying around gave me some kind of credibility as a 
researcher. As I collected signed forms from the never-ending stream of 
potential participants, I was struck by how little heed people actually paid them, 
despite my insistence that they do so. I felt that they constituted some kind of 
authority to my study, an assumption that since it had been given ethical 
approval and I had the appropriate paperwork, that the study in its entirety must 
be credible. There were very few questions relating to ethical concerns; the vast 
majority related to the topic itself. Nobody refused to sign a consent form. 
 
There was an additional problem relating to the participant documentation. One 
of the core aims of the Research Ethics Committee is to ensure that there is 
transparency in relation to the study, that people can expect to know exactly 
what will happen to them, how often, when and where. Yet this is neither 
feasible nor desirable in the emergent methodology that characterises 
ethnographic research. Furthermore, the notion of informed consent was 
necessarily deceptive. I could not possibly have explained to every participant 
the full depth of the theory that underpinned the study, nor my own reflexive 
involvement, nor the phenomenological conceptual approach. At times, it was 
difficult to explain what I meant by ethnography and I often took recourse to 
simple descriptions such as “it's how we get to know about the relationships and 
practices between the different people on the ward”. These kinds of 
explanations felt lacking, but I was unable other than on a few isolated 
occasions to provide staff with any more depth. Indeed, they didn't seek it. The 
final information sheets that I used were therefore quite broad in their scope, 
and quite non-specific in their outline of what will happen. In some ways, I felt 
that they were so vague as to be relatively useless, a fact attested to by the 
number of times staff would say to me “what is it you're researching, again?” 
even when they had already signed a consent form.  
 
Although the information sheets had been developed in collaboration with a 
group of Experts by Experience, and the Research Ethics Committee had 
requested four amendments to the wording, I was left with a sense in which the 
participants were at best only partially informed about the study. In part, this 
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relates to the nature of ethnographic research itself, whereby the nature of the 
observations and the objects and aims of the study are continually evolving in 
response to the experiences in the field.  
 
In preparation for inclusion of participants who lack capacity, a process was 
outlined for identifying consultees who would be approached and asked to 
consent if they perceived that this was in accordance with what the person 
might have accepted, should they have had capacity. In practice, this was much 
more complex than anticipated. Several patients did not have visitors and it 
became necessary for members of the healthcare team who were not directly 
involved in that person's care to become consultees on their behalf. The REC 
committee had stipulated that consultees must not be involved in any way with 
the research, including as participants. However, those members of staff not 
involved in the person's care were inevitably less likely to know the patient, and 
therefore their agreement to consent felt less informed than had I been able to 
approach a member of staff currently who was currently actively involved. I 
circumnavigated this obstacle by consulting staff nurses who had cared for the 
patients on previous shifts but who were not allocated to that ‘pod’ on the day 
when I was to undertake observation.  
 
Some patients had capacity when I initially approached them but then lost this 
as they became more unwell, or because they were asleep or unconscious 
when I visited subsequently. In these cases, I based my decision about whether 
to continue to observe them on my previous relationship with them. Often, I 
asked patients as I left if they would be happy for me to return, sometimes 
asking whether there were any situations that they would not want me to 
observe. This felt as though I was avoiding straight talking but I was concerned 
that if I asked outright about observing them if they were more unwell this might 
provoke anxiety.  
 
In one instance, I obtained consent from a patient who had been admitted with 
worsening heart failure. I had also had an opportunity to discuss the project with 
her son and best friend, both of whom agreed with her decision to consent. It 
became clear that her condition was worsening and she lost consciousness. 
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Her son approached me and requested that I discontinue my observations 
‘given the circumstances’. I did so, although I was aware that I was doing this to 
lessen his distress and not because she would have necessarily been likely to 
withdraw her consent. However, given the sensitive nature of the situation I did 
not pursue this further. Nevertheless, I did obtain his consent to use the notes 
that I had acquired up to that point. 
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Appendix 3 – Staff Participants 
Pseudonym Profession Demographic info 
Nursing Staff and Support Staff 
Brett 
Nurse, qualified 4 years - has always 
worked with older people.  
Originally from Caribbean, trained in UK and has worked in various 
clinical settings. Older people’s care is his favourite. 
Rebecca Staff nurse Qualified for 6 years, worked in this setting for last 2 
Jasmine Healthcare assistant;  Wants to do her nursing training. Enjoys end of life care.  
Alvar Qualified nurse  Recently arrived from Portugal on working visa. 
Rachel Qualified nurse 
Recently qualified, currently undertaking her ‘Supporting Learning in 
Practice’ module to allow her to mentor student nurses 
Edith Dietary assistant.  
Used to be a healthcare assistant, new role was created to support 
patients at mealtimes. If patients are not able, Edith is responsible for 
ordering meals, coordinating assistance with eating 
Liz Matron.  Has responsibility for several wards across two hospital sites. 
Sue Ward sister 
Worked here for 11 years, feels like the Francis Report has changed 
things for the worse. Hopes to be able to take early retirement 
Hannah Newly qualified staff nurse Wants to work in acute care but hasn’t made mind up yet, thinks older 
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peoples care is a good foundation as it gives you a “bit of everything” 
Kirsty Staff nurse Qualified for three years and has worked on same ward since qualifying 
Pam Staff nurse, qualified for 36 years.  
Has always lived in this area but has seen changes in the local 
community. Thinks people’s health is getting worse, not better 
Mercy Agency nurse,  
Originally from Namibia but has lived in UK for ten years. Devout 
Christian. 
Claire First year student nurse,  Lives locally with parents, wants to work in A&E when qualified 
Sonia Healthcare assistant, 48,  
Originally from Pakistan but she moved to UK to marry twenty years ago. 
Thinks old people should be cared for at home and that it is sad when 
they are in hospital 
Becky Staff nurse, 32, qualified 6 years.  Used to be a policewoman. Grew up in local area 
Keely Healthcare assistant, 
Grew up in local area. Used to work on gastroenterology but found it too 
stressful 
Cheryl Qualified nurse 
Mostly works right shifts because it fits in with her ‘other job’ as a 
grandmother. Keen to retire.  
Eve Healthcare assistant Wants to do her nurse training one day 
Sue 
Discharge coordinator  
 
New band 4 post. Previously had worked as Healthcare Assistant on the 
ward for 6 years  
Wendy Specialist palliative care nurse Works across the hospital and takes referrals from all wards. Has 
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worked as a Macmillan Nurse for 4 years, prior to that in Oncology and 
Hospice nursing. Trained as a nurse in a large city, moved to this area 
10 years ago. 
Dot Staff nurse Describes herself as “also a poet and artist”.  
Jane Clinical Site Commander 
Works across the hospital to coordinate admissions and discharges, 
known as ‘patient flow’. Does not communicate directly with the ward - 
instead does so via the ‘Discharge Coordinator’ (DC) - each ward has its 
own DC, usually a healthcare support worker who has had additional 
training to fulfil the new role. 
Jean Domestic Assistant Has worked on this and similar wards for over thirty years.  
Helen Ward administrator 
First point of contact for visitors to the ward. Also, administrative 
responsibilities such as making up patient notes, filing and triaging calls. 
Medical Staff 
Dr Roberts Consultant in Older Person’s Medicine Has worked in the hospital for over 15 years 
Dr Frank Junior Registrar 
Currently on rotation in Older Person’s Medicine but wants to specialise 
in Gastroenterology Originally from Nigeria but never practised medicine 
there, but would like to go back one day 
Dr Burton Junior Registrar 
Grew up near London but undertaking medical training in the North of 
the UK 
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Dr Rockwood Senior Registrar 
British, from London, travelled to North to be with partner but doesn’t feel 
she “quite fits” 
Dr Ben FY1 (newly qualified doctor) 
His parents are from China but he was born in UK. Qualified in nearby 
medical school, not sure what speciality he wants to enter. 
Dr Keira FY1 (newly qualified doctor) From Malta, has lived in UK since arriving to do medical training 
Dr Basu Consultant in Older Person’s Medicine 
Originally from the Bengal area of India, has lived in UK for 22 years. He 
has worked in this hospital for 4 years. 
Dr Fischer Consultant in Older Person’s Medicine 
She has worked in the hospital for twelve years. Originally from Germany 
but trained in the UK. Involved in clinical education and link worker for 
palliative care within the hospital.  
Allied Health Professionals 
David Rehabilitation assistant:  
Supports physiotherapist (Sophie) by implementing and evaluating plan 
of care 
Sally Dietician 
Works closely with Dan (below). Assesses patients thought to be at risk 
of malnutrition  
Dan Speech and Language Therapist  
Assesses patients thought to be unable to swallow safely, advises on 
changes to diet 
Jo Social Worker  
Accepts referral from patients once ‘medically stable’ and assesses 
needs after discharge, also sees patients where there are concerns 
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about safeguarding or other social issues 
Kerry Occupational Therapist 
Accepts referrals for patients when home is planned to assess function 
and activities of living 
Kate Physiotherapist 
As above in relation to mobilising, transferring; key role in safety. Works 
across hospital and usually gets to Bluebell Ward by late morning as has 
to see ‘front end’ ward patients first to sustain patient flow (e.g. medical 
assessment ward) 
Alice Lead Clinical Site Commander Oversees ‘patient flow’ across the hospital site 
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Appendix 4 – Patient Participants 
Patient participants are listed here in the order in which they appear in the thesis 
Pseudonym Demographic and clinical information 
Vincent 84 years old with end-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, admitted to ward with infective 
exacerbation. Inpatient for 22 days, admission ended in death.  
Dot 88 years old with dementia and cancer, admitted with worsening confusion. Recently diagnosed with 
cancer and decided not for active treatment. Admitted for 11 days, discharged on ‘Fast Track’ 
package to die at home  
Sheila 77 years old with dementia, also had a pressure sore infected with MRSA, was admitted with 
worsening confusion from a residential home. Had been in the hospital for over four weeks prior to the 
fieldwork and was still an inpatient at the end. Became gradually bedbound. Discharged to a nursing 
home where she died two months later. 
Doris 72 years old, admitted for investigations of syncope (fainting). Cardiac problems diagnosed, plan is 
for home with referral to Heart Failure nurses. 
Florence 65 years old, admitted with persistent diarrhoea and dehydration, also has bilateral leg ulcers infected 
with MRSA. Diarrhoea diagnosed as E.Coli. Nursed in a side room. Issues with pain in legs. 
Eventually discharged to care home after 6-week admission. 
David 81 years old, admitted having fallen down the stairs at home and sustained multiple fractures. During 
admission became acutely unwell with a urinary tract infection from which he recovered. He was still 
an inpatient at the end of the field work as no suitable placement could be found in the community. 
Ned 90-year-old man with dementia, admitted with a severe chest infection. Initially thought to be dying but 
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responded to antibiotics. However, concerns persisted about risk of aspiration. Debates regarding 
ethics of feeding tube but he and family declined. Admission for 18 days.  
Edward 79 years old man with dementia, admitted with pneumonia which was treated with antibiotics but he 
did not respond, and his condition continued to deteriorate. He died 9 days after admission.  
Rita 94 years old with end-stage heart failure, admitted with worsening symptoms of shortness of breath. 
Improved with treatment with diuretics.  
Paul 88-year-old man with advanced dementia and a chest infection that has not improved despite 
antibiotics, steroids and oxygen. He deteriorates rapidly and dies 4 days after admission. 
Alfie 69-year-old man admitted after taking an overdose but subsequent investigations suggested no 
overdose had been taken, however he had multiple symptoms that were investigated without a clear 
diagnosis. These did not improve over the course of his 8-day admission. He self-discharged home 
against medical advice.  
Michael 72 years old, admitted from warden-controlled accommodation with a grade 4 pressure ulcer that was 
infected. Dependent on carers for everything. Investigated for possible sinus formation. Treated with 
antibiotics. Did not improve during admission. Discharged to nursing home 23 days after admission. 
Ellen 68 years old with end stage heart failure and renal failure, admitted from home with a suspected 
stroke or seizure. Investigations inconclusive. Deteriorated during admission and died 9 days after 
admission 
Bert 94 years old, admitted with chest pain and dizziness. Developed delirium whilst an inpatient. 
Discharged to care home 18 days after admission. 
Lilian 85 years old, admitted via A&E from nursing home with delirium against a background of dementia. 
Develops numerous problems during admission – still an inpatient when fieldwork finished but had 
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deteriorated significantly. Questions over whether could go back to same nursing home  
Roland 84-year-old man admitted from a care home for investigation of falls. Admission lasted 16 days, no 
conclusive diagnosis identified.  
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Appendix 5 – Patient Participants mapped 
to themes of suffering 
 
Figure 17: Themes of suffering 
 
CHAPTER 6
Vincent
Rita
Alfie
Michael
Florence
Chapter 7
Roland
Dot
Bert
Sheila
Ellen
Lilian
loss of independence choicelessness
uncertainty
Vulnerability
grief
Alienation
loss of hope
Disempowerment
Boredom 
body
self
others
Resignation
Agitation
Loneliness
Disorientation
Indignity
fear
Depersonalisation
Loss of meaning
loss of dignity
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Appendix 6 – Sample Observational Chart  
(adapted from Roller and Lavrakas 2015) 
Appendix 7 – Research Outputs 
Area of 
observation 
Outside sluice in corridor 
  
Who?  1 staff nurse, 1 agency nurse and a student physio 
Behaviour / 
demeanour 
Casual, laughing 
Conversation Nurses are talking about how some of the physiotherapists come and get 
them if a patient needs the loo while they are reviewing them 
Verbatim 
comments  
“too posh to wipe up crap” 
Context The student physio is new on the ward 
Person 
characteristics 
Comfortable and at ease with one another, all in uniform. Staff nurse 
seems “in charge” – wearing lots of coloured badges on her uniform and 
a rainbow clip in her hair. Smiling but formidable.  
 
General mood Relaxed 
 
Other areas of 
observation 
The corridor is busy – it’s lunchtime and the trolley is being trundled on 
to the ward 
 
Sensory notes 
(smells, sights, 
sounds etc.)  
Behind them the sluice machine is making noise and the sounds and 
smells of lunchtime are happening. There are several beeps – patients 
needing the toilet. The other nurses are busy.  
Reflexive notes Are the nurses making sure the student physio knows “the rules” (in 
their book)?  
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Conference Presentations  
Middleton-Green, L (2015) Breaking down the walls, Royal College of Nursing 
Research Conference, London 
Middleton-Green, L (2015) Suffering in peripheral vision, Ethnography and 
Health, London School of Tropical and Hygiene Medicine 
Middleton-Green, L (2015) “Making a drama out of a question mark”: findings 
from an ethnography. Allied Health Professionals End-of-Life Care Conference, 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust 
Capstick, A and Middleton-Green, L (2016) Breaking Repression, Everyday 
Ethics, Royal College of Nursing, London 
Middleton-Green, L (2015) Connecting the World: Twitter in end-of-life care 
practice, education and research, Marie Curie / Royal Society of Medicine 
Research Conference, RSM, London 
Middleton-Green, L and Russell, S (2015) Relational Conversations, Hospice UK 
Conference, Liverpool  
Middleton-Green, L (2016) Adapting sensory ethnography to research patient 
experience, Palliative Care Congress, Liverpool 
Middleton-Green, L (2016) “Will you tell me how I am?” End of Life Care in 
Dementia, Yorkshire & Humber Acute Dementia Champions, Wakefield 
 
Posters 
Middleton-Green, L (2016) “But I’m Not a Doctor”: choice and non-choice in 
conversations about cardiopulmonary resuscitation, Palliative Care Congress, 
Harrogate 
 
Blog 
Reflections on Compassion in End of Life Care 
https://lmiddletongreen.wordpress.com/ 
 
Books 
Middleton-Green et al (2016) End of Life Care in Dementia, London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishing  
Green, L and Spencer, S (2017) Change Management in Palliative Care, in press 
